NATO's Arctic Command: A Case for the Expansion of NATO’s Mission in the High North

In light of a rapidly melting Arctic, aggressive regional competitors and ever-changing geostrategic situation, NATO should consider expanding its mission in the High North through a dedicated Arctic Command. Photo: Lee Mottola

The Arctic as we know it is changing at an unanticipated pace. In all but the most optimistic outlooks, the geophysical state of the world’s most northern region will be irrevocably altered within the next century. With rapid change comes incredible opportunity and risk for countries interested in the region. By forming a new command, NATO’s Arctic Command (ARCCOM), with the purpose of fostering discussion and deterrence in the High North, NATO can demonstrate its commitment to ensuring the region does not become a flashpoint for international conflict. This command would be structured in similar fashion to other tactical commands such as MARCOM, to concentrate the particular expertise, technology and strategy necessary to operate in this singular threat environment. In this manner, NATO will be able to safeguard the security of its northern borders and deter the expansion of future conflict into the Arctic.

The North Pole of the future

The radical geophysical alterations that will critically alter the security landscape in the Arctic are a strong impetus for NATO to increase its involvement in the region. The most drastic change to the High North will be the disappearance of the polar ice cap. Satellite observations from NASA determined that sea-ice extent is regressing at ~13% per decade.¹⁾Arctic Sea ice minimum, NASA Global Climate Change. https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/arctic-sea-ice/. Accessed on 29 April 2022 The IPCC concluded that in all scenarios sea-ice will decrease at this rapid pace, and in extreme cases, they think it is likely the Arctic will be reliably ice free by 2050, while more optimistic scenarios give it until 2070.²⁾Masson-Delmotte, et al. (2021) IPCC, 2021: Summary for Policymakers. Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/. Accessed on 26 April 2022 Regional sea-level rise is likely to be between 0.3-0.4m, and combined with permafrost melt, could threaten huge swathes of the arctic coastline.³⁾Masson-Delmotte, et al. (2021) IPCC, 2021: Summary for Policymakers. Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/. Accessed on 26 April 2022 Because of the significant investment of time and capital into the establishment of ARCCOM, it would be prudent for NATO to invest in the most extreme scenario.

NATO’s northern competitors

NATO’s most important competitors from a security standpoint are undoubtedly the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. Russia’s polar territories have become a national focus under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin. Though polar development has been a longtime endeavor for Russia, Putin’s 2035 Arctic Strategy refocusses the nations efforts to exploit vast northern riches that are becoming more accessible.⁴⁾Kluge and Paul (2020) Russia’s Arctic strategy through 2035: Grand plans and pragmatic constraints. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/russias-arctic-strategy-through-2035/. Accessed on 2 May 2022 Through the development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR), improvement of regional infrastructure and expansion of business opportunities, Russia has stated its intention to remain a pivotal power in the Arctic region.

A lack of Arctic territory has not hindered China from expressing interest in extending its growing influence into the High North. Beginning with a 2018 declaration wherein the People’s Republic of China identified itself as the “near-Arctic power”,⁵⁾Dams, Ties et al. (2020) Presence before Power: China’s Arctic Strategy in Iceland and Greenland. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep24677.5. Accessed on 2 May 2022 while designating the polar region for considerable investment. Russia appears a potential partner for Chinese regional ambitions as their individual attempts in Greenland were relatively ineffective because of US intervention.⁶⁾Brunnersum (2022) China Failed Its Arctic Ambitions in Greenland. https://www.politico.eu/article/china-arctic-greenland-united-states/ Accessed on 5 November 2022 Working together, they represent a powerful bloc challenging the stable cooperative order NATO should seek to protect in the High North.

Geopolitical flashpoints

As the Arctic changes physically, so will the strategic calculations of the powers interested in the region. Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine earlier this year, the potential economic booms were by far the largest draw to the region. There are a few critical sectors that are receiving attention for near-future development: shipping and transport, and resource extraction. This, alongside the more overt concerns of Russian aggression, significantly increases potential securitization of the polar region as Russia, China, and NATO attempt to safeguard their national interests.

