Identity and Relationship-Building in China’s Arctic Diplomacy

China’s icebreaker Xuelong docked in Shanghai, June 2015. Photo: Marc Lanteigne

China’s Arctic engagement has increased considerably during the past decade, which has not only offered plentiful economic opportunities but also created new risks and concerns among the eight Arctic states, non-state actors, and peoples. To increase understanding of dimensions of Beijing’s Arctic activities, The Arctic Institute’s China Series 2020 probes into China’s evolving Arctic interests, policies, and strategies, and analyses their ramifications for the region (and beyond).

The Arctic Institute China Series 2020

• China and its Arctic Trajectories: The Arctic Institute’s China Series 2020
• The tortuous path of China’s win-win strategy in Greenland
• Defining the Chinese Threat in the Arctic
• Reducing China’s Black Carbon Emissions: An Arctic Dimension
• Identity and Relationship-Building in China’s Arctic Diplomacy
• A Framework for Sino-Russian Relations in the Arctic
• The Emergence of a Sino-Russian Economic Partnership in the Arctic?
• Arctic Technopolitics and China’s Reception of the Polar Code
• ‘Prepared to Go Fully Kinetic’: How U.S. Leaders Conceptualize China’s Threat to Arctic Security
• China and its Arctic Trajectories: Final Remarks

In 2013, the Arctic Council agreed to admit¹⁾Myers SL (2013), Arctic Council Adds 6 Nations as Observer States, Including China, New York Times 15 May six new states as formal observers, with five of them, including China, being from the Asia-Pacific region.²⁾These are India, Japan, Singapore and South Korea; Italy was the sixth This decision can be viewed as a watershed for regional diplomacy, both because it underscored the fact that Arctic affairs were in the process of becoming steadily more globalised in scope, and that the admission of Asian governments as observers, including countries far from the Arctic Circle such as India and Singapore, has brought forward the question of how best to define an ‘Arctic stakeholder.³⁾Lanteigne M (2018), How to Define an Arctic Stakeholder, Over the Circle, 19 February, <https://overthecircle.com/2018/02/19/how-to-define-an-arctic-stakeholder/> Unlike previous observers welcomed by the Council, including Britain, Germany, Netherlands and Poland, the five Asia-Pacific observers lacked an extensive history of far northern exploration and scientific endeavours. Thus, the quintet sought to accentuate other assets which could be brought to the Council’s expanding portfolio including modern scientific diplomacy as well as the potential for Arctic economic engagement. 

The need to create an acceptable Arctic identity was arguably most pressing for China, given its status as a great power and early concerns expressed by other actors, particularly the United States, that Beijing was seeking a revisionist agenda in the region, especially at a time when the Arctic was seen as a resource bonanza-in-waiting.⁴⁾Arsenault C (2010), ‘A Scramble for the Arctic. Al-Jazeera, 8 December <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2010/12/8/a-scramble-for-the-arctic> Increasing concerns was the timing of China’s admittance as a Council observer, which coincided with rising tensions between Beijing and Washington over the South China Sea, as critics often attempted to loop together that waterway and the Arctic Ocean as simply facets of the same policy of Chinese strategic assertiveness. While the acceptance of China as an observer could considered a validation of the country’s emerging Arctic interests, at the same time it placed Beijing under a metaphorical microscope, prompting the Chinese government to adopt a conservative approach to regional diplomacy. 

Navigating as a ‘near-Arctic state’ 

Central to the success of China’s emerging Arctic policies was the need to be accepted as a legitimate stakeholder in the region without being viewed as pursuing a dissenting agenda and risking being marginalised in a region which Beijing had recognised as one of emerging strategic importance. Therefore, China was required to build a robust Arctic identity over the past decade, and despite more overt pushback⁵⁾Lino MR (2020) Understanding China’s Arctic activities. IISS, 25 February, <https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis//2020/02/china-arctic> from the United States since last year, Beijing has been largely successful in achieving this goal. To understand why, it is necessary to look closely at the building blocks of the country’s current Arctic identity, especially since Beijing was able to develop key bilateral and multilateral relationships in the region to fortify the perception of it becoming an indispensable partner in the development of the Arctic. 

