Shifting Ice: How the Russian Invasion of Ukraine has changed Arctic Circle Governance and the Arctic Council's Path Forward
The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has become one of the most important foreign policy developments in recent history. The impact of this conflict on the Arctic Circle has forever changed the region. Photo: Annie Spratt
The Russian Federation invaded Ukraine over two years ago in a direct violation of international law. While many feared Ukraine would fall to Putin’s soldiers, the Eastern European nation has repelled offensive upon offensive by the Russians while taking back territory from the invading force. Assisted by US and Western European supplies and materials, the Ukrainians have captivated the entire world in their fight against a totalitarian force which has changed not only the entire geopolitical framework of Europe, but also affected nearly every country and continent.
Outside of Ukraine and the immediate vicinity of former Soviet satellite nations, the impact of the Russian invasion has most clearly and presently been felt in the Arctic Circle.
How the Russia-Ukraine War Has Impacted the Arctic
The Arctic Circle is of utmost importance to various nations for clear financial, political, and social reasons, the region being key to the global oil and gas industry, to scientific research, and to the fishing industry.
According to the Atlantic Council1) the Arctic Circle “provides researchers with the means to almost predict the effects of climate change through polar amplification—the phenomenon where changes to our climate tend to produce more extensive changes near the poles than the planetary average—showing what the future will hold,” holds an impressive amount of oil and natural gas, “is the perfect incubator for clean energy,” and also allows for faster shipping, which immeasurable helps international business, travel, and communications. The disruption of these programs in the wake of the Russian invasion spells trouble for the global community.
In early March of 2022, roughly fifteen days since the beginning of Russia’s invasion, the Wilson Center held an event titled “Ukraine and the Arctic: Perspectives, Impacts, and Implications”. One panelist, Dr. Michael Sfraga, the Chair of the US Arctic Research Commission and founding director of The Polar Institute, described how the Ukraine crisis has and will affect the Arctic impressively. He states, “There is a wide array of social, cultural, environmental, economic, political aspects of the Arctic that, at this moment, are feeling the tensions originating in Europe … we see how connected, interdependent, and integrated we really are”.2)
The same day this panel was held, “Seven of the Arctic Council’s eight members — all except Russia, which currently holds the council’s rotating chairmanship — have agreed to boycott future meetings … indefinitely [pausing] council proceedings on issues from climate change to Arctic oil drilling”.3) This effectively halted all kinds of work being performed in the Arctic given Russia is such a massive partner to various projects in the region.
With the conflict now drawn out for over two years with no end in sight, it is apparent now how the invasion has affected the Arctic. The Arctic Council’s determination to boycott future meetings has substantially changed the way in which governance will occur. While the removal of Russia from the Council does allow for a temporary end to “[Russian] participation in one of its few remaining soft power venues capable of meaningful international coordination”, it also means the Council “forfeit the institutional legitimacy and progress [it] has fostered” with “little utility [existing] in such an organization without Moscow”.4) This spells severe problems for the Arctic as the Council can no longer claim to be fully or wholly immune to armed geopolitical conflicts and also indicates that the Council will “lose legitimacy and goodwill and its agenda will shrink in both scope and size as future Russian statements on Arctic cooperation will likely be met with more skepticism from the other seven members than ever before”.5) In July 2022, the Arctic Council announced it would resume limited work “in projects that do not involve the participation of the Russian federation,” posing serious problems for future governance policies in the Arctic for 2023.6)
From a climate and scientific research standpoint, Russia is a key figure in “tracking changes such as permafrost degradation and methane emissions from warming landscapes,” yet this work has now been halted due to Russia’s actions in Ukraine and the international community’s desire to pressure Russia into submission. Some academics focusing on climate issues argued that “[the breakdown in relations is] significantly worse now because of the open warfare”.7)
From a military perspective, Russia has long been building up a military presence in the region, modernizing and expanding “military installations … along more than 6,000km of Arctic coastline” as well as reorganizing and updating “Russia’s fifth, military district … [serving to] protect the forces of the Northern Fleet and its nuclear deterrent,”8) while also announcing in August 2022 that it would refocus its military might on the Arctic and Nordic region. Given that Russian militarization shows no sign of stopping in the Arctic,9) this is quite concerning and poses a problem for nation-states in the European Arctic, especially for those states that are fiercely opposed to Russian action like Norway.10)
Furthermore, according to national security and defense experts at the think tank CNAS, “the Kremlin’s sense of security is most likely to be affected by the movement of any NATO infrastructure into Finland and Sweden, the increased size and complexity of NATO exercises in the region, the gathering of air forces on the Scandinavian peninsula, cross-border air exercises, enhanced intelligence collection, and the changed dynamics in the Baltic Sea, which will now be surrounded by NATO member states,” which in turn could heighten the chances “of miscalculation and escalation.”11)
Not only this, but strategically, China has become a far stronger power12) in the Arctic,13) using the power vacuum and political instability to further its economic and military goals in the region.
Overall, the Arctic remains highly vulnerable to changing geopolitical developments, and has likely never been more vulnerable in its history, considering increased global interactions with the region. In fact, the Arctic affairs have become even more vulnerable in recent months, considering Russia’s threat to leave the Arctic Council and their refusal to pay the annual contributions.14)
How the West Can Reclaim the Arctic
Allowing China to gain a further foothold in the region could lead to severe issues for the global community and for the Arctic itself. However, the end result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and how this may affect the Arctic in the immediate future of the conflict and after the conflict is over remains to be seen.
