Past Need Not Be Prologue: Applying the Lessons of History to NATO-Russia Relations in the Arctic

Nagurskoye is Russia’s Northernmost air base, located on an island in Franz Joseph Land, an archipelago approximately 1,350 km north of Murmansk. Photo: Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation

The Arctic Institute NATO Series 2024-2025

• NATO in the Arctic: The Arctic Institute’s NATO Series 2024-2025 (Part I)
• Russia’s Arctic Military Posture in the Context of the War against Ukraine
• An Evolution in Arctic Collective Defense
• France’s Strategic Role in NATO’s Arctic Ambitions: A Non-Arctic Power’s Perspective
• Past Need Not Be Prologue: Applying the Lessons of History to NATO-Russia Relations in the Arctic

NATO is not responsible for the war in Ukraine, nor should its expansion be used to legitimize Russia’s unprovoked and reprehensible war against its sovereign neighbor. That being said, NATO expansion has also contributed to the decline in Russia-West relations since 1989. Until we are prepared to confront this reality in the West, we risk repeating the past. Adversarial relations have elevated the threat environment in the Arctic, with both NATO and Russia perceiving each other as potential aggressors. With all Arctic nations (apart from Russia) now belonging to NATO (the Arctic Seven), the Alliance features prominently in Russian framing of the Arctic as a potential threat to its energy and sovereignty interests there. Since the end of the Cold War the Arctic was a region of cooperation, but is now facing adversity, driven by Russia’s war in Ukraine and the state of NATO-Russia relations. As war ravages Europe, and Russia is once again considered an adversary – or by some accounts an enemy – it is important to understand how this influences its approach to the Arctic.

Western nations failed after the Cold War to find a path toward normalizing relations with Russia,¹⁾Sakwa (2017) Russia Against the Rest: The Post-Cold War Crisis of World Order, New York: Cambridge University Press arguably to our detriment, and we risk continuing to make the same mistakes if we delegitimize Russia’s insecurities about NATO, all of which could have unfortunate consequences for the Arctic. How Russia frames its Arctic interests is increasingly affected by its wider relations with the West because NATO is now a much larger presence there with the accession of Finland and Sweden.²⁾Dean, Lackenbauer, and Roberts (2023) Framing Russia’s Arctic Interests: Implications for Canada, North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network. https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/23-feb-Framing-Russia-Arctic-Interests-workshop-report.pdf. Accessed on 19 September 2024 Russia has invested in military development in the Arctic as a means to flex its power capabilities in the region, and to defend its interests and sovereignty in a region critically linked to its economic future.

This article draws on some of the leading critics of the West’s approach to Russia, who lament the failure to acknowledge Russian security concerns and the actions that delegitimize them. To consider Russian perspectives on NATO is not akin to accepting Russian brutality in Ukraine. The West’s failure to normalize relations with Russia has been consequential, and NATO is now viewed by Russian officials as emblematic of Western disregard for Russian security interests in general and its Arctic interests in particular. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov responded to the US Department of Defense’s 2024 Arctic Strategy by decrying NATO’s increased military exercises in the Arctic, noting Russia’s readiness to respond.³⁾Reuters (2024) Lavrov Vows Russia to Defend its Arctic Interests. Sept 19. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/lavrov-vows-russia-defend-its-arctic-interests-2024-09-19/. Accessed on 19 September 2024

If heightened conflict is to be avoided – a goal all Arctic nations ostensibly share – then normalizing relations with Russia, free from the encumbrances of unmet and unrealistic expectations, may be useful. This paper takes a high-level view of Russia-West relations in general, with implications for the Arctic, and suggests a possible path forward by learning from past missteps, and reframing relations with Russia.

