Partnership with a Healthy Dose of Distance: Sweden’s Changing Attitude towards the EU as an Arctic Player
Swedish Prime Minister, Stefan Löfven, holding a press conference during the European Council Meeting in June 2017. Photo: European Council
As the final piece of our series on Sweden’s Arctic strategy, this article seeks to shed light on two key characteristics of Sweden’s EU policy in general. In doing so, it, where applicable, seeks to use Arctic related examples in order to demonstrate or support its arguments.
The Arctic Institute Sweden Series 2019-2020
- Sweden’s Arctic Strategy: An Overview
- Reviewing Stockholm’s Strategy for Sustainable Regional Development in the Arctic
- Small and Non-Aligned: Sweden’s Strategic Posture in the Arctic (Part I)
- Small and Non-Aligned: Sweden’s Strategic Posture in the Arctic (Part II)
- Partnership with a Healthy Dose of Distance: Sweden’s Changing Attitude towards the EU as an Arctic Player
For Sweden, joining the European Union (EU) was more than just joining an economic club. The EU was portrayed as a political union that would not only allow Sweden to play a more active role in global affairs. Rather, it would also enable Stockholm to regain and strengthen its European identity while simultaneously influencing the EU’s institutional and doctrinal developments. Conservative politicians were particularly relentless in their promotion of discourses which essentially equated neutrality with isolationism and the EU membership as a sign of active internationalism.1)
As such, and to further boost their chances of a desired transition to post-neutrality, a concerted and well-orchestrated campaign of media leaks and agenda setting took place which effectively helped to de-mythify the delusion of neutrality.2) Not only did newspapers begin reporting on Sweden’s secret arrangements with Western powers but many pundits and politicians alike were now arguing that states can never be truly neutral and hence it (neutrality) “had a false relationship to the identity of the nation state”.3)
Once in the bloc, Stockholm’s policy stances and its broader conduct have been largely dual in nature: to play a leading role in setting policy norms4) while retaining a high degree of strategic independence so it can go its own way when its interests clash with those of other EU Member States.5) And in spite of the common belief, it has not, at least not systematically, sought to form and lead a common Nordic block within the EU. On the contrary, it has been in a soft competition over status and influence with its Nordic counterparts.6)
The Awkward One
Starting with its decision to stay out of the Monetary Union, Sweden has demonstrated a persistent determination to follow its own path in the EU and that it has not shied away from “revealing policy preferences that differ from the majority of EU members on issues of the environment, social policy, and defence”.7) Its response to the COVID pandemic is the latest example of this tendency for independence.
This attitude, in turn, has its root in Sweden’s initial reluctance to join the bloc, its desire for the preservation of its strategic and decision making autonomy, and a sense of, albeit narrowing, uniqueness all of which collectively have earned it the reputation of awkward partner.8) In other words, Swedish awkwardness, or its awkward attitude towards regional integration processes within the EU, has both ideational and material underpinnings.
Moreover, some scholars claim that Sweden’s conduct within the EU and its general attitude towards the bloc is best described as one revolving around a solid logic of quid pro quo or delicate balancing; that is, it seeks to contribute to certain initiatives or policies in order to stay outside certain others without opening itself to criticism.9) For instance, Von Sydow10) claims that Sweden participated in and contributed to the EU’s common foreign and security policy framework in order to cushion its rejection to join the Monetary Union.
With regard to the Arctic, it has been consistent in its call for the articulation and implementation of common European environmental policy frameworks11) but it has resisted initiatives, such as the Northern Dimension (ND), which facilitate a strong and active role for Brussels in the region’s defence and security sectors.12)
Put briefly, the main disagreement between the two with regard to ND boils down to their opposing view on and the weight they assign to the EU and its role within the Baltic Sea and Northern Europe. While Finland prefers a wide-ranging and expanded role for Brussels in the region, Stockholm has traditionally favoured a limited role for the EU and instead has sought to put in place a distinctively regional mechanism for the management of regional affairs with itself at the realm.13)
The Norm Entrepreneur
Sweden has been commonly identified as a staunch norm entrepreneur within the EU.14) Given its lack of military and economic power, Stockholm has consistently utilised its normative credentials to influence, and contribute to, the development of the EU’s normative power ever since its joining of the bloc.
