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Sweden’s Arctic Strategy: An Overview

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April 16, 2019
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A sunset in Arctic Sweden with a blue sky and few white clouds, snowy trees, and a snowy landscape

Sunset in Arctic Sweden. Photo: Robert Riewald

This article provides an overview of Sweden’s Arctic strategy and is in parts based on the author’s own discussions with Swedish officials. Following articles will address more specific aspects, like regional development in Sweden’s Arctic region, Sweden’s approach towards a Common EU Arctic Policy, and a Swedish Perspective on hard security in the North.

The Arctic Institute Sweden Series 2019-2020

To Sweden, the Arctic is both a matter of domestic politics and foreign policy. Any attempt at understanding Stockholm’s approach towards its own Arctic region as well as the wider Arctic, therefore, must take into account not only its foreign policy priorities but also its domestic needs and sensitivity to various social, political, environmental, and economic developments that are taking place at an accelerating rate including, among other things, the possibility of an oil leak due to an accident on the sea or at an exploration site and its potential impact on the Arctic’s fragile environment, biodiversity, and its indegenous people. Nonetheless, Sweden’s concerns with regard to the future trajectory of the region on both fronts share a large number of important similarities including effective and inclusive governance, environmental protection, peace and security, and sustainable economic growth.

This article is the first in a series of five exploring and explaining Sweden’s Arctic policy. The objective is to provide a general overview of and/or guideline on the country’s Arctic strategy as stipulated within the larger framework of its foreign and domestic policy making. Future papers will then shed light on and delve deeper into some of the more specific issues touched upon in this article. These include a survey of Swedish businesses in the Arctic and how they are contributing to the economic development of the region; Stockholm’s approach towards a common Arctic policy at the European level; a critical analysis of Sweden’s military neutrality in the High North and whether or not it can keep this position in the long run; and Stockholm’s preferred role for the Nordic Cooperation and Nordic Defence Cooperation in the Scandinavian Arctic.

Seeking Influence via Cooperation

Given its small population size of only 10 million, principled stance on neutrality, and meagre geopolitical weight on the global stage, Sweden’s foreign policy is firmly based on the principle of multilateralism and institutional cooperation with like-minded nations. To this end, it has consistently called for close cooperation with and within the EU since this is considered the surest path towards the attainment of peace, security, and stability for itself as well as its neighbours. However the problem is that the EU itself is changing and hence influencing the direction of that change is the number one priority of the Swedish foreign policy, as outlined by Sweden’s Foreign Minister: “To do this, foreign policy during this electoral period will have three priorities: the promotion of democracy, shared responsibility for peace and security, and active diplomacy”.1)

Promoting democracy and democratic causes are deemed essential because they underpin the liberal international order on which Sweden’s export-led economy is highly dependent. This has gained an added urgency since democracy is on the backseat as more and more countries retreat on their democratic progress and instead fall prey to authoritarian practices of governance more akin to what is being labelled as the “Chinese model”; that is, a closed political system combined with a state-managed market economy or authoritarian capitalism.2)

With regard to the second priority, three particular issues tend to stand out: climate change, nuclear proliferation, and de-radicalisation and prevention of terrorism. The common denominator in all three is that none can be addressed and/or contained individually and thus a high degree of both regional and international cooperation is needed in order to be able to have a realistic chance of effectively addressing them. “They must be addressed by sharing responsibility for our collective security,” the country’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Margot Wallström told the Swedish Parliament.3)

Sweden’s principle stance on foreign and security policy-making revolves around the ideals of neutrality and active cooperation in the context of a cohesive EU. “The European Union is our most important foreign policy arena. A strong and united EU is of crucial importance in a time of uncertainty around the world. We must strengthen the Common Foreign and Security Policy. We will hone the EU’s instruments, including diplomacy, military and civilian crisis interventions, and development assistance and trade”.4)

Moreover, Sweden believes that its neutrality not only serves its own security but in fact contributes to the stability of Northern Europe. With regard to its Arctic policy, however, it attaches special importance to its cooperation with Finland followed by its cooperation with the other Scandinavian and Baltic states within the Nordic Co-operation (NC) – comprising the intergovernmental Nordic Council of Ministers and the inter-parliamentary cooperation within the Nordic Council – and the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO).5) In fact, Sweden has the stated objective of encouraging more discussions and debates on Arctic-related projects and issues within the NC as stated in its 2011 and 2016 Arctic Strategy documents.6)