Writing for The Conversation, Mathieu Landriault and Paul Minard, political scientists at the University of Ottawa and the University of Saint-Paul, write, “it’s difficult to foresee how Arctic institutions will continue in the future given the fundamental rift between Russia and the West … [but many Arctic experts] were correctly pessimistic about Arctic Council members, including Russia, resuming co-operation by the end of September 2022,”15) with most instead seeing the most likely scenario being that Russia and the other members of the Arctic Circle be unable to resume their regular operations in the near future.
In spite of this, commentary in the Financial Times16) and Foreign Policy17) has argued that Western efforts at cooperation must be made with Russia in the Arctic. While these experts certainly do not ignore the realities of the Ukraine-Russia conflict, there appears to be a desire to disregard these events in favor of keeping the status quo that has long existed in the Arctic.
No matter the desire to see a return to normalcy or continue operations in the Arctic, while it is important to ensure continuity, it is also important to protect human rights and work against those who are continuing to engage in illegal or criminal activities with no indication or inclination to stop. By continually refusing to work with Russia in the Arctic Circle, the Arctic Council is applying pressure to the Russian Federation in coordination with the international community and the rest of the West. Certainly, the nation-states that make up the Council do realize that this lack of participation with Russia does spell issues for the Council as a whole and in terms of properly governing and regulating the region, yet they understand that what Russia is doing in Ukraine (flagrantly violating international law, indiscriminately killing Ukrainian civilians, torturing and mutilating combatants and prisoners of war, suppressing their own domestic population, and using sexual assault as a weapon of war) matters far more than the current stability of the Arctic Circle. To them, and to the vast majority of individuals, protecting human rights and stopping totalitarian regimes matters more than maintaining the status quo of a region.
Nonetheless, this is not an excuse for allowing China or other world powers that pose an additional threat to stability and apply further pressure and influence in this important region. As such, it should be an additional priority of the Arctic Council to halt Chinese incursion and consolidate Western power over the Arctic against nation-states intent on further increasing their own power to the West’s detriment.
Solutions for the Arctic of the future
The first solution to this complex situation is for the Arctic Council to disband itself and reform their organization in total, without Russia. Timo Koivurova, a research professor at the University of Lapland in Finland whose work largely focuses on the Arctic Circle, detailed in an article for the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs that, “the Arctic Council is only an intergovernmental forum—that is, it is not a formal international organization—so it is possible to continue its work by creatively applying the rules that have evolved over time in the Arctic Council”.18)
While some have argued the Ottawa Declaration (which established the Council’s authority) is legally binding, Jeremy Greenwood, a fellow at the Brookings Institution and an officer of the United States Coast Guard reasoned that, “[it] is not a binding treaty and the Rules of Procedure that govern the Council are similarly not legally-binding on any State,” meaning these “high-level agreements made in careful negotiation among the Foreign Ministers of all eight States and the representatives of the Permanent Participants”19) could be broken with the permission and consultation of the Foreign Ministers and appropriate representatives of the involved states.
As such, the Council is not bound to any legal mandate to retain its membership, so the precedent to move forward without Russia is a realistic one. However, Greenwood does argue for a different path forward, stating, “Russia should be given a clear choice: Voluntarily absent itself from the Arctic Council for the time-being or the other seven Arctic States will establish a parallel forum which will forever doom the current Arctic Council … The benefit to Russia of agreeing to this self-imposed isolation is their ability to maintain a say in Arctic Council final decisions through correspondence,” while noting the other signatory members of the Council can remove Russia of chairmanship by way of a vote. Should this not work, Greenberg continues, the Council should then “consider a new parallel body and announce with one voice their intention to carry-on the important work of the Council without Russia … [establishing] a new charter and rules of procedure, with Norway assuming the first Chairmanship”.20)
If the Council did decide to dissolve and recreate itself without Russia, this would give it the ability to continue its operations while maintaining an uncompromising mentality with Russia, in addition to having a more realistic pathway towards countering threats in the region. However, as Heather Exner-Pirot and Evan Bloom, two Senior Fellows at the Wilson center focusing on Arctic politics and governance, have pointed out, this does “mean it will be hard to muster the time and energy to push a new body forward, and its effectiveness for the Arctic region as a whole would be limited without Russian participation”.21)
Conclusion
The Arctic is an imperative region for further multinational cooperation, economic development, and scientific advancement. It is necessary for the region to be protected and defended from any kind of geopolitical upset as it is far too important and essential to many global industries. However, this balance should not be sacrificed at the cost of doing what is morally right, adhering to the values of individual nation-states and liberal democracies, and also ensuring that despotic leaders are unable to violate international law and human rights.
In continuing operations in the Arctic, it is first important that Russia be defeated in Ukraine. Through providing arms and materiel to the Ukrainian forces and government, something most of the West has already been doing,22) the global community has been able to undeniably help push back Russia while also protecting their own interests and the interests of Liberal Democratic governance. However, another way of showing global solidarity, working against the Russian Federation, and making for a safer Arctic Circle is by completely reorganizing the Arctic Council and removing Russia from activities in the forum.
The Arctic Council has already made a noble decision to continue many of its projects and forces without including Russia. While many political science and international relations experts in influential publications have argued that the Arctic Council should continue coordinating efforts and cooperate with Russia, the unclear future and complicated current geopolitical situation requires innovation and risk.
Allowing the Arctic Circle to be unprotected is not a solution, but also cooperating with a nation-state that has proven time and time again to be a threat to global security in return for an uneasy alliance in the Arctic is not a viable solution either. By removing Russia from the Arctic Council and reorganizing the entity in total, this allows for an entity that can secure the Arctic region on its own terms, in accordance with international law, and promote security and stability without having to compromise their beliefs or working with nations that violate those international norms.
Alan Cunningham is a doctoral student at the University of Birmingham’s Department of History in the United Kingdom.
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