Past As Prologue? Tensions and Missed Opportunities in Russia-NATO Relations

Russian intentions have often been perceived suspiciously by American leaders,⁴⁾Tsygankov (2013) The Russia-NATO Mistrust. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 46 (1): 179-188 even during times of cooperation. This is visible in the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations, all of whom adopted a hedging strategy against a potentially resurgent Russia, which justified the expansion of NATO.⁵⁾Albright (2003) Madame Secretary. Miramax Books; Clinton (2014) Hard Choices. New York: Simon and Schuster. This approach assumed that what was once true of Russia would always be true – a version of historical determinism – that places blame for the decline in relations on innate qualities of the Russian state, and denies the West any responsibility for the deterioration of its relations with Russia. If history can help to explain Russian behavior, then surely it can also reveal the lessons of the past. Might we learn anything from failed approaches to Russia?

Some have criticized the West’s response to Russia after the Cold War, stemming from George Kennan’s vigorous warning about the perils of NATO enlargement.⁶⁾Kennan (1997) A Fateful Error. The New York Times, February 5 Nonetheless, Western leaders hedged and forged ahead with expansion, an approach captured in the 1993 testimony of former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to the Senate Armed Services Committee about NATO expansion: “if you don’t see smoke, there’s no reason to stop paying for fire insurance.”⁷⁾US Department of State (1997) Prepared Testimony to the Senate Arms Services Committee on the Subject of NATO Expansion, April 23. https://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/970423.html. Accessed on 19 September 2024 Sentiments like these heightened Russian threat perceptions and galvanized anti-Western resentment in Russia. There has long been a reluctance to consider why Russia perceives NATO as a threat, and there is even greater reluctance to entertain this now, for fear of legitimizing Russia’s brutal war in Ukraine. Instead, some Western analysts and practitioners signal the virtues of denying Russia any legitimate security interests, eager to bring NATO ever-closer to Russia’s doorstep. This was exemplified in Vice-President Dick Cheney’s advocacy against engaging Russia and his stated desire to diminish its influence in Ukraine and Georgia by inviting them into NATO.⁸⁾Stent (2014) The Limits of Partnership: US-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century, Princeton University Press, p. 101, 137

Relations with Russia seem especially bad at the moment, in part because expectations for the peaceful end of history and a convergence of interests were so high.⁹⁾Sakwa (2023) The Lost Peace: How the West Failed to Prevent a Second Cold War, New Haven: Yale University Press Unfortunately, very little was done to bring about this desired result, with laments about “who lost Russia” to follow. Efforts to build positive relations with Russia were insufficient, and instead of meaningful reflection about this, there is now an attempt in the wake of the Ukraine invasion to demonize voices critical of the West’s contributions to the new threat environment. Analysts critical of the West’s past mistakes, for example Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsy (2019), and John Mearsheimer (2014), to name a few, are swiftly met with moral outrage at the suggestion that the US might learn some lessons from its past policy failures.

Putin perpetuates a Russian exceptionalism that is based upon a unique interpretation of Russia’s place in the world, and vis-à-vis its neighbors. Any meaningful engagement with Russia will require a recognition of this identity, and must not be based upon what the West would like Russia to be.¹⁰⁾Stent (2014) The Limits of Partnership: US-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century, Princeton University Press, p. 356 Thomas Graham observes that American manifest destiny has been unable to make room for a Russia that did not enable its hegemonic goals.¹¹⁾Graham (2023) Getting Russia Right, Cambridge: Policy Press, p. 43 American exceptionalism diminishes policymakers’ abilities to perceive the US as anything less than the pre-eminent great power.¹²⁾Graham (2023) Getting Russia Right, Cambridge: Policy Press, p. 168 Russia did not want to be the junior partner, sought a seat at the table, and was repeatedly rebuffed,¹³⁾Graham (2023) Getting Russia Right, Cambridge: Policy Press, p. 63 exemplified by President Barack Obama’s 2014 derision of Russia as little more than a regional power. Unsurprisingly, this barb was not well received, and Russian officials did not appreciate being overlooked as a major force in global politics. This may have provoked Putin’s warning about new nuclear missile technology in 2018: “Nobody listened to us. Well, listen to us now.”¹⁴⁾Weselowsky (2018) ’Listen to Us Now:’ Putin Unveils Weapons, Vows to Raise Living Standards in Fiery Annual Address, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 1. https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-set-give-annual-address-amid-presidential-election-campaign/29069948.html. Accessed on 19 September 2024

