Explaining the Arctic Council Secretariat: Norms and Values (Part I)

The Fram Centre in Tromsø, home of the Arctic Council Secretariat. Photo: Eirik Nicolai Heim 

This article examines the creation of the Arctic Council Secretariat in 2013. Part 1 discusses the secretariat’s establishment as an empirical puzzle and introduces historical institutionalism as a theoretical perspective for its explanation.

• Part 2: Explaining the Arctic Council Secretariat (ACS): Transmission and Imitation

Why does an organisation undertake a reform, despite having been resistant to change in previous years? And why does it choose a reform that contradicts its original loose structure without implementing further reforms that would make it a more formal, treaty-based organization? These questions arise in the case of the establishment of the Arctic Council Secretariat in 2013. This paper aims at explaining the reasons for this specific and rather surprising reform. The Arctic Council (AC) was created in 1996 as a high-level intergovernmental forum for the coordination of Arctic politics by the “Arctic Eight”.¹⁾The “Arctic Eight” are Canada, the US, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and the Russian Federation. Its main aim is the promotion of “cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic states, with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues”.²⁾Arctic Council (1996): Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council. Ottawa, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/85. Accessed on 13 July 2018. While becoming an increasingly important actor in Arctic affairs by facilitating regional cooperation, the Council’s status as a high-level forum persists. It does not have the legal status of an international organization and its institutional capacity is limited.³⁾Ramos B (2013) Strengthening the Capacity of the Arctic Council. Is the Permanent Secretariat a First Step? In: Heininen L (Ed.), Arctic Yearbook 2013. Akureyri: Northern Research Forum, p. 265. Instead, the AC is a loosely structured “creature of [its] founding states and routinely responsive to their wishes”.⁴⁾Nord D C (2018) The Arctic Council: Governance within the Far North. New York: Routledge, p. 34.

Despite this permanent configuration as a political forum, the AC’s structure has been modified. In 2011, the decision to establish a permanent secretariat was declared. Two years later, the permanent secretariat was established in Tromsø, Norway. There are two reasons why this reform is a surprising step. First, the establishment of the permanent secretariat is the only reform of the AC’s institutional structure so far.⁵⁾Ramos B (2013) Strengthening the Capacity of the Arctic Council. Is the Permanent Secretariat a First Step? In: Heininen L (Ed.), Arctic Yearbook 2013. Akureyri: Northern Research Forum, p. 267. Second, permanent secretariats are bodies associated with more formal, treaty-based international organizations.⁶⁾Bauer S (2006) Does Bureaucracy Really Matter?: The Authority of Intergovernmental Treaty Secretariats. Global Environmental Politics. Global Environmental Politics: 6(1): 23–49.); Bauer, Busch, Siebenhüner & Bernd. (2007) Administering International Governance: What Role for Treaty Secretariats? Global Governance Working Paper 29. They are “tools to assist the parties to a treaty to fulfill the treaty obligations and to ease compliance with the treaty provisions”.⁷⁾Sellheim N (2012) The Establishment of the Permanent Arctic Council Secretariat: Challenges and Opportunities. In Axworthy, Koivurova, & Hasanat (Eds.) The Arctic Council: Its Place in the Future of Arctic Governance: 60–82. Toronto: The Gordon Foundation; Munk School; p. 62. Despite the establishment of the permanent secretariat, the AC was not transformed into a formalized treaty-based organization. Thus, the formal character of the permanent secretariat does not really fit the otherwise loosely structured political forum the Arctic Council is. Based on these considerations, the establishment of the permanent Arctic Council secretariat (ACS) forms an empirical puzzle that undergirds the research question of this paper: Why did the Arctic Council establish a permanent secretariat in 2013?

