Mapping Estonia's Arctic Vision: Call for an Influential European Union in Securing the Arctic

View to Tallinn Bay (Gulf of Finland) from the Tallinn TV Tower. Photo: Igor Siimon

The Arctic Institute EU-Arctic Series 2023

• The Arctic Institute’s 2023 Series on the European Union’s Arctic Policy – From a Stakeholder Perspective
• The European Union and its Member States in the Arctic: Official Complementarity but Underlying Rivalry?
• The Crossroads of Science Diplomacy: Italy and the Challenges of the European Union’s Greener Engagement in the Arctic
• Navigating Uncertainties: Finland’s Evolving Arctic Policy and the Role of a Regionally Adaptive EU Arctic Policy
• Mapping Estonia’s Arctic Vision: Call for an Influential European Union in Securing the Arctic
• A Path to Dialogue: The Arctic for EU-Russia Relations
• The Sámi Limbo: Outlining nearly Thirty Years of EU-Sápmi Relations
• How to streamline Sámi rights into Policy-Making in the European Union?
• Why should the European Union focus on co-producing knowledge for its Arctic policy?
• Time for Systems Thinking in the Arctic? The Need for Aligning Energy, Environmental and Arctic Policies in the European Union
• The Arctic Institute’s 2023 Series on the European Union’s Arctic Policy – Final Remarks

As the European Union shapes its Arctic policy, Estonia’s message is clear: It is time for the EU to step up its engagement in the Arctic for greater security for its Member States (MS). It means the EU needs to be more involved in protecting the environment and energy security and facilitating MS cooperation on enhanced defense surveillance in the context of the Arctic. The country also reminds all EU MS that the concerns and viewpoints of non-Arctic MS should be considered more in the EU’s Arctic policy. This article aims to emphasize Estonia’s soft security connections to the Arctic and illustrate Estonia’s domestic debates about how the EU’s influence should be applied in the Arctic.

The Estonian government has expressed public support for the updated 2021 EU Arctic policy adoption.¹⁾Vabariigi Valitsus. 2021. “Valitsuse 23.12 istungi kommenteeritud päevakord.” Vabariigi Valitsus [Government of Estonia]. December 22, 2021. https://www.valitsus.ee/uudised/valitsuse-2312-istungi-kommenteeritud-paevakord. Accessed on 26 March 2023 However, it highlights that there is work to be done to refine the EU’s Arctic approach in the following years. Tallinn conveys that the EU needs to take greater responsibility for its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).²⁾Vabariigi Valitsus. (2022) “Välisminister Eva-Maria Liimetsa ettekanne välispoliitika arutelul Riigikogus [Speech by Minister of Foreign Affairs Eva-Maria Liimets at the Debate on Foreign Policy in the Riigikogu].” Vabariigi Valitsus [Government of Estonia], 15 February. Available at: https://vm.ee/uudised/valisminister-eva-maria-liimetsa-ettekanne-valispoliitika-arutelul-riigikogus-0. Accessed on 26 March 2023. The same conviction extends to the Arctic. The reason is that Estonia seeks the EU to step up as a potent influencer capable of critically questioning the activities of large(r) countries in the Arctic region. These countries are primarily but not exclusively Russia and China. Notably, Estonia envisions an EU that assumes a more central role in Europe, shaping norms that counter harmful behavior that affect EU Member States in the European Arctic.

Estonia, the northernmost non-Arctic EU MS, is very observant of any changes in its Arctic neighboring countries: Russia, Finland, Sweden, and Norway. The Arctic became an agenda item for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Riigikogu (Parliament of Estonia) between 2013-14. Before that period, the Arctic was primarily an area studied by the Estonian scientific community.³⁾Musanovic, A. (2022) “Estonia in the Arctic: Interview with Prof. Rein Vaikmäe.” Polar Connection, 3 May, https://polarconnection.org/rein-vaikmae-interview/. Accessed on 28 February 2022. It must be added that there was less domestic discussion and feedback on the 2016 Joint Communication on ‘An integrated European Union policy for the Arctic’ than on its update in 2021. This matters because there is a notable overlap between the Estonian application period (2018-2021) for the Arctic Council and its endorsement of a more influential EU in the Arctic after publishing the updated EU Arctic policy.

