Data Hunting in Subzero Temperatures: The Arctic as a New Frontier in Beijing’s Push for Digital Connectivity

World travel and communications recorded on Twitter. Data from the Twitter streaming API through September 1, 2011. Photo: Eric Fischer

China’s activities and presence in the Arctic have been the subject of rigorous and detailed analysis ranging from scientific cooperation and exploration to climate change, energy security, and infrastructure.¹⁾Kopra, S. (2020). China and its Arctic Trajectories: The Arctic Institute’s China Series 2020. Available from https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/china-arctic-trajectories-the-arctic-institute-china-series-2020/ However, less attention has been paid to the very subtle and critical link between its Arctic strategy, or Polar Silk Road Strategy (PSR), and its much grander Digital Silk Road strategy (DSR). In an important, and yet understudied sense, China’s PSR seems to constitute a complementary, and thus important, part of its DSR. 

Although China’s spending on digital infrastructure still lags behind its investment in energy and other hard infrastructure projects along its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) its spending on digital infrastructure represents the only growing segment of its overall BRI project. In fact, the Economist reports that not only has its investment in digital infrastructure not stopped, but it has gained pace and urgency in the aftermath of the COVID 19 outbreak.²⁾The Economist. (2020). “The Digital Side of the Belt and Road Initiative Is Growing”. Available from https://www.economist.com/special-report/2020/02/06/the-digital-side-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-is-growing What’s more, the scope of its investment in and spending on digital infrastructure has widened, moving above and beyond the initial focus on fiber-optic cables to include cloud computing, smart cities, and big data projects.

Given the commonly acknowledged multi-dimensionality of China’s Arctic policy as well as the increasing strategic prevalence of DSR, the time is ripe to investigate China’s intent and/or motivation in developing and implementing its PSR strategy by, as a first step, highlighting the link between the Arctic and China’s strategic objective of establishing a healthy and impactful presence in global digital infrastructure. 

Why Does DSR Matter

One of the key reasons for the introduction of the DSR was the Chinese government’s realisation that the smooth functioning of its various infrastructural projects within the framework of its BRI requires the harmonisation and standardisation of data and digital applications. As such, in implementing its DSR, China is not only building cellular wireless infrastructure but it is also constructing submarine and terrestrial optic cables as well as data centres to the point that it now has a stake in 11% of existing cables and 24% of planned cables as either owner or supplier.³⁾Wheeler, A. (2020). China’s Digital Silk Road (DSR): the new frontier in the Digital Arms Race? It is also promoting the wider adaptation of its domestically produced technologies and cyber norms and standards, which could potentially boost its efforts at setting the legal framework for global internet governance at the United Nations (UN).

Increased access to data and the availability of advanced digital infrastructure both at home and abroad is also of paramount importance if Beijing is to be able to reap the economic benefits of intelligent connectivity. In contrast to connectivity, which can be understood as a mix of ICT infrastructure, intelligent connectivity has an added AI component built into it whereby AI plays a dual role: it both synchronises and optimises how different ICT infrastructures function together. It also assists with faster and arguably better decision making by human agents in charge of those ICT infrastructures.⁴⁾Huawei. (2019). Powering Intelligent Connectivity with Global Collaboration: Mapping your transformation into a digital economy with GCI 2019. Available from https://www.huawei.com/minisite/gci/assets/files/gci_2019_whitepaper_en.pdf?v=20191217v2

How Does the Arctic Fit In

China’s BRI as a whole could be considered as an express track for its tech giants to establish a healthy and firm presence in the global digital infrastructure, and it is no exaggeration to claim that the DSR is the heart of the BRI as a whole. This is because access to, and control over, data is, and will increasingly become an important source of power⁵⁾Blanchette, J and Hillman, J. E. (2020). China’s Digital Silk Road after the Coronavirus. Available form https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-digital-silk-road-after-coronavirus What is less explored in these discussions is the potent fact that a significant part of the global digital infrastructure is deep under oceans; that is, the bulk of global data is transferred via undersea cables simply because transmission via cables is both cheaper and faster.⁶⁾CCDCOE. (2019). Strategic Importance of, and Dependence on, Undersea Cables. Available from https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/11/Undersea-cables-Final-NOV-2019.pdf And herein lies an advantage that is unique to the Arctic Ocean. While all sea cables are at risk of intentional interference by a limited number of technologically capable states, such as Russia and the USA, cables laid in the Arctic Ocean are less vulnerable to damage from threats related to earthquake, tsunamis, anchors, and fisheries.⁷⁾Buchanan, E. (2018). Sea Cables in a Thawing Arctic. Available from https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/sea-cables-thawing-arctic.