So far, there is no systematic attempt to explain the establishment of the ACS – but there are different accounts on possible drivers for its creation presented in studies with a broader focus. These existing accounts can be classified into two distinct sets of explanations. The first set discusses functional arguments for the establishment of the ACS, such as an increasing need for coordination due to new challenges and opportunities for the AC.⁸⁾Ramos B (2013) Strengthening the Capacity of the Arctic Council. Is the Permanent Secretariat a First Step? In: Heininen L (Ed.), Arctic Yearbook 2013. Akureyri: Northern Research Forum, p. 267.); Śmieszek G & Koivurova T (2017) The Arctic Council: Between Continuity and Change. In Lackenbauer, Nicol, & Greaves (Eds.) One Arctic: The Arctic Council and Circumpolar Governance (pp. 1–26). Ottawa, Waterloo: Canadian Arctic Resources Committee.); Spence J (2017) Shaping or Making Policy in a Melting Arctic: Examining the Institutional Effectiveness of the Arctic Council. Ottawa: Carleton University. The second set of studies deals with the negotiation process on the creation of a permanent secretariat.⁹⁾Chater A (2015) Explaining the Evolution of the Arctic Council. London, Ontario: Western Libraries.); Nord D C (2016) The Changing Arctic: Creating a Framework for Consensus Building and Governance within the Arctic Council. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.); Pedersen T (2012) Debates over the Role of the Arctic Council. Ocean Development & International Law 43(2): 146–156. These accounts offer explanations for the change of positions of the AC member states linked to their strategies and self-interest. The specific starting point for this study is the narrow focus of this scholarly debate on functional and rational-choice arguments. I argue that existing accounts do not offer a convincing explanation for the establishment of the ACS because they ignore alternative explanations.

Therefore, this paper analyzes the decision to establish the ACS with the help of two theoretical perspectives that focus on cultural rather than on rational and functional arguments– namely historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism.¹⁰⁾Koning E A (2016) The Three Institutionalisms and Institutional Dynamics: Understanding Endogenous and Exogenous Change. Journal of Public Policy 36(4): 639–664. Historical institutionalism stresses the role of history and culture in shaping institutional structure, whereas sociological institutionalism states that institutions influence actors’ preferences and perceptions, leading to institutional isomorphism.¹¹⁾Sager F; Thomann E; Zollinger C & Mavrot C (2014) Confronting Theories of European Integration: A Comparative Congruence Analysis of Veterinary Drug Regulations in Five Countries. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 16(5): 457-474, p. 460. These two theories offer a useful perspective on the research question, as they focus on the “dimensions to the relationship between institutions and actions that may not be highly instrumental or well-modelled by rational choice theories”.¹²⁾Hall P A & Taylor R C R (1996) Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. Political Studies, 44(5): 936–957 p. 951. Instead, they argue that actors may be choosing strategies from culturally-specific repertoires.¹³⁾Hall P A & Taylor R C R (1996) Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. Political Studies, 44(5): 936–957 p. 951. Thus, both theories are suitable to address the above-mentioned lack of non-functional and non-rational explanations for the establishment of the ACS. Based on this approach, a theoretical sub-question can be formulated: To what degree can historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism contribute to a more holistic explanation for the establishment of the ACS?

To answer the research question and the underlying theoretical sub-question, the paper proceeds in two steps. In a first chapter, the two theoretical perspectives are discussed in relation to their explanations for organizational reform. Based on these findings, the specific expectations for the reasons for establishing the ACS are deduced and formulated as hypotheses. Second, the analysis is conducted by presenting empirical information on the establishment of the ACS and evaluating their congruence with the theoretical expectations. The results of the analysis suggest that sociological institutionalism offers a good explanation for the establishment of the ACS, while the insights based on historical institutionalism are limited.

Why do organizations implement reforms

Historical Institutionalists define institutions “as the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy”.¹⁴⁾Hall P A & Taylor R C R (1996) Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. Political Studies 44(5): 936–957, p. 938. This definition already hints towards the approach’s focus on formal and informal norms and values. Formal norms refer to the instrumental, tool-like features of an organization, while informal norms and values are associated with ideas that determine the appropriateness of certain structures and actions.¹⁵⁾Christensen T, Lægreid, P, Roness P G, & Røvik K A (2007) Organization Theory and the Public Sector: Instrument, Culture and Myth. London. New York: Taylor & Francis, p. 38 This focus on institutionally determined norms and values is usually described as a “cultural approach”, which emphasizes the extent to which individuals turn to established routines or familiar patterns of behavior to attain their purposes, instead of solely focusing on self-interest and rationality.¹⁶⁾Hall P A & Taylor R C R (1996) Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. Political Studies 44(5): 936-957, p. 939

