Small and Non-Aligned: Sweden’s Strategic Posture in the Arctic (Part I)
The Riksdag is the national legislative parliament of Sweden. Photo: Christopher Chan
This two-part series presents an up-to-date picture of both Sweden’s national defence and security policy, and Arctic policy. In doing so, the first part contextualises foreign and defence policy-making in the country, thereby introducing readers to the fundamentals of Swedish strategic thinking and the place of the Arctic within it. Having established why the Arctic matters to Sweden, the second part explores Stockholm’s key security concerns in the region as well as the ways and means, by which it seeks to mitigate security risks and threats. It concludes by evaluating the country’s current policy initiatives and their future trajectory. The article is part of a larger series on Sweden’s role in the Arctic.
The Arctic Institute Sweden Series 2019-2020
- Sweden’s Arctic Strategy: An Overview
- Reviewing Stockholm’s Strategy for Sustainable Regional Development in the Arctic
- Small and Non-Aligned: Sweden’s Strategic Posture in the Arctic (Part I)
- Small and Non-Aligned: Sweden’s Strategic Posture in the Arctic (Part II)
- Partnership with a Healthy Dose of Distance: Sweden’s Changing Attitude towards the EU as an Arctic Player
Known for its neutrality during the Cold War, Sweden, the so-called “moral superpower” of the bygone era went on a rather short soul-searching journey once the infamous wall in Germany crumbled and an important historical page was turned over. Excited by the triumph of the West, political elites in the self-crowned capital of Scandinavia swiftly moved to pave the way for joining the European Union, thereby swapping one of the worst-kept secrets in the history of global affairs – neutrality – with non-alignment in 1995. Moreover, freed from the Soviet threat and unrestrained from having to consider how its actions could have an impact on Finland’s security, Sweden drastically reduced its military’s budget and size, altered its strategic and security focus from territorial defence and stability in the Baltic Sea region to domestic and regional economic development, and began to pursue a more internationalist agenda participating in the United Nations, and later EU, mandated missions abroad while reaping the economic benefits of globalisation.
Similar to other Scandinavian nations, however, a gradual, yet radical, paradigm shift has taken place since 2009. Stockholm is now in the midst of overhauling its defence and security strategies in response to a resurgent Russia, a rising China, an unreliable, erratic, and declining America, escalating incoherences and infightings within the EU, and atmospherically-induced increased activity in the Arctic. Total defence is back in the public domain, the military budget has increased, and in what appears to be a stark contrast to the Cold War era, the Arctic’s security is now considered to be on a par with that of the Baltic Sea from both defence and economic perspectives.
Foreign and Defence Policy Making in Sweden: Swedish Strategic Culture
Commonly categorised as a small state with niche capabilities, Sweden’s defence and foreign policy making (henceforth referred to as strategic decision-making) has been subjected to a fair share of theoretical diagnoses seeking to pinpoint the underlying factors which shape and/or influence its policy articulation. Of particular interest or importance, are the country’s past neutrality and contemporary non-alignment.
Two broad narratives are identifiable.1) On the one hand, there is the realist-inspired reading of Sweden’s strategic policy-making, which ties its neutrality/non-alignment to its small military and economic size, geographical location, and limited human resources. Accordingly, non-alignment and passivity are the most optimal options available to small states even though that makes them, or at least their conduct of foreign affairs, highly amoral and hypocritical, in the view of some scholars. Experts call these practices hypocritical because they “aid the stronger belligerent and profit from war” and amoral because they are blind or indifferent to the “fate of others”.2) Sweden’s tacist concessions to Nazi Germany’s invasion of Norway is a clear case in point.
On the other end of the spectrum is the constructivist-inspired account of small states which, especially when applied to cases of socioeconomically vibrant nations, refutes the realist explanation and instead claims that such states do have options and thus tend to make conscious decisions about their foreign and defence strategies/doctrines. To put it otherwise, their strategies are neither imposed nor implied by structural and/or material factors. Rather, it is their identity and their histories which guide policy-making; that is, Sweden’s past neutrality and current non-alignment is, first and foremost, a reflection of its socio-historical identity. Its material attributes come in second place.
There is a third way of analysing small states’ strategic decision making which, in essence, builds on the constructivist insights on the primary importance of identity and secondary significance of material considerations. However, it treats identities as evolving or changing entities produced via discursive struggles; that is, the identity which dominates national politics is a direct result of political battles amongst different political parties and the wider socio-political groups within a given community. This way, dominant identities become a clear indicator of power relations.3) This post-structural approach, or critical constructivism, is useful because it allows one to unpack Sweden’s journey from a neutral to a non-aligned state and identify the pillars of a country’s strategic culture based on the frequency of referral, repetition, or recurrence.
Sweden has not been involved in a conflict since 1814. Such a historically long stretch of peace and stability, in turn, has left a mark on the nation’s self-perception, allowing it to distinguish itself from its neighbours as a conflict-averse nation apt at ‘making peace not war’. However, Stockholm’s ability to maintain peace and avoid invasion is, to a considerable extent, due to its geographical location. Finland has been a useful buffer zone between Sweden and Russia, allowing the former to be a ‘protected nation’. This explains why Finland’s security has been important to Stockholm to the point that any attack on Finland is considered a direct threat to Sweden.
