Back to Publications

Language, Identity, and Statehood: A Brief Insight into the History of the Minoritization of the Komi People

By | Article
November 8, 2022
, , , ,
Paved street in the Komi Republic with a house and green hills in the back

The summer landscape of the Komi Republic reflecting the blue, green, and white of the Komi flag. Photo: Maria Fedina

Indigenous peoples have inhabited the Arctic since time immemorial, establishing rich regional cultures and governance systems long before the introduction of modern borders. The Arctic Institute’s 2022 Colonialism Series explores the colonial histories of Arctic nations and the still-evolving relationships between settler governments and Arctic Indigenous peoples in a time of renewed Arctic exploration and development.

The Arctic Institute Colonialism Series 2022

“Maria Fedina: Well, let’s say, 100 years ago we had Komi here, Russians were a minority. Why in 100 years, Komi has turned from, in fact, the language that was the main language in this territory and was the language of not only domestic communication, but also of business and everything. And nowadays, and it is highly unlikely that I will go to the bank and speak Komi there.

O.B.: I think this is just a purposeful policy of the Russian Empire. It does not matter what it was called, the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union. <…> There are absorber states. They want to own everything. <…> And this state, on the way to its domination, faces other states and peoples. For example, the Russian state faces the Komi people. And it wants to assimilate them very strongly, because then the resources of these Komi people will belong to those who lead this state. And they do it by humiliating the Komi people as much as possible. And they make sure that they [Komi people] do not feel their otherness, their authenticity. So that they become like Russians, and then they do not want to resist Russians. Why would Russians resist Russians? They will give you everything they have. Forest? Please, take it. Well, all the resources. Because they [Komi people] will not feel the difference between Komi and Russian. We are all Russians. We are all brothers. So, use us in whichever way you like. And then the state sends residents of other nationalities to the Komi region so that they speak the same language, Russian, among themselves. So that they dilute the Komi people. And they make sure that everything related to civilization is in Russian, and those who do not speak Russian, they feel disenfranchised and humiliated. That they are like animals, they have the language of animals. They cannot even express such a thing as “state” in their language. They can only imitate the cry of animals and birds, and call objects with onomatopoeic words. So, and a Komi person feels humiliated, and he strives not to be humiliated. And in order not to be humiliated, you need to know the language of the colonizers. Of those people who want to capture you. And you need to be like them, so that they do not put pressure on you.”1)

Talking about Russian Empire and Soviet Union’s relations with non-Russian ethnic groups, inhabiting their territories, we might vaguely divide such groups into external, which would possess their own sovereign demarcated states in the post-Soviet era, and internal, which would stay in the margins of territorial borders of newly formed Russian Federation. Such division, as well as wording choice, is to some extent artificial but I hope it will serve the purposes of this paper. The colonial character of Russian and Soviet relations with external ethnic groups and nations, inhabiting particularly Central Asia and the Baltic shore, was largely discussed in the postcolonial and decolonial works of such authors as Madina Tlostanova and Epp Annus.2) As for the state relations with internal non-Russian groups, it is important to mention Yuri Slezkine and Nikolai Ssorin-Chaikov’s seminal works about peoples of Siberia.3)

At the same time, particularly in the works of contemporary Russian scholars we may find purposefully neutral approach to description of the state policies towards non-Russian peoples, which is specifically visible in vocabulary used by some of the scholars, consisting of such terms as ‘assimilation’, ‘industrial development’, ‘cultural development’ and ‘state paternalism’. In this regard, we can outline that it is, to some extent, non-surprising that it is not academia, which is being vocal when it comes to portraying the relations between state and its non-Russian “nationalities” as colonial, but such rhetoric is employed more widely by ethnic and indigenous activists. At the same time, I argue that Soviet/Russian policies towards the non-Russian population should not observed with the of rather neutralistic terms but instead require to be approached more critically.

When talking about the internal ethnic groups, in this paper we primarily address those peoples who in different stages of the Russian and Soviet state and ethnic or “nationalities” policies development have been named as, for example, “inorodtsy” and “culturally backward nationalities”. While these categories do not entirely replicate each other and indeed are based on different attributes, to a greater extent they include similar ethnic groups. Although, the discussion of the genealogy of terminological choices for categorization of non-Russian ethnic groups and grounds for such categorization are out of reach of this paper, I would still like to point out that substantial majority of terms implies the narrative of the state superiority and dominance. In post-Soviet Russia such a term as “indigenous small-numbered peoples” was coined, which although essentially escaped the narrative of “otherness” and “backwardness” of non-Russian groups, but at the same time reproduced the inherently paternalistic state approach towards indigenous peoples.