One example of the difficulties Beijing faced in developing its Arctic identity was the negative reaction in some international policymaking circles towards China’s self-identification, starting almost a decade ago, as a ‘near-Arctic state’ (jin beiji guojia近北极国家). From a geographic viewpoint, the label made little sense. China has no territory in or near the Arctic; the county of Mohe (漠河县), which despite being the northernmost point in the country and renowned for its sub-zero winters, is located over 1400 kilometres south of the Arctic Circle. Nonetheless, the use of the term began to appear in both Chinese policy statements and research commentaries shortly before China achieved Arctic Council observer status, and then was a feature in the country’s six-point statement⁶⁾MFA China (2015) Keynote Speech by Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Ming at the China Country Session of the Third Arctic Circle Assembly. 17 October, <https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/201510/t20151017_678393.html> on the Arctic produced in 2015, and within China’s first government White Paper on Arctic policy,⁷⁾State Council Information Office, PRC (2018), Full text: China’s Arctic Policy, 26 January, <https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm> released three years later, which also confirmed that the Arctic was to be linked with Beijing’s greater ‘Belt and Road’ trade and infrastructure strategies. The ‘near-Arctic’ concept was also explained in an official Blue Book on Chinese Arctic affairs, published in 2018,⁸⁾Liu H, Dong Y, Sun K and Chen Y (2018) 北极地区发展报告(2018版2017)/北极蓝皮书 [Arctic Development Report (2018 Edition 2017 / Arctic Blue Book] Beijing, Social Science Academic Press. which suggested that in addition to China’s relative proximity to the Arctic, the country’s economic weight, and the connections between Arctic climate change and its changed weather and pollution conditions within China,⁹⁾Chen H, Liu N and Zhang Z, (2013) Severe Winter Weather as a Response to the Lowest Arctic Sea-Ice Anomalies Acta Oceanologica Sinica 32(10)(October): 11-15; Zhu Z, Fei H and Xiao X (2019) Predictability of Chinese Summer Extreme Rainfall Based on Arctic Sea Ice and Tropical Sea Surface Temperature Journal of Ocean University of China 18(3)(June): 626-32. were also components of that descriptor. 

However, the term has at times been denigrated outside of China, including last year by the US government,¹⁰⁾Wong A (2019) US Rebukes China’s Claim to be a ‘Near-Arctic State’, Inkstone, 7 May, <https://www.scmp.com/news/world/united-states-canada/article/3009095/entitled-exactly-nothing-us-secretary-state-mike> for implying that Beijing was seeking to challenge the sovereignty of Arctic states and institutions. China has been actively seeking to dispel such concerns, given that much of its Arctic policy is heavily dependent upon the goodwill of the Arctic states themselves, especially Russia, which is the centrepiece for future development of an ‘Ice Silk Road’ (Bingshang Sichouzhilu 冰上丝绸之路), which would connect China to markets in Northern Europe, and potentially elsewhere in the Arctic Ocean, via the Russian Arctic.¹¹⁾Guan X, Yang B and Liu M (2019), “冰上丝绸之路”与中俄参与全球经济治理的新探索[The Polar Silk Road and New Exploration of Sino-Russia Cooperation in the Global Governance,] Journal of Northeast Asia Studies 3: 30-42; Lanteigne M (2020) The Twists and Turns of the Polar Silk Road, Over the Circle, 15 March, <https://overthecircle.com/2020/03/15/the-twists-and-turns-of-the-polar-silk-road/>

Faced with both a considerable degree of international scrutiny and a sensitivity to being viewed as an illegitimate Arctic actor, Beijing has undertaken a multifaceted approach to developing its Arctic diplomacy, which has included a heavy focus on regional scientific cooperation,¹²⁾Bertelsen RG, Li X and Gregersen MH, (2017) Chinese Arctic Science Diplomacy: an Instrument for Achieving the Chinese Dream? in Global Challenges in the Arctic Region: Sovereignty, Environment and Geopolitical Balance, ed. Elena Conde and Sara Iglesias Sánchez (New York and London: Routledge, 442-61. economic engagement, and institution-building via bilateral and multilateral engagement as well as using both governmental and ‘Track II’ (sub-governmental) organisations. This protean, ‘all-around’ approach, which has focused specifically on relationship building and strengthening, has provided China the opportunity to both deepen its diplomatic footprint in the region and accumulate necessary information on the subjects of regional politics, governance, development, and security perceptions while, until recently, avoiding a blowback situation from Arctic governments. 

