Sweden’s New Arctic Strategy: Change and Continuity in the Face of Rising Global Uncertainty

Arctic environment ministers met in the world-famous ice hotel in Jukkasjärvi (Sweden) on 5-6 February 2013 for a meeting focused on actions to address the rapid environmental changes in the Arctic. Photo: GRID-Arendal

Announcing the release of her country’s latest Arctic Strategy during a press conference on September 29th, 2020, Swedish Foreing Minister, Ann Linde highlighted the region’s increased strategic importance and proclaimed that the new document reflects this changed status.¹⁾Government of Sweden. 2020. “Strategi för den arktiska regionen”. Available from: https://data.riksdagen.se/fil/9FFD538C-85BE-4269-92A1-ED2AB5C7626A

It is indeed a marked improvement over the country’s previous strategic dossier on the region.²⁾Government of Sweden. 2011. “Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic region”. Available from: https://www.government.se/international-development-cooperation-strategies/2011/10/swedens-strategy-for-the-arctic-region/ While affirming Stockholm’s commitment to its longstanding defence and security ties with the United States, the new document also highlights the importance of Germany, Canada, and, most importantly, the EU, as strategic partners for Stockholm and the pursuit of its interests in the Arctic. Above all, what is unique about the new policy document is the creative use of both human and national/state concepts of security. This complementary mix signals a much welcomed, yet imperfect, evolution in the country’s strategic thinking about the Arctic. It also demonstrates a more sophisticated approach to its role as an Arctic, Nordic, and European democracy.

The Strategic Continuities

The document represents continuity because the cornerstone of Stockholm’s Arctic strategy still revolves around its well-known concerns with respect to climate change and its dramatic effects on the social, political and economic dynamics of the region. In other words, and similar to the 2011 document, the environmental changes taking place in, and simultaneously shaping, the Arctic, are still identified as the root cause of all Arctic opportunities and challenges.

Whether it is increased military and commercial activities, the urgent need for increased resiliency of local communities, infrastructural development, or buttressing of legal and institutional frameworks for crisis and dispute management, the view from Stockholm is that most of these issues would have not been as dominating as they are today had it not been for rapid and accelerating environmental changes around the globe.³⁾Government of Sweden. 2020. “Strategi för den arktiska regionen”. Available from: https://data.riksdagen.se/fil/9FFD538C-85BE-4269-92A1-ED2AB5C7626A

To this end, it is not surprising that a strong emphasis is placed on the need for sustainable economic development, empowerment of local actors as “equal” partners in decision making processes at the national and regional levels, and a more robust multinational agenda for scientific cooperation and collaboration between Arctic states, as well as their non-Arctic counterparts in Asia and Europe.⁴⁾Government of Sweden. 2020. “Strategi för den arktiska regionen”. Available from: https://data.riksdagen.se/fil/9FFD538C-85BE-4269-92A1-ED2AB5C7626A Mostly inspired by the human security paradigm, these initiatives trace their origins back to 2011 and thus represent an extension of past policy prescriptions; that is, they have been given more depth and character.

Of particular interest are:

• The drive to promote gender equality amongst indigenous groups,
• An unequivocal admission to the mistreatment of Samis in the past, 
• A sharp focus on youth development and expansion of digital infrastructure, and
• Prioritisation of environmental protection and communal wellbeing as pillars of a sustainable economic development strategy.⁵⁾Government of Sweden. 2020. “Strategi för den arktiska regionen”. Available from: https://data.riksdagen.se/fil/9FFD538C-85BE-4269-92A1-ED2AB5C7626A

A Growing Role for the European Union?

However, the new strategy also makes a clear departure from the 2011 roadmap and its goal of preserving the region as a zone of peace and stability.(Government of Sweden. 2011. “Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic region”. Available from: https://www.government.se/international-development-cooperation-strategies/2011/10/swedens-strategy-for-the-arctic-region/)) Although such characterisation has found its way into the new document as a novel objective, it is crystal clear in reading between the lines that the government has serious reservations about the materialisation of such idealistic prospects. Invoking the concept of national security, therefore, Sweden is now attaching the same level of strategic importance to its Arctic region as it does with regard to the Baltic Sea.

