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An Evolution in Arctic Collective Defense

Pituffik Space Base tarmac, hangars, base facilities, and a US C-17 cargo aircraft, set amidst the frozen winter wilderness of Northern Greenland. Photo: David Palmer

The Arctic Institute NATO Series 2024-2025

• NATO in the Arctic: The Arctic Institute’s NATO Series 2024-2025 (Part I)
• Russia’s Arctic Military Posture in the Context of the War against Ukraine
• An Evolution in Arctic Collective Defense
• France’s Strategic Role in NATO’s Arctic Ambitions: A Non-Arctic Power’s Perspective
• Past Need Not Be Prologue: Applying the Lessons of History to NATO-Russia Relations in the Arctic
• The Future Battlefield is Melting: An Argument for Why the U.S. Must Adopt a More Proactive Arctic Strategy

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Evolution is inevitable – be it technology, economic development, weapons systems, geopolitics, or international agreements. It is increasingly clear that the Arctic is facing an accelerated evolutionary trend that is dramatically impacting its security environment. Unprecedented warming has converged with Russian belligerence and strategic competition to shatter the previous ‘High North, Low Tension’ adage.¹⁾NATOs Strategic Warfare Development Command (2023) The Future of the High North, NATO, 12 May, https://www.act.nato.int/article/the-future-of-the-high-north/. Accessed 27 Sep 2024

It is time to reassess our collective defense frameworks in the region. We must not rely upon relics of a Cold War security architecture for Arctic defense, but rather take an innovative, all-domain approach that will enable peace, stability, and prosperity in a demanding future security environment. While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is transforming to the realities of the current geopolitical situation – strengthened with the accessions of Sweden and Finland – we must further examine our defensive frameworks.

The Arctic is a unique region in which survival requires expertise and in which the ability for friendly forces to fight and win in times of crisis is a daunting challenge. Since it is no longer a region focused predominantly on the flight paths of ballistic missiles and strategic bombers or submarines lurking below the ice, NATO must reexamine its approach to the High North through more clearly defined command and control. North American nations must also reconsider the relevance of old security frameworks that are falling into obsolescence. This paper will examine innovative approaches to solving this challenge – to include enhancing current structures and establishing a new Joint Force Command – by carefully building upon the legacy of successful organizations of the past to succeed in the security environment of the future. We argue that to execute an effective layered defense in the face of an increasingly belligerent Russia and growing Sino-Russian cooperation, the NORAD Agreement and piecemeal Nordic cooperative security agreements should give way to NATO establishing a new Joint Force Command dedicated to the security of the Northern Flank.

The Threat Has Changed

There is no question – the North is changing. Warming trends affect the region as much as four times more than the rest of the world, dramatically amplifying sea ice melt, coastal erosion, permafrost thaw, and myriad other geophysical and hydrographical characteristics of the region. But the change does not end there. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has frozen dialogue and cooperation within the Arctic Council, little of which has subsequently resumed. Further, the demonstrated aggression prompted the unthinkable – Finland and Sweden became Allies under the North Atlantic Treaty. The Arctic now consists of seven NATO Allies and Russia, the latter increasingly turning to China²⁾Chen C (2023) China_Russia Arctic Cooperation in the Context of a Divided Arctic. The Arctic Institute, 4 Apr, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/china-russia-arctic-cooperation-context-divided-arctic/. Accessed 27 Sep 2024 to provide much-needed economic and technological investment to continue development of northern resources.

The Arctic is emerging as a new frontier in strategic competition, which is particularly worrisome given the potential implications of a growing Sino-Russian partnership. Indeed, the multi-domain environment of the North is being shaped by convergence of climate trends with geopolitical competition, which is increasing concerns for economic, environmental, and human security. New technology – such as hypersonic missiles – combines with evolving gray zone tactics to create a time-sensitive threat environment that spans traditional military domains.