For the last decade, the potential for creating reliable alternative shipping lanes between Europe and Northern Asia has been thoroughly investigated by economists and researchers. The aforementioned NSR, which traverses the general area of the Russian-controlled Eurasian Coastline, has garnered much attention because it is significantly shorter when compared to traditional voyages between northern ports that must traverse the Suez Canal. Since 2007, cargo ships have plied variations of this northern route with increasing ease and seasonal length, however the inconsistency of ice melt and other navigational challenges has lead some researchers to posit that the economic primacy of this path is not set in stone, or in this case ice.⁷⁾Humpert (2011) The Future of the Northern Sea Route – a ‘Golden Waterway’ or a Niche Trade Route, The Arctic Institute. https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/russias-arctic-strategy-through-2035/. Accessed on 2 May 2022

If the NSR becomes a vital link in global shipping, Russia’s near complete control of the route would hand them an economic and diplomatic lever with which to extend their regional influence.To ensure this, the Russian Northern Fleet has stepped up its surface and underwater monitoring of the route.⁸⁾Moe (2020) A New Russian Policy for the Northern Sea Route? State Interests, Key Stakeholders and Economic Opportunities in Changing Times, The Polar Journal. Vol. 10, Iss. 2., pp. 209-227 It is not difficult to imagine Russia exploiting global transport through this route. Russia has not shied away from using its gas exports to Europe as an economic weapon in past and current conflicts,⁹⁾Davies Boren (2015) Putin Threatens to Cut off Gas Supplies to Europe, The Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-crisis-putin-will-cut-gas-to-europe-unless-russia-is-paid-by-the-end-of-the-week-10071475.html. Accessed on 2 May 2022 a vital global trade route would likely be no different.

While shipping and transportation routes are a major potential economic benefit in the mid-future, the extraction of hydrocarbon and mineral resources from the Arctic remains perhaps the most lucrative opportunity in the near-term. Critical for the geopolitical balance of the region, a majority of these resources are thought to be located in Russia’s Siberian territory. Russia’s “Strategy for Developing the Russian Arctic Zone and Ensuring National Security through 2035” plan devotes major attention to this area because of its massive strategic import; “the Arctic accounts for more than 90 percent of Russia’s natural gas production and 17 percent of its oil.”¹⁰⁾Kluge and Paul (2020) Russia’s Arctic strategy through 2035: Grand plans and pragmatic constraints. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/russias-arctic-strategy-through-2035/. Accessed on 2 May 2022 The North Pole also contains sizable concentrations of rare-earth and other critical minerals for modern production, such as phosphate, bauxite, iron ore, nickel, palladium, and vanadium. Some western estimates think “the total value of mineral resources in Russia’s North exceeds 22.4 trillion US-Dollars”, all but ensuring its vital relevance to Russian national security in the future.¹¹⁾Pilyavsky (2011) The Arctic: Russian Geopolitical and Economic Interests, Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/07925.pdf. Accessed on May 6 2022

NATO’s interest in the Arctic

Because NATO operates through consensus, advancing priorities for the benefit of the entire organisation can be scuppered by individual nations lacking the knowledge or interest in particular regions. While such divisions occasionally slow the coordination of NATO, there is no question that the future of the Arctic is a priority for its member states. The alliance has directed increasing attention to the North Pole with joint military exercises such as Trident Juncture in 2018 and a Norwegian-sponsored operation in 2022, Cold Response. The addition of Sweden and Finland will only bolster the resources NATO has to dedicate to the Arctic issue. However, escalating exercises is not enough to demonstrate the importance of the Arctic to NATO.

Danoy and Maddox, authors of a recent article compiled for NATOs 20/2020 review, discuss further expansion of the NATO footprint in the Arctic.¹²⁾Danoy and Maddox (2020) Set NATO’s Sights on the High North, Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/nato20-2020/set-natos-sights-on-the-high-north/. Accessed on 19 August 2022 In their opinion, for NATO to contend with the enlargement of Russian and Chinese influence resulting from the changing climate, it must build political consensus on Arctic policy, enhance domain awareness, ensure allies can operate effectively, and maintain stability through discussion and, if necessary, deterrence.¹³⁾Danoy and Maddox (2020) Set NATO’s Sights on the High North, Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/nato20-2020/set-natos-sights-on-the-high-north/. Accessed on 19 August 2022 Without a doubt, “Finland and Sweden together would vastly expand the alliance’s presence in the Baltic Sea and the Arctic Circle.¹⁴⁾Masters (2022) How Nato Will Change If Finland and Sweden Become Members, Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-nato-will-change-if-finland-and-sweden-become-members. Accessed on 15 July 2022 Establishing a new command to coordinate these efforts would send a strong signal that NATO is seriously invested in the future of the High North.