In this article, I examine two crucial aspects that help to understand Estonia’s interest and stake in the EU Arctic policy development. First, I discuss factors influencing Estonia’s connection to the Arctic. Second, I explore why and how the country advocates for more EU presence in the Arctic region. My analysis draws from official reports, the Government’s and Parliament’s communications, the President of Estonia’s contribution at the 2022 Arctic Circle forum, and interview articles with key persons driving the Estonian Arctic community. These sources offer insights into Estonia’s domestic discussions, influencing its stance towards EU Arctic policy evolution.

Estonia’s Arctic Ties

Estonia wants to enhance its Arctic connections through two main approaches. First, it sees more room for economic and cultural cooperation with Nordic Arctic countries. This could involve exporting Estonian icebreakers, technology, and services alongside greater scientific cooperation on polar matters.⁴⁾Riigikogu, dir. (2021). Arktika Nõukogu- miks me vaatlejaks kandideerime? [Arctic Council- Why We Apply to Become an Observer?]. Video. Riigikogu: YouTube, 21 January, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rmbINBb9X0E. Accessed 3 April 2023; Keskkonnaministeerium (Ministry of the Environment) (2020). “Riigikantselei resolutsioonile vastamine: avalik konsultatsioon: ELi poliitika Arktika asjades [Response to the Chancellery’s Resolution on Public Consultation on EU’s Arctic Policy].” 1-5/20/4070-2. Tallinn, Estonia: Keskkonnaministeerium, 2 October, https://eelnoud.valitsus.ee/main#3cn1TOTM. Accessed 3 April 2023. Second, Estonia seeks support in dealing with Russia, Estonia’s eastern neighbor. Russia’s economic and military activity that may threaten sovereignty is not taken lightly in the Riigikogu, as is the case in Finland, which also shares a border with Russia.⁵⁾Middleton, A. (2023). “Navigating Uncertainties: Finland’s Evolving Arctic Policy and the Role of a Regionally Adaptive EU Arctic Policy.” The Arctic Institute, 22 August, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/navigating-uncertainties-finland-evolving-arctic-policy-role-regionally-adaptive-eu-arctic-policy/. Accessed 22 August 2023. The presence of military equipment and forces in the Russian Arctic poses a direct threat not only to Estonia’s security but also to NATO’s position in the region. Besides Russia’s military buildup in the Arctic, Estonia is also concerned about ecological harm caused by economic activities and energy security. Notably, incidents like the 2020 Norilsk diesel oil spill highlight potential environmental damage in Russian territories, impacting the territories of its immediate neighbors in the region. Consequently, Estonia is proactive in emphasizing the need for unity among like-minded Western countries that can counter Russia’s actions in the Arctic.

Estonia focuses on strengthening its legitimacy as an Arctic stakeholder. This can partly be accounted for by the country’s desire to contribute to preventing the emergence of tensions in the European Arctic.⁶⁾Musanovic, A. (2022). “Estonia in the Arctic: Interview with Ambassador Märt Volmer.” Polar Connection, 12 May. Available at: https://polarconnection.org/mart-volmer-interview/. Accessed 28 February 2022. This is why Estonia strategically positions itself to exchange crucial information in trusted Arctic collaborations. By fostering diplomatic relationships with Nordic and North American countries, Estonia aims to enhance Northern European social security and find support for its stakeholder status with respect to the Arctic. Estonia’s bid for Arctic Council observer status in 2019-2021 application period highlights its dedication to establishing credibility in the region.⁷⁾Estonia was not granted the observer status during the May 2021 Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting. The reason for that is that reviewing observer applicants was taken off the agenda. Gaining observer status remains essential to the Estonian foreign policy agenda also today. This is why the government has prepared a roadmap, currently awaiting publication. This roadmap will likely serve domestic and diplomatic purposes, facilitating discussions about the Estonian place in Arctic development.⁸⁾Riigikogu. (2021), “Väliskomisjon: Eesti vajab kõikehõlmavat Arktika strateegiat [Foreign Affairs Committee: Estonia Needs a Comprehensive Arctic Strategy]”, Riigikogu [Parliament of Estonia], 8 June, https://www.riigikogu.ee/pressiteated/valiskomisjon-et-et/valiskomisjon-eesti-vajab-koikeholmavat-arktika-strateegiat/. Accessed 2 January 2023.

