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The Crossroads of Science Diplomacy: Italy and the Challenges of the European Union’s Greener Engagement in the Arctic

By | Article
August 15, 2023
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A two story woode house - Italian research station Stazione Dirigibile Italia in Ny-Ålesund - with a gravel road in front of it

The Italian research station Stazione Dirigibile Italia in Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard (Norway), established in 1997. The research station belongs to the Italian National Research Council and it is managed by the Italian Polar Science Institute. Photo: Superchilum

The Arctic Institute EU-Arctic Series 2023

Science Diplomacy is crucial in Arctic politics, where peaceful cooperation, environmental protection, and sustainable development are strong operational concepts.1) SD is indeed defined as “a practice that aims to maintain, cultivate, deepen and prolong relations”2) enabling states to cooperate even “where the relationship is not good otherwise”.3) In the Arctic, scientific cooperation is necessary to comprehensively understand how climate change is affecting the region. However, political actors may conduct SD in the Arctic not only to participate in regional governance, but also to set standards and goals for the future of the Arctic on the grounds of scientific advice. The EU’s 2021 Arctic policy update, Engagement for a Greener, Peaceful and Prosperous Arctic (2021) exemplifies this approach. In the document, the European Commission proposes taking actions towards limiting hydrocarbon extraction in the Arctic to prevent the rise of global temperatures, in line with both its 2021 Science for Policy Report and Strategic Foresight Report.4) However, the Commission needs to take into account the positions of the EU Member States, whose interests and roles in the Arctic, and their actions do not necessarily match the EU’s.

One example of this situation is Italy. The Italian strategy for the Arctic, published in 2015, reads that the country’s actions are meant to be in harmony with the EU’s environmental policy.5) However, ENI continues its extractive activities in the Nikaitchuq and Oooguruk fields, placed along the Alaska North Slope, and in the North Sea, Norwegian Sea, and Barents Sea. The EU’s moratorium risks colliding with ENI’s activities, which have been crucial for Italy’s economic power since the end of the Second World War6) and which is an essential part of Italy’s political and scientific involvement in the region. The case of the EU’s proposed moratorium raises questions about the definitions of sustainable development that the EU Institutions and Member States propose, and about the role of science in creating common foreign and environmental policy goals for the EU and its Member States.

Science Diplomacy at the crossroads of national goals and global needs

Italy and the EU see SD as a political tool to engage in international cooperation in the Arctic. According to the accepted classification of SD,7) political actors can employ scientific advice to inform foreign policy objectives (science in diplomacy); they can also facilitate international science cooperation (diplomacy for science); or, they might resort to scientific cooperation to improve international relations when other instruments fail (science for diplomacy), enabling the formation of epistemic communities that can cooperate beyond or despite political conflicting positions and values. Even though these three approaches never appear in isolation, science for diplomacy has been crucial in Arctic politics, where the eight Arctic States had cooperated together despite international crises and tensions8) until the breakout of the Russian war against Ukraine in 2022.

Both Italy and the EU have long adopted a similar approach that may be labeled as science for diplomacy – but now the paths are diverging in terms of use of scientific advice in policy-making. Italy has devoted its SD to ensuring its strategic involvement through the promotion of national expertise, and the same approach can be detected in the national strategy for the Arctic, formulated in 2015 – two years after being granted Observer status at the Arctic Council. As far as research activities are concerned, Italy has research stations in Norway (Ny-Ålesund) and Greenland (Thule), where Italian universities have been conducting or financing research projects since the late 1990s. The Universities of Venice and Siena, and SIOI (Società Italiana per l’Organizzazione Internazionale, also a partner of the network University of the Arctic) also offer master’s degrees and doctoral programs on Arctic and Polar Studies. SIOI also holds an annual symposium called Arctic Connections, in partnership with the Norwegian Embassy in Italy and the High North Center for Business and Governance at Nord University in Bodø. ENI is a sponsor of Arctic Connections, and the Italian companies Fincantieri and e-Geos participate in the Arctic daily business and EU projects by providing services in sectors from construction to geo-spatial data. Through scientific cooperation, Italy is able to participate in Arctic politics and diplomacy, both as an observer at Arctic Council and within the format of the biannual Arctic Science Ministerial meetings.9)

Similarly, the EU invests in Arctic science – with EUR 200 million dedicated to Arctic-related research between 2014 and 2020, and bilateral cooperation agreements on science and technology with the Arctic States. Like Italy, the EU also participates in the Arctic Science Ministerial meetings. However, the difference is that the EU is trying to set a normative agenda impacting the way business in the Arctic is conducted. In 2021, the EU stated its will to ensure “that oil, coal and gas stay in the ground, including in Arctic regions”.10) This is not only an aspect that differentiates the EU and Italy’s approaches, but is also potentially detrimental to ENI, which plays an important role in the Italian strategy for the Arctic.

Starting out as a state-owned company in 1953 (replacing the 1920’s company AGIP, Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli), ENI has been operating in Norway since 1965, when the Norwegian government started to release licenses for exploring the North Sea Continental Shelf. Later, ENI and the Norwegian oil and gas fund HitecVision established Vår Energi, stemming from Eni Norge AS and Point Resources AS merging together in 2018. At the beginning of 2022, after the release of the EU’s Arctic policy update, ENI was awarded 10 exploration licenses in the Barents Sea, where Vår Energi discovered a gas field by the end of the same year. ENI also operates in the North-American Arctic and started its activities in Alaska back in 2006. After the Trump administration removed President Obama’s ban on oil and gas drilling in the US Arctic in 2017, ENI became the first company to re-start exploration in Alaska. Nowadays, ENI has acquired the full shares of the Nikaitchuq and Oooguruk fields – where the Biden administration recently approved a new drilling project.11) Therefore, ENI’s activities might collide with the EU’s vision for the region.