Relations with the US, both within the bilateral as well as the Nordic setting, are still viewed as paramount to the country’s long term security. The government remains intent to maintain and improve its strategic ties with the US. Relations with China are undergoing a revision, which will probably be on friendly terms since currently there seems to be no party in Sweden who would support a hardline approach towards Beijing, for example in form of securitising its polar silk road policy. Beijing is considered as a key source of investment and a major market for Swedish businesses and the current debate is mainly focused on finding the right balance between commercial cooperation and protection of the core Swedish values such as human rights and freedom of expression. A common Nordic approach is highly desirable but there is still a long way to go before the Scandinavian states can tailor and agree on a common approach towards China because Denmark and Norway, due to their NATO membership, have different threat perceptions compared to Sweden and Finland and also have less freedom in determining their China policies on their own.7)

Russia is viewed as a problematic neighbour both in the Arctic and the Baltic. Nevertheless, similarly to Finland, but unlike Denmark and Norway, which follow a different strategy, Sweden has adopted a more sober approach towards Moscow. While condemning its aggressive behaviour in and around the Baltic, Stockholm prefers to keep the channels of communication open realising that, for better or worse, Russia, as a neighbour, is here to stay. “We – like the EU – have contacts and dialogue with Russia and Russian society. We need to cooperate where we have common interests. We support Russian civil society and encourage stronger people-to-people contacts. The Council of the Baltic Sea States, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Arctic Council are forums in which we have concrete cooperation”.8)

Calling for a diplomatic approach towards Russia, lastly, arises from the third pillar of Sweden’s foreign policy making; that is, active diplomacy. In fact, Sweden’s recent activism in promoting and facilitating dialogue between opposing sides in the Yemen conflict or between Washington and Pyongyang are both indicators for the implementation of this pillar. As such, it ought to come as no surprise that Stockholm prefers dialogue and building bridges as the key mechanisms for conflict resolution and prevention within the Arctic Council as well. Whether it is environmental regulation or biodiversity, Sweden’s principled stance is to use the Council as a viable forum to peacefully address disagreements. At the same time, Sweden supports a reform of the Council in the form of adding new policy issues to its mandate. According to its first Arctic Strategy document, “the Council could be further energised if its mandate were broadened to include other important strategic issues such as joint security, infrastructure and social and economic development. More concrete projects and clear political initiatives should supplement the Council’s existing work. Sweden therefore wishes to strengthen the Council both institutionally and politically”.9)

Climate Change

Traumatised by the last summer’s fire in its Arctic region, environmentally conscious Sweden has put in place a comprehensive approach towards climate change in general and the Arctic in particular. Stockholm’s approach has economic, security, scientific, and soft power aspects to it. As such, it is concerned with both the ways in which atmospheric changes could affect the region’s ecosystem and the locals’ lives and how to mitigate negative effects and benefit from changing conditions.

Sweden will work within the EU in order to call for and implement measures to substantially reduce global emissions of greenhouse gases. Not only do such undertakings and being seen as a leader in the fight against climate change add to its arsenal of soft power; it would also open a new market for its businesses as they take the lead on this fight at home. Envac’s – a waste collecting company – rapid expansion in India is a case in point. In June 2017, therefore, Sweden introduced its most ambitious climate policy framework to date, which sets the goal to have zero greenhouse gas emissions by 204510) The overall objective is to provide a degree of order and continuity to the country’s climate policy regardless of the composition of the government while turning the country and its private sector into a leading force in the fight against climate change. As an increasing number of countries are projected to face and grapple with climate-induced crises, there is a consensus in the government that early investment in green technologies and businesses will have significant financial payoffs in the long run for Swedish businesses internationally. This supports the ideal of leading by example which is, in and by itself, an immense source of soft power.

What is more, Stockholm is determined to use the NC, the Arctic Council, and the UN in order to articulate and foster proposals for knowledge-building and knowledge-sharing with regard to probable effects of climate change on Arctic communities. From this could emerge, amongst other things, a coordinated crisis management framework to guide states’ responses when disaster strikes. Stockholm is equally keen to bank on the Arctic states’ cooperation in order to contribute to the formulation of a common environmental policy for the entire region although its politicians and diplomats do, privately, express doubt over the possibility of such an outcome because of the Trump administration’s position on climate change.

Security and Defence

The Baltic region and its stability is the main concern for defence planners in Sweden. They prefer close cooperation between Baltic and Nordic States via settings like N5+3, which includes the five Nordic states and the three Baltic Sea states, or NORDEFCO, within which Baltic cooperation is one priority as well. They tend to coordinate with the EU but, given the EU’s lack of defence and military mechanisms, such coordinations are limited in nature and scope. The US and the importance of Transatlantic relations, lastly, has not lost its appeal within the country’s defence and security circles, although there are concerns regarding the US’ long term commitment to Nordic countries’ security.