As a world leader in environmental sustainability and home to an environmentally conscious population, for example, Stockholm has sought to influence the EU’s climate change and Arctic strategies by contributing to the articulation and implementation of detailed measures aimed at reducing global emissions of greenhouse gases.15) Similarly, it has been relentless in its efforts to ensure that EU’s Arctic policies are, at least partly, reflexive of its own ideals of individual rights to security and prosperity, and thus enough attention is paid to the needs and interests of local communities and their resiliency.16)
To this end, it has used various techniques and tactics, including framing, agenda setting, and use of presidency, in order to promote its own values and interests and align EU foreign and strategic decision making with its own. The EU is an ideal platform or arena for such undertakings since there is a natural synergy between its norms and values as a peace project and those of Stockholm as a liberal democracy.17)
For a small state like Sweden in particular this is of paramount importance because it enables it to exercise power and yield influence by transferring its own domestic norms into the decision making procedures of a larger and more powerful actor. Norms and their wide adaptation do influence action and decision making and thus one can gain authority if its norms and values guide conduct and behaviour.18)
The Soft Competitor
There is a common assumption outside academic circles that Nordic members of the EU act in tandem, and that they tend to coordinate their policy stances at the EU. Their common history, close socio-cultural links, and geographical proximities are commonly singled out as the key facilitating factors.
However, a closer look at their conducts demonstrate a rather wide-ranging and substantial level of soft competition and disagreement over numerous issues.19)
Part of this soft competition is due to their differing historical trajectories as well as political and national identities. This creates differing threat perceptions and interests with regard to the role of the EU in their region and how best to address security and commercial challenges.20)
However, it is also due to their rivalry over status whereby these very similar nations – small and well functioning democracies – seek to outcompete one another over both the attainment of leadership pole in their own subregion and greater strategic worth in the eyes of their mightier European counterparts.21) In fact, the nature of this status rivalry is particularly fierce amongst relevant comparison or ideational groups simply because they all have similar attributes and thus differentiating oneself from others could become a complex, and at times controversial, affair.22)
This is best demonstrated if one analyses Finland and Sweden. Given their common EU membership and close historical and communal ties, one might assume that they both pursue a similar strategy towards the Arctic. Until very recently, however, this had hardly been the case.
While Finland prefers a wide-ranging and expansive role for Brussels in the Arctic that include defence and security,23) Stockholm has traditionally favoured a limited role for the EU when it comes to security policy. Instead it has sought to put in place a distinctively regional mechanism for the management of regional affairs with itself at the realm.24) This explains why Stockholm persistently sought to frustrate Brussels and Helsinki efforts in implementing the Nordic Dimension. 25)
Conclusion
Overall, given its track record on Arctic related policies and initiatives at the EU as well as the minimal mentioning of the EU in its 2011 Arctic Strategy Document,26) it is fair to suggest that Stockholm’s policy towards the block as an Arctic player has been traditionally ambivalent at best and unarticulated at worst. By a way of analogy, its attitude towards the EU in the Arctic has been akin to an individual who desires both having a committed partner and being in an open relationship simultaneously.
This, in combination with its soft competition with other Arctic states of the EU, in turn, have been a complicating factor in EU’s efforts to develop a coherent Arctic strategy even though Brussels has, arguably, benefited from the Nordic states soft competitions; they have had the effect of halting the emergence of a united Nordic bloc.
Based on its recently released Arctic Strategy, however, it appears that Stockholm’s attitude towards the EU is softening; that is, it is now, similar to Helsinki, calling for a strong EU presence in the region.
A resurgent Russia, a declining America, and an overall increase of commercial and military activities by both Arctic and non-Arctic states seem to have convinced Swedish decision makers that the EU provides the least bad option in their search for a reliable economic and defence/security partner; at the very least, they can influence decision making in Brussels. Both Nordic cooperation as well as old – in case of the US – and new – in case of Canada – bilateral relations are still deemed as essential. However, it is the EU which is now at the centre-point of the country’s Arctic strategy. And the fact that its new Arctic ambassador is a veteran EU diplomat adds a degree of cogency to this observation.27)
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