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Fisheries Disputes: The Real Potential for Arctic Conflict

By and | Article
June 3, 2021
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The view of a fishing vessel from a U.S. military ship

A U.S. Coast Guardsman with, embarked aboard the guided-missile destroyer USS Shoup (DDG 86), takes a photo of a fishing vessel in 2018. Photo: U.S. Pacific Fleet

Much recent discussion has focused on the contemporary militarization of Arctic and subarctic regions. Journalism and scholarship alike question if military conflict might occur, how peace can be maintained, and what war would look like in the Arctic. To provide insight on such queries, The Arctic Institute’s 2021 Conflict Series provides analysis on past Arctic militarization and military activities—seeking both historic context and lessons learned for modern Arctic politics.

The Arctic Institute Conflict Series 2021

Conflict is a natural part of society. It describes a situation where two or more actors hold incompatible goals. Despite common usage, the term does not entail outright hostility or war. As described by the SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution: “conflict is normal, ubiquitous, and unavoidable.” 

As sea ice diminishes in the Arctic, writings about conflict in the region have directed focus to accessing and potentially claiming undiscovered offshore oil and gas resources. However, oil and gas resources in the North have not yet generated conflict or aggression. Instead, small-scale disputes in the Arctic are being primarily driven by another ocean-based commodity: marine living resources. 

In the Arctic, retreating sea ice and climate change are altering the distribution of marine living resources, while demand for these resources has risen. This, in turn, is challenging established management regimes for transboundary resources and calling for new forms of cooperation. Consequently, over the last decade several disputes have emerged over Arctic fisheries, at times even escalating into outright conflict. 

This is not the same as claiming that outright hostilities amongst Arctic states are inevitable. Still, we should look at past and current examples of marine resource disputes, in order to say something about how the way forward might evolve. 

Here we will examine three cases of conflict related to fisheries management impacted by global warming in the Bering Sea, Barents Sea, and the North Atlantic in an effort to tease out lessons, dynamics, and general relevance to the Arctic region. We start with the Bering Sea/Strait domain, before turning to some relevant examples in the North Atlantic. Thereafter, we assess what lessons these examples hold for future resource conflicts in the Arctic.

The Bering Sea / Strait

The Bering Sea and Bering Strait have long been an area of contention surrounding the harvesting and conservation of marine living resources. In 1887 and 1889, the U.S. – citing sustainability concerns – seized British-Canadian vessels harvesting seals in international waters of the Bering Sea.1) This dispute set the stage for larger discussions on sustainable harvesting in the region, ultimately leading to the North Pacific Sealing Convention of 1911 and setting the precedent for future agreements.2)

Today, the Bering Sea is home to one of the world’s largest fisheries3) and its stocks are growing rapidly as fish migrate north due to rising ocean temperatures.4) The fishery has subsequently become a theatre of renewed U.S.-Russia competition: In 2020, fishing vessels were targeted by Russian military within the American exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Some 90 warships and military aircraft were part of the Russian effort to secure economic development in the North Pacific, a region that is becoming increasingly lucrative as melting sea ice makes way for resource extraction and trade routes.5)

Meanwhile, President Biden has signed executive orders regulating pollution associated with maritime vessels and restricting trawling practices across large portions of the Bering Sea, Bering Strait, and Chukchi Sea. The executive orders contrast with Russia’s moves towards economic development, suggesting renewed friction between economic priorities and environmental sustainability in the North Pacific.

The North Atlantic / Barents Sea

One particular issue in the North Atlantic has been the still unresolved division of mackerel quotas, as the stock has shifted its geographic positioning. On its own, mackerel constitutes one of the most profitable fish stocks in the North Atlantic. Since reaching an agreement on quotas in 1999, the Northeast Atlantic mackerel stock has predominantly been divided between the EU, Norway, and the Faroe Islands. 

In 2006, the mackerel shifted northwards, in tandem with a rise in the sea temperature in the North Sea and North Atlantic.6) From virtually no catches prior to the stock’s arrival in 2006, Icelandic fishermen caught more than 100,000 tonnes in 2008–2009,7) constituting approximately 20–25 percent of the total catch of mackerel in the Northeast Atlantic. To date, however, Iceland remains outside of the total quota-setting scheme. 
Over time, the coastal states’ combined increase in fishing pressure resulted in ever-growing overfishing of the stock. By 2019 the fish stock had lost its “sustainable” certification through the Marine Stewardship Council.8) In late 2019, Icelandic officials stated they would not back down on the issue, while the remaining states criticized its unilateral quota setting for endangering the health of the fish stock.9)

Another relevant case just north of Iceland – in the Barents Sea – concerns snow crab and the Svalbard continental shelf. Snow crab was first recorded in the eastern Barents Sea in 1996. In Canada and the United States, snow crab ranks among the most valuable fisheries. Thus, expectations in Norway have been high concerning the economic potential of this new species, with some anticipating that it might even surpass cod, which is currently the most valuable fishery in the Norwegian EEZ.10)

Starting in 2015, however, Norway introduced a ban on the catching of snow crab on the Norwegian continental shelf, which includes the shelf around Svalbard. In practice, the Norwegian government permitted a limited number of licences to be issued to Norwegian fishermen exclusively, through special requests.11)

Both the EU and Norway define the snow crab as belonging to the continental shelf regime. Therefore, the broader legal ramifications of this dispute go beyond the right to catch snow crab on the continental shelf around Svalbard, with potential applications to sedentary resources such as oil and gas and seabed minerals. Although there has thus far been no oil and gas drilling on the continental shelf around Svalbard, the outcome of the dispute over snow crab might set a precedent for future industrial activity.12)

Arctic (marine) Resource Conflicts

As shown in the cases here, although the potential for conflict over fisheries – access to or distribution of – is relatively high, states have generally preferred to keep these disputes and, at times, outright conflict separate from other issues.13) The mackerel dispute has not hampered quota negotiations on other fish stocks amongst the Northeast Atlantic coastal states (although there have been issues concerning herring), nor has it affected their regional and bilateral foreign relations.