Moreover, it occupies a central location on the Scandinavian Peninsula, providing a direct route into mainland Europe and Russia. Aware of this, Stockholm has proved tactful in developing a geopolitical discourse that depicts its non-alignment as beneficial not only for Sweden but the overall security of both Europe and Russia.4) In other words, it has used its location as an effective bargaining card to discourage outside forces from invading its territory, threatening to tip the balance of power by siding with one camp against the other.
Sweden, furthermore, traces its identity back to an agrarian society in which cooperation for the attainment of the collective good has been inspiring public and political life for generations. This is evident in the strength of communal norms which are themselves epitomised in the dominance of social democratic norms, such as high tax rates and a strong and well functioning welfare state. Given its small population size, highly dense population centres, and its relatively vast territory, Sweden has real material interests to avoid being dragged into conflict. Population density provides an easy target for an adversary to inflict serious pain on the country’s population centres. What is more, its landscape and the centrality of bridges for connectivity are easy targets to bring socio-economic life into a standstill. By remaining non-aligned, therefore, Sweden retains a higher chance of avoiding conflict, thus ensuring a steady rate of economic growth, which is an absolute must for the perseverance of the normatively inspired Swedish way of life.
Last but certainly not least, one could also detect traces of its great power past in its current strategic formations. The most direct manifestation of this is perhaps in its habit of labelling itself as a normative superpower like “moral superpower” during the Cold War5) or “humanitarian superpower” in recent times.6) This great power status could also explain Sweden’s desire to initiate and push for the establishment of regional institutions like the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) and Nordic Council, or the development of a common Nordic approach within multinational or international settings like the EU and the UN. However, these endeavours have material underpinning, too. Reduced cost or economic efficiency, for instance, has been a widely recognised factor behind Stockholm’s drive for the establishment of NORDEFCO. Given their limited influence individually, similarly, common Nordic approaches at the UN and EU give more voice to these states and thus provide them with a better chance of influencing decision-making.
Overall, it is in the transition from being neutral to non-aligned that one can see the interplay of strategic culture, discourse, and policy formation. In the period between the fall of the Berlin Wall and Sweden’s accession into the EU, the normative pillars of Swedish strategic culture played a pivotal role in shaping public debates and policy-making. Geographical proximity to Russia, which was weak and in retreat in the 1990s, were downplayed and instead a heavier emphasis was placed on Sweden’s identity as a ‘neutral’ ‘Western’ state, which now had a chance to join a ‘Western and liberal’ block to ensure its own economic growth.
The EU was also presented as a normative power and hence joining it was compatible with Sweden’s own identity, a claim that was boosted by Finland’s membership. Neutrality, simultaneously, was equated to isolationism which could jeopardise Sweden’s economic security. This argument was further aided by the official de-mystification of neutrality as evidence of secret deals with NATO, the USA, and the UK began to be ‘leaked’ to the press. However, given the predominance of the Social Democratic norms, which stand in sharp contrast to the EU’s key states’ colonial, Catholic, and capitalist identities, neutrality was not fully abandoned. Rather, it was replaced with non-alignment.7)
The Arctic’s Growing Importance: What Are Sweden’s Key Concerns?
Although Sweden is commonly described as a reluctant Arctic state,8) the Arctic has always occupied an important place in the geostrategic thinking of Swedish officials. One can detect the trace of this in its advocacy for the non-Arctic states’ (including China’s) membership in the Arctic Council as observers. The underlying reason for such effort was to defuse an ill-intended, ill-advised effort by the five Arctic littoral states in sidelining the non-littoral ones by linking decision-making rights to geographical attributes (i.e. having a coastline). The possibility of having non-Arctic states in the Council would potentially confer a benefit in elevating the position of non-littoral states on par with their littoral counterparts.9) More recently, its decision to set a good example by addressing the Sami people’s grievances regarding land use rights is yet another indication of Stockholm’s recognition of the region’s economic and geopolitical importance.10)
Still, there can be no denying that there has been an increased interest in the Arctic in the recent past. This uptick itself is connected to the prospect of an emerging great power competition in the Arctic at a time of changing global order. Added to this is the continued melting of the Arctic ice. Given its vast resources, its unique location as a potential transit hub between Europe and Asia, its climatic suitability for the construction of vast data centres and hence its untapped potential to become a 21 century industrial and scientific heartland, and its unparalleled landscape and suitability for ecotourism, it should not be surprising that Stockholm has begun to pay more heed to its northernmost region.
