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Vulnerability in the Arctic in the Context of Climate Change and Uncertainty

By | Article
May 2, 2023
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Reindeer pasturing next to gas extraction machinery

The encounter between traditional lifestyles and development projects. Bovanenkovo gas field, Yamal. Photo: Bruce Forbes.

The Arctic Institute Arctic Collaboration Series 2023

Climate change affects the Arctic disproportionally. Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine furthers the burden upon already vulnerable Arctic ecosystems and its inhabitants, who are at the forefront of climate change impacts. Arctic Indigenous Peoples have resisted and maintained traditional lifestyles in harmony with nature since time immemorial, despite persistent incursions from outsiders. However, the current state of uncertainty in the region as a result of the conflict in Ukraine increases geopolitical and economic interests in the region, putting at further risk the fragile Arctic environment and Indigenous Peoples living there.

Climate change in the Arctic environment

Climate change adversely affects ecosystems and communities globally, however, its impacts are felt first and most severely in vulnerable regions worldwide. The Arctic region and communities living there are disproportionately affected by the impacts of climate change, which threatens the survival of several species and puts at risk a range of human rights of its inhabitants. For example, the milestone Inuit Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2005) to oppose United States actions contributing to climate change, for the first time, brought to the attention of a judiciary body and the international community the impacts of climate change upon the Arctic environment and how these adversely affect a range of human rights of its peoples. These rights include, for instance, the rights to life, health, culture, property, means of subsistence, among other rights of Inuit peoples.1)

Also, the accelerating climate impacts in the Arctic have largely been warned about in authoritative scientific studies. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change “Global Warming of 1.5°C” Special Report establishes that “warming greater than the global annual average is being experienced in many land regions and seasons, including two to three times higher in the Arctic.”2) More alarmingly, subsequent studies find that global warming is nearly four times faster in the Arctic than in the rest of the globe.3) There is, certainly, scientific vast consensus that the Arctic region is one of the uniquely threatened ecological and human systems in the world, along with, for example, coral reefs and mountain glaciers.4)

In this context, Indigenous communities living in the Arctic are distinctly affected by the impacts of climate change. There are approximately 4 million people living in the Arctic, among which Indigenous population represents approximately 12 percent.5) The warming of the Arctic adversely impacts its fragile ecosystems and, as a consequence, the ancestral lifestyles and knowledge of Indigenous Peoples, which are strongly integrated with the Arctic landscape. The everlasting connection of Indigenous Peoples with the land is illustrated, for example, by Sámi peoples from northern Finland, who describe this relationship as a “history book [that] tells the story of their past.”6) This connection with the land is everywhere: “Language, humans and livelihoods are tied together: livelihood helps preserve culture but both are dependent on the land and its well-being.”7) The growing impacts of climate change in the Arctic landscape thus directly affect the life and culture of its inhabitants. Among other effects, the decrease of snow cover, thawing permafrost and rapidly melting sea ice increase the accessibility to the Arctic and its resources, including minerals necessary to cover the demands for ‘green’ solution to the climate crisis, which, in turn, boosts the interest of Arctic and non-Arctic states, and extractive industries in the region (notably, from China).8)

In addition, the climate of uncertainty in the region and beyond generated by Russia’s war in Ukraine has revived the need of independence from Russian energy supplies among different actors, such as the European Union, which – in light of its ‘green’ climate policy objectives (such as achieving carbon neutrality by 2050) – have reinforced their reasons to position themselves in and look at the Arctic as supplier of resources necessary for the ‘green’ transition and energy independence from Russia. As a result, the growing accessibility to the Arctic due to climate change, in addition to the increased interest in the region and its resources exacerbated by the Russian war in Ukraine, puts Arctic ecosystems and traditional livelihoods of Indigenous Peoples, such as harvesting, fishing and hunting, at further risk. In this way, sustainable livelihoods that have been the basis of social, economic, cultural and spiritual life in the Arctic for generations become increasingly threatened, requiring climate adaptation measures which can cause (again) trauma and dispossession of land and culture. Reindeer herders in Finland, for instance, have had to incorporate several adaptation strategies in everyday herding practices as changes in the Arctic climate affect reindeer feeding patterns.9)

The Russian war in Ukraine also aggravates the climate impacts upon Indigenous Peoples’ traditional means of subsistence like herding due to the increased costs and scarcity of wheat and grains necessary for reindeers feeding, as both countries are major producers of these supplies. Besides, as one of the largest producers of these non-renewable resources, the disruption in the production and distribution of oil and gas from Russia has not only increased the costs of these and derived supplies globally, but it also raised geopolitical interest in the Arctic as a supplier of these and other resources.10) Hence, the ongoing conflict, which is colonial in nature as well, also intensifies the vulnerability of the Arctic by reviving traditional colonialist approaches to the region from diverse Arctic and non-Arctic actors.

