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France's Strategic Role in NATO's Arctic Ambitions: A Non-Arctic Power's Perspective

By | Article
November 12, 2024
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A gray British Royal Navy Merlin MK2 Helicopter hovering next to the Amethyste Attack Submarine of the French Navy, during the NATO Steadfast Defender 24 exercise off the coast of Norway in 2024 over a dark blue sea

British Royal Navy Merlin MK2 Helicopter and French Navy Amethyste Attack Submarine, during NATO Steadfast Defender 24 off the coast of Norway. Photo: SHAPE NATO

The Arctic Institute NATO Series 2024-2025

Despite being located 1,600 kilometers away from the Arctic Circle, France holds an Observer seat on the Arctic Council. This role aligns with the country’s history of engagement in polar territories. France indeed has a history of having territorial possessions around the world, particularly in the South Indian Ocean, and territorial claims in Antarctica, which are gathered under the administrative area of the “French Southern and Antarctic Territories” (TAAF). The European Union Member State, has had a historical presence in the region and has contributed to the EU’s broader objectives1) of safeguarding the environment and geopolitical stability in the region.

This duality of interests encompassing both the claimed territories in Antarctica and the historical presence in the Arctic has pushed France to adopt a particular posture, merging its polar ambition and vision to cover Arctic and Antarctic issues within the same strategy. France has historically sought to establish and reinforce its presence globally through territorial claims, like in Antarctica, or by influencing policies, such as seeking an Observer Seat at the Arctic Council to influence Arctic multilateralism and governance, promote its scientific expertise, and play a role in economic transformations in a context of climate change. Also illustrating France’s interest in the polar regions, the post of Ambassador to the Polar Regions was created in 2009 by former president Nicolas Sarkozy, attached to the French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is a military alliance of 31 North American and European Countries that agreed in 1949 to be committed to mutual defense and cooperative security against aggression, especially in a Cold-War context. Despite the fall of the USSR, the Alliance is still relevant. Very recently, two Nordic States, Finland and Sweden, joined NATO respectively in 2023 and 2024. Today, the vast majority of states in the Arctic belong to the Alliance thus creating a political and geographical quasi-hegemonic presence of the Alliance The presence and behavior of Russia, a power seen as hostile2) by NATO, which notes in its 2022 Strategic Concept3) that Russia’s “capability to disrupt Allied reinforcements and freedom of navigation across the North Atlantic is a strategic challenge,” justifying its involvement in the regional geopolitical scene.

In this context, France, as a nuclear power and key member of NATO, plays a pivotal role in the Alliance’s strategy to strengthen its hegemony over the region. The first section of this article explores the evolution of France’s interests in the Arctic, from its early scientific expeditions to its current political and military commitments, while the second section examines the country’s contributions to NATO initiatives, to the activities of the Atlantic Alliance and attempts to identify strategic prospects following the 2022 French Polar Strategy. Ultimately, this piece highlights how France’s evolving role in the Arctic enhances its regional influence and positions the Country as a key player in shaping NATO’s presence in the region.

Historical perspective of France’s Arctic Interests

To determine France’s current multisectoral involvement in the Arctic, it is essential to explore historical developments of the presence of the European country in the region, from early scientific explorations to the institutionalization of scientific research, and to analyze the progressive consolidation of a comprehensive national polar policy, inclusively addressing scientific, environmental, economic, governance and security interests.

France has been involved in the Arctic for over two centuries, from voyages led by Joseph René Bellot in the mid-1800s which focused on mapping unexplored territories, as well as the Northwest Passage, to the establishment in 1992 of the Polar Institute Paul-Émile Victor – which was named for the famous Polar explorer4) who conducted one of the first series of French polar expeditions since 1947. The Polar Institute today covers a wide range of scientific areas: glaciology, chemistry, physics, geology, astronomy, biodiversity and biology, human and social sciences concerning local populations. Outside Antarctica and the Subantarctic French Islands, the Polar Institute co-operates the Franco-German AWIPEV Station located at Ny-Ålesund in the Norwegian Svalbard. In addition, France supports numerous scientific projects in Nunavik and Labrador (Canada), in Greenland, in Alaska (USA), Yakutia and Amur (Russia), and in Iceland, Sweden, and Norway. The Polar Institute Paul-Émile Victor is completed by the Centre for Scientific Development (CNRS) and its French Arctic Initiative designed to coordinate the research activities of French Universities. Other private institutes such as the Cercle Polaire think-tank, the Arctic Observatory co-led by the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique and the Ministry of Armed Forces, contribute to national scientific efforts. According to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the country ranks eleventh5) concerning scientific publications on the Arctic, with focuses on various topics,6) including ecology, glaciology, climatology, paleontology, biology, and social sciences.7)