With additional uncertainty surrounding energy security during the ongoing shift to renewable energy, NATO must acknowledge that Russia, and to a lesser extent China, will continue to increase its focus in the securitization of strategic energy reserves. Russia first used the threat of oil shipments to Europe as a diplomatic tool during its Crimean invasion¹⁵⁾Davies Boren (2015) Putin Threatens to Cut off Gas Supplies to Europe, The Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-crisis-putin-will-cut-gas-to-europe-unless-russia-is-paid-by-the-end-of-the-week-10071475.html. Accessed on 2 May 2022 and because the energy sector remains a cut-out in the current sanctions regime of Europe demonstrates the Russian power projection it remains. NATO 2030, a recent analysis authored by a Working Group assigned by Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, acknowledges that NATO must redouble its efforts to coordinate political and military deterrence of such actions¹⁶⁾Bossenmaier et al. (2020) NATO 2030, NATO. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf. Accessed on 15 July 2022 and ARCCOM would be a perfect vessel through which to do so in the High North.

The other future priority of NATO outlined in “NATO 2030” that has extreme relevance to future Arctic operations is climate and green defence. All NATO members are likely to face serious security and economic impacts from climate change, so of prime concern is how it will redefine “the intensity of geopolitical competition, freedom of navigation in the High North and migration streams from the south, all of which involve vital Allied interests.”¹⁷⁾Bossenmaier et al. (2020) NATO 2030, NATO. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf. Accessed on 15 July 2022 The potential outgrowths of these changes are likely to be felt throughout the alliance.

The Working Group exhorts NATO to “enhance its situational awareness across the High North and the Arctic and… develop a strategy that takes into account broader deterrence and defence plans.”¹⁸⁾Bossenmaier et al. (2020) NATO 2030, NATO. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf. Accessed on 15 July 2022 ARCCOM represents a solution to address these goals in the near future while establishing NATO as an irrevocable polar power to balance possible Russian aggression.

Importance of Arctic focus

The Arctic represents a dynamic arena for geopolitics because of its susceptibility to climate change. Foremost amongst those ready to capitalize on this change is Russia, which is considering critical infrastructure and security measures to ensure continued regional dominance.¹⁹⁾Kluge and Paul (2020) Russia’s Arctic strategy through 2035: Grand plans and pragmatic constraints. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/russias-arctic-strategy-through-2035/. Accessed on 2 May 2022 Alongside this already present actor lies China’s long standing ambition to be recognized as a circumpolar power, evidenced by their declaration as a “near-Arctic state” in 2018.²⁰⁾Dams, Ties et al. (2020) Presence before Power: China’s Arctic Strategy in Iceland and Greenland. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep24677.5. Accessed on 2 May 2022 Russia’s 2022 invasion of eastern Ukraine is a significant flashpoint for the region, elevating tensions already growing at a slow albeit steady rate since the Crimean invasion in 2014. In light of this action, countries sharing borders with Russia are right to be more concerned for their own territorial integrity. In an Arctic region where many borders have only recently been determined, the desire to extend one’s influence to areas of particular interest through economic coercion or physical force may become quite tempting, especially if there is a perceived lack of deterrence against such action.

With the billions of infrastructure and economic investment to advance Russia’s northern territory comes Putin’s predilection to protect what is in effect a newly vulnerable external border from outside aggressors. To ensure the safety of both its territorial boundaries and economic interests, Russia has been reactivating Soviet-era bases and constructing new ones. This includes “ten search and rescue bases, sixteen deepwater ports, ten new air bases…and ten air defence installations.”²¹⁾Kluge and Paul (2020) Russia’s Arctic strategy through 2035: Grand plans and pragmatic constraints. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/russias-arctic-strategy-through-2035/. Accessed on 2 May 2022 Though Russia has indicated that many of these installations have cooperative purposes, like polar S&R, provocative actions such as mock aerial assault on radar installations in Norway, GPS signal-jamming in Finland, and increased submarine patrols intimate a far more aggressive stance.²²⁾Kluge and Paul (2020) Russia’s Arctic strategy through 2035: Grand plans and pragmatic constraints. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/russias-arctic-strategy-through-2035/. Accessed on 2 May 2022