Climate of uncertainty within the Arctic (Council)

Despite its common characterization as a remote, harsh and homogenous landscape, the Arctic is a multifaceted and varied region where a plethora of actors and complex issues, including, inter alia, historical, social, cultural, geopolitical, economic and environmental dimensions intersect at different levels. Prior to the start of Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine in February 2022, the Arctic Council was considered to have achieved relative success in maintaining cooperative relations in the region, despite high tensions in recent history, including in relation to Russian actions in Ukraine (notably, during the annexation of Crimea in 2014). This is probably due to the deliberate decision to “exclude military security issues” leading to increased interactions among state and non-state actors, such as “Arctic Indigenous Peoples as they gained more political visibility and an official voice.”11) In this vein, with the aim of coordinating and cooperating on environmental protection and development issues among Arctic states, the Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council (1996) – the Ottawa Declaration, provides for the participation of non-state actors in the Arctic Council, including Indigenous Peoples’ organizations.

The erosion of relationships with the Russian Federation within the Arctic Council following the start of the conflict in Ukraine in a context of global climate and ecological crises poses additional challenges to the already vulnerable Arctic and its (Indigenous) inhabitants, given the prominent role of the Russian Federation in the region in many respects. As the largest Arctic state in terms of area, coastline and population, including Indigenous population, the role of the Russian Federation in the Arctic – and the Arctic Council – is crucial. The fracture of relationships between the Russian Federation and the other members of the Arctic Council poses several questions on the ability of the latter to operate “business as usual” without its largest member. For instance, it is uncertain how critical legally-binding agreements, such as the Agreement on Search and Rescue in the Arctic (2011), the Agreement on Marine Oil Pollution in the Arctic (2013), and the Agreement on Enhancing Arctic Scientific Cooperation (2017) could materially operate without Russian participation. The scope of the Agreement on Search and Rescue in the Arctic, for example, would have limited significance and effectiveness if the state with the largest Arctic coastline is not involved in its implementation. Similarly, the protection of the Arctic ocean and cooperation under the Agreement on Marine Oil Pollution in the Arctic would be seriously impaired without the participation of the Russian Federation, especially, considering the numerous precedents of major oil spills and related contamination in the Arctic.12) Therefore, the climate of uncertainty in the applicability of these agreements and the future of partnerships within and outside the Arctic Council in connection with the fractured relations with Russia therein add onto the continuous vulnerability in the Arctic, which is adversely affected by climate change impacts as well as the constant threat of (neo)colonial incursions.

Although the full implications of the ongoing war on Ukraine are yet to unfold in the Arctic and beyond, it is already possible – and necessary – to reflect on the trajectories that have led to the current situation in the Arctic and ask questions touching upon the foundations of relations in the region. Independent of geopolitical turbulence, it is important to reconsider long-lasting assumptions underpinning state-led relations in the Arctic to meaningfully address current interrelated challenges, like those posed by the climate and ecological crises. Accordingly, to understand traditionally prevailing colonial approaches to the Arctic by all kinds of state and private actors, it is crucial to rethink enrooted assumptions on nature underpinning past and current human relationships with the natural world, inextricably linked, inter alia, to notions of land, authority and resources, which guided colonial and post-colonial relationships in the Arctic and elsewhere. These assumptions on nature are fundamental axes to the ongoing climate and ecological crises, which correlate to and exacerbate current geopolitical tensions that add burden to already vulnerable ecosystems and peoples, like those in the Arctic. In this vein, one could thus ask what the primary assumptions on land that underpinned the construction of authority over the Arctic and its peoples and natural resources were; and, how these prevailing assumptions on land, authority and resources have shaped current imaginaries on the Arctic and, consequently, guided its governance so far?

Tracking vulnerability in the Arctic and the development myth

While an intimate, respectful and harmonious relationship with the land is core to Indigenous Peoples’ understanding of nature, for colonizers, looking for “new” lands for expansion had a totally opposite meaning. Colonizers saw the land as an object of appropriation over which to exercise authority for its exploitation as a source of wealth. This is a central point where these two diametrically different understandings of the world collide. Indeed, the relationship with land is integral to Indigenous systems since ancestral times: “[the] natural world is referred to as ‘mother’ and features of the land are often known as places of the grandfather or grandmother. Arising from relationships to land are obligations to care for the country as one would care for oneself.”13) Conversely, the colonizers’ view of the natural world, which still prevails until our days and is facilitated by contemporary laws, is “one which is largely predicated upon an individualized connection to land as property and commodity”.14) The Arctic was not an exception to these assumptions brought with outsiders’ interventions that continue leaving its harmful footprint in the Arctic environment. As Csonka recounts:

“Colonization had an impact on the ways of life of indigenous peoples that still reverberates today. These Peoples were affected by contact with incomers at different times, different rhythms, and in different ways… The exploitation of non-renewable resources of the North, such as mining, oil, and gas, and construction of hydroelectric dams increased, generally with little regard for environmental consequences or impacts on Indigenous societies…”15)

