Norway, the Kingdom of Denmark and Sweden Should Prioritize Societal Security to Help Saving the Arctic Council

This is the gavel used by the Chairman of Senior Arctic Officials at Arctic Council meetings. In 2025, Norway will pass the Arctic Council gavel on to the Kingdom of Denmark and two years later Sweden will be next in line. Photo: Arctic Council

Societal security should be given even more attention within Arctic governance where Norway, the Kingdom of Denmark and Sweden play special roles as chairs of the Arctic Council for the next six years altogether. This is a rare opportunity for them to influence the Arctic agenda if they can agree on what to prioritize.

Footnote 1 in the Arctic Council’s founding document, the Ottawa Declaration, stipulates that “The Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military security”. Previously there have been talks about if we should soften that particular footnote and start talking about regional military security in the Arctic Council. However, in the current situation this idea certainly does not resonate.

Instead, we should focus even more on societal security which is currently under extra pressure due to the pause – or rather the limited activity – in the Arctic Council.

Threats to societal security in the Arctic

The list of actual and potential threats to societal security across the circumpolar region is too long to mention here, so let’s instead highlight two examples that are related to the functional and the identity wise understandings of the concept.

The first, functional, example is the cruise ship Ocean Explorer which went aground in Northeastern Greenland one month ago. Luckily, none of the 200 passengers were hurt and no oil spill occurred, but without using much imagination, we all know how grave it could have turned out if the weather conditions were harsh, an oil spill occurred and if there were 2000 rather than 200 passengers on board. Imagine then, the additional challenges if the accident had happened near the Russian border. That would require close cooperation between authorities on both sides, and although there are agreements and plans in place, the strained relationship would probably have negative effects on the situation.

Secondly, and related to the identity branch of societal security, is the concern uttered by Sámi and Inuit representatives about the lack of interaction with their counterparts in Russia following the war in Ukraine. For instance, Eirik Larsen from the Sámi Parliament in Norway recently told High North News how he is worried that Russia’s decision to leave the Barents Euro-Arctic Council will further constrain interaction with Sámi across the border. As time goes, this feeling of deprivation and the accompanying internal pressure within the council to do more in this regard will only grow.

Russia’s possible misuse of the negative narrative

Whereas those examples constitute challenges to the Arctic nature, the cruise ship passengers as well as to the values and identities of Indigenous peoples, there is also a risk that Russia will misuse the situation to create a narrative about the negative effects of the Arctic Council pause.

The narrative goes something like this: Because Russia occupies more than half of the Arctic land area, one cannot claim to have real circumpolar cooperation without them. While the regional temperature increase is four times higher than the global average, and a potential oil spill would not respect national borders, Arctic nature risks becoming the victim of the lacking cooperation. At the same time, the restricted possibilities of crossing the border to Russia put Indigenous’ relations and values under pressure.

By promoting that narrative, Russia could try to take on an unprecedented green profile and support NGOs and Indigenous peoples’ organizations pointing to those exact problems. The Danish Defence Intelligence Service emphasizes that there is, indeed, a risk that Russia will fuel this narrative as a way to put pressure on and create a hostile attitude towards the seven other Arctic states.

Prioritizations of the next three Arctic Council chairships

While it is very understandable that we cannot cooperate with Russia at the moment, the Nordic countries could do more to pragmatically counter the negative narrative by giving even more attention to societal security in the Arctic.

A great example of how they can do so is Norway’s brand new Wildland Fire Initiative that seeks to elevate the issue on the Arctic Council agenda by making information accessible through public panels and outreach campaigns during the Norwegian chairship. This initiative certainly fits within the umbrella of ‘societal security’, where the currently moderate ambition of ‘knowledge sharing’ can hopefully be the first step to put out more fires.

The Kingdom of Denmark and Sweden would be well advised if they follow suit along the same lines in order to counteract the negative consequences of the challenged council, and the simultaneous negative narrative which Russia may try to benefit from. One way to do so could be through emphasizing better protection of the rights of Arctic Indigenous peoples.

Collective ambition for a new binding agreement?

If we aim high, and the situation allows it, a common goal for the three Nordic chairships could be to take further steps beyond the ambition of knowledge sharing and try to achieve a new binding agreement regarding better protection of the rights of Arctic Indigenous peoples.

This would be in line with the two binding agreements on Search and Rescue and oil spill preparedness and response which were the tangible results of the Kingdom of Denmark’s and Sweden’s respective chairships in 2009-2011 and 2011-2013.

If Norway, the Kingdom of Denmark and Sweden together manage to achieve such an agreement during their six years in charge of the council, it will undoubtedly be a feather in their caps. At the same time, and more importantly, it would further underline the relevance of the Arctic Council while generally benefitting Arctic governance which is under severe pressure.

Right now, Russia’s crimes in Ukraine make such an agreement impossible, but depending on how the war – and the world in general – develops, one can hope that at some point in the future the time will be ripe for it. For the three Nordic chairships, it must happen before May 2029. For the sake of the Arctic Council, it must probably happen sooner.

Marc Jacobsen is an Assistant Professor at the Royal Danish Defence College’s Centre for Arctic Security Studies where he researches security politics and diplomacy in Arctic contexts. Marc was also a Member – in various positions – of The Arctic Institute between 2013 and 2020.