Relationships matter

A recent addition to international relations (IR) studies in China has been in the field of relational theory, which seeks to understand the importance of, and the potential power derived by, select relationships in the international system using Chinese historical and philosophical traditions.¹³⁾Qin Y (2016) A Relational Theory of World Politics International Studies Review 18: 33-47; Kavalski E (2018) Guanxi or What is the Chinese for Relational Theory of World Politics International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 18: 397-420. As this theory explains, global actors exist within a network of relationships which could and should be studied specifically along with the processes they create. These interactions, relational theory suggests, can also create and shape power in the information system, including through the development of prestige or ‘face’ (mianzi面子) amongst various actors. Unlike Western materialist approaches to IR theory, including various schools of realism and liberalism, relational theory tends to focus less on the actors themselves, with a preference for examinations of the linkages they produce. This approach is useful in understanding how Beijing has been able to develop both its Arctic interests and a distinct Arctic identity despite the challenges posed by both geography and history. 

On one level, China has sought to develop bilateral Arctic partnerships with regional governments over the past decade, although its success rate has been mixed at best when looking at each of the eight Arctic states. By far the strongest of these ties has been with Russia, as the Ice Silk Road slowly but steadily develops based on energy partnerships¹⁴⁾Tsafos N (2019) Is Russia Winning the Race to Develop Arctic Energy? Cener for Strategic and International Studies, 22 March, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-winning-race-develop-arctic-energy> and the promise of future infrastructure projects. Beijing has also developed strong relations with Finland and Iceland in recent years, with the latter country signing a free trade agreement with China in 2013. Free trade talks are also, sporadically, underway¹⁵⁾Klesty V and Solsvik T (2020) Norway Hopes for China Free-Trade Deal in 2020, Industry Minister Says, Reuters, 8 January, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-norway-china-trade/norway-hopes-for-china-free-trade-deal-in-2020-industry-minister-says-idUSKBN1Z71FP> between China and Norway after a six-year diplomatic freeze ended in December 2016. 

China’s bilateral Arctic ties are less evident in the cases of Canada and Sweden. Chinese relations with Ottawa deteriorated in late 2018 after Canadian authorities arrested a senior executive with the Chinese telecommunications firm Huawei at the behest of the United States, and Sino-Swedish ties have become brittle¹⁶⁾Milne R (2020) Swedish Cities Cut China Links after Increase in Tension, Financial Times, 25 February <https://www.ft.com/content/b6c8d510-429e-11ea-a43a-c4b328d9061c> over human rights policies and the recent Chinese sentencing of a Hong Kong-based Swedish bookseller. Chinese relations with Denmark have also faced headwinds over the past few years, due to Danish concerns about Chinese interests in pursuing investments in Greenland, developments which Copenhagen is beginning to view as representing a potential security risk.¹⁷⁾Shi M and Lanteigne M (2019) China’s Central Role in Denmark’s Arctic Security Policies, The Diplomat 8 December, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/chinas-central-role-in-denmarks-arctic-security-policies/> Finally, as previously noted, the Arctic is one of the many areas where US-China relations have frequently clashed of late. 

However, to understand the current state of Chinese diplomacy in the Arctic, an examination of Beijing’s multilateral diplomacy in the region is essential and provides much additional insight into the country’s effective use of relationship building. For example, China has sought to be an active participant in the Arctic Council despite its limiting observer status, or as one academic paper from the Ocean University in Qingdao colourfully phrased it, ‘dancing in shackles’.¹⁸⁾Liu H and Sun S (2016) 中国与北极：合作与共赢之路, [China and Arctic: To Create a Cooperative and Win-win Situation], Journal of Ocean University of China (Social Sciences) 2: 1-7. China’s most recent activity report to the Council, covering 2016-8, noted that Chinese representatives were active in several of the organisation’s Working Groups, including those overseeing climate change monitoring and marine environmental protection.¹⁹⁾Arctic Council (2018) China Working Report, 31 May, <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/9a0755f2-bc1a-4f04-8a21-11beee7306ef/content>