As occurred in other colonized lands, certainly, the Arctic natural world and its peoples were subjected to outsiders’ authority who ignored and disparaged Indigenous relationships with their lands and forcefully imposed theirs through diverse means, including state laws. As a result, otherwise indivisible lands were parcelled and their peoples separated, causing widespread destruction and suffering. Thus, under the colonial scheme, the state is considered the agency with authority over land and its components, including its Indigenous inhabitants. The pervasive implications of such understanding of ‘discovered’ lands and consequential subjugation of its natural environment and peoples to the authority of a state through laws created by and for colonial state interests last until our days. The vulnerability of the Arctic environment and its Indigenous Peoples is thus, at least to a great extent, the result of this colonial past and neocolonial present. As Evans reflects: “Colonialism touches nearly every aspect of the Arctic… [One] cannot understand the Arctic without first acknowledging the colonial realities of its past and present.”16)

One of the long-lasting implications of the Arctic (and global) history of colonization, intertwined with the ongoing climate and ecological crises, is the utilitarian assumption of nature as a depository of ‘resources’ to be exploited to satisfy human needs oriented to unlimited economic growth. This predominant understanding of nature implanted during the colonial enterprise has been materialized across the Arctic (and globally) through development projects, often causing harm to Arctic ecosystems and its Indigenous Peoples. Persisting in pursuing an agenda of economic development at all cost, even in its refurbished ‘sustainable’ version will only continue and accelerate the effects of the climate and ecological crises that are leading the world and, in particular, vulnerable ecosystems like the Arctic to collapse.

Yet, despite the Arctic being at the forefront of increasingly severe and frequent impacts of climate change, state-led Arctic governance – where the centers of state control are not in the Arctic, but far from it, in states’ capitals – does not reflect the urgent need of changing the current development path. This should not be surprising since, for instance, the Arctic Council is explicitly committed to sustainable development goals, which provide the opportunity to continue pursuing an economic growth-oriented development agenda by accomplishing delusive sustainability standards. The Declaration of Ottawa, “affirms [the] commitment to sustainable development in the Arctic region, including economic and social development.” However, it is unclear how a sustainable Arctic is possible through the pernicious exploitation of its fragile environment in the name of development. In fact, the Declaration contradicts itself by affirming its commitment “to the protection of the Arctic environment, including the health of Arctic ecosystems, maintenance of biodiversity in the Arctic region and conservation and sustainable use of natural resources.” Yet, in the context of the global climate emergency, it is unclear how exploitation of natural resources in the Arctic could be done in a sustainable way. In this sense, the Declaration – and policies oriented to achieve development goals through ‘sustainable’ use of natural resources – is feeding a fallacy. As Finger clearly points out:

“Resources extraction is overall predatory in nature; that is, it is not sustainable in itself and it does not sustain local communities and their economies. This will not be different in the Arctic… [The] very nature of the extractive Arctic industries will not allow for sustainable development of the Arctic and its communities. In other words, the sustainable development of the Arctic thanks to resources extraction is illusionary.”17)

Arctic Indigenous Peoples have always been aware of the impossibility of seeing nature as a unity from which all forms of life, including human life, proceed and depend on; and, at the same time, seeing it as an object of exploitation for the use of its “resources.” (Neo) Colonizers did not, and do not, understand Indigenous Peoples’ lifestyles strongly connected with nature and, rather, violently imposed theirs through states’ authority, causing suffering and rights violations.18) This perpetual clash between state authority and Indigenous Peoples on a fundamental understanding of the natural world – where the first is posited at the center of decision-making power on the use of lands and the latter at the periphery – is what will likely continue determining the future of the Arctic. The search for and exploitation of resources in the Arctic will likely only grow, along with the demand of Arctic minerals necessary for the ‘green’ global transformation, and the increased accessibility to the Arctic due to the melting of Arctic sea ice and permafrost, which, in turn, triggers added global interest in the region.19)

Conclusion

The erosion of relations between the Russian Federation and Western Arctic states within the Arctic Council following the start of Russias’ full-scale war on Ukraine exacerbates vulnerability in the region. The prominent role in the Arctic of the Russian Federation in many respects, as well as its strategic position as the home of one of the two most important state-owned enterprises (Gazprom) and other oil and gas producers operating in the Arctic, make any configuration of Arctic governance hard to envisage without its largest partner. The suspension of activities within the Arctic Council following the start of Russia’s war in Ukraine furthers the threat upon vulnerable Arctic ecosystems and peoples. Russia’s war activities contribute to the impending state-led race to the North in search of Arctic resources that ensure not only economically attractive development projects, but also independence from the Russian Federation to cover energy, fuel, and other needs. It also reveals persistent misassumptions on nature and neglection of Indigenous Peoples’ relationship to it, which could meaningfully contribute to addressing the climate crisis. In a vulnerable Arctic (Council) convoluted with uncertainty, one should thus ask whether traditional states’ apparatus – embracing colonial assumptions on nature – is still the ideal actor to lead much needed far-reaching climate actions, where the preservation of (Arctic) ecosystems and its peoples prevail.

Marlene Payva Almonte is a Senior Researcher at the Northern Institute of Environmental and Minority Law and Minorities at the Arctic Centre, University of Lapland, Finland.

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