The age of the explorations, the wide range of scientific areas, and the number of institutions illustrate the pioneering nature and the importance of French scientific activities in the Polar regions. France’s involvement in the Arctic was indeed historically driven by scientific exploration and studies. However, during the last decades and in line with the emergence of new economic, strategic and political stakes, France recently adopted a more holistic posture8) that builds on the historical pillar of scientific research, new policies in areas (local governance, strategic partnerships, economic activities…) that were, until then, more incidental. The request formulated in 2000 by the government to become an Observer State at the Arctic Council illustrates this ambition to contribute to regional forums and local governance, beyond scientific activities.

This long tradition of scientific exploration in the Arctic, institutionalized around the Paul-Émile Victor Polar Institute, has gradually become part of political objectives, developed in policy documents in recent years. In 2016, the government published the National Roadmap for the Arctic,9) which developed and explained the country’s interests and stakes in the region. Although this publication was published after those of other European States, which released similar policies years earlier, it builds on prior working documents focused on various related areas such as the environment. These documents include the 2013 White Paper on Defence and National Security,10) reports from members of Parliament on European stakes in the Arctic (2014),11) on Oceans Geopolitics (2012),12) on Ecological, Economical and Gopolitical Climate Change in Arctic and Antarctic (2013)13) and more. As a political and diplomatic document, the National Roadmap for the Arctic covers France’s interests in the region, including scientific research, economics, security, and ecology.

Although the 2016 Arctic Roadmap14) expressly prioritized sustainable development, ecology, and environmental protection and marked its alignment with the Arctic Council’s environmental requirements, the practical reality seems to show that economic stakes still overshadow the environmental commitments of the Roadmap. In essence, the French government initially planned to support the highly criticized Arctic LNG 2 project,15) led by Russia’s Novatek and France’s Total Énergies, with EUR 700 million. The LNG 2 project aims to build an important liquefaction facility in the Gydan Peninsula, Northern Russia, to export natural gas to Asia and Europe. Once extracted from the frozen Arctic soil, the gas would be cooled to -163ºC and shipped via LNG tankers. A process highly criticized for its important environmental impact. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Total Énergies decided to suspend its participation and the Government eventually abandoned its contribution to the project due to public pressure, led by environmental NGOs16) that recalled the government’s commitment to reduce fossil energies and to protect the Arctic from climate change consequences. More broadly, France’s national greenhouse gas emissions remain dramatically superior17) to the limits established by the 2015 Paris Agreement, despite a recent modest decline. This contradicts the objectives of the Arctic Roadmap – among other environmental commitments – greenhouse gases being a major contributor to the climate change impacts observed at the Poles, particularly in the Arctic.

The 2016 roadmap18) also considers national defense and security issues of interest, including sovereignty disputes, competitive economic activities, and maritime security. In this regard, the document sets out France’s role in a multilateral approach, both within the EU and NATO frameworks with a power justification: “France’s membership of the European Union and NATO means that it may have to contribute to maintaining the stability of the Arctic, since it is one of the few countries with the capability to deploy significant resources at such great distances.” The document underlines the need for an advanced level of cooperation in the region, and highlights Russia’s participation in regional forums and its peaceful resolution of the Barents Sea boundary dispute with Norway in 2010. The roadmap notes however that any threat to the stability of the region, or concerning allied States of the EU and/or of NATO is part of France’s security interests, along with the gradual opening of maritime routes and the general use of the Arctic Ocean as a manœuvre area for the French Navy.

Six years later, in 2022, the Government published France’s 2030 Polar Strategy,19) comprehensively detailing the challenges related to the two polar regions and developing strategies to address these stakes. This document allows the government to clarify and restructure the national polar strategy.

Regarding scientific research, a large-scale research strategy is introduced in the context of European and international cooperation, through the EU-PolarNet 2, Horizon, and Horizon Europe projects and in collaboration with the EU Polar Cluster of the European Commission. The resources are rebalanced to reinforce the Polar Institute’s presence in the Arctic. The Polar Institute – expressly qualified as “undersized” in the Polar Strategy will have its duties and scope enlarged with around 200 additional scientists. The strategic document details three specific missions for the Polar Institute: coordination of polar scientific activities, management and logistical support of polar research, and education on polar issues. The emphasis on human and social sciences is also underlined. In addition, the document encourages scientific actors to develop a “Polar culture and education.” To remedy the decline in resources, the Strategy announces the renewal of the Oceanographic Fleet, the commissioning of a coastal polar icebreaker and the development of other permanent research facilities in the Arctic, especially in Greenland – a “region of the globe where the signature of climate change is most visible and most devastating” and region where the French presence continuously declined during the last decades.

