Risks of Genocide Elsewhere: Any Responsibility for Arctic States?
View of the International Court of Justice courtroom at the start of the public hearings on Israeli practices. Photo: International Court of Justice
The ongoing Israeli invasion of Palestine, along with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) hearings regarding Israel’s alleged breaches of the 1948 Genocide Convention, followed by an interim ruling with provisional measures in the South Africa v. Israel ongoing proceedings,1) along with a UN General Assembly’s request for an advisory opinion on the legality of Israel’s longstanding occupation of Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem,2) have garnered worldwide attention. While the situation in Palestine has not directly and immediately impacted Arctic collaboration, global issues such as conflicts, human rights violations, and geopolitical tensions can have far-reaching implications beyond their immediate geographic locations. Since the UN Security Council approved a draft resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire between Gaza and Israel after the United States abstained only yesterday,3) this article aims to examine the potential implications and spill-over of the (alleged) risks of genocide in Palestine for Arctic cooperation and security, analyze the responses of Arctic states to the issue, and explore some of the positioning of Arctic Indigenous peoples’ organizations in relation to the ongoing invasion.
A Not So Recent Legal Issue
The State of Palestine, accepted as an observer state of the United Nations General Assembly only since 2012, is so far recognized as a state by three Arctic states: Iceland, Sweden, and the Russian Federation. Yet, the legal issues pertaining to Israel’s occupation of Palestine can be traced back at least to 1948, with the Arctic states exhibiting inconsistent positions on this matter, often influenced by domestic and international political considerations. Back in 2003, the ICJ was asked by the UN General Assembly (Resolution ES-10/14)4) to give an advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.5) As the Court considered the impacts of the expansion of the green line and the building of border wall on the daily life on Palestinians, it mandated Israel to halt the construction of the wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, dismantle existing sections, and nullify related legal acts, emphasizing Israel’s breach of international obligations, including the right to self-determination and international humanitarian law. For instance, the Court decided under the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (12 August 1949), which all Arctic states have ratified, that state parties are under an obligation, while respecting the UN Charter and international law, to ensure compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention.6) The UN, particularly the General Assembly and Security Council, was urged to act against this illegal situation, highlighting the broader need for Israel and Palestine to adhere to humanitarian law, Security Council resolutions, and pursue a negotiated settlement for peace and the establishment of a Palestinian State. In the Wall Advisory Opinion, some Arctic states intervened. For example, the Russian Federation,7) Canada,8) Norway,9) and Sweden,10), contributed to the proceedings in which they condemn the building of a fence-like border structure (the Wall) as a violation of international law and showed commitment for the road map toward a two-state solution.
What Has This Got to Do with Arctic States?
Although the Northern Norway city of Tromsø has had an official twin city agreement11) with Gaza since 2001, the Israeli government’s ongoing response to the 7 October attack by Hamas may seem far removed from any Arctic implication. However, all states have a peremptory obligation … to employ all means reasonably available to them, so as to prevent genocide so far as possible, a duty articulated in the seminal case of Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro (2007) by the ICJ. According to the Court in this, there is an “obligation … on any State party which, in a given situation, has it in its power to contribute to restraining in any degree the commission of genocide”.12) It underscored the obligation of ‘conduct’ for states to employ all means reasonably available to them, to prevent genocide when they learn of, or should have learned of, the existence of a serious risk that genocide will be committed.
Given this legal backdrop, Arctic states, despite their geographical distance from the Middle East, find themselves in a position where their actions or inactions could have implications for their legal obligations under the Genocide Convention. As the idea of ‘Arctic exceptionalism’ slowly fades away from IR Arctic discourses,13) the interconnected nature of global affairs means that geopolitical tensions, such as those arising from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, could indirectly influence Arctic governance, especially given that not all Arctic states adhere to the same stance on this issue. However, the reverse is equally true: Arctic states have a role to play in the broader international community’s efforts to prevent genocide and serious breaches of international humanitarian law. For Arctic states, this responsibility could manifest in several ways, including diplomatic efforts to encourage compliance with international legal norms, supporting international investigations and accountability mechanisms, and ensuring that their own policies do not indirectly facilitate breaches of international legal obligations.
