Sweden's Strategic Shift: Navigating NATO Membership and the Path Forward
The Swedish flag in a conference room at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. Photo: NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
In a pivotal moment in its modern history, Sweden made a decisive shift in its defense posture by opting to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Fueled by a deep-rooted sense of realism and faced with a new sets of geopolitical realities and strategic imperatives, including uncertainty over the United States long term commitment to the security of Eurozone, the ongoing Sino-American rivalry, and Russia’s growing assertiveness,1) this landmark decision has marked a departure from the Nordic nation’s longstanding, and indeed long cherished, tradition of military non-alignment.
Starting with the Russian assault on Georgia’s sovereignty in 2008, a slow yet earnest attempt at reevaluating Sweden’s defensive capabilities began to unfold in 2009 which gained further potency in 2014 when Moscow annexed Crimea. By 2015, Stockholm had already initiated a shift in its security policy and started to prioritize national defense with the stated aim of both providing and receiving military assistance in the event of an attack on an EU or a Nordic country. However, Sweden’s national resources were found inadequate due to the drastic cuts in defense spending during the 1990s and early 2000s, and the absence of reliable multilateral defense arrangements posed significant vulnerabilities;2) an assessment that solidified into conviction after what some local analysts refer to as “Russia’s imperial war in Ukraine.”3)
It is thus evident that the catalyst for Sweden’s move towards NATO was multifaceted ranging from an undeniable strategic vulnerability in the absence of any security guarantee akin to NATO’s Article Five to a normative affinity that has its root in Sweden’s historical and ideological ties with the Western democratic community.4) Yet, there seems to be a consensus amongst policy watchers that it was Finland’s pivotal decision to join NATO which ultimately swayed the government to pursue membership.5) Notwithstanding the initial hesitancy within the ruling Social Democratic Party, which had historically stood for non-alignment, Helsinki’s decision convinced the Swedish government that continued neutrality no longer ensured security in the face of escalating regional and global tensions and evolving security threats. It must be noted, however, that the official assessment of the membership’s impact on Sweden’s image on the global stage as “negligible” also played a role in tilting the balance of judgment in favor of NATO.6)
The perks of Swedish NATO membership
The affiliation between Sweden and NATO yields various benefits for both parties.
Membership in NATO serves as a deterrent against potential adversaries, making it more costly for them to contemplate any aggression against Sweden.7) This deterrence effect, while mainly supported by treaty obligations outlined in Article Five, is also reinforced by additional factors. By being part of NATO, Sweden gains access to collaborative opportunities for developing advanced military capabilities at a reduced cost.8) This potential advancement in the techno-military sphere not only enhances Sweden’s defense capabilities but also strengthens its overall presence and deterrence capacity in the Arctic and the Baltic regions and thus contributes to further strengthening its sense of national security.
Furthermore, NATO membership removes institutional and legislative obstacles thereby allowing Sweden to enhance its existing initiatives and agreements with other NATO members. For instance, cooperation among NORDEFCO states could see significant improvement including, but certainly not limited to, a less cumbersome integration of defense and logistical systems on the Scandinavian Peninsula.9) Stated differently, with Sweden and Finland integrated into NATO, barriers complicating military planning, information sharing, and free movement of troops and assets among Nordic neighbors can be overcome; a development that can be a boon for advancing the NORDEFCO’s Vision 2025 objectives.
Moreover, Sweden’s strategic significance in the Arctic, characterized by its key assets like Europe’s largest iron ore mining site, fast growing number of data centers, and the EU’s primary space center, highlights the importance of ensuring stability and security in the region.10) Strengthening capabilities for early detection and deterrence of potential hostile actions will therefore become essential for maintaining sociopolitical stability and economic growth in the country’s most northerly regions. While NATO membership may not entirely address the full spectrum of Sweden’s strategic vulnerabilities in the North, or elsewhere for that matter, it would nonetheless significantly discourage hostile intentions towards Sweden and hence make a tangible contribution to the overall improvement of regional security and stability; a prospect that would certainly help the government to lock in foreign investors long term commitment to the growth of Sweden’s strategic industries.
In the same vein, being in NATO would enable Stockholm to better withstand and respond to Russia’s hybrid threats and/or scrutinize China’s investment initiatives in and around its neighborhood in close cooperation with its Baltic and Nordic partners; a possibility that is certainly not lost on the mind of Sweden’s strategic thinkers.11)
Likewise, NATO as a whole stands to derive certain mission critical advantages by having Sweden in its fold. On the tactical side of the equation, seven out of eight Arctic countries and all the Baltic states are now within the NATO framework; a reality that facilitates the emergence of a unified approach to establishing tactical commands for Arctic operations and bolstering Baltic air policing missions.12) In the Arctic in particular, Finnish and Swedish membership is likely to pave the way for a potentially revitalized Nordic Air Force, boasting improved defense capabilities through the collaborative Nordic Air Power Concept.13) By leveraging the collective strength of Nordic nations, this concept could significantly enhance the alliance’s aerial defense posture.