Alongside Russia, China wishes to advance its maritime power and economic influence through the founding of a “polar silk road,” an addendum to the Belt and Road Initiative. The prime concern driving this is the desire to decouple yet more of China’s vast economic power from what it perceives as outside interference by the United States, manifested by US control of important geopolitical chokepoints of global shipping like the Straits of Malacca and Gibraltar.²³⁾Dams, Ties et al. (2020) Presence before Power: China’s Arctic Strategy in Iceland and Greenland. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep24677.5. Accessed on 2 May 2022 The NSR, under the control of an increasingly agreeable Russia, would not only impart its already described economic benefits but would also be a strong step in asserting Chinese maritime independence and accelerate their rise as a “great maritime power.”²⁴⁾Dams, Ties et al. (2020) Presence before Power: China’s Arctic Strategy in Iceland and Greenland. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep24677.5. Accessed on 2 May 2022 Continuing Sino-Russo cooperation on economic and strategic factors is a serious reason for NATO to redouble its efforts and attention in the North through ARCCOM. If NATO wishes to cement itself as a relevant actor in polar security it must demonstrate similar investments in capabilities and attention through the founding of ARCCOM.

NATO’s Arctic Command

NATO’s goals have already been discussed: to use discussion and deterrence to moderate competition within this latent geopolitical hotspot. Establishing ARCCOM is a strong potential solution to the myriad security concerns and objectives which fall underneath this objective. Since 2016, the United States has had a national strategy for the Arctic which engages many of the same issues that ARCCOM will tackle: evolving strategic capabilities, promoting international law and freedom of the seas, and safeguarding US energy security.²⁵⁾Arctic Executive Steering Committee (2016) Implementation Framework for the National Strategy for the Arctic Region, Executive Office of the President of the United States. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/National%20Strategy%20for%20the%20Arctic%20Region%20Implementation%20Framework%20%28Appendix%20A%29%20Final.pdf. Accessed on 15 July 2022 Likewise, the UK Ministry of Defense commissioned a report in 2019 to study the security implications of climate change which highlighted the need for collaborative decision making.²⁶⁾Cox et al. (2019) A Changing Climate: Exploring the Implications of Climate Change for UK Defence and Security, Rand Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA487-1.html. Accessed 15 July 2022 Other countries like Iceland and Norway have also spurred increased NATO attention in the region by hosting training exercises.

So why should NATO address their goals in the Arctic with an entirely new tactical command? Because the nature of competition in the High North is so unique it will require an individualized focus. The “U.S. Coast Guard frequently notes that physical presence in the Arctic equals influence. Presence can take the form of a heavy polar security cutter, a deep-water port, a scientific observation center, a sustainable economic investment, or a significant investment in a diplomatic outcome in a multilateral negotiation format.”²⁷⁾Conley and Melino (2020) America’s Arctic Moment: Great Power Competition in the Arctic to 2050, CSIS. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/Conley_ArcticMoment_layout_WEB%20FINAL.pdf?EkVudAlPZnRPLwEdAIPO.GlpyEnNzlNx. Accessed on 23 August 2022 Therefore, NATO should establish a dedicated command to be the motive force of the alliance’s efforts to advance discussion and deterrence in all things Arctic, be they diplomatic, informational, or military, allowing it to pursue all of these goals at once.²⁸⁾Conley and Melino (2020) America’s Arctic Moment: Great Power Competition in the Arctic to 2050, CSIS. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/Conley_ArcticMoment_layout_WEB%20FINAL.pdf?EkVudAlPZnRPLwEdAIPO.GlpyEnNzlNx. Accessed on 23 August 2022

Foremost, the alliance should be committed to finding diplomatic solutions to the forthcoming security concerns. ARCCOM’s role would be that of a central forum for alliance-wide discussion on arctic concerns. Discussions led by ARCCOM would focus on forging consensus within the alliance in order to present diplomatic unity at other such summits. Its greatest potential in this arena lies as a forum for alliance members to iron out the specifics of NATO’s Arctic policy.