The Government of Estonia is working to solidify its position within the updated 2021 EU Arctic policy framework. In 2020, the government stressed the link between Estonia’s Arctic Council observer application and pursuing a more prominent role in EU Arctic discussions. Additionally, in 2021, the Ministry of Environment shared its perspective on the Arctic policy, desiring an EU-level recognition of MS engaged in the Arctic Council observer application process.⁹⁾Keskkonnaministeerium (Ministry of the Environment). (2020), Riigikantselei Resolutsioonile Vastamine: Avalik Konsultatsioon: ELi Poliitika Arktika Asjades [Response to the Chancellery’s Resolution on the Public Consultation on the EU’s Arctic Policy], No. 1-5/20/4070–2, Tallinn, Estonia. This strategy aligns with Estonia’s 2030 foreign policy objectives to make itself more visible (and heard) among EU MS.¹⁰⁾Välisministeerium. (2020), Eesti Välispoliitika Arengukava 2030 [Estonian Foreign Policy Roadmap 2030], Välisministeerium [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia], Tallinn, Estonia, pp. 1–42. These actions mean that Estonia aims to amplify its influence in EU Council dialogues, shaping the development of EU Arctic policy.

Countering Russian Influence in the Arctic

Estonia sees the European Arctic as a source of soft and, to a lesser extent, hard security threats. This is why the state supports a clear regulatory framework that promotes lawful conduct in the Arctic. Stable governance and effective law enforcement in the Arctic are essential for businesses from Estonia to either supply services for or operate in the Arctic without interruption. A prime example of such industries would be IT, hardware manufacturing, transit transportation and transport services (for fisheries).¹¹⁾Idarand, T., Jüris, F., Raik, K. and Ventsel, A. (2021), Estonia’s Interests and Opportunities in the Context of Global Developments in the Arctic, International Centre for Defence Studies, Tallinn, Estonia, pp. 1–18, 11; ERR. (2021), “Memorandum: Rail Baltic a precondition for Tallinn-Helsinki tunnel”, ERR, 27 April, https://news.err.ee/1608192223/memorandum-rail-baltic-a-precondition-for-tallinn-helsinki-tunnel. Accessed 16 March 2023. Because the EU does not have the power to enforce European law on non-EU states, Estonia can only rely on strategic use of EU funds and coordinated action to apply pressure on unwanted behavior of non-EU states like Russia (and China). The 2021 EU’s Arctic Joint Communication, aimed at keeping oil and gas untouched in the Arctic, achieves this goal.¹²⁾European Commission. (2021), Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Stronger EU Engagement for a Peaceful, Sustainable and Prosperous Arctic, No. JOIN(2021) 27 final, European Commission, pp. 1–16, 10. Despite the EU’s economic strength, these actions might not suffice in the long run. The EU policy needs to evolve further to create a well-integrated framework for the Arctic that addresses MS resilience in the region.

Estonian Parliament and the Defence Forces are greatly concerned about the negative impact of Russia’s influence and military buildup in the Arctic and other regions.¹³⁾Riigikogu. (2021), “Riigi sõjalise kaitse jätkusuutlik areng (XIV Riigikogu, V istungjärk, täiskogu istung) [Sustainable Development of National Military Defence]”, Riigikogu, 23 March, https://stenogrammid.riigikogu.ee/et/202103231000. Accessed 1 March 2023); Defence Forces of the Republic of Estonia. (2017), “Kaitseväe juhataja: Venemaa tegevust tuleb näha laiemas kontekstis [Chief of Defence Staff: Russia’s Actions Must Be Seen in a Broader Context]”, 17 May, https://mil.ee/uudised/kaitsevae-juhataja-venemaa-tegevust-tuleb-naha-laiemas-kontekstis/. Accessed 22 August 2023). It is relatively reasonable for Estonia to believe that the Russian military would intimidate its Arctic neighborhood, most of them being NATO members. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has led Estonia’s Riigikogu (and government) to combine its concerns about Russian aggression in its Arctic-related foreign and security policy.¹⁴⁾Riigikogu. (2023), “Sutt arutab Stockholmis ELi kolleegidega Ukraina edasist toetamist [Sutt Discusses Further Support for Ukraine with EU Colleagues in Stockholm]”, 2 March, https://www.riigikogu.ee/pressiteated/valiskomisjon-et-et/sutt-arutab-stockholmis-eli-kolleegidega-ukraina-edasist-toetamist/. Accessed 28 March 2023. Estonian President Alar Karis expressed this sentiment during the 2022 Arctic Circle Assembly. He highlighted the uncertainty and lack of trust in Russian actions in the Arctic. President Karis outlined three key points: continuing Arctic cooperation without Russia (for now); limiting excessive exploitation of natural resources and environmental damage by Arctic coastal states; and preventing dominance by large countries active in the Arctic.¹⁵⁾H.E. Alar Karis, President of the Republic of Estonia. (2022), 20 October, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sw89CZE-BYs. Accessed 3 March 2023. The points underscore that Estonia seeks more space for small Arctic stakeholders like itself to voice against the actions of large Arctic nations.