There are two central concepts connected to explanations of organizational reforms rooted in historical institutionalism. The first concept is path dependency. Path dependency implies that the initial structure and the specific goals of an institution significantly determine its subsequent development. Path dependency may increase the stability of norms and values in an institution and thereby decrease uncertainty among member states, but it can also lead to a resistance to institutional reform.¹⁷⁾Christensen T, Lægreid, P, Roness P G, & Røvik K A (2007) Organization Theory and the Public Sector: Instrument, Culture and Myth. London. New York: Taylor & Francis, p. 46 However, strong path dependency does not necessarily prevent the realization of reforms. If institutional structures are flexible, actors may interpret this as a norm of structural flexibility. The second concept is the concept of critical junctures, which take place when a period of continuity is interrupted by a series of events that open a window of opportunity for change. The events causing such critical junctures are external to the respective organization. Since historical institutionalists expect institutions to reinforce themselves endogenously, only an unpredictable event from outside can provoke modifications of the status quo.¹⁸⁾Koning E A (2016) The Three Institutionalisms and Institutional Dynamics: Understanding Endogenous and Exogenous Change. Journal of Public Policy 36(4): 639–664, p. 644.¹⁹⁾This argument builds upon the concept of path dependency, as institutions are basically thought to exert influence on historical trajectories long after their creation. Thus, specific events determine the future development of an organization to a large degree. An example are efforts to constitutionalize the European Union, which can be traced back to the Treaty of Rome. The key advantage of the concept of critical junctures is that it offers a clear initial cause for organizational change – if there is no specific event without a significant impact on the respective organization, organizational reform and change will not occur due to stability rooted in path dependency, see Koning E A (2016) The Three Institutionalisms and Institutional Dynamics: Understanding Endogenous and Exogenous Change. Journal of Public Policy 36(4): 639–664, p. 644. From there on, historical development moves onto a new path and institutions may undertake reforms that otherwise would have been impossible to conduct.²⁰⁾Hall P A & Taylor R C R (1996) Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. Political Studies 44(5): 936-957, p. 939 Thus, there are two hypotheses for the establishment of the ACS connected to historical institutionalism.

H1.1: The permanent secretariat of the Arctic Council was introduced because the reform fitted the culturally inherited appropriate norms for institutional design of the Arctic Council.

H1.2: The permanent secretariat of the Arctic Council was introduced because the emergence of a critical juncture opened a window of opportunity for the reform.

Historical institutionalism and the establishment of the Arctic Council Secretariat

The first hypothesis on the establishment of the ACS proposed by historical institutionalism – path dependency leading to a culture fitting the reform – is tested by investigating the evolution of the AC’s structure. Initially, the AC was designed as a forum for knowledge generation, agenda setting and policy framing with little formal authority and a very limited degree of internal coordination and steering.²¹⁾Young O (2012). Building an International Regime Complex for the Arctic: Current status and next steps. The Polar Journal 2(2): 391–407, p. 13. As a consequence, it did not receive an ongoing budget, permanent staff or unit for coordination, such as a permanent secretariat. However, this configuration as a weak political forum disputed constantly. There have been conflicts of interest between the US and Russia, on the one hand, and the Nordic states and Canada.²²⁾At least in the AC’s early years, Canada argued for the Council’s transformation into a full-fledged international organization and probably would have supported the establishment of a permanent secretariat. In the 2000s, Canada changed its position and supported the US and Russia in their opposition to a permanent secretariat, see Chater A (2015) Explaining the Evolution of the Arctic Council. London, Ontario: Western Libraries, p. 186. on the other. While the former sought a weak organization that would rely on voluntary contributions from states, the latter states argued that reforms such as a “a permanent secretariat and stable budget would make the Council a more legitimate institution”.²³⁾Chater A (2015) Explaining the Evolution of the Arctic Council. London, Ontario: Western Libraries, p. 186. It can be argued that the Nordic countries’ position in the debate about reforming the AC is rooted in a general preference for organizations with strong bureaucratic elements. This preference can be interpreted as a cultural norm inherent to policy-makers of Nordic countries.²⁴⁾Chater A (2015) Explaining the Evolution of the Arctic Council. London, Ontario: Western Libraries, p. 186.²⁵⁾It must be noted that Canada’s self-conceived role as a ‘middle power’ also relies on an emphasis on strong multilateral institutions and respect for the rule of law, see Welsh J (2004) Canada in the 21st century: beyond dominion and middle power. The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 93(376): 583-593, p. 585f. Therefore, it can be argued that Canada was a supporter of this Nordic norm and opposed the idea of a permanent secretariat for other reasons.