As such, it is indeed fair to say that Sweden’s strategic priority clearly and unequivocally lies in the Baltic, evident in the fact that the Arctic is rarely mentioned in relevant foreign and defence or security policy statements. The Arctic, it appears, is more seen as a collective Northern or Scandinavian policy area that is best dealt with in cooperation with the EU and NORDEFCO, whereby the former should be utilised for soft foreign policy issues while the latter is best suited for hard, security issues in tandem with the United States. To this end, Sweden, which is holding the NORDEFCO chairmanship this year,11) has prioritised the enhancement of the Nordic-Transatlantic relationship as well as the further development of the Arctic Challenge Exercise, a joint exercise between the Air Forces of Finland, Norway, and Sweden, into a recurring high intensive Air Combat Flag Level Exercise.

More specifically, Sweden prefers to work and coordinate with Finland. The two states advocate a non-confrontational approach towards Russia and hence usually agree on the most optimal ways for both dealing with and containing Moscow’s actions in both the Arctic and the Baltic regions. They are also the driving forces behind the NORDEFCO in which their bilateral cooperation on security issues is embedded in.

Initially set up with cost-effectiveness in mind, NORDEFCO has gained more importance in recent years. This is partly due to the emergence of a more aggressive, norm-defying Russia whose policies in the Baltic and the Arctic are causing unease in Stockholm and other Scandinavian capitals. Ambiguity over US commitment to European security and NATO, as well as NATO’s reluctance or inability to define a clear strategy for the Arctic, give more weight to NORDEFCO and have encouraged moves towards a more meaningful coordination of security issues . However, given their NATO membership and the fact that they have both frustrated past efforts for articulation of a unified NORDEFCO strategy, Denmark and Norway’s commitment to NORDEFCO cannot be taken for granted.

Given its geographical distance from Russia and the existence of Finland as a natural buffer zone, all in all, Sweden is not overly concerned with the possibility of a military attack on its Northern border. However, it considers Finland’s security as its own to the extent that any threat to Finnish territorial integrity is deemed as a threat to Sweden’s territory. As such, it is reasonable to suggest that Sweden’s defence planning with regard to the Arctic is more geared towards assisting Finland in case of an invasion and is thus more indirect.

Finland and Sweden have been able to develop closer security ties because the two countries not only share a distaste for a full NATO membership, but also a wider common concern and interest in the security and stability of the Baltic region. They have close commercial ties since most of the goods destined for Sweden get shipped through Finland. In addition, and more relevant to the Arctic context, Finland’s plan to become the logistical hub of the region12) through the establishment of a network of rails and tunnels has significant financial and commercial implications and benefits for Sweden. This, in and by itself, provides another incentive for Stockholm to coordinate and cooperate with Helsinki for its Arctic policy and to take an active interest in Finland’s security.

Economics and Trade

It is a matter of national security and interest for Sweden to ensure the survival of the liberal international order and its accompanying free trade practices. The government is thus adamant to play a key role in securing free trade as part of its official policy via the EU. Expectedly, it has an interest in the EU remaining a free trade block. According to the government’s own official document on Sweden’s trade strategy, “Sweden must continue to push the EU to liberalise its trade policy, reduce its customs duties, phase out its trade barriers and make trade in services and the flow of data easier. Sweden, via the EU, must also influence rest (sic!) of the world to pursue an open trade and investment policy and avoid protectionist tendencies”.13)

Given its large dependency on export, Sweden’s economy is faced with the challenge of both maintaining and expanding its global market share. To this end, the government has set itself the objective of playing a more hands-on role in promoting small- and medium-size businesses abroad as evident in the case of InnoVentum, a start-up company that offers innovative wooden towers for renewable energy, and its entry into the Philippino market. With regard to the Arctic region, there is consensus that local businesses are better placed to come up with relevant services and products, which can create jobs and prosperity and address socio-economic challenges faced by the region and its population. Some, while not all, Arctic communities have similar climatic and, albeit to a lesser extent, cultural and societal characteristics, and thus local businesses can establish a presence in other Arctic regions and states easier and more cost-effectively.

The Swedish government is directly and indirectly, by encouraging the private sector, investing heavily in the startup scene of its own Arctic region, setting up incubators like ABI, a startup incubator that only works with local startups. These efforts are further complimented by Finnish and Norwegian policies, which pursue the same priorities when it comes to the economic development of their Arctic regions. One promising area is the environment. Given its fragile ecosystem and the need for environmentally friendly practices, the hope is that Arctic-based startups might come up with unique products relevant to the region, which can then be scaled up and sold to other countries. In other words, in order to be able to survive and prosper, local companies have no option but to come up with unique ways in sync with the reality of the environment within which they operate. As such, an Arctic based company is much more likely to fabricate an innovative and environmentally friendly method of, for example, extraction than a Stockholm based company. Once they have mastered the technology, government hopes to be able to sell it to other environmentally conscious countries.