In the same fashion, Sweden’s strategic maritime position, characterized by its extensive coastline and numerous islands, offers NATO distinct advantages in controlling and navigating the Baltic Sea. The Swedish Navy’s proficiency in operating within the Baltic’s challenging environments adds a critical dimension to NATO’s maritime strategy enhancing its capacity to monitor and counter any adversarial attempts to disrupt maritime traffic thereby fortifying maritime security in the region.14) In other words, Sweden’s accession effectively extends NATO’s defensive reach closer to Russian borders, increases deterrence against potential aggressions, and constrains Russia’s ability to challenge NATO maritime operations in the Baltic. Additionally, Sweden’s geographical location facilitates quicker and unrestricted reinforcement routes to Norway and Finland, while also extending NATO’s missile range to strategic locations within Russia, such as Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg.15) These factors add an extra, and indeed critical, layer of deterrence against potential threats that could emanate from Russia.
Last but certainly not least, Sweden’s total defense approach to national security presents a compelling model that other NATO members could consider adopting or adapting to enhance their own defense capabilities. Encompassing all aspects of national security, including military readiness, civilian preparedness, and societal resilience, this holistic approach engages multiple sectors and the entire population in defense preparedness.16) The benefits of such an approach are clear cut especially in the context of hybrid and informational warfare and rising cyber threats which can only be effectively responded to by expanding both societal and infrastructural resiliency. Whether or not the Alliance or its individual member states will opt to replicate the Swedish model is an open ended question, and that trying to answer it would at best be an open ended guesswork. However, it seems certain that many will look favorably upon Sweden’s Psychological Defence Agency and its work in pre-bunking mis and dis information.17)
On the other hand, two points tend to stand out on the strategic end of the scale. Firstly, Sweden’s accession is likely to enable the Organization to adopt a common threat assessment of security risks which in turn would pave the way for a swifter military response to defend the Arctic and Baltic territories against any aggression if and when needed. This is of paramount importance in the Arctic given that there has already been a noticeable rise in both military and commercial activities in the region; a pattern that is set to keep on rising given the region’s vast untapped resources and its potential as a maritime shortcut between Europe and Asia.
Equally important, the ability to develop common threat assessment is considered vital given the likelihood of a future Russian-led attempt at closer strategic engagement with its non Arctic partners, including China, in the Arctic should its current regional isolation remain in place in the near future; a likely scenario given the current stalemate of the Arctic Council and Moscow’s removal of all mention of the Council in its Arctic strategy and greater emphasis on bilateral cooperation ever since the closure of its Council chairmanship last year.18) Keen to avoid marginalization and exploit the economic benefits of an opening Arctic, Kremlin might forgo its previous wariness of Beijing’s Arctic ambitions and instead seek to forge closer strategic cooperation with it not least because both are heavily interested economic potentials of developing the Northern Sea Route and streamlining resource extraction in the Russian Arctic territories.19)
The second strategic advantage is tied to Stockholm’s willingness to work with, and perhaps even lead, the Nordic and Baltic states to further synchronize their defense and security cooperation by putting in place comprehensive defense preparedness plans that include tackling hybrid threats, increasing societal resiliency and integrating defense planning in the framework of NB8. Already, influential voices in the Swedish defense and security circles are calling for accelerated and deeper cooperation amongst the NB8 member states asserting that such endeavors are a prerequisite for a better and more meaningful contribution to, and cooperation with, both NATO and the EU in countering not only Russian but also Chinese threats.20)
Accordingly, the first step is to develop a detailed understanding of the current security environment that takes into account the concerns of all parties and goes beyond the politico-military level by encompassing civil society actors as well. The goal, it follows, must be to improve “the security culture”21) across all the Nordic and Baltic states especially in dealing with the complexity of hybrid threats. As of now, this is just a proposal and/or work in progress albeit a welcomed one. Should it come to fruition, suggests a Swedish-led approach to burden sharing which could make a contribution, albeit small, to easing the United States’ defense responsibilities in Europe; a prospect that might appease frustrations with regard to the U.S. outsized contribution to European security that are prevalent in certain American policy circles.
Not all a rosy road
On the balance, there ought to be no doubt that Sweden’s NATO membership improves the overall level of security in the Euro Atlantic zone, and hence it is a welcomed development for both Sweden and NATO. Still, the road ahead is a bumpy one, and there are a number of challenges which need to be addressed while Sweden makes adjustments to its force structure and makes it compatible with that of NATO.
To fully leverage its NATO membership, influence debates and policymaking within the Alliance, and alleviate existing public anxieties regarding NATO membership, improving both officials and the broader public’s understanding of NATO’s inner workings constitutes a critical prerequisite for the Swedish state.22) Currently, domestic discussions on NATO are predominantly framed in militaristic terms with little recognition of NATO’s political role. This overlooks the political implications of NATO membership for Sweden and its foreign policy interests. In essence, there is a knowledge gap among Swedish officials and the public concerning the political nature of NATO, which must be addressed so Stockholm can begin to align its membership with its national interests effectively.