However, the EU’s proposal is not entirely new. The EU Parliament discussed bans on drilling without success in 2012, when the Parliament’s industry committee rejected environment committee’s suggestion for a moratorium on Arctic drilling.12) In 2017, the Parliament proposed a non-binding motion against exploration for oil and gas in the Arctic icy waters of the EU and the European Economic Area, in a time when Norway was boosting exploration and exploitation of Arctic fossil fuels. Yet, the EU Parliament’s proposed ban had been defined ‘symbolic’ and ‘alarming’ by Norwegian lawmakers.13) In the end, the Parliament rejected the proposal.14) In the 2021 policy update, however, the proposal avoids the accusation of being ‘symbolic’ through the support of scientific advice in policy-making.

Shaping the future of the Arctic through science?

As mentioned in the previous section, the third function of SD is science in diplomacy – which means to use scientific advice to inform foreign policy objectives – may offer a common knowledge platform to understand the present and future needs of the Arctic region. With regards to sustainability, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) calls for a substantial reduction in the use of fossil fuels in order to halve greenhouse gas emissions and ensure a livable future.15) The focus on the future is necessary not only because politics is a future-oriented activity, but also because the World Commission on Environment and Development defines sustainable development as the “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.16)

In the case of the Commission, the reference to the future is explicit. Indeed, the Commission seeks to hinder extractive activities and decarbonise its energy supplies on the grounds of its Strategic Foresight Report – ‘The EU’s capacity and freedom to act’. The report builds upon the 2021 Science for Policy Report by the Commission’s Joint Research Centre, which underlines the necessity to substitute fossil fuels.17) Consequently, the EU Commission supports its positions through science and foresight, a method which the Commission has adopted to better inform its decision-making and move towards a desirable future18) adopting a specific approach called anticipation-for-the-future.19) – for example, a future where the global temperature does not cross the +2-degree threshold.20)

Italy, on the other hand, neither directly mentions perspectives nor specific goals about the future of the region. Rather, the strategy frames sustainable development as balance between environmental protection, economic development, and needs of the Arctic Indigenous peoples – which cannot be defined a priori. With regards to the role of scientific advice, ENI signed a research agreement with the Italian National Research Council (Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, CNR) in 2019, in order to study the impact of greenhouse gasses on the Arctic cryosphere. The project is expected to be conclude by the end of 2023.21) However, such an initiative does not necessarily align with the proposed moratorium, since the development of more environmentally-friendly technologies still implies the exploitation of natural resources and fossil energy.

These differences hit the EU right where it hurts, i.e. its capacity to speak with one voice in international affairs. The EU’s foreign policy presents challenges that are related to the collective nature of the EU or, as it has been suggested, because of the gap between the ‘political idealism’ of the EU supranational institutions and the national interests of the EU Member States.22) For the time being, the Council of the EU (where the governments of the EU Member States are represented) has stated that the EU needs “to mitigate the impact of climate change in the Arctic region”, with reference to the EU’s Climate and Energy Diplomacy23) – yet, it has not adopted any Conclusion on the EU’s renewed Arctic Policy so far.

A more explicit use of scientific advice and information might strengthen the EU’s domestic dialogue, where the environmental discourse had grown less strong24) until the launch of the European Green Deal. Yet, with regards to the Arctic, the Green Deal presents limitations due to the contradictions between decarbonization and the need for raw Arctic material to pursue the green transition. Or, tensions stemming from the exploitation of Arctic territories for renewable energy resources, e.g. windmills, and their impact on the Saami communities and their traditional activities, such as reindeer husbandry.25) Ideally, a common vision for a desirable future informed by research might be helpful to circumvent some of the political limits of SD – such as the need to balance national interests and global needs, and the construction of the legitimacy of the EU’s actions in the Arctic region.

However, as Ruffini observes in the case of the IPCC, “scientific knowledge, as objective as it strives to be, is far from inspiring homogeneous national choices”.26) Countries may agree on the threats posed by global warming and the impact of human activities, but they might disagree on how to handle them in light of their national interests – and the ones of the Indigenous Peoples. The Arctic is no exception. For example, Greenland has stopped the exploration of new oil and gas reserves, in the name of environmental concerns but also because of low profitability.27) Norway, on the other hand, has always criticized the ban on extractive activities, and still opposes the position of the Commission – considering deep-sea mining in Arctic waters.28)

Conclusions

In the words of Carmine Robustelli, Italy’s Special Envoy for the Arctic, the Italian government pursues an Arctic policy that: respects the Arctic States’ sovereignty; promotes and respects the interests of locals and Indigenous peoples; contributes to sustainable economic development.29) However, the EU’s greener engagement in the Arctic might change how Italy conducts its Science Diplomacy and define sustainable growth in the Arctic region – which needs to be in step with the EU, according to the country’s Arctic policy.

So far, Italy and the EU have tried to legitimize their positions in the region through education, research, and technological expertise. However, as climate change affects the world, the EU adopts a more normative position. Therefore, if Italy aims to pursue its goals in the Arctic in step with the EU, it might need to adjust its environmental goals for the region, or to justify its position in terms of use of Arctic resources. Yet, for the time being, states and companies continue to exploit Arctic fossil fuels, including ENI, both inside and outside the Arctic without being able to justify these activities in light of the latest scientific advice.

Mario Giagnorio is a PhD student at the School of International Studies (University of Trento, Italy). His current research investigates how the EU manifests its actorness in the Arctic, focusing on how geography, legal systems, and geopolitical narratives influence EU Capability in Arctic governance.

References[+]

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