Arctic States and their Legal Positionings
In its Order dated 3 February 2023,14) the ICJ invited Member States of the United Nations to submit written statements on the questions referred to the Court by the UN General Assembly in its resolution 77/247 of 30 December 2022,15) for a request for an advisory opinion on the legality of Israel’s long standing occupation of Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem. While the Advisory Opinion request was made months before recent developments following the October 7 attack and responses from Israel, both the written comments submitted in late 2023 and the public hearings16) in the advisory proceedings from 19 to 26 February 2024 help to position and shed light on each Arctic state’s response to the on-going situation in Gaza. In total, fifty-two UN member states, in addition to three international organizations, indicated their intent to partake in the oral proceedings before the Court. Notably, among them were four of the eight Arctic States, namely Norway, the United States, Canada and the Russian Federation.
Except Norway, the Nordics did not participate in the advisory opinion’s proceedings. In its own submission of July 7, 2023, Norway once again advocated for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, emphasizing adherence to international law and a negotiated resolution.17) Highlighting the importance of an advisory opinion, Norway viewed it as crucial guidance for the General Assembly and Security Council in advancing peace efforts. Norway recalled that it opposed any territorial acquisition by force, as outlined in Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016),18) which condemned Israeli settlements in occupied Palestinian territories as illegal. Norway consistently voiced concerns over settlement expansions, demolitions, and annexations, particularly in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, stating these actions contravened international law and undermined the possibility of achieving a negotiated peace. Furthermore, Norway supported the Palestinian right to self-determination, co-sponsoring a UN Human Rights Council resolution in 2013 to uphold the territorial integrity of all Occupied Palestinian Territories, including East Jerusalem, as essential for the establishment of an independent and viable Palestinian State.
In Norway’s address during the public hearings,19) it reemphasized its full commitment to the “two-state solution” and the Oslo Accords through which neither party should undertake actions that alter the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip before the conclusion of permanent status negotiations. Norway maintained that any lasting resolution must be grounded in Security Council resolutions 24220) and 338,21) reaffirming the importance of international law and the legal framework we have outlined. It highlighted the prolonged Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories since 1967, emphasizing the escalating concerns due to the indiscriminate and disproportionate force used in the Gaza Strip, illegal settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and the impact on Palestinians through evictions, demolitions, forced displacements, and violence. These actions are contrary to fundamental human rights, international humanitarian law, and the Palestinian right to self-determination, undermining the goal of a two-state solution with Israel and Palestine living peacefully within secure borders. Norway views an advisory opinion from the court as crucial guidance for the international community.
Norway also condemned the attacks perpetrated by Hamas from the Gaza Strip on 7 October 2023 and other indiscriminate rocket attacks against Israel, labeling them as “heinous and massive terrorist” and highlighting these as violations of international humanitarian law. It emphasized the need for accountability for those responsible for these crimes, while also noting that actions against the civilian population cannot be justified under international law. Norway acknowledges the court’s provisional measures indicated earlier in the year. Regarding Israeli settlements, Norway cited them as a primary barrier to peace, referencing the Court’s 2004 Wall Advisory Opinion and UN Security Council resolutions, including 2334 of 2016,22) which declare the settlements a violation of international law.
Norway questioned whether Israel’s occupation can still be considered a temporary military occupation or if it constitutes illegal annexation, drawing parallels with the Court’s 1971 Advisory Opinion on the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia.23) Yet, while Norwegian law, as of a 1959 decision of the Parliament prohibits direct sales of weapons to countries engaged in armed conflict,24) Norwegian arm producing companies, partly owned by the state of Norway, continue to sell weapons to Israel through foreign companies and contribute to the ongoing situation in the Occupied Territories.25) However, while many countries have paused their aid to the Palestinian people through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in the ongoing invasion, Norway has been one of the states that continued its funding. This obligation derives from a four-year agreement of Norway with the UNRWA for a total of NOK 1.1 billion ($124.5 million).26)
Next, the United States presents an interesting dichotomic paradigm between its legal arguments and its on-the-ground support to Israel. From the 1970s Camp David Accords27) to the early 1990s Oslo Accords28) and other summits,29) different US administrations have showed deep political supports and ties to Israel, sometimes pushing for a two-state solution within current legal frameworks.30) After the October 7 attacks, US Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken flew to Israel to push for an end to violence and a humanitarian pause.31) However, the United States has consistently exercised its veto power as permanent member within the U.N. Security Council, a practice that has often impacted the Council’s ability to take collective action regarding the Palestinian issue. This pattern was observed again on February 20, 2024 when the United States exercised its veto authority for the 48th time on a resolution pertaining to Palestine – this time regarding resolution put forward on behalf of Arab States by Algeria demanding “an immediate humanitarian ceasefire that must be respected by all parties.”32)
In its public hearings address,33) the United States acknowledged the ICJ’s daunting responsibility amidst the backdrop of the attack of 7 October and the protracted conflict between Israel and Hamas, which has significantly impacted Palestinian civilians in Gaza and led to an escalation of violence in the West Bank. According to the statement, the United States is proactively engaging with Palestinian and Israeli authorities, regional states, and United Nations bodies to not only address the immediate crisis but also to forge a political settlement conducive to lasting peace in the region. This peace would ensure enduring security for both Israelis and Palestinians and pave the way for Palestinian statehood. The U.S. also emphasized that the U.N. Security Council and the General Assembly have consistently advocated for resolutions 24234) and 33835) as the cornerstones for peace negotiations and that these resolutions should underpin the Court’s legal deliberations.