Since the end of the Cold War, American tolerance for a multipolar system has waned, alongside the growing expectation that the US should become the global hegemon. NATO enlargement was a mechanism by which the US could extend its hegemonic reach, and even though the Atlantic powers may not have deliberately planned to humiliate and marginalize Russia, “there was no place for Russia in the new order,” and this only aggravated Russian threat perceptions and influenced its defence posture.¹⁵⁾Sakwa (2023) The Lost Peace: How the West Failed to Prevent a Second Cold War, New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 327 Sakwa likens all of this to a Greek tragedy, quoting Petro’s observation that “tragedy results when by trying to correct an injustice, we unwittingly perpetuate it.”¹⁶⁾Sakwa (2023) The Lost Peace: How the West Failed to Prevent a Second Cold War, New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 328

Thomas Graham calls for a more deliberate and careful framing of what Russia represents for the West: is it an adversary or an enemy?¹⁷⁾Graham (2023) Getting Russia Right, Cambridge: Policy Press, p. 187 If Russia is in fact an enemy, then the implication is that it must be conquered, brought to its knees and economically devastated, which has risky implications for nuclear stability as well as Russia’s ability to manage its Arctic, and its Northern Sea Route (NSR), without Chinese involvement.¹⁸⁾Graham (2023) Getting Russia Right, Cambridge: Policy Press, p. 187, 189 At every downturn in relations with Russia, NATO has opted for growth. There does not seem to be any vision for managing relations with Russia beyond the “expansion, subordination, or destruction of Russia.”¹⁹⁾Hahn (2023) Cooperation and Long Persuasion: A New American Foreign Policy and Russia Approach for the 21^st Century, Russian and Eurasian Politics, November 7, p. 6. https://gordonhahn.com/2023/11/07/cooperation-and-long-persuasion-a-new-american-foreign-policy-and-russia-approach-for-the-21st-century/. Accessed on 19 September 2024

The more isolated Russia feels, the more likely they are to perceive Western actions as aggressive, and the more likely they are to favor intensified partnership with China. It is worth remembering that Russia is less reviled in the rest of the world as it is in the West. Even in the wake of its brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, some nations continue to resist sanctioning Russia because they perceive this as an element of American efforts to extend its global dominance under the guise of sovereignty and human rights. There is some resentment over the expectation that other nations should bear the cost of economic sanctions against Russia that primarily benefit Western agendas. Putin presents Russia as an alternative partner, one that advocates for conservative values and the preservation of established authoritarian regimes.²⁰⁾Stent (2019) Putin’s World: Russia Against the West and with the Rest (New York: Twelve Books, p. 349 There is an appetite for this narrative.

Angela Stent argued, prior to the Ukraine invasion, that “isolating Russia and refusing to deal with it, however appealing that may be to some, is not an option,” and that realistic engagement in areas of mutual interest is the best path forward.²¹⁾Stent (2019) Putin’s World: Russia Against the West and with the Rest (New York: Twelve Books, p. 361 The Arctic may present opportunities for this, as there are so many mutual interests at play, many of which continue to be recognized in Russia’s Arctic planning and policy documents.²²⁾Foundations of State Policy in the Arctic in the Period to 2035; Strategy of Development for the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and the Provision for National Security for the Period to 2035 Both prioritizing national security, scientific-technological leadership, and balancing national interests with preserving the region as a zone of peace. Russia has signaled a desire to capture 20 percent of the global LNG market by 2035, and a peaceful Arctic is the easiest path to this goal.

