Greenland stakes a Course within Defense and Diplomacy

Ski-equipped US Air Force C-130 in Greenland. Photo: 109th Airlift Wing

Greenland’s new foreign-, security-, and defense policy strategy stakes a course within defense and diplomacy, while sharing visions of how its international relations can be improved through commerce and communication. From a Danish perspective, the strategy will make it easier to find common ground between Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands – altogether constituting the Kingdom of Denmark – on how to address the security policy dynamics in the Arctic. Dynamics, which are characterized by increasing rivalry between the great powers of China, Russia, and the USA, as well as the challenged intergovernmental cooperation in the region as a result of the war in Ukraine.

Within defense and security policy, the strategy is also important in terms of creating greater continuity, as Greenland’s approach has previously been somewhat erratic, where changes of government could mean significant changes to how Greenland positioned itself on these important matters. The new strategy is supported by a broad majority in Inatsisartut (Greenland’s parliament) – only the very independence-oriented party Naleraq is not part of the agreement – which hopefully means that the content will also serve as a guideline for future governments.

Greenland’s sense of defense policy

The defense and security policy content of the document is not perfect, but it is a step in the right direction. Good strategies describe threats and opportunities, the goals to be achieved, as well as the resources and capacities (means) available, how they will be used to achieve the goals with the means (methods), and what risks and costs the chosen approach entails. Official strategy documents in general rarely hit the mark on these parameters, as they are often good at describing the situation and setting out some ambitions to be achieved, while often struggling to capture how and with what means they will be achieved and what disadvantages they entail.

The approach to defense and security policy in Greenland’s new strategy is no exception. Goals are sometimes defined, but it is unclear how they should be achieved. For example, the strategy sets a goal of greater Greenlandic participation in sovereignty enforcement, highlighting the Sirius Patrol and a necessary discussion on the introduction of conscription. Likewise, the establishment of civilian emergency preparedness activities and – in the long term – an actual coast guard are mentioned. However, common to these ambitions is the lack of explanation of how the goal will be reached, what it will cost, or what disadvantages it will entail.

Emerging realism and a pacifist ideal

The same pattern can be seen in the strategy’s analysis of the overall security policy situation. The strategy describes in broad terms that Greenland faces both military threats and so-called gray zone threats (cyber-attacks, influence operations, sabotage and the like), which fall below the threshold of outright war. Greenland wants these threats to be addressed while also striving to preserve the Arctic as a low-tension area.

Here, the strategy touches upon what in political science is called ‘the security dilemma’: Deterrence and defense require increased military presence, but when state A acts accordingly by strengthening its military capacity, there is a risk of creating mistrust in state B, which may ultimately increase the level of tension and in fact worsen the threat that state A originally sought to protect itself from.

The strategy clearly suggests that Greenland should align itself with the West, which is a rather new unequivocal statement that especially gained ground after the Russian actions in Ukraine in 2022. At the same time, however, a pacifist ideal and ideas of détente are highlighted throughout the strategy where it is often viewed as being part of a cultural tradition of always seeking peace. The strategy tries to balance this tension by emphasizing both needs without providing a clear description of how the two partially contradictory goals will be achieved simultaneously. As it says, Greenland must “not be naïve. However, we must also not give up when it comes to peace.”

Since Greenland has not taken over defense policy, the strategy can get away with a general call to Denmark and Denmark’s allies that Greenland preferably does not want more military capabilities, and if they cannot be avoided, they should preferably be limited to surveillance capabilities without the ability to defeat hostile platforms. This gives an indication of how Greenland will position itself in future discussions – including the next Danish defense agreement, in which Greenland will be involved – but it is unclear how Greenland will position itself if the security policy situation necessitates more potent capabilities.

The bear in the room

In areas that Greenland actually controls – such as the infrastructure and the research sectors – it is easier to navigate the tension between defense and détente. Although some of Greenland’s initiatives may be disruptive to Russia, they will not constitute a military threat and thus have limited effect on the level of tension. For example, the strategy highlights that Greenland has joined the EU’s sanctions against Russia. It is also emphasized that efforts will be made to ensure that critical infrastructure is not owned by foreign actors, while cyber-attacks are mentioned as an existing challenge. However, what will be done concretely to address these threats is not entirely clear.

At the same time, Greenland can take new initiatives in a wide range of areas that appeal to the ideals of pacifism and détente, which are presented as inherent in Greenlandic culture: “We must remember who we are and what our fundamental values are. Greenland will therefore, preferably in collaboration with external contributors, establish a Peace Center in Greenland with a focus on peace in the Arctic.” Japan is mentioned as an attractive partner for cooperation in this regard, because it has made great efforts to research in and the promotion of peace. What the strategy does not mention is, however, that Japan has also experienced enhanced militarization in recent years as a direct consequence of the increased threat from China and North Korea.

In this light, it is striking how few times ‘Russia’ and ‘Russian’ are mentioned. Only four times in a total of 26 pages. In comparison, the corresponding numbers for Denmark’s foreign and security policy strategy is a whopping 45 times in a total of 15 pages. This indicates that Greenland is carefully considering the signals it sends to Russia. The bear is in the room, but the strategy does not point directly at it as long as it is about what it may do in the Arctic.

In the same manner, the strategy emphasizes that “Greenland finds it important that everyone in the region participates in discussing the issues that are particularly relevant to the Arctic”. Here, the emphasis on everyone necessarily includes Russia, which is currently excluded from participating in activities in the Arctic Council. Whether the door should be opened slightly for them is a delicate question which may risk creating discord among the council’s other members.

Foundation for further defense negotiations with Denmark

Despite some shortcomings, the content of the strategy is an important step forward in taking defense and security policy more seriously. Greenland acknowledges that there is, indeed, a threat and has outlined some overarching thoughts on what it wants to achieve. In that way, the strategy is a good starting point which Denmark and other friendly states can take stock of, thus probably making cooperation with Greenland easier. Many of these thoughts resonate with the debate in Copenhagen, and it therefore seems realistic that the Greenlandic strategy can be a foundation for enhanced dialogue on defense and security policy.

Marc Jacobsen is an Assistant Professor at the Royal Danish Defence College’s Centre for Arctic Security Studies where he researches security politics and diplomacy in Arctic contexts. Marc was also a Member – in various positions – of The Arctic Institute between 2013 and 2020. Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen is an Associate Professor and head of research, education, and development at the Royal Danish Defence College’s Centre for Arctic Security Studies where his research focuses on Arctic security and defense policy.

A Danish version is published in Altinget on February 23, 2024. All citations are translated from Danish by the authors.