While the US is considered as a key partner, it is interesting to note how prominent a role has been envisioned for the EU.⁶⁾Government of Sweden. 2020. “Strategi för den arktiska regionen”. Available from: https://data.riksdagen.se/fil/9FFD538C-85BE-4269-92A1-ED2AB5C7626A This stands in sharp contrast to its previous strategy in which the EU was barely mentioned; five short sentences to be precise.(Government of Sweden. 2011. “Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic region”. Available from: https://www.government.se/international-development-cooperation-strategies/2011/10/swedens-strategy-for-the-arctic-region/)) Traditionally a reluctant advocate of the EU’s role in the Arctic,⁷⁾McCallion, M, S and Brianson, A. 2017. How to Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: Sweden, Regional Awkwardness, and the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. Journal of Baltic Studies. Vol48(4), pp. 451-464 Sweden now seems to have moved closer to Finland’s position by calling for a strong EU presence as a source of security and defence, and also as a major economic partner. In this context, expanded transport links are prioritised since they can contribute to both commercial and defensive efforts.

Nordic cooperation is also highlighted and one must expect a more intensified level of cooperation between Finland, Norway and Sweden in the Arctic. This will be especially important should the Biden Administration fail to signal a clear and unequivocal departure from the prior administration’s policies and rhetoric with respect to NATO and/or if there is not a marked improvement in the transatlantic relations within the first year of Biden presidency.

With regard to NATO in particular, it is commonly acknowledged that reduced US commitment equates to a considerably weaker NATO and that the three Nordic states seem to have already put in place a contingency plan for such a possibility by signing a trilateral defence deal in, ironically, the Arctic region of Norway.⁸⁾The Barents Observer. 2020. It is time to strengthen Nordic security, say ministers as they sign landmark defense deal. Available from https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2020/09/it-time-strengthen-nordic-security-say-ministers-they-sign-landmark-defense Canada, Germany and the UK are also specifically mentioned as possible partners.⁹⁾Government of Sweden. 2020. “Strategi för den arktiska regionen”. Available from: https://data.riksdagen.se/fil/9FFD538C-85BE-4269-92A1-ED2AB5C7626A

Reading the document in its entirety, one can detect a strong element of, for the lack of a better word, “Finlandisation” of Swedish thinking on the Arctic; one that is more geopolitical in tune and substance.

Since the issuance of its first Arctic strategy,¹⁰⁾Government of Finland. 2013. “Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region 2013”. Available from: https://vnk.fi/documents/10616/334509/Arktinen+strategia+2013+en.pdf/6b6fb723-40ec-4c17-b286-5b5910fbecf4/Arktinen+strategia+2013+en.pdf Helsinki has sought to underscore its expertise in certain industries, like shipping, and familiarity with the region’s climate and topography in order to strengthen its position and bargaining power amongst the Arctic states. Moreover, it has sought to take the lead in industries where it has a niche by investing in innovative solutions and/or products. Thanks to such efforts, it is now the leading nation in drive for autonomous shipping and autonomous maritime ecosystems.¹¹⁾See for example https://www.dimecc.com/dimecc-services/one-sea/

Stockholm seems to have taken notice of these efforts as it now seeks to highlight its own expertise in certain industries like mining. It is also going to pursue a smart investment strategy focusing on industries where it already has a global edge, such as the production of fossil free metals.¹²⁾The Barents Observer. 2020. World’s first fossil-free steelmaking starts in northern Sweden. Available from: https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/climate-crisis/2020/09/worlds-first-fossile-free-steel-plant-starts-operation-northern-sweden

Furthermore, Helsinki has been at the forefront of calls for an increased EU role in the region. In fact, it was Finland that introduced the Northern Dimension initiative in 1999; an initiative that Sweden sought to water down and upend its full implementation.¹³⁾Gebhard, C. 2013. Soft Competition: Finland, Sweden and the Northern Dimension of the European Union. Scandinavian Political Studies. Vol 36(4), pp. 365-390

Thanks to increased military and commercial activities in the region, perceived unreliability of the US under the Trump administration, uncertainty over the future direction of US Arctic policies as well as its relations with China and Russia, and a resurgent Russia, Stockholm seems to have finally begun to realise the benefits of a strong EU presence in the region via, among other things, the Northern Dimension initiative.

And the fact that Brussel has officially committed itself to adopt a more geopolitical outlook in the conduct of its external relations via its Sinatra Doctrine seem to have partially, if not fully, boosted the Swedish government confidence in the EU as a geostrategic partner in the Arctic. Sure, Stockholm has its own concerns with regard to the future of the EU and its ability to remain a coherent political block. However, it has more chances of influencing policymaking in the EU compared to its leverage over decision making processes in the US, Russia or China. To this end, it is reasonable to assume that Stockholm, alongside Finland and Denmark, will seek to shape the EU’s upcoming Arctic policy update.