Estonian politicians believe the EU’s soft power is crucial in the Arctic. The EU can use instruments such as CFSP, Northern Dimension, and funding of projects in collaboration with Arctic states to boost its role. In Tallinn, the EU is expected to have a significant role in successful MS cooperation and tackling new challenges in the Arctic.¹⁶⁾Keskkonnaministeerium (Ministry of the Environment of Estonia). (2020), Riigikantselei Resolutsioonile Vastamine: Avalik Konsultatsioon: ELi Poliitika Arktika Asjades [Response to the Chancellery’s Resolution on the Public Consultation on the EU’s Arctic Policy], No. 1-5/20/4070–2, Tallinn, Estonia; In 2020, Estonia imported a little over 20 per cent of its energy needs (natural gas, crude oil, and hard coal) from Russia. Eurostat. (n.d.), “Archive: EU Energy Mix and Import Dependency”, Eurostat, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Archive:EU_energy_mix_and_import_dependency#EU_energy_dependency_on_Russia. Accessed 27 July 2023). To illustrate, Estonia plans to partner with Sweden and Finland to import green energy and reduce reliance on Russian energy.¹⁷⁾Välisministeerium (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia). (2021), Supporting Sustainable Development in the Arctic: Estonia’s Role in Advancing Collaboration, 26 April, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MfyHU3gy-js. Accessed 1 March 2023. This idea is shared by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications, which supports the EU’s initiative of employing rare earth metal mining and investments into (green) electricity networks in the EU MS in the Arctic.¹⁸⁾MKM (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications). (2021), Sisend Eesti seisukohtadele EL-Arktika teatise kohta [Input on the Notice on Estonia’s Views on the EU-Arctic Policy], No. 2-13/21-6314, Majandus- ja Kommunikatsiooniministeerium, Tallinn, Estonia. The latter is significant to Estonia because it contributes to its high renewable energy consumption target of 65% for 2030.¹⁹⁾ERR. (2022), “Estonia Sets 2030 Target for Renewable-Only Electricity”, ERR, 25 August, https://news.err.ee/1608695428/estonia-sets-2030-target-for-renewable-only-electricity. Accessed 24 August 2023.

Using another example, former Defense Minister Kalle Laanet (2021-2022) argued for the EU’s potential role in defense because the EU has the know-how and the capacity to develop dual-use infrastructure and military mobility.²⁰⁾Riigikogu. (2021), “Riigi sõjalise kaitse jätkusuutlik areng (XIV Riigikogu, V istungjärk, täiskogu istung) [Sustainable Development of National Military Defence]”, Riigikogu, 23 March, https://stenogrammid.riigikogu.ee/et/202103231000. Accessed 1 March 2023). This implies that Estonia may encourage joint security and intelligence efforts between EU countries and NATO in the Arctic. Other EU-funded infrastructure projects can also meet Estonian security needs in the Arctic. The EU Copernicus project aids in setting up secure navigation services and tracking changes in land and sea areas of the European Arctic. This positively impacts improving the safety of Estonian commercial ships in Arctic waters.

Conclusion

Two conclusions emerge from the Estonian perspective on the EU Arctic policy. First, Estonia’s desire for increased EU involvement in the Arctic comes from its strong ties to the Nordic states and worries about Russia, energy security, and the environment. Collaborating with Nordic Arctic national offers economic growth and scientific opportunities. Yet, Estonia remains wary of Russia’s economic and military activities that pose ecological and security concerns to Estonia’s activities in the European Arctic. This is why Estonia is working on achieving more EU presence in the Arctic to confront it.

Second, the Estonian political elite realizes that the EU has not fully embraced non-Arctic MS like Estonia despite its stake in Arctic affairs. To change this, Estonia aims to shape the EU Arctic policy by making its discussions more inclusive in the EU Council. In return, the EU’s enhanced actorness in the Arctic, with notable Estonian contribution, is a considerable potential for Estonia to find support for its Arctic Council observer application. By boosting the EU’s presence in the Arctic, Estonia advances its interests and strengthens its regional influence. This improves the country’s position as a stakeholder in the Arctic.

Erika Varik is a board member of the Association of Polar Early Career Scientists of the Netherlands.