This Nordic cultural norm played an important role in the discussions about establishing a permanent secretariat. These discussions began in 1996 and remained unsolved for 15 years. The US lead the opposition against a permanent secretariat, because of fear that it would not be able to control it, while having to pay a proportionally large share of contributions.²⁶⁾Spence J (2017) Shaping or Making Policy in a Melting Arctic: Examining the Institutional Effectiveness of the Arctic Council. Ottawa: Carleton University, p. 202. Russia and Canada supported the American position. While Canada opposed the possibility of a permanent secretariat due to concerns that this measure would make the AC Europe-centric, Russia opted for a weaker organisation.²⁷⁾Chater A (2015) Explaining the Evolution of the Arctic Council. London, Ontario: Western Libraries, p. 185. Concerning the US and Russia, this argument was in line with a general normative preference for a weak organizational structure of the AC, as they feared that strong bureaucratic features would challenge their own autonomy to act in the region.²⁸⁾Chater A (2015) Explaining the Evolution of the Arctic Council. London, Ontario: Western Libraries, p. 185. The US did not change its position until 2009, when policymakers began to argue that a stronger Council with a permanent secretariat was much more favorable than the creation of an alternative forum to the AC.²⁹⁾Pedersen T (2012) Debates over the Role of the Arctic Council. Ocean Development & International Law 43(2): 146–156, p. 153.³⁰⁾Discussions about an alternative forum and the replacement of the AC had been brought up by some policy-makers of the Arctic Five (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the US). These voices saw the Arctic Five as a more viable forum for political discussions, as it did not comprise as many states and would facilitate settlements on maritime disputes, see Pedersen T (2012) Debates over the Role of the Arctic Council. Ocean Development & International Law 43(2): 146–156, p.150f. Thus, the role of the AC was weakened and discussions emerged, whether the forum was necessary for Arctic politics at all, see Hoel A H (2009) Do We Need a New Legal Regime for the Arctic Ocean? The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 24(2): 443–456. An important driver for this change of position was Norway’s proposal to establish a “joint secretariat” for six years on behalf of Norway, Denmark and Sweden in 2007. By accepting this offer, the Nordic states were able to “demonstrate the utility of a more permanent body”.³¹⁾Chater A (2015) Explaining the Evolution of the Arctic Council. London, Ontario: Western Libraries, p. 197.

Hence, there has been a permanent conflict between two norms among AC member states. The norm of weak organizational structure was supported by the US, Russia and partly Canada and hindered the establishment of a permanent secretariat until 2011. The Nordic states, on the other hand, supported the establishment of a secretariat for many years. This behavior is linked to their culturally inherited normative preference for organizations with strong bureaucratic elements. This evidence supports H1.1, as the Nordic norm for organizational structure did clearly influence the decision to establish the ACS. However, the existence of this norm had no consequences for the structure of the AC until the ACS was established, as no other reforms for the Council’s structure were realized. Thus, the direct explanatory power of the Nordic norm for the establishment of the ACS should not be overrated. It had no impact on the AC’s structure until the US and Russia decided it was in their interest to curtail the establishment of other rival forums. Moreover, there is a second circumstance limiting the explanatory power of H1.1. As the norm was only important to the Nordic states, and not to the AC as an institution, path dependency can only explain why these states advocated the establishment of the ACS. Hence, the norm itself does not explain why the debate shifted and the US, Russia and Canada came to accept the idea of a permanent secretariat.