The Komi people in the state national-ethnic system

The Komi people is one of the Finno-Ugric groups that primarily reside in the north-eastern part of the European part of Russia. Due to their size, the Komi people are not granted the official status of “indigenous small-numbered people of the North”.4) At the same time, lack of such status for the whole group does not prevent its separate units from seeking such recognition. The most peculiar case in this instance is represented by the Izvatas (Izhma Komi), a northern Komi subgroup, whose economy used to be based on semi-nomadic reindeer herding. Throughout the 21st century, Izvatas have been continuously claiming the official recognition as small-numbered peoples, but have not succeeded in their attempts, even though, their representative organization is currently the member of the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North.

Semi-settled character of agricultural economy of the Komi people did not make them “barbarous” and “backward” enough to be recognized as native by the Soviet state as well. At the same time, Komi were still enlisted among “culturally backward nationalities”. Despite the lack of official recognition, Komi have been vocally emphasizing their “nativity” throughout the last century. With establishment of the Komi-Zyryan Autonomous Oblast in 1921, the 1920s are considered as the golden era of Komi self-determination.5)

Nowadays, Komi people are the “titular” people of the Komi Republic. Such status is encapsulated in the Article 3 of the Komi Republic’s Constitution. According to the Constitution of Russia, republics are state-like entities lacking, however, the state-like sovereignty. Despite the overall hyper-centralization distinctive for contemporary Russia and simultaneously weak regional authority, state-like character of the Komi Republic is often appealed to by Komi activists, the most radical of which tend to understand such character in primary connection to the state sovereignty and national self-determination.6)

It can be argued that Finno-Ugric peoples of Russia are among those non-Russian ethnic groups who have been Russified to the greater extent. While it is mostly visible in the declining number of native speakers,7) the changes are prominent in the unified and standardized worldviews as well. Drawing on the data from the fieldwork implemented both in rural and urban areas in the Komi Republic, I may speculate that although the Komi identity is indeed based on various attributes, the language is the most frequently named vital component of such identity. The language question was appealed to both during the establishment of Komi statehood in 1920s and revitalization of the ethnic-national movement in 1990s;8) it is the one of those elements that have been most visibly affected by the Russified policies of the Soviet state and post-Soviet Russia. Further, I would like to provide a brief overview of such policies that led to the drastic decrease of number and shrinking of the share of Komi native speakers, and consequently the number of people who self-identify as Komi. It is important to outline that some of the general trends prevailing in the case of the Komi people may be regarded as rather similar for other Finno-Ugric peoples of Russia.

Soviet Union: Establishment of Komi statehood and repressive Russification

In 1926 207 314 people resided in the Komi ASSR, 191 245 (92.2%) of them were Komi.9) 191 325 residents of the Komi ASSR stated Komi as their native language, which allows us to speculate that all Komi nationals proclaimed Komi as their mother tongue. According to All-Russian Census 2010, 202 348 people (22.4%) out of total 901 189 people residing in the Komi Republic self-identify as Komi. 127 026 (62.2%) of these Komi people stated Komi as their mother tongue, and 2 717 more non-Komi people did the same. In less than a century Komi population has increased only by 5%, while Russian population has increased 40.5 times during the same time.

One of the reasons for such a drastic increase of the Russian population is its influx to the region either as the prisoners sent to Gulag camps or as the workers sent for the industrial exploration of the North.10) As majority of newcomers spoke Russian, the language soon became dominant in the region. The largest decline in the share of Komi population happened in 1940-1950s: it decreased from 72.5% to 30.1%.11) The transformation and the scale of Russification were especially dramatic in those settlements that were located near the labour camps and industrial sites.

The golden era of the Komi statehood and execution of language-national policies, commonly known as “zyryanizacija”, were terminated in the end of the 1920s. The Komi Autonomous Oblast was included in the Northern Krai, which was hugely condemned by local Komi intelligentsia, who were later accused of exercising “militant Komi nationalism” and “national-chauvinism”.12) Mirroring the developments happening elsewhere in the Soviet Union, the 1930s symbolized the dramatic repression of the national Komi movement. The key political, ideological, intellectual, and cultural Komi actors were arrested and repressed. One of them, Vasilij Molodtsov, was, for example, sent to a labour camp for the creation of “nationalistic” Komi alphabet.13)