Despite ongoing US government criticism of China’s alleged challenge to the ‘rules-based order’ of the Arctic, Beijing has sought to support governance regimes relevant to the Arctic, including older agreements such as the Spitsbergen Treaty, (which China joined in 1925),²⁰⁾Qin T, (2015) Dispute over the Applicable Scope of the Svalbard Treaty: A Chinese Lawyer’s Perspective Journal of East Asia and International Law 8(1)(May): 149-70. and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). ²¹⁾Zhang C (2017) ‘北极海域的大陆架划界问题——法律争议与中国对策,’ [‘Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in Arctic Seas: Legal Disputes and China’s Policy’] Global Review 3: 116-34. As China’s 2018 Arctic White Paper indicated, the country would ‘participate in regulating and managing the affairs and activities relating to the Arctic on the basis of rules and mechanisms’. China was also active in the drawing up and implementation of two more contemporary regional agreements, specifically the 2017 Polar Code,²²⁾Yuan X and Tong K (2019)《极地水域船舶作业国际规则》的法律属性析论 [Analysis of Legal Attributes of the “International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters”] Chinese Journal of Polar Research 31(3)(September): 334-45. via the International Maritime Organisation, and the 2018 ban on unregulated high seas fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean. Beijing’s support for the fishing moratorium, as one commentary argued,²³⁾Liu N (2018) How Has China Shaped Arctic Fisheries Governance? The Diplomat (20 June) <https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/how-has-china-shaped-arctic-fisheries-governance/> served to underscore Chinese support for a strong legal framework in the Arctic while also allowing China greater visibility in emerging regional legal debates, despite the country’s limitations within the Arctic Council. 

China, like many other non-Arctic states with broadening concerns in the far north, has also engaged extensively with Track II mechanisms both as a means for further information collection and as a means to further deepen relations with sub- and non-governmental actors. Chinese governmental, scientific and academic representatives have been frequent participants in Arctic Circle (Reykjavík) and Arctic Frontiers (Tromsø) conferences, as well as within the Russia-sponsored Arctic: Territory of Dialogue events. Shanghai hosted an Arctic Circle breakout forum in May last year, which provided China with further opportunities to demonstrate its research and business prowess in the region. In an announcement last year, Beijing also sought to develop its own Track II conferences via the China-Nordic Arctic Research Centre (CNARC) created in 2013, as well as via a similar forum, which reportedly will connect Chinese and Russian scientific expertise. 

China as an Arctic pathfinder 

Although Beijing’s Arctic diplomacy remains a work in progress and may be facing stronger resistance from the United States, and other Western governments in the near future, some initial conclusions can be drawn from China’s early patterns of Arctic engagement. First, although China is accepting, at present, of its subaltern status within the Arctic Council, the country has been actively seeking to deepen its polar diplomacy through alternative avenues, and the development of multifaceted relationships with significant regional actors is essential to achieve this. Second, China’s relational diplomacy is also having the effect of bringing forward the question of defining an Arctic stakeholder, even among states with no Arctic geography.

Third, the Ice Silk Road may still be in its infancy, but its slow and steady development may serve as the central platform for further Chinese integration, especially relating to economic diplomacy in the region. Fourth, should the United States continue to pursue a zero-sum, ‘security first’ approach to its Arctic strategy, the relationships Beijing has begun to build may be essential in a scenario, which Beijing is duly concerned about, involving a more overt ‘cutting up’ of the region amongst the Arctic powers, with no significant role for outside actors.²⁴⁾Li D (2011) 多国觊觎北极 “大蛋糕” [‘Many Countries Covet the Arctic’s “Big Cake”], Modern Navy (November): 10-12. Finally, the Arctic is proving to be a critical acid test of Chinese international relations beyond the familiar frontiers of the Asia-Pacific, and in addition to the need for greater understanding of the players within the region, China is also seeking to comprehend the political relationships amongst them, and how they can also be key components of Beijing’s emerging diplomacy in the circumpolar north.

Marc Lanteigne is an Associate Professor of Political Science at UiT-The Arctic University of Norway, Tromsø, and the editor of the Arctic news blog Over the Circle. The author would like to thank Lynn Gardinier, Francesca Rán Rositudóttir and Mingming Shi for their assistance in the preparation of this article.