On the political stage, the Polar Strategy demands the systematic reinforcement of France’s participation in the Arctic Council and its working groups and supports the EU’s request to obtain an observer status in this forum. In this regard, there is an interesting shift between the 2016 Arctic Roadmap, which depicted the Arctic as an outstanding area of cooperation in a tense global context, and the 2022 Polar Strategy, which warns that “The Arctic needs to be seen as a potential international zone of conflict once again,” noting the presence in the region of the longest Russia-NATO border and recent Russian defense investments.

As outlined in the Polar Strategy, the French Government organized in November 2023 the One Polar Summit20) in Paris, gathering delegates from 40 countries with the aim of taking measures to mitigate the disastrous climate change consequences in the polar regions. This event illustrates France’s desire to move away from a relatively inactive policy on these subjects, towards a more proactive stance, for a country that wishes to “come back to the big league.”21) The summit concluded with the “Paris Call for Glaciers and Poles,” calling for enhanced international efforts to protect the regions and their glaciers. It should be also noted that, during the closure of the summit, French President Emmanuel Macron announced the construction of an Ice-Class Research Vessel, as demanded by the Polar Strategy as well as the investment of EUR 1.1 billion into polar research until 2030 to tackle climate change effects on the Polar regions: “We are not talking about a threat for tomorrow, but one that is already present and accelerating. We are talking about a transformation of the cryosphere that already threatens millions and will threaten billions of the planet’s inhabitants with multiple direct and indirect consequences,” said Macron.22)

The 2030 Polar Strategy also underlined the “central” importance of military security aspects in the Arctic, justifying the presence of the French Navy in the region to protect the free movement at sea. The French Armed Forces presence in the Arctic is indeed well-established. In addition to joint exercises with NATO member states’ forces and allied Arctic States that will be studied in the next section, the French Navy conducts regular patrols and missions designed to recall its ability to project itself in the region and defend its interests. In September 2023, a nuclear attack submarine and a support vessel of the French Navy docked in Tromsø, Norway, in the context of a mission in the North Atlantic. In the context of this mission, the military attaché to the French Embassy in Norway, indicated that “In the current framework of the war in Ukraine, France contributes to demonstrating the strong resolution of NATO countries as well as the will to maintain a non-escalatory behavior.” These missions also allow the different army corps to acquire new skills by adapting to demanding environments and to develop interoperability between partners.23) More recently in February 2024, the European Multi-Purpose Frigate “Bretagne,” based in Brest, completed a one-month mission24) between Norway and Iceland. According to the French Navy, the mission’s goals were to “gain a better knowledge and control of the maritime zones located at the North of Europe” and the mission allowed to “reinforce the relationships between France and countries in the regions, especially Iceland and Norway. The crew of the Bretagne also strengthened its skills of operating in demanding meteorological conditions”.

France’s military activities in the Arctic are a key aspect of its national Polar policy and diplomatic stance. These missions primarily operate within a collaborative, multilateral framework involving allies and alliances, particularly NATO, of which France is one of the main European forces.

France’s contribution to NATO’s Arctic Strategy

From a political perspective, NATO covers a large part of the Arctic. Since March 2024, with the recent accession of Finland and Sweden, all the Arctic states, save for one, are members of the Alliance, thereby illustrating a certain political hegemony – or a form of prevailing influence of NATO in shaping the political and governance dynamics of the region. From a geographical point of view, however, this hegemony must be put into perspective; the Russian Federation represents an immense part of the Arctic, taking up about half of the region, with over 24,000 kilometers of coastline. France, as a founding member of the Atlantic Alliance, remains a key player in shaping NATO’s presence and strategic initiatives, including in the Arctic. France’s commitment to the region’s security, aligning with NATO’s regional agenda is illustrated by the continuous and increasing support to the Alliance’s activities in the region.

