Russia's Arctic Military Posture in the Context of the War against Ukraine
Russian military at the Arctic base Severny Klever (Northern Clover). Moscow is adjusting its Arctic military posture through adapted force projection, infrastructure development, as well as through the use of sub-threshold activities and gray zone operations. As the Kremlin is approaching Arctic security in more confrontational terms, there are heightened concerns over the risks of miscalculation and (un)intended escalation. Photo: Ministry of Defense of Russia
The Arctic Institute NATO Series 2024-2025
- NATO in the Arctic: The Arctic Institute’s NATO Series 2024-2025 (Part I)
- Russia’s Arctic Military Posture in the Context of the War against Ukraine
The full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 did not alter Russia’s Arctic military posture. If anything, Moscow’s obsessive search for complete control over the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF) has been vindicated by wider geopolitical developments. Nevertheless, Finland’s and Sweden’s accession to NATO is making Russia feel more vulnerable from a military point of view.
This self-perception of vulnerability will inform how Russia projects itself in the region, especially through low intensity warfare operations against NATO and its allies – which in turn raises the risk of miscalculation and escalation in a changing Arctic.
Posture change in the context of ‘NATO’s expansion’
From Moscow’s viewpoint, the perceived ‘enlargement’ of NATO to Finland and Sweden is fueling both a sense of vindication and vulnerability across the AZRF – geographically extending from the North Atlantic and the European High North, to North Pole approaches in the Central Arctic, to the North Pacific and the Bering Strait.
On the one hand, Russia’s self-inflicted fear of ‘encirclement’1) by the Atlantic Alliance has been validated by Finland and Sweden joining NATO. The double accession represents a fait accompli for the Kremlin, honed by a self-reinforcing propagandistic narrative that the Alliance is turning the Arctic into a ‘conflict zone’2) or that there is a ‘new Cold War’3) in the region because of Western policy.
This narrative is compounded by the recent release of the US National Strategy for the Arctic Region (NSAR) in 2022 and the US Department of Defense Arctic Strategy in 2024, which are also denounced as ‘deciding the region’s future by force’4) or ‘inviting confrontation’5) in the Arctic.
Finland and Sweden joining the Alliance further fuels the Russian logic that the non-Russian Arctic has become ‘NATO territory’. This ends up creating a ‘NATO 7 vs. Russia’6) approach, which tends to securitize Arctic affairs and shape discussions increasingly in military terms. The policy consequences are that Moscow is planning more than ever for all contingencies, including open military confrontation in the Arctic.
On the other hand, from a previous perception of relative regional strength and assertive force posture, the impact of the war has led Moscow to feel vulnerable in the Arctic. This vulnerability is strategic (with the perceived ‘expansion’ of NATO) and military, especially with regards to the impact of climate change and receding sea ice across the AZRF.
The Russian leadership fears that a more accessible Arctic will bring along more military activity from NATO and its allies in the European Arctic and above North Pole approaches. It also fears there will be more military presence from the US and Canada in the Pacific Arctic – alongside Chinese inroads in circumpolar governance and presence.
The July 2024 Ukrainian drone strike7) on the Olenya air base in the northwestern Russian Arctic, where strategic bombers are stationed, also reinforces their sense of vulnerability – not least by defying the genuine effectiveness of Russian regional air defense capabilities.
Ultimately, Moscow does not want to be dispossessed of its control over the AZRF. The fact that NATO’s direct borders with Russia have increased in size in the Arctic and Baltic theaters will undoubtedly push the Kremlin to adapt its force projection.
This situation will also force the Kremling to rethink the deployment of capabilities across the Arctic – not least towards regional chokepoints in the European High North such as the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap.
However, the consequences of the war against Ukraine have not (yet) led to a complete strategic reassessment regarding Russia’s Arctic military posture. Existing strategic priorities are linked to:
- Imposing cost on foreign military access to the region (ambitions of control),
- Extending interdiction capabilities beyond the AZRF and removing tension away from the Russian Arctic (ambitions of denial) and
- Protecting the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and contested ‘internal waters.’