In the US view, an advisory opinion from the Court is expected to influence the conflict’s dynamics and support global efforts toward achieving a durable peace, underscoring the importance of the Court’s decision in upholding the established framework for peace and respecting the prerogatives of the United Nations’ principal political organs. The United States urged the Court to reinforce this framework and support a negotiated solution that ensures mutual freedom, security, opportunity, and dignity for both peoples, thereby contributing to broader regional integration and stability. This approach, the US counsel argued, aligns with the widespread international consensus on the necessity of a negotiated settlement that leads to the creation of a Palestinian State and secures the right of all states to exist peacefully within recognized borders. The statement also called for the Court to play a constructive role in preserving and promoting the established peace framework, highlighting the critical nature of the Court’s advisory opinion in the context of international peace and security efforts. Irrespective of these statements at the Court, the Biden Administration’s unreserved backing of Israel underscores a discernible bias in the United States’ stance, exemplified by its exercise of veto power against any proposed humanitarian ceasefire resolution within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), claiming that the resolution would jeopardize a hostage-release deal.
The North American neighbor seems to have an equally ambivalent position. However, this position is rooted in procedural grounds. Indeed, Canada did not vote in favor of the resolution requesting the ICJ advisory opinion. Canada’s position was the ICJ should have chosen not to fulfill the UN General Assembly’s request for an advisory opinion in this particular situation due to significant reasons.36) According to Canada, this is a contentious case that requires the consent of states involved in the dispute (i.e. Israel). Lastly, Canada had also frozen funding for the UNRWA, however, in March 2024, it announced the lifting of this freeze and the resumption of its financial contribution to humanitarian aid through the UN organization.
In a rush of geopolitical irony, the Russian Federation, which has acted in violation of territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and the self-determination of the Ukrainian people (U.N. General Assembly Resolution 68/262)37) has been the most vocal Arctic state to denounce Israel’s actions. Building in the 2004 Wall Advisory Opinion, Russia’s written comments stated that “Israel has been persistently denying the Palestinian people its right to self-determination”.38) Russia underscored the global consensus on the necessity of terminating the Israeli occupation, a stance solidified by legally binding United Nations Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 2334.39) This resolution calls for an end to Israeli settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian territory and underscores the international community’s demand for Israel to halt its breaches of international law. Consequently, Israel is mandated to cease its violations and facilitate the establishment of an independent State by the Palestinian people. Furthermore, Russia highlighted the issue of Israel’s settlement activities, criticizing them as a breach of international law, particularly with regard to the establishment and expansion of settlements within the Occupied Territories including East Jerusalem. Russia’s position reflects a broader condemnation of Israel’s actions in these territories and emphasizes the urgent need for compliance with international law to enable the Palestinian aspiration for statehood.
In its 20 February 2024’s oral argument,40) Russia further stated that achieving security for both Israel and Palestinians hinges on addressing the underlying cause of the ongoing crisis. According to Russia, the cycle of violence will persist until the Palestinian people, who have endured decades of injustice, are able to form their own independent state within the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem serving as its capital, in line with Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. Russia believes that only a solution grounded in international law can ensure enduring peace and security for both Palestinians and Israelis. Russia also stressed its role as a mediator in the Israel-Palestine conflict, particularly as part of a so-called “Quartet”, which also includes the United Nations, the United States, and the European Union. However, Russia pointed to the conflict’s history as evidence of the consequences of neglecting Security Council resolutions and the failure of global powers to facilitate consensus-driven solutions. Attempts to maintain the conflict at a low intensity rather than seeking a comprehensive resolution have repeatedly led to outbreaks of violence in the Occupied Territories. As anticipated, Russia, which does not have the best track record in keeping with international legal obligations either, used its oral argument to criticize the United States. It stated that on-going violence is precipitated by the “United States and its allies” policies aimed at maintaining the status quo. These policies have diluted political processes and promoted a unilateral vision of peace, undermining mediation efforts. According to Russia, such a shortsighted and irresponsible stance from Washington has predictably resulted in a tragic impasse, costing thousands of innocent lives.