NATO, while primarily a military alliance, is also a political endeavor where members project their national ambitions and interests. Events within NATO can influence the bilateral relations of its member states beyond the NATO framework.23) This political aspect is particularly evident in the negotiations that shape the organization’s strategic concept; an agenda setting process which sets out the future direction of NATO. The fierce debates that take place amongst allies are nothing short of political processes that deconstruct and construct the Alliance’s identity and priorities without undermining its main characteristic as a collective defense entity. Hence, understanding and appreciating NATO as a political project aimed at fostering collective defense is essential for having a voice in NATO, justifying contributions to its missions outside the Euro Atlantic zone, and addressing public concerns about certain aspects of NATO’s strategy, such as the role of nuclear weapons.
It would also be shortsighted to ignore the unpopularity of Sweden’s NATO membership among certain segments of the political class and electorate. Left-leaning entities and parties have expressed opposition due to the role of nuclear weapons in NATO’s deterrence strategy,24) concerns over diverting public funds from welfare to NATO missions,25) and obligations to support the defense and security of less democratic members of the Alliance.26) Such concerns were highlighted in a report by the Swedish Scientists against Nuclear Weapons on the eve of the annual security conference in Sälen.27) If these grievances remain unaddressed, these groups could become prime targets for hybrid tactics and misinformation campaigns, especially if Swedish membership requires armed forces’ participation in controversial campaigns that could be deemed as controversial and/or hegemonist endeavors at the behest of NATO’s more powerful members.
Furthermore, some analysts have expressed concerns that new allies might complicate NATO’s balance between collective defense and dialogue with Russia.28) Questions arise whether these new allies, despite their political commitment and defense capabilities, “carry luggage that could corrode NATO’s legacy of defense first.”29) Analysts like Rynning speculate about an inherent, though contested, inclination within Finland and Sweden towards a “dialogue first” policy for continental stability and solidarity. Sweden’s situation is considered to be particularly intriguing due to its two centuries long history of nonalignment alongside its strong defense industrial interests. These interests might hinder Nordic defense cooperation especially that Sweden’s Nordic neighbors have traditionally favored American over Swedish military equipment. However, it should be noted that there is no publicly available evidence suggesting such scenarios will materialize in the medium term.
In addition to the complexities of decision-making, there have also been warnings about a potential Nordic competition for status within NATO; one that would echo the soft competition observed among Nordic states within the EU. Once again, it is important to state from the outset that the likelihood of such a development remains low for now. Acknowledging Denmark’s positive stance on NATO’s northern enlargement, for example, Søby argues that the accession of Finland and Sweden introduces new options and challenges for Danish defense and security policy. At the NATO, the contributions of individual allies are crucial in determining their status, with military capabilities being the primary determinant.30) However, “intangible factors” also play a significant role.
Unlike Denmark, where the bulk of military preparedness have, until very recently, been concentrated on the conduct of stabilization operations in the Global South, Finland and Sweden are perceived as bringing valuable new experience and knowledge about Russia, thereby entering NATO with considerable prestige. Consequently, their membership is seen as leading to a relative diminishment of Denmark’s status.31) As a result, and due to their perceived similarities, the possibility of a limited intra-Nordic competition for status and influence at the NATO cannot be ruled out. This means that the assumed Nordic unity represents a double edged sword whereby it can both facilitate and hinder cooperation amongst the Nordic nations. faced with such eventuality, it is prudent for the Nordic countries and NATO command to begin work on the articulation of a series of steps or initiatives to collectively navigate this paradox.32)
Conclusion
Diverging from its centuries-old stance of neutrality, Sweden’s accession to NATO signifies a profound transformation in its foreign and security policy landscape. This shift, while reflective of changing global dynamics and heightened regional tensions, particularly concerning Russia’s military assertiveness, marks a pivotal moment not just for Sweden but for the entire Nordic region.33) For the first time, the Scandinavian Peninsula unites under a single defense; one that is aimed at enhancing their collective security against potential threats. This unified stance within NATO not only strengthens Sweden’s position on the global stage but also fortifies the security architecture of the broader Arctic and Baltic regions.
However, Sweden’s integration into NATO is not without its challenges. The nation’s historical path may pose hurdles in fully harmonizing with the alliance’s existing members, particularly with neighbors bearing different historical scars. Additionally, Sweden may grapple with internal and external perceptions related to NATO engagements, especially in contexts that evoke the colonial legacies or aggressive foreign policies of some member states. As Sweden navigates its early years within NATO, thus, the task ahead is multifaceted. It involves not only adapting to a new collective defense paradigm but also reconciling its historical identity with its present and future roles on the international stage. The journey is complex, but the strategic recalibration towards enhanced security and cooperation could ultimately serve the long-term interests of Sweden and its Nordic counterparts by ensuring peace and stability in an increasingly unpredictable global environment. In a sense then, joining the Alliance was the easy part. Making good use of it will be the difficult part, requiring statesmanship and foresight.
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