Currently, Sweden faces three sets of distinct challenges in the Arctic. First, the security dynamics in the region represent a combination of both traditional and new security challenges on which Nordic states, let alone the other Arctic states or observer states, do not share a common perception.11)
Secondly, the Arctic region is now competing with the Baltic region for Sweden’s strategic attention and limited resources. Given its divergent interests and, albeit to a lower extent, threat perceptions, the adaptation of a strategy based on a division of labour logic between the Nordic states is unrealistic.12) This means that Sweden needs to have the resources and capabilities to defend its interests on two fronts at a time when its economy is set to shrink in the post-COVID pandemic era. As such, the Swedish government will have to prioritise and make calculated choices about the need for increased defence spending versus social cohesion and stability. Striking the right balance will neither be easy nor politically popular, especially as one can never rule out the possibility of unforeseen strategic shocks.
Finally, Sweden echoes the US’s concerns regarding Russia’s resurgence and budding Sino-Russian partnership in the Arctic and beyond. However, Swedish officials are also concerned about US policies and activities, as well as in-fighting within the EU and NATO, which could undermine, if not unravel, both organisations’ effectiveness and coherence.
Russia
Russia has reinvigorated its economic activities and military capabilities since the early 2000s to the point that some scholars claim that Arctic “has become a key arena for a Russia eager to sustain its status as a great power”.13)
Russia has the longest coastline amongst the Arctic states, as well as the largest population centres in the region. Its Arctic territories, furthermore, are believed to be home to the largest marine and mineral resources in the region and thus it represents a key strategic and defence arena central to Russia’s nuclear deterrence and maritime strategy. Moscow is therefore said to be pursuing two fundamental goals: to develop the Northern Sea Route as an alternative maritime route, and to develop the region’s vast energy resources so as to consolidate its dominant position in the global energy market.
To this end, Russia has reopened seven former Soviet military bases in the recent past, including the base in the New Siberian Islands, which is vital for its ability to monitor traffic and movements along the Northern Sea Route (NSR). It has also deployed new long-range surface-to-air missile systems to the Kola Peninsula and Novaya Zemlya. In doing so, Russia seems to be trying to demonstrate and/or increase its deterrence vis-a-vis the US and its NATO allies. In addition, by flexing its military muscles in the Arctic, some argue, Moscow is also sending a signal to non-aligned Sweden and Finland, as well as China, that it is serious about securing its national interests and sovereignty in the region.14) And it is in this apparent resurgence of the Russian state’s belief in its image or status as a great power, combined with its illegal and aggressive actions in Georgia and Ukraine, that one may find the root cause of Sweden’s strategic apprehension with regard to Moscow’s Arctic policy. In other words, it is not the mere revitalisation of military bases that concern policymakers in Sweden, but rather the belief system that justifies or catalyses such moves.
China
China’s interests in the Arctic can be divided into four categories.15) First, it has a stated interest in carrying out scientific research in the region, primarily in order to arrive at a better understanding of the effects of climate change in general and on China in particular. Secondly, it has an interest in Arctic shipping routes since it shortens the distance between the Chinese mainland and one of its most important trading partners, Europe, by at least 15 sailing days. Thirdly, China has an interest in the natural resources of the region including oil, gas, minerals, and fisheries. Finally, Beijing is keen on exploring tourism opportunities in the region and, more importantly, strengthening and/or consolidating its image as a constructive global and Arctic player that is proactively involved in, and contributing to, institutional developments within the region.
Given China’s recent assertiveness in global affairs, the nature of its political system, and its conduct in the South China Sea, Sweden, like many other Western nations, suspects that China could gradually adopt a more hawkish stance towards the Arctic.16) Bilateral relations between Beijing and Stockholm have recently reached a new low, leading Sweden to significantly roll back its cooperation with China in the fields of higher education, IT, telecommunication, and science and technology. It is also reviewing the role of Huawei in its future 5G network, while the county’s Defence Research Agency has urged the state to terminate its space satellite cooperation with China.17)
Overall, it seems that for Sweden, the attitude towards China has gone from neutral in 1949 to increasingly negative in 2020. This downward trajectory, itself, has less to do with China’s activities in the Arctic per se and more to do with the overall outlook of Chinese government and its political and economic practices.
United States
Finally, there are concerns with regard to the US’s commitment to the security of Europe as a whole and Sweden in particular. For example, the Trump administration’s dislike of multilateralism, the US’s pivot to Asia, and the persistent calls for financial burden-sharing have caused unease in Sweden. The US may no longer be willing to act as a reliable and credible guarantor of international security given its economic stagnation and lack of political will. Starting towards the end of the Obama presidency, politicians and policymakers in Sweden and Europe alike have taken note of the US’s inaction toward Syria and its limited, symbolic actions toward Russia in the aftermath of Crimea. In the Arctic in particular, the Trump Administration no longer shares Stockholm’s concerns with regards to the environment, while its rhetoric and policy statements are effectively undermining the legitimacy and credibility of the Arctic Council. Even worse, US officials are now, via their statements, essentially popularising the possibility of great power competition in the region, thereby diminishing the prospect for it to remain a zone of peace.
With all of the above points considered, Sweden is therefore in a position now where it has been forced to reexamine its defense and security policies and plan for the future.
References