Looking at the rest of the Nordics, both Finland,41) Sweden and the Kingdom of Denmark42) have previously demonstrated their political aim to contribute to a comprehensive, just and lasting two state solution between the State of Israel and a sovereign and contiguous State of Palestine. Finland’s country strategy for Palestine for the period 2021–2024 commits to “supporting a peaceful, negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict”, while the Kingdom of Denmark, through the Strategic Framework Denmark – Palestine 2021-2025 similarly demonstrated its aims to facilitate the creation of an independent Palestinian state. Unlike Sweden, both Finland and Denmark have however not recognized Palestine as a sovereign state. Furthermore, they have refrained from participating in any recent court proceedings concerning the matter, while Denmark’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Police is about to be sued for selling weapons and military equipment to Israel that might be used to commit crimes against civilians.43) It is noteworthy that Naalakkersuisut, the government of Greenland established through the 2009 Self-Government Act,44) lacks jurisdiction over foreign policy and defense matters, as these areas are still under the authority of the Kingdom of Denmark (Section 11, para. 3). As a result of the lack of full independence from Denmark, Greenland’s capacity to be involved in foreign policy pertinent to pressing international issues beyond Arctic diplomacy is hindered.45)
Lastly, Sweden, traditionally one of the Arctic states most dedicated to the Palestinian cause, has recently shifted its stance dramatically. Notably, on 30 October 2014, Sweden became the first European Union member state to recognize Palestine as a sovereign state. However, in the nine years that followed, Sweden’s position has experienced a notable shift and has exhibited a nearly unwavering support for Israel, absenting from all recent relevant court proceedings. While not directly advocating for a ceasefire during the present conflict, Sweden has previously emphasized the importance of humanitarian access to Gaza and the protection of civilians. Despite this stance, Sweden abstained from voting on the resolution presented by Jordan to the UN General Assembly on 27 October 2023. In March 2024, Sweden also announced it is resuming aid to UNRWA.
In December 2023, during an emergency session, the UN General Assembly voted by large majority for immediate humanitarian ceasefire as part of a resolution regarding the “Protection of civilians and upholding legal and humanitarian obligations”.46) All Arctic states, except the United States, voted in favor of the ceasefire. However, despite the worsening of the conditions in Gaza as a result of human rights abuses and despite the ICJ’s subsequent order for provisional measures, Arctic states still in part support the Israeli government’s actions. Unlike the rest three of the Nordics, Finland and Iceland initially suspended their contributions to UNRWA following allegations that a dozen staff members had participated in Hamas’ attack on Israel on 7 October.”47) In September 2023, Iceland had signed a framework agreement with UNRWA for the period 2024-2028 to have an annual contribution of ISK 110 million (800,000 USD).48) Up to that point, Iceland had provided many rounds of emergency funding to UNRWA since the beginning of the October violence.49) However, Iceland’s Foreign Minister announced that the contribution will be delayed allowing for a thorough investigation to take place.50) However, there is no evidence to support Israel’s argument that UNRWA funded Hamas in the first place. In addition, it is short-sighted to believe that the funding does not provide humanitarian relief – as intended – to civilians who desperately need it.51)
The ICJ South Africa v Israel Case: Where are the Arctic States?
Perhaps even more telling are the political responses of some Arctic states to the on-going ICJ South Africa v. Israel case52) on the ground of potential violation of the 1948 Genocide Convention, to which all Arctic States are party. In its order of provisional measures of 26 January 2024, the Court ordered Israel to take all measures within its power to prevent acts under the Genocide Convention concerning Palestinians in Gaza, including preventing killing, serious harm, conditions leading to physical destruction, and measures intended to prevent births within a group. The ICJ also tasked Israel with preventing and punishing incitement to commit genocide and to enable the provision of basic services and humanitarian assistance in Gaza. Additionally, Israel must protect evidence related to allegations of acts under the Genocide Convention and report back to the ICJ within one month on the measures taken to comply with the Court’s order, allowing South Africa to comment on the report.