Historically, the Arctic was a major source of tension during the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the West. After the fall of the USSR, rivalries gave way to collaboration, which was illustrated by the creation of the Arctic Council in 1996 and by the assistance provided by certain Western states to decontaminate Russian territories polluted by nuclear waste. In recent years, however, renewed tensions have shattered this spirit of exceptionalism and collaboration. Although Arctic stability has taken a hit, particularly since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the growing involvement of China in the region, the Arctic is not the “new Wild-West,”25) as certain abusively overstated.26)

In May 2023, the NATO Allied Command Transformation published a note27) recalling the significant strategic interests for the alliance: “A combination of military interests, technological advancements and climate changes point to an increasingly contested High North, the changing security environment will require careful navigation.” A few months later, in October 2023, the Chair of the NATO Military Committee, Admiral Robert Bauer, addressed the Arctic Circle Assembly: “The increased competition and militarization in the Arctic region, especially by Russia and China, is concerning. The melting ice in the Arctic is creating new sea routes that would facilitate the movement of large vessels and shorten navigation times. We cannot be naïve and ignore the potentially nefarious intentions of some actors in the region. We must remain vigilant and prepare for the unexpected.”28) This discourse summarizes the global strategy of the Atlantic Alliance in the region: addressing the Arctic’s evolving geopolitical dynamics, especially in light of the behavior of Russia and China, around three key words: readiness, capacity, and deterrence.

Since the early 1950s, NATO has conducted joint exercises in Europe, including in the Arctic, where some of them were based in the region, such as Mainbrace (1952), Strikeback (1957), Anorak Express (1980) etc. From January to May 2024, NATO allies organized the largest military exercise since the end of the Cold War: Steadfast Defender 2429) involving over 90,000 troops from all 32 Member States, including France. The exercise partially took place in the Arctic between 21 February and 15 March to simulate an attack on the Alliance’s northern and eastern flanks. In the context of the Arctic Component of the exercise, the French Armed Forces mobilized 450 soldiers to Norway and Finland, some of which came from the Seventh Battalion of Chasseurs Alpins (Alpin Hunters),30) based in the French Alps. For France, the objective is varied: to show its support for its Arctic allies, to reaffirm its central role within NATO, to test new materials, and to improve its ability to operate in difficult environments in the region, that don’t exist in continental France.

Arctic aside, France participates on a regular basis in NATO military exercises. This regularity and involvement is also present in the exercises taking place in the Arctic and/or with States in the region. The table below illustrates the recurrence of NATO’s exercises in the Arctic and the regular participation of the French Armed Forces in those activities.

Exercise NameObjectiveDatesLocationsPersonnel involvedFrance’s involvement
Cold ResponseEnhance interoperability and combat readiness in extreme conditionsBiennial, 2006-2022Norway2022: 30,000 from 27 countries2022: 1st Marine Infantry Regiment, amphibious ship Dixmude, Frigate, Atlantique 2 Aircraft, Helicopter detachment involved
Trident JunctureTest NATO’s collective defense capabilities2015, 2018Norway2018: 50,000 from 31 NATO and partner countries2018: 3,000 personnel, 2 frigates, projection and command ship, replenishment oiler, 4 Mirage fighters
Arctic ChallengeMultinational air exercise for Air Forces interoperabilityBiennial, 2013-2023Norway, Sweden, Finland2023: 3,000, 150 aircrafts from 14 NATO and partner countries2023: 11 Fighter jets, E-3F Awacs
Steadfast Defender 2021Rapid deployment and military mobility, Article 5 ScenarioMay-June 2021North Atlantic Ocean component9,000 from 20 NATO and partner countriesEuropean Multi-Purpose Frigate “Normandie”
Joint WarriorGeneral training and interoperabilityApril-May 2021North Sea, Norway13,000 from 10 NATO countriesEuropean Multi-Purpose Frigate “Normandie”
Dynamic MongooseAnti-submarine warfare trainingAnnual, 2012-2024North Atlantic, Norwegian Sea, Iceland, Norway2024: Thousands from 10 NATO countries2021: Navy’s Command and Supply Vessel “Marne”, Reinforced Multi-Purpose Frigate “Alsace”, Surveillance Aircraft (Atlantique 2)
Northern VikingStrengthen cooperation and interoperabilityBiennial, 2004-2024Iceland, Norwegian Ses2024: 1,200 personnel from 7 NATO countries2022: Anti-submarine Destroyer “Latouche-Tréville”
2024: European Multi-Purpose Frigate “Aquitaine”
BaltopsImprove maritime and amphibious operationsAnnual, 1991-2024Baltic Sea2024: 9,000 personnel from 20 NATO countries2024: European Multi-Purpose Frigate “Auvergne”, Atlantic Diver-base Vessel “Styx”, Amphibious Helicopter Carrier “Mistral”, French (Land) Army and Navy commandos, the 9th Marine Infantry Brigade, the 6th Light Armored Brigade and the 4th Air Combat Brigade.
Steadfast Defender 24Forces deployment across Europe, including Arctic component (Nordic Response)January-May 2024Norway, Finland, Atlantic Ocean,90,000 from 32 NATO countriesEuropean Multi-Purpose Frigate “Normandie”, Attack submarine Fighter jets, 5500 Land Army personnels.
Nordic Reponse: 150 personnel from the Mountain Commando Group
Table source data31)