In the EU-Norway case, politicians and diplomats actively worked to keep the issue separate from larger Arctic governance questions, preferring to treat it as a fisheries concern rather than linking it to the EU’s continuous quest for a role in the Arctic.14) Similarly, the U.S. Coast Guard refrained from engaging Russian military in the Bering Sea – even as American fishing vessels were threatened – citing Russia’s right to conduct military operations in the EEZ.15)

Despite this relative compartmentalization, two trends suggest that relations and issues concerning fisheries are unlikely to become less sensitive in the near future. First, an increasing number of fisheries – American, Icelandic, Norwegian and Russian – are expected to venture further northwards in the Bering Sea, Bering Strait, and the Barents Sea. This development will prompt the coastal states to discuss changes to their management regimes and quota distribution. Second, the Barents Sea and Bering Sea are playing an increasing role in strategic posturing and military exercises, as NATO members and Russia showcase their Arctic capabilities and aim to secure rights to valuable trade routes.

Furthermore, although fisheries disputes are, to some extent, compartmentalized, they are also increasingly entangled in domestic politics. The interests that states hold in marine living resources—the Icelandic and Norwegian interests in mackerel fisheries, Russian fisheries interests in the waters around Svalbard, the interests of the EU and EU member states in snow crab fisheries, and conflicting economic and sustainability interests in the North Pacific—should not be underestimated. Although the monetary value of these fisheries might not dwarf that of other Arctic industrial or economic ventures, neither is it insignificant from a financial viewpoint. 

Arctic states, driven by their fishers and fisheries, are not likely to forgo access to fish stocks or yield quotas simply because the fish stocks themselves have altered their distributional patterns. These dimensions could be evidenced here by European politicians’ statements over the snow crab dispute; by the U.S. Coast Guard’s lack of forewarning to fishing vessels of planned Russian military operations in U.S. waters; and by the arguments of Norwegian and Icelandic fisheries organisations when disagreeing on mackerel quotas.

Science to the Rescue?

The role of scientific advice in preventing future conflict stands out as a particularly useful dimension for further examination. The use of an assumedly neutral source of reliable information is crucial for trust in the relevant regime, especially when dealing with issues linked to climate change.16) If, however, there is too much uncertainty surrounding reliable information, actors sometimes opt to ignore, be selective of, or even hide relevant information.17)

One solution that states in the Arctic and beyond have used to alleviate such pressures is regional issue-specific multilateral cooperation. For example, the Barents Sea management regime – through the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission – has often been heralded as best practice with regards to marine resource co-management mechanisms.18) Similarly, in the Bering Sea, as the pollock stock collapsed in the early 1990s after a decade of overfishing in the so-called “Donut Hole,” a regime came into existence to manage the stock.19) In 1994, an agreement on a temporary moratorium on pollock was reached by the various national stakeholders, including Japan, China, Poland, and South Korea, with stringent enforcement measures.20)

More recently, in 2018, the five Arctic states with direct access to the Arctic Ocean – together with China, Japan, Iceland, South Korea and the EU – agreed to prevent unregulated commercial fishing in the high seas of the central Arctic Ocean.21) This was heralded as a “proactive rather than reactive approach, showcasing the Arctic states’ commitment in dealing with climate change”.22) There are similar bans on commercial fishing within the EEZ in the Chukchi Sea (where the United States imposes the ban unilaterally) and the Beaufort Sea (with the United States and Canada imposing the ban bilaterally), which are in place pending further research on the potential fish stocks migrating to these areas. 

In other words, although conflict potential exists concerning marine living resources in the Arctic, disputes over such issues are not destined to escalate and/or become protracted. However, taking proactive measures or diffusing an ongoing dispute requires both political engagement and concern over the long-term effects of a protracted dispute. Here, the mackerel dispute can serve as a staunch lesson, as the stock lost its rather valuable MSC-certification in 2019.23)

The future is blue

In the Arctic and beyond, we can observe rapid changes in the maritime domain over the last few decades. As these changes occur, attention is increasingly directed towards the question of “who has what rights” at sea. Some elements are central here: the state and use of scientific/external advice when agreeing on quotas for marine living resources;24) the depth of institutionalisation between the states in question;25) and the (un)willingness by states to forgo access to fisheries seen in conjunction with domestic interests and symbolism.26)

It is no secret that humanity is experiencing a widespread reduction in the total biomass of marine resources, closely linked to human exploitative activities.27) At the same time, stocks are changing their migratory patterns because of changes in the geophysical marine environment.28) It would be simple to conclude that the conflict potential between states over how best to manage marine living resources in the Arctic is likely to rise as a consequence of these factors. However, the Arctic states have a history of developing co-management mechanisms to solve problems with overfishing in northern waters. 

International cooperative mechanisms have grown in all oceans bordering the Arctic, as well as in the Arctic basin itself. They have grown out of a realization that continued over-exploitation would lead to a lose-lose situation for all states concerned. As the Arctic is particularly prone to environmental changes, states will continue to navigate emerging issues with marine resource management and distribution. Fisheries is indeed where the real conflict potential in the Arctic lies, but that does not mean these conflicts cannot be managed, or even resolved.

References[+]

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