Wartime adaptations
If strategic priorities remain unchanged, Russian force projection in the Arctic will continue to adapt to the impact of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The main adaptation is the reshuffle of the command-and-control (C2) structure in High North.
In early 2024, the Russian armed forces reverted8) to the Soviet-era Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts, thus officially putting an end to OSK Sever and the Northern Fleet’s status as a formal Military District. This change is less about the Arctic as it took place in the context of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine to deal with the demands of the war.
The Leningrad MD will oversee Arctic-related operations in the western and central Arctic and connect with the Eastern MD and the Pacific Fleet. This new situation will inevitably create integration and coherence issues within the wider C2 structure.
Although air, naval, and nuclear capabilities have been left largely untouched by the war against Ukraine, Russia has lost a large amount9) of its spearhead, Arctic-capable conventional ground forces located at the borders with Finland and Norway. It will take some time before Russia can recapitalize its conventional troops in the High North.
Finally, the lofty and ambitious plans to completely (re)build dual-use infrastructure across the AZRF have been paused. Although it is often argued that ‘Russia has more Arctic military bases than NATO’10) the actual operational picture11) is that of a disparate, uneven, and disheveled network of forward bases and outposts in the Russian Arctic.
The Kremlin is now prioritizing the completion and maintenance of existing infrastructure rather than seeking to expand the network. Moscow must also consider climate change impact and budget constraints.
Russia’s low intensity warfare operations in the Arctic
As a response to the sense of vulnerability in the AZRF, Russia is becoming more confrontational in its approach towards regional security and finding excuses to ‘defend’ itself against perceived external threats. While the Kremlin is taking stock of the consequences of Finland and Sweden joining NATO, Russia will likely conduct more conventional power demonstrations, sub-threshold activities, and grey zone operations in the Arctic.
While there is little incentive for the Kremlin leadership to escalate in the region per se, there is also a strong willingness to continue probing and testing the resolve of the Arctic 7 through a well-established toolkit of low intensity warfare operations. These sub-threshold operations and grey zone activities mostly take the form of:
- Brinkmanship-prone activities12) through offensive peacetime maneuvers at sea and in the air, especially close to the air defense identification zones (ADIZ) of NATO countries and NORAD,
- Regular snap military exercises, strategic bomber overflights and patrol activities, and the weaponization of notices to air missions13) (NOTAM) in the Barents Sea, across North Pole approaches, and close to the Bering Strait and Alaska – including with China14),
- Seabed warfare activities15), and notably the disruption of critical undersea infrastructure (CUI) such as energy pipelines and fiber optic data cables across Arctic chokepoints,
- GNSS/GPS jamming and recurrent electronic warfare operations16) in Lapland and Finnmark in the European High North – with severe risks for civilian and commercial assets.
Risks of miscalculation
A more vulnerable yet assertive Russia in the Arctic, coupled with more NATO attention towards the region, can only mean that the risk of miscalculation provoked by civilian and military accidents, incidents, and tactical errors will increase. Because of the absence of clear lines of communication and deconfliction between Russia and the Arctic 7 countries, it could lead to unintended escalation and further down the road, to military tension if not conflict.
This situation is worsened by the fact that Moscow’s restraint over such events cannot be taken for granted anymore – as exemplified by Russia’s continued low intensity warfare operations in peacetime against Arctic nations and NATO allies. Finally, the absence of Russian transparency regarding recent environmental disasters17) in the region adds more complexity to peacefully solving potential crises.
Another form of risk relates to horizontal escalation – i.e. military tension from other theaters such as the North Atlantic or the North Pacific spilling over into the Arctic. In the context of the Finnish and Swedish adhesion to NATO, the Baltic Sea represents a key area for horizontal escalation towards the Arctic.
Finally, miscalculations could happen in the context of Russian sharp power activities in circumpolar governance – for instance, the contestation of the Svalbard Treaty with Norway or exploiting recent decisions18) by the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) regarding Russia and the United States. As a knee-jerk reaction, Moscow also recently threatened to withdraw from the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).19)
Freedom of navigation?
