NATO has always been an Arctic Alliance (Part II)
A Dutch Marine participates in amphibious landing training in March 2024 as part of NATO’s Nordic Response exercise. The exercise brought 20,000 soldiers from 13 NATO member states to the Norwegian Arctic. Photo: NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
As discussed in the first part of this series, the Arctic has been a major security consideration for NATO since the first days of the Alliance’s inception, and the region was a tension point between the Soviet Union and the West throughout the Cold War. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s Murmansk Speech in 1987 and the fall of the USSR in 1991 ushered in an era of “Arctic exceptionalism,” a two-decade period of stability and cooperation in Arctic relations.1) The Arctic Council was founded in 1996 in accordance with these values.2) Western states helped Russia clean up and decontaminate vast swaths of territory affected by nuclear waste dumping and pollution, and sent aid to treat outbreaks of tuberculosis in the north.3) Until the mid-aughts, the region did not experience significant geopolitical competition. The unfolding climate emergency, Russia’s northern development, and growing NATO interest in the region has changed the status quo in many ways. Today, NATO lacks an official Arctic policy, and opinions about whether the Alliance needs one have been fragmented. However, the Organization is invested in northern European defense, and its newest members, Finland and Sweden, are Arctic states. Considering Russia’s most recent belligerence in Europe and the reverberations these events have had in Arctic affairs, it is clear that the region is no longer at the periphery of the Western geopolitical arena the way it was twenty years ago, and NATO must adjust to these realities.
NATO’s northern trajectory
Arctic affairs began to heat up as early as 2006. Scholars argue that Russia’s efforts towards revitalizing its northern areas that year prompted Norway to call for increased NATO engagement in the region and the development of an official Arctic policy.4) Canada argued against this proposal and ultimately rejected it.5) In 2007 Russia planted its flag on the seabed under the North Pole, triggering what journalists have termed a “scramble for the Arctic” and ushering in a renewed period of increased tension and rivalry.6) Russia also began rapidly developing its Arctic regions primarily for the exploitation of valuable northern resources.7) Indeed, 80 percent of Russia’s gas production and 20 percent of crude oil production come from the Arctic,8) and Arctic resources make up 10 percent of the Russian GDP.9) As Arctic warming accelerated, retreating sea ice began to open access to Russia’s Northern Sea Route (NSR), a maritime corridor which could substantially reduce shipping times between Europe and Asia.10) Additionally, Russia began to increase its military presence in the north, reopening old Soviet military bases that had been abandoned after the USSR’s collapse and establishing new ones.11)
Despite growing tension between Russia and the West throughout the 2000s, not even NATO enlargement into the Baltics and Balkans in 2004 and 2009, the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, its military intervention in Syria, and the annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea peninsula in 2014 could shake the relative stability of Arctic relations.12) While Europe was in crisis following Russia’s incursion into Ukrainian territory, the members of the Arctic Council maintained good relations and cooperation continued in various regional organizations throughout the north. Some joint military exercises between NATO states and Russia were cancelled, but the tradition of Arctic exceptionalism continued mostly unaffected under the well-known adage of “High North, low tension.”13)
The watershed moment came in February 2022, when Russia launched a full-scale invasion against Ukraine. In the months that followed, the Arctic Council members issued a statement that they would pause work with Russia,14) and Sweden and Finland negated decades of neutrality policy when they petitioned to become NATO members.15) Finland was admitted to the Alliance in April 2023, followed by Sweden in March 2024, making seven out of eight Arctic states NATO members.
