Pending Finnish and Swedish NATO Membership and the Future Relevance of ASFR and CHOD
Special address by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the 2022 World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos, Switzerland. Photo: NATO
Much has been written on the looming prospect of Finnish and Swedish NATO membership with the overwhelming majority of analysis singling out the hawkish turn in Moscow1) and, in case of Sweden, under-investment in defense industrial base2) as the key factors behind the two Nordic nations’ decision to lodge an application with the Alliance. Nor has there been a shortage of discussions on the potential costs and benefits of the Finnish and Swedish membership. Given their technological resources, naval and aerial capabilities,3) and their democratic political systems, their membership has been viewed positively although some have cautioned4) against potential threats by highlighting their geographical proximity to Russia.
However, scant attention has been paid to the implications of the duo’s expected membership for the Arctic governance in general and deliberations on defense and security related issues in particular. As seven out of eight Arctic states will soon be NATO allies, put otherwise, the future utility of non-treaty entities like The Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR) and The Arctic Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) can no longer be taken for granted; that is, it may very well be the case that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) will be a more qualified venue for holding high level Arctic related talks on a wide range of defense and security topics including climate change, technological development, deterrence, and maritime security.
ASFR and CHOD: A Short Overview
Established in 2011 to “build dialogue and agree on tangible actions that could lead to peaceful progress and stability in the region”,5) ASFR is a non-treaty entity that brings together the general officers from the Arctic eight as well as the UK, France and the Netherland each year. In doing so, it seeks to facilitate talks and promote common understanding amongst the high-ranking officials from the Arctic eight armed forces and their British, Dutch and French counterparts. CHOD, on the other hand, represents6) yet another informal but more exclusive strategic forum that provides an opportunity for the Arctic states’ Chiefs of Defense to exchange notes and ideas on key security issues and/or trends once a year. In an important sense, both ASFR and CHOD, one could argue, contribute to the Arctic governance by compensating for the Arctic Council, the premier regional institution, inability7) to discuss hard security topics.
Finnish-Swedish NATO Bid and the Future Relevance of ASFR/CHOD
Given the pending Finnish and Swedish NATO membership, however, it is hard to see what purpose(s) the ASFR and CHOD serve when participating members can utilize their common NATO membership in order to develop a consensus-based approach towards the Arctic. Opponents of a more prominent role for NATO in the Arctic affairs argue that a more active NATO presence in the region would simply add fuel to the fire and exacerbate Russia’s strategic anxieties, undermine the Arctic states desire for retaining a high degree of exclusivity in regional governance, and expose the non-arctic members of the Alliance to the security dynamics of the region.8) Such concerns, however, come across as problematic and poorly thought through for a number of reasons.
First and foremost, these accounts are blind to the fact that NATO has had a longstanding presence in the Arctic9) and that there is historical precedent for its renewed engagement with the region. What is more, and in the light of expected Swedish and Finnish membership, seven of the eight Arctic states will be NATO members, and hence the alliance’s relevance to the region as well as its status as a legitimate Arctic actor can no longer be disputed. Nor the argument with regard to heightened Russia anxiety holds simply because relations between Russia and the West are already at their lowest point since the Cold War. In the context of the Arctic, one needs to be mindful of the facts that Russia has been de-facto boycotted10) at the Arctic Council and, more importantly, it has been suspended11) from both ASFR and CHOD meetings since 2014. Its absence from future NATO level meetings, therefore, amounts to nothing but the continuation of the status-quo.
As for exclusivity and exposure of other members to the security risks in the Arctic, finally, suffice to say that ASFR has already challenged the notion of exclusivity by counting three non-Arctic nations as participants while the fast accelerating trajectory of expanding non-Arctic states (commercial) presence in the region12) will eventually render appeals for exclusivity irrational and counterproductive. The exposure argument, on the other hand, is simply based on thin reasoning. With rights comes responsibility and in the context of NATO that translates to collective defense in return for guaranteed support at times of conflict. As such, any rejection of NATO’s political role in the Arctic based on individual risk assessments of the member states defies the very essence of NATO membership, and hence ought not be given any weight.
NATO’s Opportunity
Lack of formal institutional settings for comprehensive discussions on defence and security matters in the Arctic could be boost NATO’s efforts in revitalising13) its political role provided that it begins to position itself as the venue for such deliberations amongst members and third parties. NATO should utilise the North Atlantic Council as a forum where all Arctic related issues could be debated and discussed amongst allies. Doing so has the added advantage of contributing to the Organisation’s border drive to engage14) Beijing on a more formal and/or institutional footing and, at the same time, restart dialogue with Moscow when conditions allow.
Contrary to the commonly held assumption about Moscow’s unease with any NATO-led initiative in the Arctic, one must keep in mind that such apprehensions only arise when/if Moscow is excluded from discussions. The fact the Russia has participated in both ASFR and CHOD signals a high degree of pragmatism on the side of Russian leadership which is itself born out of a need to keep tensions on the low in the Arctic.15) At a time when Russia’s Foreign Minister has openly called for16) resumption of defense and security talks with the other Arctic states and as ASFR and CHOD become an extension of NATO, hence, one should not write off the prospect of a renewed NATO-Russia engagement.
Conclusion
Still, strengthening NATO’s political role in the Arctic and seeking to become the premium forum for strategic deliberations would prove a challenging task given that the nature and scope of the Alliance’s Arctic strategy is yet to be finalised. This is a work in progress that may prove more difficult than it might appear in the first instance given that each member state has its own unique sets of priorities in the Arctic which tend to vary depending on a number of factors including geographical proximity to Russia as well as the extent of their vulnerability to climate change. Equally significant is the considerable conceptual divergences17) amongst the Arctic member states with regard to NATO’s role in the region. However, decision making in NATO has always18) been marred with diplomatic jockeying aimed at reducing perceptual gaps amongst allies; that is, the NATO leadership is no stranger to consensus building efforts. It can therefore benefit from the current show of unity amongst the member states and try to use the momentum to its advantage by encouraging members to prioritize the greater good of the Alliance as a whole and agree on a common NATO approach towards the Arctic.
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