The main risk of miscalculation with Russia, however, pertains to Moscow’s contestable interpretation of the legal status of the Northern Sea Route (NSR). For years, the Kremlin has been projecting the NSR as a body of internal waters covered by Article 234 of the Law of the Sea (also known as the ‘Ice Clause’), therefore offering Russian authorities the possibility to enforce ‘non-discriminatory laws and regulations’20) over ice-covered areas.
The issue is twofold. On the one hand, the impact of climate change is completely reshuffling access to the AZRF, in turn preventing Russia from invoking the clause to increase control over the NSR because of seasonal sea-ice reduction. On the other hand, Moscow’s application of ‘non-discriminatory’ rules is, in fact, highly discriminatory. Indeed, for the past few years, Russia has been introducing stringent national regulations clearly violating UNCLOS – for instance by strengthening navigation rules and transit rights or interdicting passage to foreign military assets21) through the NSR.
Moscow seeks to appropriate the NSR as a body of internal waters regulated by Russian law, and no longer linked to UNCLOS under the principles of freedom of navigation and innocent passage. This obsession for control responds to the fear of ‘encirclement’ in the Arctic and the unwarranted belief that NATO will soon contest the self-appropriation of the NSR.
Russian fears have crystallized in the belief that NATO or the United States are willing to conduct a freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) through the NSR to ‘test’ innocent passage in contested waters. Most of these fears remain unfounded, especially since there is little value in arranging such an operation as well as high operational risk.22)
The fact remains that the Kremlin’s rhetoric around a potential Western-led FONOP has grown aggressive in recent months, with NATO arguably seeking to ‘snatch’23) the NSR from under Russia’s control. Furthermore, the Russian armed forces and the FSB (in charge of the Coast Guard and Border Guard) have reportedly been making plans to ‘counter’24) a potential foreign FONOP.
Policy consequences
Under the impact of climate change and the subsequent increase in human presence across the Arctic, Russia will find it harder to secure its ‘new’ Northern border in the AZRF. So far, Moscow’s response has been to approach the region through a military lens, leading to perimeter control and sovereignty enforcement as well as the deployment of Arctic-specific capabilities and the revamp of dual use infrastructure.
The Arctic remains key to national interests, and especially the survivability of the sea-based nuclear deterrent on both sides of the AZRF as well as the security of North Pole approaches in the central Arctic.
Russia’s imperative to remove tension from the Arctic is consequently adding pressure on critical regional chokepoints – notably in the European High North with the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap, the Greenland-Iceland-Norway (GIN) gap, and the ‘Bear gap’ (between the Svalbard archipelago, Bear Island, and mainland Norway) as well as in the Pacific Arctic across the Bering Strait.
In the High North, Russian actions are heightening tension across the North Atlantic sea lines of communication and on the Nordic-Baltic continuum regarding NATO reinforcements. As the Atlantic Alliance is taking stock of the Finnish and Sweden accession, more policy attention will be required to determine the exact role and place of NATO in a circumpolar environment.
Meanwhile, the Kremlin is currently taking stock of how Finland and Sweden will approach their NATO membership, notably the deployment of troops and military capabilities. The Alliance recently agreed to the creation of a Multi Corps Land Component Command25) (MCLCC) as well as Forward Land Forces (FLF) in Finland, a multinational battle group initially composed of Norwegian, Swedish, and Finnish troops.
These initiatives will undeniably strengthen the land component of High North defense. Yet it is something Moscow will follow closely and ultimately feel forced to respond to, with the risk of miscalculation and military escalation looming.
This article synthetizes and expands on key findings from the recent publication The Impact of the War Against Ukraine on Russia’s Arctic Posture: Hard Power on Vulnerable Ice, Polar Institute – Wilson Center, June 2024.26)
Mathieu Boulègue ist a Global Fellow at the Wilson’s Center Polar Institute.
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