Small and Non-Aligned: Sweden’s Strategic Posture in the Arctic (Part II)
Swedish Air Force Saab Gripen over RAF Fairford during the final hour of the 2018 Royal International Air Tattoo. Photo: Dave_S.
This two-part series presents an up-to-date picture of both Sweden’s national defence and security policy, and Arctic policy. In doing so, the first part contextualises foreign and defence policy-making in the country, thereby introducing readers to the fundamentals of Swedish strategic thinking and the place of the Arctic within it. Having established why the Arctic matters to Sweden, the second part explores Stockholm’s key security concerns in the region as well as the ways and means, by which it seeks to mitigate security risks and threats. It concludes by evaluating the country’s current policy initiatives and their future trajectory. The article is part of a larger series on Sweden’s role in the Arctic.
The Arctic Institute Sweden Series 2019-2020
- Sweden’s Arctic Strategy: An Overview
- Reviewing Stockholm’s Strategy for Sustainable Regional Development in the Arctic
- Small and Non-Aligned: Sweden’s Strategic Posture in the Arctic (Part I)
- Small and Non-Aligned: Sweden’s Strategic Posture in the Arctic (Part II)
- Partnership with a Healthy Dose of Distance: Sweden’s Changing Attitude towards the EU as an Arctic Player
In light of domestic, regional and global developments that were explored in Part I, the Swedish government seems to have adopted a holistic approach that strikes a complementary balance between diplomatic efforts and defensive means as it seeks to overhaul its strategic outlook and formulate optimal policy options in response. In other words, Stockholm is now seeking to attain a high degree of self-reliance via the reactivation of its tried and tested total-defence concept while simultaneously seeking to put in place a diversified portfolio of security partnerships. This in turn demonstrates both change (diversification) and continuity (total defence) in Swedish strategic decision making. Both concepts, more importantly, signify a high degree of pragmatic thinking and mistrust towards outside actors amongst the Swedish elites and policymakers.
Sweden’s new military doctrine therefore has the following cornerstones: “a credible threshold and deterrence policy, a sufficient level of readiness and availability, sustainability, cooperation with other nations, re-establishment of comprehensive (total) defence”.1)
The Baltic Sea is still seen as the main theatre of concern as it is considered to be a potential passage route for NATO and Russia. However, Swedish officials increasingly recognize the importance of the Arctic as an area which can potentially have a large impact on the North Atlantic. Sweden sits in the middle of the European Arctic region and thus occupies a particularly important location, which makes it geo-strategically important to both Russia and the US/NATO.
National Level
As a result of changing conditions in its neighbourhood, Sweden has had to downscale its international missions and increase its domestic readiness and defence spending. However, it ought to be noted that part of the rationale for increased defence spending is certainly political in that it aims at pleasing the current US administration, which has been asking for increased burden-sharing from its NATO and non-NATO allies. Since 2015, Stockholm has reoriented its national defence strategy on territorial defence and the “threshold effect”, which aims to make an invasion of Sweden too costly for an adversary.2) Still, much more needs to be done. As it stands, Sweden has enough capabilities to fend off attacks on one of its five major locations and defend itself for a week until assistance arrives. However, it would suffer immensely if it were to be attacked on two fronts simultaneously.
Bilateral
Notwithstanding its non-aligned doctrine, Sweden has established strong bilateral relations with the US, UK, Finland, Germany, EU, and NATO.
Finland
Cooperation between Finland and Sweden has been on the rise both bilaterally and within the context of the NORDEFCO. However, none of their agreements are binding and no mutual defence pact exists between the two countries. Given their membership in the EU and EU’s solidarity clause, the absence of a formal mutual defence agreement does come across as puzzling. In other words, formalization of their defence cooperation via a treaty constitutes a natural evolutionary step in the broader context of their close socio-historical ties, as well as their common institutional membership. One potential explanation lies in both countries’ sensitivities to Russia’s reaction to such an undertaking. Given their close communal and historical ties, therefore, it is very likely that they have settled for an informal agreement in order to avoid provoking Moscow.
United Kingdom
The UK has been trying to position itself as the partner of choice for the Nordic states as they attempt to establish a defence mechanism that is more regional in character, command, and control. In the aftermath of the Brexit vote, the British government is likely to be eager to carve out a more proactive foreign and defence policy, and thus it is not unreasonable to expect a more active partnership with Sweden and the other Nordic states to emerge in the coming years. This is especially the case given that the foundations for such partnerships have been in place since 2011 when the UK hosted the first Nordic-Baltic summit of Prime Ministers.3) More importantly, such cooperative arrangements would strengthen the UK’s hand in the Arctic by allowing it to play an important role in defence and security decision making concerning the Arctic.