This will be significantly bolstered by the Arctic research and expertise the command should seek to proliferate. As LANDCOM, AIRCOM, and MARCOM are the preeminent authorities on the alliance’s traditional capabilities, so should ARCCOM become the preeminent authority relevant to NATO operations in the Arctic. One of NATO’s greatest assets is the range of talent and ideas within the diverse composition of its member states. Combining the regional knowledge of long-standing arctic countries like Norway, Iceland, Finland, and Sweden, with the technical expertise of countries such as Italy, a major producer of cold-weather equipment,²⁹⁾Fincantieri. (2018) Vard Will Build Three Vessels for the Norwegian Coast Guard, https://www.fincantieri.com/en/media/press-releases/2018/vard-will-build-three-vessels-for-the-norwegian-coast-guard/. Accessed on 20 August 2022 would provide multifaceted novel approaches to the challenges arising in the rapidly changing region.

ARCCOM should seek to emulate the major successes the alliance has had in establishing similar centres of expertise on areas of emerging security concerns by supporting an Arctic Working Group. A model to consider is the Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn, Estonia. Since its establishment, CCDCOE has grown in prestige and hosts annual training for alliance members with the goal of sharing and expanding knowledge of the fifth domain of warfare. In its role as the premier body for arctic security concerns, ARCCOM’s mission would be bolstered by a similar expansion and distribution of expertise in various aspects of the Polar region and therefore support a specialised Arctic Working Group.

Both of the political and informational aspects of ARCCOM are meant to be mutually reinforcing to its kinetic security mission. Certainly, the unique nature of conflict within the High North merits its own expert coordinating command. History is well situated with examples of military campaigns reduced to failure because of improper knowledge and preparation for cold-weather warfare, victims of the great “General Winter.”

Traditional military tactics, logistics, and equipment will likely be unsuited to the challenges of combat in the High North. Much of NATO’s land forces would require special modification and training to operate in the region if they intend to maintain the flexibility and rapid response abilities that make them so potent. Alternatively, new investment could be made to develop additional cold-weather combat platforms specifically for this arena. Likewise, the issue of polar seas would restrict the usage of traditional naval forces that have come to characterise NATO’s global reach. From unpredictable sea ice movements, to topside icing and combat system degradation, much of NATO’s current naval assets are unprepared for extended combat in polar conditions. While the US is developing two specially designed icebreakers for the Coast Guard and its search-and-rescue efforts in the Arctic, they are unlikely to enter service until 2023.³⁰⁾Harper (2021) JUST IN: Coast Guard in Talks to Add Ships to Heavy Icebreaker Program, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2021/6/28/coast-guard-in-talks-to-add-ships-to-heavy-icebreaker-program. Accessed on 20 August 2022 In the meantime, naval assets sent to the Arctic would benefit from a specialized command dedicated to understanding this specific theatre of combat and the impacts it will have on naval force projection. While air power projection may be the least affected by the polar theatre, maintenance of air bases and infrastructure could become an issue should weather patterns become more erratic and permafrost melt erodes the foundations of bases. The invasion of Ukraine has certainly heightened NATO’s attention to the Arctic and the alliance has recently announced publicly a desire to invest in an Arctic Command similar to what has been proposed here.³¹⁾NATO (2022) NATO Is Stepping up in the High North to Keep Our People Safe, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_206894.htm. Accessed on 10 September 2022 If NATO hopes to be a significant polar presence, to be able to support its diplomatic and informational efforts with the deterrence of capable kinetic forces, it must consider creating ARCCOM, or as a command to coordinate these efforts.

Conclusion

While NATO’s current arctic capabilities are considerable because of its individual member’s contributions, it can only stand to gain through increased cooperation and coordination. The establishment of ARCCOM can achieve many of the alliance’s regional goals in a single stroke while capitalizing on renewed support from its members following the invasion of Ukraine. The “NATO 2030” report stated, “It is paramount for NATO to have an accurate understanding of the threat environment and of the intentions, capabilities and operations of its potential competitors, including Russia and China. … The Group encourages NATO to focus on measures that will strengthen all domain awareness, conduct extended cold-weather operations among interested Allies and share a common Arctic operating picture.”³²⁾Billon-Galland et al. (2021) NATO 2030: Embrace the Change, Guard the Values, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/2/pdf/210204-NATO2030-YoungLeadersReport.pdf. Accessed on August 4 2022 To achieve these multiple goals, the alliance will benefit from a polar presence emboldened by a powerful, new command focused specifically on NATO’s priorities in the Arctic, ARCCOM.

Lee Mottola recently graduated with Merit from King’s College London’s War Studies Department, with a degree in Conflict, Security and Development. He currently lives in Denver, Colorado, USA and works to promote international understanding through cultural and educational exchange.