While the region has always been filled with geopolitical complexities and a challenging operational³⁾Hamilton C (2022) Operating in the Extreme: Sustaining the Arctic Army and Joint Force in Competition, Crisis, Conflict. US Army, 14 Dec, https://www.army.mil/article/261651/operating_in_the_extreme_sustaining_the_arctic_army_and_joint_force_in_competition_crisis_conflict. Accessed 27 Sep 2024 environment, the increasingly global focus on the North demands that we reexamine its regional security architecture in order to build better military deterrence – while also offering swift response to crisis or conflict by upholding NATO’s commitment to collective defense. The most effective way to ensure NATO’s ability to rapidly respond to potential crises in the Arctic is to create and empower a distinct NATO JFC focused on the North.

Understanding the Old to Enhance the New

Conflict in the Arctic dates back centuries. One only needs to look at the coastal forts in the Nordic region to develop a historical sense of the need to deter and defend. During the outset of the Cold War, technological trends merged with political ideology to necessitate new perspectives on securing the northern approaches. In North America, the United States and Canada cooperatively envisioned the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) to tackle security challenges. Yet NORAD is a bi-lateral agreement, rather than a component of the North Atlantic Treaty. In order to better evaluate the layered defense in depth protecting the Northern Flank of Europe and North America, it is imperative to examine the strengths and weaknesses of NORAD, as well as NATO’s Joint Force Command framework. Doing so will reveal opportunities to harness proven relationships and capabilities with an innovative approach to resolve persistent command and control (C2) and capability gaps.

NORAD: An Evolving Organization

North American defense has a history of evolving to meet new threats. NORAD, arguably the most successful and recognizable homeland defense institution, was established in 1958.⁴⁾Office of History (2013) A Brief History of NORAD, NORAD, 31 Dec, https://www.norad.mil/Portals/29/Documents/A%20Brief%20History%20of%20NORAD%20(current%20as%20of%20March%202014).pdf. Accessed 11 Aug 2024 As Russia advanced their long-range bombing capabilities, the United States and Canada recognized the need for a bi-national approach for the defense of North America.

The primary threat to North America at the outset of the NORAD Agreement was formations of Russian bombers carrying nuclear gravity bombs. The United States and Canada worked quickly to establish a system of sensors and air defense bases to detect and respond to manned airborne threats. Over the following decades, Russia fielded an array of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and sea-launched missiles, against which the NORAD air domain sensors and traditional fighter interceptors would be ineffective. This shift to ballistic missiles forced NORAD to adjust, incorporating new space warning radars, creating command centers with greater survivability, and in turn reducing fighter forces and alert bases. NORAD reflected its agility again in response to the September 11^th terrorist attacks, working to protect the North American homeland from all threats – inward or outward – and becoming a homeland defense partner upon the 2002 establishment of US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) under a single, dual-hatted commander.⁵⁾US Northern Command Public Affairs (2024) US Northern Command: Our Story, US Northern Command, 27 Sep, https://www.northcom.mil/About/. Accessed 27 Aug 2024

The US Unified Command Plan (UCP)⁶⁾Congressional Research Service (2013) The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 3 Jan, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R42077/11. Accessed 11 Aug 2024 designates the Arctic region as a key focus area for USNORTHCOM. Yet while significant portions of Canada and the US, by way of Alaska, reside in the Arctic, the NORAD agreement does not specifically call out the Arctic as a focus area.⁷⁾The Government of the United States and the Government of Canada (2006) 2006 NORAD Agreement, NORAD, 28 Apr, https://www.norad.mil/Portals/29/Documents/History/NORAD%20Agreements/2006%20NORAD%20Agreement.pdf?ver=52SH6UU_1njFmjaq4fQUTg%3d%3d. Accessed 11 Aug 2024 The NORAD Agreement does, however, state “cooperation is conducted within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty” and “(the agreement) will need to continue to adapt to future shared security interests.”

Forward deployment and ‘defense in depth’ is more important now than ever. While the ballistic missile threat has not diminished, the fielding of Chinese and Russian long-range hypersonic weapons presents a new and challenging threat to North America and makes cooperative Russian and Chinese bombers a much more credible threat.⁸⁾Williams H, Bingen K, MacKenzie L (2024) Why Did China and Russia Stage a Joint Bomber Exercise near Alaska, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 30 Jul, https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-did-china-and-russia-stage-joint-bomber-exercise-near-alaska. Accessed 12 Aug 2024 Indeed, while NORAD and USNORTHCOM have been effective in the past, our future demands greater domain awareness, capabilities, and coordination across the North.