It is extremely unlikely that Russia will ever match the power of the USSR, or realize its dream of parity with the US, but it is the perception that the US purposefully threatens this goal that contributes to Russian perceptions of the West as aggressive. For example, President Joe Biden’s 2022 comments about wanting to unseat Putin and see regime change in Russia fuel a ferocious anti-American sentiment in Russia that gives political cover and even justification for Putin’s extremism. To be very clear, the West is not responsible for Putin’s actions, but it is important to understand that this rhetoric is powerful and impactful. American power underwrites NATO, and so the disruption of the Alliance has become a top priority for the Kremlin. The more Russia feels pressured to accept a rules-based order that is antithetical to Russian interests and that imposes itself on Russia,²³⁾Stent (2019) Putin’s World: Russia Against the West and with the Rest (New York: Twelve Books, p. 357 the more likely it is to react aggressively. It may be difficult to correct course in Ukraine in the short term, but it may not be too late in the Arctic.

Enemy or Adversary? The Importance of Framing in NATO-Russia Arctic Relations

It is well-established in international relations that, while enemies do not recognize each other’s legitimacy and therefore seek to destroy each other, adversaries or rivals respect one another’s right to exist.²⁴⁾Wendt (1992) Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics, International Organization 46 (2): 391-425 The enemy framing of Russia is a worrying basis for the cooperation that both Russia and Western Arctic states claim to desire in the North, and which is articulated in various national Arctic strategy and defence documents and public statements.²⁵⁾Sethi (2021) Russia, the United States, and Churning Arctic Geopolitics. The Arctic Institute, July 27. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/russia-united-states-churning-arctic-geopolitics/. Accessed on 19 September 2024

Elizabeth Buchanan aptly reminds that cooperation does not mean the total absence of conflict, and can refer more specifically to the pursuit of shared interests. She explains that “the strategic basis for Russia’s Arctic agenda is more or less cooperative” because it seeks to “regain great power status on the back of its energy wealth.”²⁶⁾Buchanan (2023) Red Arctic: Russian Strategy Under Putin, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, p. vii Therefore, Buchanan goes on to observe that it is in Russia’s national interest to avoid intensified conflict in a region that represents “Putin’s Trinity” – the confluence of Russia’s great power ambitions, energy interests, and dominance in the Arctic.

There are some who advocate for the isolation of Russia from Arctic regional fora, as penance for its unprovoked and brutal attack on Ukraine, and owing to fears that engagement only legitimizes or excuses Russian aggression. This view is understandable, especially in the short term, but could backfire if Russia is pushed so far into a corner – isolated in a region of critical economic and strategic importance – that it perceives a need for backlash in response.²⁷⁾Buchanan (2023) Red Arctic: Russian Strategy Under Putin, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, p. 140 Buchanan notes that it is easy to see the Arctic as a theater for geopolitical tension. It is much less complicated for Western leaders to refuse nuance, deny communication, and enable an enemy image of Russia in the Arctic to flourish, rather than do the hard work of coexisting with an adversary whose actions they denounce.

Russia has prioritized military development in support of its desire to dominate the Russian Arctic, to assert its sovereignty in its NSR, protect its economic interests, and to demonstrate its power capabilities.²⁸⁾Buchanan (2023) Red Arctic: Russian Strategy Under Putin, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, p. 12 Given the high stakes for Russia in the region, this may be enough to prioritize safe and cooperative engagement with Western Arctic states, whose goals are not all that different. It is no surprise that Russia wishes to protect its strategic energy reserves. After all, it is a global leader in gas, oil, and coal production, a leading exporter of LNG, and the Arctic accounts for 10 percent of Russian GDP and 20 percent of all its exports.²⁹⁾Buchanan (2023) Red Arctic: Russian Strategy Under Putin, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, p. 51 Understanding these interests is important if there is any hope of moving away from ideologically motivated assessments of Russia’s “intentions” when making threat assessments.

To be fair, Russia is not always consistent in its Arctic messaging. Buchanan notes that “the misreading of Russian Arctic strategy has a lot to do with residual Cold War geopolitical story lines, but it also stems from mixed signals from Russia itself about its intentions in the region,”³⁰⁾Buchanan (2023) Red Arctic: Russian Strategy Under Putin, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, p. 50 which are largely motivated by Putin’s aggressive rhetorical style, and a perceived need to respond to what is seen as aggressive NATO posturing as its hardware moves closer to Russia. This response is sometimes welcomed by those Buchanan labels an “Arctic strategic panic group,” who may stand to benefit from the steady drumbeat of alarm about Russian motives. It also helps to justify the views of those who prefer to signal the virtues of isolating Russia as punishment for its human rights abuses in Ukraine and its flouting of international laws and norms. While these approaches are understandable, the lessons of the past tell us that punitively cutting off communication with Russia rarely gets us anywhere. Though it is difficult to do, it is crucial to avoid framing relations with Russia in the Arctic as irretrievably uncooperative, and to consider instead what measures can be taken to prevent future cooperation from becoming impossible.