Russia’s latest unprovoked violence in Ukraine has irreparably changed the security landscape of both Europe and the Arctic.16) The breakdown of relations has been far-reaching, affecting everything from major intergovernmental bodies such as the Arctic Council and regional partnerships such as the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), which Russia dropped out of in September 2023 after stating that Western hostility was to blame for the lack of cooperation.17) Arctic Indigenous groups have reported difficulties in carrying out ongoing initiatives to strengthen Indigenous rights and monitor environmental problems in the north after the fracture of relations between Russia and the West.18) Yet Russia remains a formidable force in the north, with jurisdiction over 53 percent of the Arctic coastline. Contrary to what some journalists have argued, Russia has not “lost the Arctic to NATO,”19) considering that the Russian Arctic is the most populated and industrialized northern region in the world, and that it has a substantial head start on Arctic military build-up and navigation compared to most other Arctic states.20) Russia also significantly outnumbers NATO in terms of military bases in the Arctic.21)
While Norway has been one of the few NATO states to consistently invested in Arctic development over recent decades, most other Arctic states, and NATO itself, have seemingly only recently awakened to the fact that the balance of power in region is arguably in favor of Russia. The Canadian government faced criticism throughout the 2010s for not doing enough to modernize and engage with its Arctic regions,22) which the Trudeau government attempted to amend in 2017 with the release of its new defense policy,(Østhagen A, Sharp G, and Hilde, P (2018) At Opposite Poles: Canada’s and Norway’s approaches to security in the Arctic. The Polar Journal, 8(1): 170.)) and the United States has only recently updated policy documents concerning the Arctic.23) Some experts have argued that Arctic security was very much on the backburner of American strategic priorities up until the Trump administration.24)
NATO’s Arctic future
NATO currently has no official Arctic policy nor a command devoted to northern affairs, which some experts have called problematic due to the possibility that this will impede NATO’s ability to “adequately navigate revived strategic competition in the region.”25) Over the past 15 years, NATO officials have dismissed ideas of developing a dedicated body to oversee Arctic projects. In 2009, then-NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated that a Joint Force Command (JFC) for the Arctic was untenable because it would lead to regionalization in the Organization, which would undermine its core principals.26) In 2020, Camille Grand, NATO’s assistant secretary for defense investment, said that a separate JFC for the Arctic was unnecessary because the Organization did not have any other regional working groups.27)
At this time, the closest thing to a northern command in NATO is JFC Norfolk. Established in 2019, this command is based in the United States and oversees the United Kingdom and Norway, covering the strategic GIUK gap.28) Scholars have pointed out that a greater NATO presence in the Arctic would potentially not be welcome by all members, firstly because some Arctic states such as Canada may see the shift as a dilution of their sovereignty and control in the North, and secondly because southern NATO states may be opposed to stretching their resources to a region that does not concern them and drawing attention away from other priority locations.29) Arguments against having an increased NATO presence in the Arctic also highlight that a strong NATO presence in the region would do nothing but aggravate Russia, which already sees the Alliance as hostile and considers its encroachment close to Russian borders an existential threat.30) In 2017, a member of the NATO Committee on Transatlantic Relations himself recommended that NATO should maintain situational awareness in the Arctic, but must do so in a “non-provocative” way “without the deployment of military assets in the High North.”31) Experts arguing for a greater NATO presence in the Arctic say that it is needed to unequivocally show Russia that NATO has its eye on the region and deter further Russian aggression, especially in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and an uptick in Russian military presence in the Arctic, as well as recent hybrid warfare tactics against Western nations.32)
Despite the lack of an official Arctic position, NATO and its member states have taken a greater interest in Arctic affairs in recent years, and especially following the second invasion of Ukraine. NATO exercises in the Arctic have become more frequent, and NATO member states’ warships and submarines have been making port calls more often in northern Norway and operating in nearby waters as part of NATO missions and in cooperation with the Norwegian Armed Forces.33)
A significant policy shift for NATO’s northern engagement has come from Canada, which has increasingly welcomed NATO exercises on its territory and stated in its recent Arctic policy that it is committed to supporting information sharing with NATO and strengthening situational awareness in the Arctic. While Canada still relies more on its relationship with the United States in the scope of NORAD rather than NATO, this encouraging language towards NATO cooperation “indicates a significant shift in Canada’s official position.”34) Montreal, Canada will also be the host of the new NATO Centre of Excellence for Climate Change and Security, which was announced in summer 2023.35) An August 2022 visit by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg was another positive sign regarding Canada-NATO relations. During the trip, Stoltenberg visited the Canadian Arctic with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and stated that NATO must step up its presence in the Arctic.36)
Efforts to improve cooperation and defense are also ongoing in the European Arctic. Even prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Finland and Sweden’s bids to join NATO, the Nordic states discussed forming a joint Nordic air force to improve communication and defense between Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland.37) According to journalists and military sources, the project has received even more support since the events of 2022.38) High North News pointed out in summer 2023 that there is a larger than normal military presence of both American and NATO forces in Iceland,39) and that Norway is working on developing an air command center in northern Norway in collaboration with the United States and United Kingdom, which called itself “the Arctic’s nearest neighbor” in 2013 and 2015 policy documents.40) In September 2023, NATO’s defense chiefs met in Oslo for a conference on NATO’s Military Committee, during which Norwegian Defense Minister Bjørn Arild Gram said that “NATO is the north” and that the addition of Finland and Sweden into the Alliance means that the Nordic states will have a responsibility to develop “NATO’s deterrence in the northern areas.”41) At the same conference, Norwegian Chief of Defence Eirik Kristoffersen added that 2024 would also see the largest exercise held in the Nordic region, called Nordic Response, during which the new joint Nordic air defense would be tested.42) Nordic Response took place in March this year in the Norwegian Arctic with 20,000 soldiers from 13 countries, and was a “crucial first step in implementing NATO’s regional plans for defending northern Europe.”43) It was part of a larger European exercise called Steadfast Defender which had over 90,000 participating troops from every NATO member state and was the largest exercise NATO had held since the Cold War.