The development of Russian and Chinese stealthy long-range hypersonic cruise missiles, in combination with greater access to the Arctic being afforded by a changing climate, raise the question as to whether NORAD has the ability to adequately evolve. Both Canada and the United States have proven ineffective at quickly procuring and fielding advanced domain awareness systems⁹⁾Sherman J (2024) Air Force Delays Procurement of Homeland Defense Over-the-Horizon Radar to ‘Future” Budget, Inside Defense, 3 Jul, https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/af-delays-procurement-homeland-defense-over-horizon-radar-future-budget. Accessed 29 Sep 2024 in sufficient volume to address the threats that exist today. Canada has failed to build or improve the equipment and infrastructure required to support rapid response into their own high North.¹⁰⁾Lagasse P and Massie J (2024) Don’t Count on Us: Canada’s Military Unreadiness, War on the Rocks, 11 Apr, https://warontherocks.com/2024/04/dont-count-on-us-canadas-military-unreadiness/. Accessed 29 Sep 2024 Neither Canada or the United States has shown the ability to surge forces forward far enough into the high northern latitudes and with enough mass to provide a true defense-in-depth against threats.

The World’s Most Powerful Alliance

Recently celebrating its 75^th birthday, NATO has proven to be an enduring alliance, focused on promoting “stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.” The alliance is “resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.”¹¹⁾North Atlantic Treaty Organization Public Affairs (2023) The North Atlantic Treaty, NATO, 19 Oct, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm. Accessed 12 Aug 2024 The preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty has withstood the shifting security landscape, guiding the Alliance as it welcomed its 32^nd Ally this year. The Alliance has proven versatile in adapting to the challenges of an evolving global strategic environment – but must continue to adapt as NATO’s center of gravity shifts northward.

The establishment of Allied Joint Force Command Norfolk in 2018 sought to respond to the evolving threats emerging from adversaries and enhanced capabilities. The newest of three Joint Force Commands, JFC-Norfolk provides an operational level command and control (C2) capability and is particularly focused on defending the sea lines of communications (SLOCs) between Europe and North America. The Commander of JFC-Norfolk is dual-hatted as Commander of US Second Fleet (C2F), bringing exceptional capabilities and coordination for this mission. The (re)establishment of C2F further demonstrated a striking recognition of the growing challenges in assuring sea control of the North Atlantic and this is a tremendously important – and resource consuming – task.

Yet the renewed Russian – and growing Chinese – focus on the Arctic demands re-thinking of the Cold War problem set. Whereas NORAD prioritizes bi-lateral deterrence and defense, NATO must provide collective defense for the entirety of the Alliance – doing so through the specialized contributions of Allies, such as military forces, localized air defense, and littoral response. Determining the most effective C2, while avoiding any capability gaps, is a poignant challenge for any defense structure. This is perhaps even more critical in the North, where the strategic environment has evolved dramatically since the days of the Cold War.

Strengthening our Collective Defense

Should a crisis unfold in Europe targeting NATO Allies, the United States would need to act quickly to project power from North America to Europe. It would be to Russia’s advantage in that case to strike the United States, both kinetically and non-kinetically, to frustrate the flow of military power to aid our European allies. Advanced Russian hypersonic weapons have ranges beyond 1,500km¹²⁾Liffey K (2023) What We Know About Kinzhal, Russia’s Hypersonic Missile, Reuters, 16 May, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-do-we-know-about-kinzhal-russias-hypersonic-missile-2023-05-16/. Accessed 11 Aug 2024 and can be launched at targets from the safety of bastions, giving NORAD forces very little time to respond.

Allied forces that are resident in the Nordics could, in theory, eliminate adversarial bombers or missiles before long-range weapons are launched. The critical question is, how can those cooperative forces share their data and coordinate the use of force across vast distances? JFC-Norfolk, ostensibly best placed, could be consumed with focus on establishing and maintaining SLOCs. A fragmentary approach, carried out by non-coordinated multi-national forces, would be unreliable at best.