Politically, none of the Arctic states have supported South Africa’s case at the court, with the US emphatically criticizing the South African submission as “meritless, counterproductive, completely without any basis in fact whatsoever”.53) Considering the current discourse on security assistance to Israel, the implementation of provisional measures raises questions about its impact on domestic adherence to international legal obligations by states offering such assistance. While there is lack of enforcement mechanisms for ICJ decisions, this scenario prompts an examination of whether states that continue to provide security assistance to Israel might face a real risk of being considered complicit in genocide, according to the standards set by international law. Following the reasoning of the ICJ provisional measures, the answer is ‘no’54) as there are no legal risks for third-party states. The provisional measures order does not inherently increase the likelihood of states being deemed complicit in genocide or failing to fulfill their prevention obligations through military assistance to Israel. Of course, the determination of whether a state is responsible for genocide is a question to be decided on the merits, not through provisional measures, and it is subject to a high evidentiary standard. However, this does not erase third states’ obligations to prevent potential genocide in the first place and refrain from any acts that might aid and assist its commission.
A Response from Arctic Indigenous Organizations
As this article focuses on Arctic states’ responses to the on-going violence in Gaza, one would be remiss not to talk about how Arctic Indigenous peoples’ organizations have responded. Most of their public statements show a moral compass and courage that supplants those of any state. The engagement of Arctic Indigenous peoples with the issue introduces an additional dimension to the discourse on state responsibility. With historical struggles for decolonization and fighting for respect of basic human rights, Indigenous peoples advocate for the promotion of peace, self-determination, and a basic end to state violence that go beyond national borders. No one can be free if everyone is not free. In December 2023, the Sámi Council acknowledged the disproportional military invasion by Israel in Gaza and publicly called for an end to violence and supported the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders55) and the UN Security Council Resolution 242.56) As one Sámi activist recently told Al-Jazeera, Sámi’s struggle for independence, Indigenous rights and self-determination has turned the Sámi into vocal advocates for the Palestinian cause.57) As of the time of writing, no other non-governmental and international organizations representing Arctic Indigenous Peoples have made public declaration concerning the situation in Gaza.
Conclusion
In conclusion, does the Israeli government’s actions in Palestine teach us anything new about (geo)political alignments and potential spill-over conflicts in the Arctic? No. It is difficult to imagine that the loss of Palestinian and Israeli lives as a result of a settler state’s deployment of unforeseen violence to respond to the attack of October 7 would have anything to do with Arctic governance. However, the notion of responsibility for third-party states to prevent genocide and human rights violations,58) particularly of those wealthy such as the Arctic ones, to avert the risks of genocide, as illuminated by the alleged risks of genocide in Palestine and the ongoing ICJ proceedings, is a crucial element of contemporary international legal discourse. If we are serious about the rule-based legal order, states need to condemn violence everywhere and underscore the importance of a proactive and engaged stance by states, within their capacities and the international legal framework, to prevent genocide and uphold the principles of international humanitarian law. Arctic states do not have any additional legal responsibility to prevent genocide because they are Arctic – that is not a legal argument. They do not even have a legal responsibility because they are some of the richest and most economically developed countries in the world – again this would not be a legal argument. What they have however is a legal obligation owed to the international community to prevent genocide everywhere and anywhere by definition of being states. Of course, unlike the dangerous and discarded responsibility to protect, “all means to prevent genocide” should not be an open–door to military intervention.59) However, if Arctic states have the economic and geopolitical means to export weapons to help a state “defend itself” (whether this argument holds does not even really matter), they also have a legal duty to ensure such basic obligation is respected.
This international legal responsibility is emblematic of the broader duties of states in the international community to prevent atrocities and protect human rights, reinforcing the rule-based legal order of global peace, security, and justice. We still need to see how yesterday’s UN Security Council’s resolution for immediate ceasefire will be enforced, even if legally binding. However, in the meantime, the international legal responsibility outlined above is emblematic of the broader duties of states in the international community to prevent atrocities and protect human rights, reinforcing the rule-based legal order of global peace, security, and justice. Arctic states, therefore, also bear a responsibility in upholding these principles. For now, international responsibility in the Arctic is far too passive.
References