Germany
As part of the EU’s “Pooling and Sharing” concept, Germany and Sweden launched the Ghent Initiative in 2010 with the dual objectives of persevering and enhancing “national operational capabilities – with improved effect, sustainability, interoperability and cost efficiency as a result”.4) However, some have claimed that the initiative was a direct Northern European response to the deepening defence cooperation between the UK and France.5)
United States
Cooperation with the US presents the bulwark of Sweden’s defence and security decision-making. There is a long history of wide-ranging cooperation between Stockholm and Washington including intelligence sharing, research and development (R&D), and domain training. Relations with the US are deemed so valuable that Stockholm has actively resisted calls for the establishment of a truly European defence and security force. Swedish officials fear that such a move might weaken transatlantic ties, reduce US presence in the region, and cause unease between Europe and the US.6) Since the election of Donald Trump, however, relations have worsened and Sweden, while adamant to both maintain and strengthen its current ties, is unlikely to take measures to deepen security and defence relations unless there is a noticeable change in the US’ approach and attitude toward Europe.7)
NATO
Like Finland,8) Sweden has taken a more active part in Partnership for Peace (PfP) and international exercises because of an ostensible consensus amongst local experts that Stockholm cannot remain an outsider in the event of a war or limited conflict between Russia and NATO in mainland Europe or the Arctic. This is clearly evident in the four likely scenarios of the final report of Swedish Defence Research Agency9) and the Royal Swedish Academy of War Science,10) which address challenges to the country’s total defence concept. These are: “strategic influence operations against Swedish decision making, a hybrid war against Gotland, limited military attack against southern Sweden as a prelude to Baltic invasion, and limited military attacks through Finland to northern Sweden.”
Today, there is an increased level of cooperation between Sweden and NATO that involves education, training, situational awareness, surveillance, and common use of infrastructure. Overall, cooperation is thought to be beneficial to Sweden by enabling it to implement its deterrence strategy more efficiently. This is why Stockholm has been so receptive to the further expansion of ties with NATO; an openness that is replicated by NATO which has sought to increase cooperation with both Helsinki and Stockholm through “decision-making exercises, elevated situational awareness, and host nation support (HNS) arraignments, as well as cooperation within key NATO institutions”.11) NATO has also strengthened its command structure for the Baltic Sea region and Swedish officers have an active presence in almost all of the NATO decision-making processes with regards to the Baltic Sea region.
Full membership in the Alliance, while always an option, remains a distant possibility unless there is a radical change of conditions. Sweden’s potential accession to NATO would drastically change the geopolitical and security landscape in Europe. That would only expose Sweden to Russian aggression and hence prove counterproductive to its overall goal of sustained territorial integrity. Moreover, a number of NATO member states have now backtracked on their commitments to the rule of law and democracy and hence selling the membership to the Swedish public would be close to impossible on normative and ideational grounds. Given the recent political developments in Hungary, Poland, and Turkey, put differently, NATO is no longer an alliance of democracies. Thus joining it would not only be a hard political sell but it would also contradict Sweden’s national identity; that is, a free, liberal democracy and a moral superpower. Lastly, there are economic interests at stake, and influential domestic groups such as SOFF would likely put up a fight against the full membership on behalf of their members. This is so because a full membership would have consequences for the domestic arms and weapon industry, which could lose a great deal of the market share to their American counterparts in the event of Sweden joining the Alliance.
European Union
Although Sweden has signed a solidarity declaration with its fellow EU member states, and while Trump’s anti-EU stances are providing impetus for a real push towards the establishment of a common European defence force, the prospect of Sweden contributing to such endeavour, let alone joining it, is at best slim. Given the EU’s key powers’ colonial past, Sweden has traditionally been suspicious of the EU’s drive for a European strategic autonomy. Another key concern for Stockholm is that any push toward strategic autonomy might endanger or reduce the US’ security commitments to the continent even further—a prospect that must be avoided at all costs.12)
Furthermore, there are increasing voices cautioning against taking the future unity and cohesion of the block for granted. Brexit has already set a precedent which could be taken up by some other states in the near future. Far right and nationalist parties have been making a slow and yet steady comeback in the EU member states. The Union’s response to the ongoing COVID pandemic has been dismal at best, causing the worst-hit countries, or segments of their populations, to seriously question the utility of their membership.13) Even worse, Poland and Hungary are distorting the democratic image and ideal of the Union, and there is a dangerous lack of common vision on the way forward. For instance, the EU is clueless about Russia and how to deal with it; should it maintain the status-quo or, as France prefers, seek a rapprochement at the risk of causing anger and unease in East and Central Europe.