Now that seven of the eight Arctic nations are NATO Allies, we suddenly have a unique opportunity to enact a broader NATO-based solution to secure the Alliance’s Northern Flank. It must first be noted that the positive effects of the NORAD Agreement on the collective defense of North America cannot be overstated. NORAD has long been the gold standard for multinational defense cooperation and it has conducted its mission faithfully for over six and a half decades. NORAD’s accomplishments should be celebrated. But, there is a demonstrated need to adapt security architectures to the future.

It is time to reevaluate options to modernize northern defense infrastructure and to explore the creation of a new Joint Force Command that specifically focuses on deterrence and defense in the High North, in order to eliminate C2 gaps, enable more efficient movement of air defense assets, improve communications and domain awareness, and strengthen interoperability and interchangeability of Allies tasked with defending the region. We will present two options for the creation of this new command, each with advantages and disadvantages that should be considered as NATO seeks to address the security challenges inherent in the North.

JFC-Stavanger

The NATO Joint Warfare Centre was established in Stavanger, Norway in 2003, under Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), and is a multinational organization currently represented by seventeen nations contributing to the overall warfighting readiness of the Alliance.¹³⁾North Atlantic Treaty Organization Public Affairs (2024) Who We Are: Joint Warfare Center, NATO, 27 Sep, https://www.jwc.nato.int/organization/who-we-are. Accessed 27 Sep 2024 Stavanger could be well-suited for tasking as a new Joint Force Command for several reasons.

• While transforming a training command to an operational one is not an easy or rapid process, the basic infrastructure, capabilities, and potential to succeed as a JFC are inherently present in Stavanger. 
• With a location just south of the Arctic, Stavanger is well-suited to coordinate C2 and focus on the highly specialized Arctic fight.
• Stavanger has the basic NATO infrastructure required to swiftly assume command and control of forces and would be able to act as a bridge between the other JFCs for the northern fight.
• The location draws upon centuries of operational experience in the region on how to fight – and win in the challenging northern environment.

Aligning Stavanger as a JFC would require political maneuvering within NATO and substantial investment to fully modernize facilities. Yet it presents an appealing solution to the C2 gap when looking at the responsibilities of JFC-Norfolk and JFC-Brunssum.

JFC-North to Colorado

While the primary mission of JFC Norfolk is to defend sea lines of communication from North America to Europe in time of crisis, the primary mission of JFC-North would be to defend all domains of the non-Russian Arctic region in order to guarantee uninterrupted force projection of the assumed preponderance of forces for NATO defense, from North America in time of crisis. Simply defending the Nordics would not be the primary mission – this option accounts for the broader circum-polar Arctic challenges rather than focusing only on the European High North.

Colorado Springs, Colorado presents an ideal location for the new JFC for several reasons.

• The Arctic Region is already a key focus area for the USNORTHCOM Commander.
• Colorado is a greater distance from the primary threats of China and Russia, giving the Commander the most time possible for decision-making in the event of an attack.
• Finally, NORAD/USNORTHCOM Headquarters is already purpose built and connected to world-wide systems for broad area command, control, and communication (C3). Housing the JFC in an already established, globally-capable command headquarters would eliminate the need for significant monetary investment to build a new command center.

Given the evolving threat to North America, the expansion of NATO to include all non-Russian Arctic countries, and the growing challenges of the antiquated NORAD Agreement, establishing a new NATO JFC North in Colorado Springs would require the following steps:

1. Due to its inability to evolve to address the rapid advancement of the Russian and Chinese threat, dissolve the NORAD Agreement and its associated bi-national command structure.
2. Replace the NORAD Agreement with a procedural, non-command, bi-national (US and Canada) base access and overflight agreement.
3. Task all-domain defense of the Continental US (CONUS) to USNORTHCOM.
4. Task all-domain defense of Canada to Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC).
5. In the place of the NORAD HQ, establish the new JFC, appointing the Commander of USNORTHCOM as the dual-hatted Commander of JFC North. Deputy Command could rotate through NATO’s Arctic Allies.
6. NATO countries who are represented in the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable would provide the bulk of staffing for JFC North.