France deployed a wide range and variety of military resources across the different NATO exercises. The three components of the French Armed Forces (Navy, Land, Air and Space) are involved in Arctic exercises with the participation of Navy vessels, including amphibious helicopter carriers, multi-purpose frigates, Air Force fighter jets, helicopters, surveillance aircrafts, land troops and vehicles, etc. The personnel deployed included specialized units such as commandos, or anti-submarine units, thus indicating a clear intent to be fully involved in NATO activities.

This regular and substantial participation by France in NATO exercises reflects a desire to anchor its Arctic defense and security policy in a multilateral perspective, particularly within the NATO framework. However, this component is additional and complementary to bilateral initiatives already existing between France and various Arctic allies. The Arctic Roadmap32) expressly prioritized this approach. For example, the French Land Army and the Canadian Armed Forces organize annually a joint exercise designed to develop “extreme cold” skills, and the French Navy regularly participates in joint exercises with Denmark, such as the Narval operation in 2015.

Prospects of the 2022 “Polar Strategy”

Although the 2030 Polar Strategy issued in 2022 by the French Government to comprehensively address the challenges posed by national interests in the Antarctic and Arctic regions requests a stronger engagement and mobilization, it appears that the first two years of implementation show continuity rather than a real break. On the scientific research and cooperation aspect, the polar research budget slightly increased,33) generally following a trend in French research funding. However, the construction of the new ice-capable vessel is still pending.

Regarding environmental programs, the government supported international initiatives to reduce fuel exploitation in the Arctic, even if, realistically, this progress is largely due to the abandonment of support for the Arctic LNG-2 project because of Russia’s war on Ukraine and in the face of pressure from public opinion, rather than to a real desire for environmental change.

From a defense and security perspective, the government had announced greater involvement in multilateral activities, particularly within NATO. France’s participation in exercises conducted by the Atlantic Alliance has increased significantly in recent years, as illustrated for example by the Steadfast Defender exercise in 2024. However, this increase in the French contribution must be put into perspective with the general increase in the volume and recurrence of NATO exercises since 2022.

France’s involvement in the region is indeed motivated by strategic objectives, including enhancing its defense capabilities, securing access to resources and trade routes, and establishing its influence in a competitive area, reshaped by climate change. Its active participation, including in the context of NATO initiatives, grants strategic and political leverage, allowing the country to play a key role in shaping international Arctic governance.

Based on the developments between the 2016 Arctic Roadmap and the 2030 Polar Strategy, it is possible to identify certain trends. France seems to want to increase its capabilities and its political and military presence in the Arctic in general by deploying military vessels to the region and participating in NATO’s air border patrols. This general increase cannot be achieved without enhanced cooperation, bilaterally with various Arctic states, following a similar approach with the relationship that France has with the Baltic States, and multilaterally within NATO in the first place, but also within the structure of the EU.

In a slightly more distant future, the consequences of climate change will generate major geopolitical changes that will force Arctic states and their allies to adapt to a new paradigm. New trade routes across Arctic waters, access to natural resources, the growing strategic importance of the region, especially in a context of growing distrust between Western allies and Russia, not to mention the leading role played by China, have pushed the Arctic away from its prior position of regional cooperation. The international balance that previously reigned in diplomatic and cooperation bodies in the Arctic was shattered after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and it is unlikely that a return to stability will be imminent, also considering the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the conflict in Ukraine. Non-Arctic States, which, like France, see a national interest in the region, will have to adapt to these new challenges and opportunities in the north. The 2030 Polar Strategy is only a beginning. We should expect France to continue comprehensively strengthening its positions, partnerships, and capabilities in the Arctic.

Alix Renaudin is a Lawyer specialized in International Law and serves as an Associate Legal Officer with the National Implementation Measures Program of the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) in London. He holds degrees from Nice Côte d’Azur University and of the Lille Catholic University and is also a Research Fellow of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).

References[+]

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