Conclusion
Building gradually from 2006 and growing over the last decade especially, tensions in the Arctic have risen to levels unseen since the days of the Cold War. Hard security is at the forefront of Northern European policy agendas once again, with military strategists and defense experts discussing the GIUK gap, Arctic missile placements, and increased military exercises in the north. While NATO does not have an official Arctic policy or command center, it is very much present in the region, both through its historic guardian of the northern flank, Norway, active participants Canada, the United States, Iceland and Denmark, and newest members Finland and Sweden. In recent years, countless newspaper articles have voiced concerns about a “new Cold War” in the north. Some experts argue that in fact the Cold War never ended in the Arctic, considering that most military installations in the region have remained at the ready even while the Arctic was regarded as a “zone of peace” in diplomatic circles.44)
There has been much discussion about what NATO should do in the face of growing Arctic tensions. On the one hand, it would be unwise for NATO to contribute to further militarization of the Arctic as it will likely aggravate the situation with Russia. On the other hand, Russia has proven time and time again in Moldova, Georgia, Syria, and Ukraine that it does not respect the territorial integrity of sovereign states, and has been increasingly aggressive and unpredictable in recent years, meaning that a strong defensive posture, especially in the Arctic, which is a key region of interest for the Russian Federation, may be needed to indicate that there will be a swift response if boundaries are violated in the north.
In the immediate future, NATO must contend with the climate emergency. NATO itself has pointed out that climate change is a “threat multiplier” and a potential driver for future conflict in the Arctic.45) The region is warming four times faster than the rest of the planet. Some areas, such as Svalbard, are now several degrees Celsius hotter on average than they were fifty years ago. Many parts of the north are already in crisis, brought on by retreating sea ice, thawing permafrost, eroding coastlines, and raging wildfires. While these developments open opportunities for natural resource extraction in the north, they also have a devastating impact on remote settlements and Indigenous communities, which are at the forefront of the climate catastrophe. A lot of attention and resources have gone towards hard security in northern regions, but the Organization has not sufficiently consulted Indigenous groups or considered its role in soft security in the Arctic.46) The inability to constructively work with Russia poses major challenges in this area, both for continued work on Indigenous rights and on research collaboration that can shed light on the ongoing impacts of climate change.
For too long, the Arctic has been considered a remote and peripheral region that is outside of global processes. Today more than ever, it is evident that what happens in the Arctic does not stay in the Arctic both politically and environmentally, and that regional events and global processes have an irrevocably interconnected relationship that will likely be amplified in the coming years and decades. The Arctic is undergoing profound changes, both to its political order and geopolitical position, but also to its very geography. This rapidly unfolding situation makes the path forward murky and means that NATO will have important decisions to make for its future in the region and the future of Alliance security. What is clear is that the Arctic is once again re-entering center stage in Atlantic geopolitical rivalry, and this development will have far-reaching consequences in the European and global security order, especially as NATO becomes increasingly involved.
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