While creating a new NATO JFC in the place of the NORAD Headquarters would be the most expeditious option to the C2 dilemma, there are significant political implications that will need to be carefully navigated. The United States and Canada have enjoyed the special security relationship afforded by NORAD for nearly 70 years. Transitioning from this agreement will require actively communicating the enhanced value of NATO – bringing the capabilities of 32 Allies to the strategic region. C2 structures would need to be updated for the future strategic environment and the US and Canada would still be required to update critical domain awareness, early warning, and air defense infrastructure. But other northern NATO Allies would also become part of the team, a critical improvement given the minimal reaction time afforded by hypersonic missiles. Indeed, the reaction time of a hypersonic missile launched from Franz Josef Land – or nearby waters – is considerably less than a Cold War era launch from Novaya Zemlya.

Conclusion

Deterrence demands credible capabilities in order to be effective, and a new approach to the defense structure is warranted. Any such announcement should be expected to be met by disinformation and misinformation campaigns to incite public protests. Concern over the US political environment may drive a recommendation to establish a new JFC in the Nordics. Yet the US has proven to be a stalwart Ally since 1949 and benefits from the collective defense afforded by NATO. Now more than ever, it is important to demonstrate resolve and unity in order to demonstrate a credible deterrence.

Given consideration of fiscal realities and budget planning cycles, now is the time to reexamine the defense of all Allies. This paper highlights options to build on the current successful command structures, by offering the following recommendations for consideration:

• The most likely military threat against NATO nations in the Arctic is from Russian and Chinese missiles fired from Arctic bases, submarines, or bombers operating in the Arctic.
• The United States and Canada, due to lack of basing infrastructure, have limited options to deploy defensive assets forward into the Arctic.
• NATO member nations have the ability to collectively provide all-domain layered defense of the Allied Arctic territory, but lack the region-specific joint command structure to close the C3 gaps that may limit joint operations effectiveness.
• The NORAD Agreement is unable to close those C3 and domain awareness gaps on its own. A new NATO JFC focused specifically on defense of the Arctic is the best solution to provide effective Command and Control for joint all-domain Arctic security operations.

The existing NATO and NORAD command structures, through years of proven defense effectiveness, have provided a tremendous foundation from which to prepare for the strategic challenges of the future. While the proposals in this paper are incumbent upon nations allocating appropriate fiscal resources and strengthening capabilities, NATO offers the best approach for collective defense frameworks in the North. Existing command structures are already being strengthened, notably the newly announced Multi Corps Land Component Command (MCLCC) to be based in the Finnish city of Mikkeli and reporting to JFC-Norfolk. But the strategic environment demands both reassessment and a reimagination of command structures to determine the best path forward. A new JFC-Stavanger could draw upon numerous synergies with existing command structures and be ready to engage in the fight relatively quickly, but a new JFC-North in Colorado Springs, Colorado could serve to both replace the NORAD Agreement and strengthen a NATO-based security blueprint for the North.

There is no doubt that we are at a unique intersection where warming trends, strategic competition, and security concerns are converging in the North. The accession of Sweden and Finland, combined with advances in technology and capabilities, presents both dilemmas and opportunities for providing collective defense to the broader Alliance. The strength of thirty-two nations in the world’s most powerful Alliance can be utilized to develop innovative approaches to the northern problem set. While the solutions of the past were vital in the Cold War, today’s world is a dramatically different one that demands greater innovation and capability. The establishment of a new JFC to execute an effective layered defense would be a critical step in improving regional security and stability by forming both a credible deterrence and a robust defense of NATO’s Northern Flank.

U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel (retired) David Palmer is a Security Researcher and Academic Course Designer at the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies. David previously served as a Future Operations Planner and Lead Global Integration Planner at the NORAD Headquarters. David leverages extensive multinational Arctic military operations planning experience to educate senior leaders and inform policy decisions. His views presented in this article do not reflect those of the Ted Stevens Center, U.S. Air Force, or U.S. Department of Defense.

Commander Rachael Gosnell is a U.S. Navy foreign area officer and strategist, currently serving as a military faculty member in the Strategic Security Studies Department of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. She is a doctoral candidate at the University of Maryland, focusing on Arctic security. Her views presented in this article do not reflect those of the Marshall Center, U.S. Navy, or U.S. Department of Defense.