This leads to the second key concept of historical institutionalism, namely critical junctures. H1.2 implies that external events could have interrupted the flow of historical events – characterized by the AC’s period of institutional stability between 1996 and 2011 – and opened a window of opportunity for the establishment of the ACS. Can we identify such an event? Usually, critical junctures are associated with economic crises or military conflict conduct.³²⁾Hall P A & Taylor R C R (1996) Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. Political Studies 44(5): 936-957, p. 942. Such an event clearly cannot be identified in the case of the establishment of the ACS. Admittedly, AC policy-makers frequently stressed the need to adapt the AC’s structure to new challenges. The 2011 Nuuk Declaration, for example, states “that rapidly changing circumstances, in particular the changing climate, have increased the challenges and opportunities facing the Arctic in both volume and complexity, and underscoring the importance of strengthening the Arctic Council to address this change”.³³⁾Arctic Council (2011) Nuuk Declaration. Nuuk. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/92. Accessed on 13 July 2017. These challenges are not expressed concretely enough to justify an interpretation as a critical juncture facilitating the establishment of the ACS. A conceivable critical juncture for the reform could be drastic new knowledge about climate change, which would be accepted by a wide range of policy-makers. Such an event could provoke a new will to tackle environmental problems with strong institutions and thus would facilitate reforms. However, such an event cannot be identified here.

Arguably, there is another influential external event that could be judged as a critical juncture. In the late 2000s, the AC and the Arctic as a region in general faced increasing international attention.³⁴⁾Koivurova T (2010) Limits and Possibilities of the Arctic Council in a Rapidly Changing Scene of Arctic Governance. Polar Record 46(2): 146–156, p. 150. This growing attention was demonstrated in multiple observer applications to the AC, which eventually resulted in the expansion of the Council in terms of observers.³⁵⁾Observer status in the AC is open to non-Arctic states, to intergovernmental organizations and to non-governmental organisations, see Spence J (2017) Shaping or Making Policy in a Melting Arctic: Examining the Institutional Effectiveness of the Arctic Council. Ottawa: Carleton University, p. 2. The main difference between AC members and participants on the one hand and observers on the other hand is their level of localness. While members and participants have local rootedness in the Arctic region, observers do not have roots, but may have specific interests in the region, see Steinberg P E & Dodds K (2015) The Arctic Council after Kiruna. Polar Record 51(1): 108–110, p. 109.). In 2013, six new observer states joined and it was expected that even more observers would join the AC, thus increasing the coordination workload, which necessitated a permanent secretariat. Hence, H1.2 is supported to a certain degree. However, the overall influence of observers on the Council’s policies is rather weak.³⁶⁾Chater A (2015) Explaining the Evolution of the Arctic Council. London, Ontario: Western Libraries, p. 234. Moreover, a large proportion of new observers only joined the AC after the ACS was established. As mentioned above, six states joined in 2013 (China, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea and Singapore), followed by Switzerland in 2017. Hence, it is questionable whether the rising international interest lead to the creation of the ACS. Turning the question around could lead to a more interesting question: did the establishment of the ACS motivate observer states to join the AC? One could argue, that the strengthening of steering capacities and access to information made the AC more attractive to observers. However, these observations limit the overall congruence between the theoretical predictions based on historical institutionalism and the case of the establishment of the ACS. While it was shown that there is a Nordic norm for strong bureaucratic structures explaining the Nordic states’ motivation to establish the ACS, the approach cannot explain why the other AC member states came to accept the utility for a permanent secretariat.

Lukas Thiele is a Master student of Public Administration at the University of Potsdam. This essay is based on an assignment written for the course “Climate and Ocean – Security and Sustainability Challenges in Rapidly Changing Realms” taught by Dr. Kathrin Stephen in 2017/18.