Moreover, the government is working on a strategy for new industrialisation that aims to improve the conditions for Swedish industry to become a world leader in modern industrial production. Of particular importance is the mining sector.14)

Sitting on the mineral-rich Fennoscandian shield, the mining industry is an important economic player in Sweden, contributing to the country’s economic growth as a main source of tax, employment, and indeed innovation in green technology. As a leading mining nation with clear technological advantages in terms of mining with state-of-the-art technology with minimal environmental impacts, opening of trade routes in the Arctic in conjecture with its rich mineral resources and fragile environment provides a unique opportunity for Swedish businesses to expand their market share by either winning projects in other Arctic states or selling their services and know-how to other mining operators. The likes of Atlas Copco, Sandvik, LKAB, Boliden, and Lundin Mining have been successful in creating a world class mining technology cluster and therefore have much to gain from – and contribute to the state coffers – an expansion of Arctic mining and trade.

Given the massive urbanisation process that is underway today with two thirds of the world population expected to live in urban areas within the next four decades, there is no doubt that there will be a constant demand for metals mined and extracted in an eco-friendly way. Since the vast majority of this urbanisation process is going to take place in Asia, ensuring effective and uninterrupted transport and logistical systems in the Arctic is thus of key paramount to Sweden’s economic growth, especially since the majority of its mines are located in its Arctic region. “Establishment of the majority of new mines is planned in northern Sweden where there are environments of high natural and cultural value, an active outdoor life and where the Sami have a long tradition of reindeer husbandry. It is important that the mining expansion takes place in consensus with and with respect for other industries and values so as not to weaken the region’s overall attractiveness”.15)

Indigenous People – Sami

Sweden recognised the Sami as an indigenous people in 1977 and hence they enjoy, at least on paper, special privileges and protection under Swedish law. However, prejudices are still prevalent in both the Swedish popular culture and day-to-day practices to the point that the Swedish Ombudsman against Ethnic Discrimination has admitted the persistence of racist characteristics of the Swedish Sami policy. As a result, Sweden has been the subject of frequent “international criticism for its handling of Sami questions”.16)

Swedish authorities’ interaction with the Sami dates back to the 14th century when the Crown began colonising Norrland. A process of taxation was subsequently introduced and intensified in the following centuries, as the Crown began to eye the riches of Lappmark. When the first silver deposit was discovered in Nasafjäll in the 1630s, the Swedish state tightened its hold over Sami affairs even further and embarked upon a forced assimilation process by encouraging mass migration from the south to Sami lands in the north of the country. By the 18th century, the settlers had gradually forced the Sami out and the state had begun to build churches as yet another means of forced integration, promoting its own religion at the expense of the Sami’s. Given the economic importance of the region as a main source of income for the state, the Crown favoured the settlers in terms of land ownership.17)

Current Swedish Sami policy has its roots in the outdated Reindeer Grazing Act of 1928, which “created a basis and a kind of truth for its description of who are to be considered genuine Sami”, assigning the reindeer herding Sami “a special entitlement to that industry and the right to hunt, fish and use the forest on crown land.” However, this classification institutionalised a very narrow and limited definition of who is Sami and therefore paved the ground for further discrimination by giving the state the right to define who is and who is not considered Sami and thus eligible to certain privileges. This discriminatory act is still in practice today, albeit not with the same intensity and force. In conclusion, “[T]he Sami in Sweden have hence been denied the rights that international law grants them as an indigenous people”.18)

Today, the Sami Parliament, established in 1993, lacks real political power, has no financial teeth, and thus is a weak institution compared to its counterparts in other Scandinavian countries. In fact, prominent scholars of the subject, such as Ulf Mörkenstam from Stockholm University, claim that giving the Sami of Sweden real political power has never been seriously considered by Swedish authorities and that its Parliament is a lame duck institution incapable of doing anything meaningful to ensure the political, economic, and cultural rights of the Sami.19) Given the current state of affairs as well as the long history of discrimination, it is no surprise that there is a lack of goodwill towards the Stockholm amongst the Sami, who are an integral part of Sweden’s Arctic region. As such, it seems that the Sami constitute the weakest link in Sweden’s domestic Arctic policy. The good news for Sweden is that the largest Sami population outside Sweden lives in Norway, a close ally, and that its own Sami population is immune from foreign meddling. Had Russia had a sizable Sami population of its own, it is not far-fetched to assume that Stockholm might have felt the need to address, and indeed compensate for, its past mistakes much more urgently. Still, it is in Stockholm’s best interest to strive for devising policies aimed at addressing past injustices, especially if it is to realise the full potential of its Arctic mineral resources, which will not be possible with intense opposition from the Sami.

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