NORDEFCO
Via the NORDEFCO setting, Sweden and its neighbours have signed agreements that allow for the development of “enhanced security policy dialogue” between the state capitals and the armed forces, both in peace and conflict, while enabling the free movements of troops and equipment across their territories. The overall objective for doing so is to achieve a high degree of military integration in the Nordic region by “exchanging air pictures and opening up each other’s bases for joint use”.14)
Sweden and the other Nordic states have also been holding larger joint military exercises involving their own troops and those of the other nations including the USA and the UK. Still, the overarching consensus amongst the experts is that we are far from a truly cooperative arrangement between the Nordic states for defence and security.15) For example, the US has been traditionally ambivalent towards the idea of a common Nordic defence organisation, worrying that such grouping might render NATO obsolete to Northern Europe and deprive its arms industry of a profitable market. In fact, it was due to the US opposition that talks on the establishment of a common Nordic Defence organisation between Norway, Sweden and Denmark failed in 1949. Similarly, the Russian government is not keen on the emergence of such organisations. Moscow fears that the Nordic states’ increased cooperation is a prelude to Sweden and Finland ascending to NATO membership.16)
Conclusion
By and large, the main assumption within the defence circles in contemporary Sweden is that any attack on the country will be part of a wider European war. To this end, Stockholm attaches great importance to its southern and, more recently, northern borders. Southern territories are highly populated and constitute the industrial heart of the country. The northern lands are home to some of the most important mining sites in Europe and yet are sparsely populated. Also, the Sami people constitute a sizable part of that population, whose long struggle for rights and sovereignty against the Swedish government might, in a worst case scenario, make them particularly prone and/or vulnerable to misinformation campaigns. As such, the northern part of Sweden could be easily overcome should there be an attack via Finland. As the Arctic continues to gain more strategic importance, Sweden seems to have begun to give serious considerations to its Northern borders, taking measures to reinforce its defences. The March 2019 Northern Wind military exercise 17) and the recent court ruling in favour of Sami land rights 18) are two important cases in point.
Looking ahead, however, there are difficult choices to be made. Although the merits of a common regional approach via NORDEFCO are, to a large extent, self-explanatory, the Nordic neighbours’ differing threat perceptions, different institutional memberships, and unresolved historical grievances tend to collectively present a formidable obstacle to its realisation. As such, and as a first step, efforts must be made to bridge perceptual gaps amongst future generations of policymakers and military officers by creating common curricula and increase collaboration and/or interaction amongst defence universities/colleges.
Besides, with the neutrality myth out in the open , Sweden is unlikely to be able to revert back to a neutrality doctrine; any such move will lack credibility. This means that Stockholm might have no option but to develop layers of partnership while building its own capabilities. The trouble is that the more Stockholm strives to secure itself, the less secure it may become. Partnerships potentially raise suspicions in Moscow – a dynamic fuelled by the two countries’ troubled history and widely divergent political systems. Given the importance of Finland to its security, moreover, Swedish decision-makers must contemplate and grapple with the so-called Finland Question; that is, they need to consider how their decisions and policies could affect Helsinki’s security.
Domestically, even if one discounts the effects of the COVID pandemic on the economy, Sweden’s biggest challenge in the coming years is to balance the need for increased defence spending with the rising cost of maintaining its world-famous welfare state in a context of rising anti-immigrant sentiment and a shrinking workforce. This could mean that the much-needed funds to revitalise the Armed Forces might not be forthcoming; a prospect that not only jeopardises Sweden’s ability to execute its total defence, but it would also distort the credibility of its solidarity plea in the eyes of its European counterparts. If Sweden lacks the means for defending itself over an extended period of time, how is it going to be able to come to the aid of its partners?
In the light of above mentioned constraints, shortcomings, and dilemmas, one could safely speculate that Sweden is most likely to bank on its geostrategic position in the years ahead by doing what it does best: promoting a geopolitical discourse that depicts its non-alignment as a win-win strategy for all the parties involved, thereby effectively paving its way to sustained peace and security. This is perhaps what the great American-Norwegian author and diplomat John Ausland had in mind when he questioned the willingness, not the ability, of Swedes to put up a fight in the face of an adversary: “The question regarding the Swedes is not so much whether they could defend their country but whether they would”.19)
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