On the other hand, cold climate and availability of land are the two commonly cited factors behind claims on the suitability of the Arctic regions for the establishment of data centres.⁸⁾Raspotnik, A and Steinicke, S. (2017). The Arctic’s Economic Future is Digital. Available from https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/arctic-economic-future-digital/ However, for these regions to be able to attract data centres they first need to address the current lack of sufficient telecommunication and data infrastructure which are prerequisite for the establishment of such centres. As such, there is an urgent need for the establishment of both more cross-border connection and direct subsea cables connecting the Arctic regions to Asia and America.⁹⁾Middleton, A and Ronning, B. (2020). Data Centers as Critical Infrastructure in the Arctic. Available from https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/data-centers-critical-infrastructure-arctic

Enter the Arctic Connect Project. Spearheaded by the Finnish government, majority owned by the European data communications company Cinia, and driven by Beijing’s BRI, Arctic Connect is in essence a revival of ROTACS (Russian Optical Trans-Arctic Cable System), which seeks to bridge the digital gap between Europe, Russia, and Asia. This is why Helsinki calls the project a win-win-win for the Eurasian region.¹⁰⁾Buchanan, E. (2018). Sea Cables in a Thawing Arctic. Available from https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/sea-cables-thawing-arctic One of the key objectives of the project is to encourage operators of data centres to relocate to the Arctic regions of Scandinavia, especially since China’s leadership expects the project to reduce network communication delays by around 40 percent. Such a reduction, in turn, would have significant economic advantages both for manufacturers that need fast and high-capacity connections, as well as tech or internet giants like the Google and Amazon.¹¹⁾Pfeiffer, T and Khrennikov, I. (2019). Melting Arctic Means New, and Faster, Subsea Cables Available from https://gcaptain.com/melting-arctic-means-new-and-faster-subsea-cables/

What is more, not only will the proposed Arctic cables be 1,500-2,000 km shorter than existing links from Europe to Eastern Asia, but their existence will also increase intercontinental data transfers by around 100 milliseconds and could prove more reliable than cables which go through the Indian Ocean and strategically volatile chockepoints such as the Suez Canal and Strait of Malacca.¹²⁾Pfeiffer, T and Khrennikov, I. (2019). Melting Arctic Means New, and Faster, Subsea Cables Available from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-12/global-warming-gives-traders-and-google-an-arctic-speed-lane Once in place, therefore, the system can address some of the current digital shortcomings in the region, and in doing so, attract more data centre players to the North 

Concluding Remarks

All in all, the fact that the two initiatives are closely intertwined ought not to be surprising. After all, the Arctic is home to both a vast amount of untapped resources, as well as some of the most cyber-advanced nations in the world. According to the latest Network Readiness Index, for example, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Canada, and USA are amongst the most connected and cyber resilient countries globally.¹³⁾Dutta, S, Lanvin, B, Bratt, M, and Rossini, C. (2019). Section I – The 2019 Network Readiness Index in Dutta, S, Lanvin, B. (2019) The Network Readiness Index 2019: Towards a Future-Ready Society. Available from https://download.networkreadinessindex.org/reports/data/2019/nri-2019.pdf The case of Scandinavian nations is of particular interest in this context since they seem capable of satisfying Beijing’s demand for acquiring technological know-how in a number of sectors, including renewable energy, cybersecurity, space technology, and Arctic shipping.¹⁴⁾Sverdrup-Thygeson, B and Hellstrom, J. (2018). Quintet out of Tune? China’s Bilateral Relations with the Nordic States in Sverdrup-Thygeson, B., Lindgren, W. Y., and Lanteigne, M. (2018) China and Nordic diplomacy. London; New York: Routledge. pp.1-10.

Currently, Chinese companies like Huawei and ZTE are involved in numerous overseas ICT projects ranging from the development of 5G networks, smart cities, data centres, and undersea and terrestrial telecommunications cables in spite of mounting US pressure to curb their ability for doing so. The problem in the Arctic is that America’s allies do not have the same threat perception as Washington. From Washington’s perspective, China’s growing Arctic role is largely a military threat. However, some of the Nordic members of the Arctic Council see enormous commercial benefits in China’s Arctic presence in spite of their rising concerns with regard to potential security (not military) risks of increased Chinese activities in the region. This is clearly evident in the case of the Arctic Connect project. 

How these interests develop and whether or not they will be able to cement and maintain commercial partnerships in spite of their political and strategic differences is difficult to say. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to state that a more comprehensive understanding of Beijing’s Arctic strategy requires one to analyse its PSR within the context of its DSR, which itself should be seen as an extension of China’s resource diplomacy in search of securing access to this century’s fuel: data.