Conclusion

Instead of naively viewing cooperation in the Arctic as virtuous in its own right, perhaps it is better to consider it a means to an end.³¹⁾Buchanan (2023) Red Arctic: Russian Strategy Under Putin, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, p. 65 An interests-based approach to cooperation may advance the wider goal of normalizing relations with Russia, and avoiding the trap of “ideologically motivated assessments of Russian intentions” when we make threat assessments about the Arctic.

Admittedly, much of the antagonistic rhetoric comes from the Russian leadership and its prickly response to Western support for Ukraine, but it also comes from those in the West who appear eager to embrace a militarized Arctic. The heightened specter of war may be good for business among those whose employers stand to benefit from elevated regional threat perceptions. But for Russia, Arctic conflict is not good for business, particularly given its heavy emphasis on regional energy development as a key pillar of its national economy. While Putin likes to “throw his weight around in the Arctic,” in part for domestic political appeal, Russia has no ability currently to dominate the Arctic beyond its own Arctic zone.³²⁾Buchanan (2023) Red Arctic: Russian Strategy Under Putin, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, p. 79

While a case can be made for both conflict and cooperation in the Arctic, the best argument is undoubtedly one backed by evidence, rather than fear and assumption. In order to create conditions under which cooperation can occur, the past’s lessons about the disutility of cutting off communication with Russia are instructive. The West must find a way to establish normalized relations with Russia that keep lines of communication open and enable coordination where desired and possible, even when each side considers the other an adversary. It is going to be critical to embrace nuance when it comes to Russia, to hold two “truths” at once: that Russia’s war is reprehensible, and that Russia has legitimate security interests that are not inherently threatening to its Arctic neighbors, and which it should be expected to prioritize in its defence posture.

The history of failed Western approaches to Russia is worth considering if we want to preserve the Arctic as a space in which Russia and NATO can co-exist as adversaries. Past need not be prologue if engagement with Russia can be normalized. This starts with framing expectations about Russia differently. Making space for adversity may also create space for discernment,³³⁾Buchanan (2023) Red Arctic: Russian Strategy Under Putin, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press to be better able to determine when Russian activities might actually be problematic, rather than assuming that they always are. But at the current rate, if our only tool is a hammer then everything looks like a nail, and the resulting response becomes expensive and inflammatory.

Western Arctic NATO members should continue to signal that Russia must cease its reprehensible war in Ukraine and withdraw from its sovereign lands. Western officials should also signal an openness to dialogue with Russia in ways that legitimize its Arctic interests, and delegitimize its Ukraine activities, while avoiding rhetoric and actions that could make future engagement impossible. Part of this reframing will involve recognizing Putin’s saber-rattling rhetoric for what it is, which means meeting Putin’s narratives about NATO’s militarization of the Arctic with a united response that remains open to, and even encourages, constructive engagement. This is not a perfect solution, but instead realistically accepts the new normal. It will be essential to keep lines of communication open and normalize relations with an adversarial Russia, rather than adopting the failed approach of framing Russia as an enemy to be destroyed or converted into a Western asset. This is one of Russia’s greatest fears, and it rules out any hope of constructive engagement.

Kari Roberts PhD, is Associate Professor of Political Science at Mount Royal University in Calgary, Canada. She is also a Network Coordinator with the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NAADSN). Her research is primarily concerned with Russian foreign policy toward the West, with a specific emphasis on Russia-US relations and Russia’s interests in the Arctic as they relate to Russia’s wider foreign policy goals.