Alongside with the formation of the Komi statehood and development of the literary language in the 1920s, the Komi language was introduced to schools. According to Popov et al.,14) in 1925 there were 203 Komi, 14 Russian, and 54 Komi-Russian schools. However, the rapid shift to Russification in the 1930s and lack of consistent regional ethno-linguistic policies in the post-war period led to practical suppression of the Komi language from the school system. By 1974 there were no schools left, where teaching was organized in the Komi language. 15)

One of the key roles in such decline was played by the introduction of the Law on schools in 1958. Article 15 of this law permitted parents to decide whether to send their children to a school with teaching in the Russian language or in the Komi. Seemingly liberating choice led to the situation when Komi children neither had teaching in the Komi language, nor had Komi as a school subject. As Popov describes it, “a situation arose when the Komi language was the only school subject that became legally waived”.16)

Repressions of the 1930s, widespread Russification, lack of the adequate ethno-national policies in the Komi ASSR in the 1950-70s, and destruction of the Komi national education led to the displacement of the Komi language to the periphery of public life. Continuous marginalization of the Komi people, internal shame associated with being Komi and speaking Komi additionally led to reduction of its use even at the mere household level.

Systemic changes leading to the minoritization and marginalization of the Komi population and creation of the Russian-centered system undoubtedly had their repercussions in the everyday of the Komi people. Most of the adult Komi residents still bear a memory of insults, particularly verbal, which they were experiencing because of their ethnicity:

“There were insults both in everyday and professional life. And it was very painful to hear, when, for example, they [Russian speakers] would see someone intoxicated or dishonorable, no matter who she is, they would call her “komjachje”, “this komjachje still wants something”. Yes, it was like that. And people were embarrassed to be Komi”.17)

Post-Soviet Russia: Revival and decline

Following the political and societal developments started elsewhere in the Soviet Union and then continued in post-Soviet Russia, the 1980-1990s symbolized the revival of the national Komi movement. As Markov describes,18) “’national’ was no longer interpreted as ‘nationalistic’”. Several Komi ethnic and ecological organizations were established, the most prominent of which was Komi Voityr (in English: Komi people), intiallly called Komi Kotyr (in English: Komi family). Komi Voityr is regarded as the most influential Komi ethnic organization, since their right to legislative initiative is encapsulated in the Article 75 of the Constitution of the Komi Republic. However, due to the fact that the organization has never employed this right and in recent years has effectively become the satellite of the regional Ministry of National Policies, its real authority and influence among the Komi population is highly debated.19)

And what about Russia of the 21st century? Centralization of the state, creation of the strict hierarchical relations between the federal center and regions, and introduction of the national policies centering Russian people as “state-forming people” (Article 68 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation) and Russian as a primary language are shaping the federal and regional ethno-national policies. Among recent developments that further weakened the role of regional languages were changes to the school teaching of regional languages, initiated in the result of Putin’s speech delivered in 2017, in which he proclaimed that “the Russian language cannot be replaced by anything, as it is forming the spiritual framework of a multinational country” and urged to make teaching the regional languages in Russia’s republic to be voluntary.20) The aftermath of this speech was devastating both for teaching the Komi language and training of the new Komi-language teachers.21)

Conclusion

There is a clear connection between Komi language, Komi identity and Komi statehood in the public perception. A menace to one of these elements is seen as a menace to others as well. Komi activists and intellectuals indeed fear that further decline of the number of Komi speakers will lead to the decline of those people who will self-identify as Komi.22) The decline of the number and share of the Komi people may consequently lead to the questioning of necessity of Komi statehood existence. The rumors on the potential unification of the neighboring Arkhangelsk Oblast and the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, as well as public commentaries of several officials involved in this process, led residents of the Komi Republic consider that the Komi Republic might be as well included in the newly established entity.23) And while the head of the Komi Republic repelled such speculations in 2020,24) his weak governance made local residents, Komi and non-Komi, to consider him as non-legitimate leader and therefore do not trust his comments or promises.

At the same time, we may also emphasize that preservation of the Komi statehood is no longer a field restrictive to the concerns of only the Komi people. On the contrary, it unites all indifferent actors irrespective of their ethnicity and promotes the construction of the local identity of a resident of the Komi Republic. It is yet to be seen how development of this place-based identity will coexist with and affect the preservation and development of the Komi identity. This question is out of the reach of this paper; however, it may potentially be reflected in future scholarships.

References[+]

Latest

November 12, 2024 France’s Strategic Role in NATO’s Arctic Ambitions: A Non-Arctic Power’s Perspective By:
Article
Read more
November 8, 2024 The Arctic This Week Take Five: Week of 4 November, 2024 By:
Take Five
Read more
November 7, 2024 An Evolution in Arctic Collective Defense By: and
Article
Read more