The Document’s Shortcomings

On the downside, Sweden’s new strategic outlook and policy objectives in the Arctic tend to suffer from a number of shortcomings and ambiguities, of which two stand out starkly. 

First, it is not at all clear how one can increase scientific collaborations between research centres of Arctic and non-Arctic states at a time when national governments have just begun to politicise science and technology. This is certainly more true with regard to some specific fields and sectors such as space, material science, and telecommunication.

Citing national security concerns, for instance, Sweden itself has sought to substantially reduce the scope of academic exchanges and collaborations between its universities and their counterparts in China.¹⁴⁾The Local. 2005. China “suspected of spying at Swedish universities”. Available from: https://www.thelocal.se/20050509/1397-2 Citing a changed geopolitical environment, similarly, the country’s telecoms regulator (PTS) has banned Huawei from participation in the country’s 5G infrastructure while Sweden Space Corporation (SSC) – a state owned company – to no longer renew contracts with China or accept new Chinese business.¹⁵⁾Reuters. 2020. Sweden bans Huawei, ZTE from upcoming 5G networks. Available from: https://www.reuters.com/article/sweden-huawei-idINKBN2750VJ; Reuters. 2020. Exclusive: Swedish space company halts new business helping China operate satellites. Available from: https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-china-space-australia-exclusive-idUKKCN26C20A In light of these developments and as the Arctic continues its ascendance up the geopolitical ladder, Stockholm’s call for expansive and depoliticised scientific cooperation between Arctic and non-Arctic states amounts to nothing but shallow PR soundbites.

Secondly, so much emphasis has been put on the Arctic Council and yet its future relevance cannot be taken for granted. This important issue is not even mentioned in the new strategy. If one is to agree with Swedish officials’ own assessment that hard security issues are to become more prevalent in Arctic affairs,¹⁶⁾Government of Sweden. 2020. “Strategi för den arktiska regionen”. Available from: https://data.riksdagen.se/fil/9FFD538C-85BE-4269-92A1-ED2AB5C7626A establishment of an institutional setting where these issues can be openly deliberated and addressed is an inevitability.

As an official policy document, it is understandable why no explicit references are made to the future of the Arctic Council or its inability to address defence and security. Such a move could be viewed as undermining the Council. However, the point still remains that the document fails to discuss and/or suggest venues and mechanisms for addressing hard security issues in the region.

As it stands, defence and security issues are outside the Arctic Council mandate and hence it can only provide an informal venue for officials to discuss such matters. Although valuable, it is hard to know where, and under what provisions, defence and security issues can be discussed¹⁷⁾Heather Exner-Pirot, Maria Ackrén, Natalia Loukacheva, Heather Nicol, Annika E. Nilsson and Jennifer Spence. 2019. “Form and Function: The Future of the Arctic Council”. Available from: https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/form-function-future-arctic-council/.

Delegating such tasks to the UN Security Council is a non-starter, since the Security Council is dominated by non-Arctic states. The other options are to either reform the Arctic Council and expand its mandate or to establish a new forum designed to specifically address emerging security issues in the Arctic.¹⁸⁾Wiseman, M.S. 2020. “The Future of the Arctic Council” in Coates, K. S and Holroyd, C. 2020. “The Palgrave Handbook of Arctic Policy and Politics”. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan

Capitalising on its non-aligned status, Stockholm could have used its updated strategy to initiate an idea on these issues and place itself in a strong position to take the lead on such discussions when they occur. It has not and as a result it has lost a golden opportunity to shape the debate on this vital subject. While the Arctic Eight commonly view the addition of security issues to the Arctic Council’s mandate as unhelpful, none has yet to put forward a clear and well defined alternative which could enable Arctic states to engage with each other on these issues multilaterally.

Concluding Remarks

All in all, Sweden’s updated strategic dossier signals a clear departure from the country’s previous stance, which was highly idealistic and somewhat shallow, and a pivot towards a more nuanced and sober approach; one that is conscious of the evolving geopolitical trends in and around the Arctic and further afield. As such, while it rightly highlights the importance of environmental and social issues and calls for increased scientific cooperation, it no longer considers the prospect of retaining the region as a zone of peace and stability as a realistic objective. 

In other words, while Stockholm wishes to maintain the current status-quo, its efforts to strengthen old strategic partnerships, while simultaneously fostering new ones, indicate active preparations for a new era in the Arctic; one that will likely be marred with increased great power competition. Notwithstanding this awareness, the document fails to introduce new initiatives and/or mechanisms for addressing and mitigating the negative effects of climate change in local and national communities, as well as how to better manage increased commercial and strategic interests in the region multilaterally.