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China’s northern roots stretch back farther than is generally known. In 1644, the Manchus invaded Beijing from the north, establishing the Qing Dynasty. The Manchus are a Tungusic people whose ancestral homeland lies in Siberia, and their language falls within the same family as Even and Evenki, spoken by the Siberian reindeer-herding peoples of the same names. Some Evenks, who are generally recognized as Arctic indigenous people, still live in pockets of northern China, where some still practice reindeer herding.

More conventionally, China’s involvement in Arctic affairs is said to have commenced in the 1980s when the country began carrying out Arctic and Antarctic expeditions. The Polar Research Institute of China, headquartered in Shanghai, oversees the country’s Arctic research program, which largely concerns sea ice, glacial monitoring, and the atmosphere. In 2004, China opened its Arctic Yellow River Station on Svalbard, where other countries also have research stations; its first overseas satellite receiving station, the China Remote Sensing Satellite North Polar Ground Station, opened in Kiruna, Sweden, in 2016, and the second research station, the China-Iceland Arctic Science Observatory opened in northern Iceland in 2018. China also has four research stations in Antarctica, with a fifth station under construction. China’s Arctic research has grown by leaps and bounds in recent years. In 2012 the Chinese icebreaker, MV Xue Long (Snow Dragon), a Ukrainian Arctic cargo ship refitted in the 1990s in Shanghai, attempted to reach the North Pole in a widely publicized voyage, although it fell short of its goal. China’s second polar research vessel, the MV Xue Long 2, was launched in September 2019. Jointly designed with Finnish icebreaker specialists Aker Arctic and built in Shanghai, the vessel marks a breakthrough in Chinese polar shipbuilding by being the country’s first indigenously-built polar icebreaker.

In 2013, China gained observer status in the Arctic Council alongside Japan, South Korea, Singapore, India, and Italy. More and more Western politicians and media outlets have begun to take notice of the country’s role in the Arctic, often with skepticism or incredulity. However, many Arctic states have welcomed China’s engagement in the region and the potential role it can play as an investor. This is particularly true of Russia, for whom China is a strategic partner. Chinese companies and government agencies, including the China National Petroleum Corporation and the Silk Road Fund, are major shareholders in Novatek’s Yamal LNG project and the former have also invested in subsequent Russian Arctic LNG projects.

This page was updated on 1 August 2022. If we have missed anything, please contact info@thearcticinstitute.org.

The Arctic Institute’s 2020 China series offers a comprehensive account of China’s policies and activities in the Arctic. In general, China is interested in the Arctic for its natural resource potential, possible shipping shortcuts, scientific relevance to global climate change, and investment opportunities. China is therefore similar to Japan and South Korea in its interests, but attracts more attention—and more negative attention at that—due to its larger size. China’s state-owned shipping company, COSCO, carried out its first cargo ship transit of the Northern Sea Route in 2013. At the end of 2019, it has completed a total of 36 transits through the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The NSR shaves off 28% of the distance between Rotterdam and Shanghai, but persistent unpredictability in sea ice and the lack of port infrastructure and additional markets en route have so far hampered development. COSCO and the Silk Road Fund, together with Novatek and Sovcomflot, established the Maritime Arctic Transport (MArT) joint-venture to further facilitate energy shipments from the Russian Arctic to the Asia-Pacific region. Nonetheless, both state-owned and private companies see many opportunities aside from shipping for investment and growth in the Arctic. To name just a few examples:

Yamal Peninsula, Russia: Chinese companies, including newly formed China Insurance Investment Ltd., have invested in the Yamal Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) project in central-northern Russia. Two major state-owned energy firms have also taken shares in the Arctic LNG 2 project, located on the Gydan Peninsula across the Ob Bay from the Yamal LNG project. Chinese fabrication yards have also been awarded contracts for constructing the modules for both projects.
Greenland (Denmark): Hong-Kong based company General Nice took over the $2 billion Isua iron ore mine in southwestern Greenland after taking over the failing London Mining company in late 2014.
Canada: Jilin Jien Nickel Company has reportedly invested up to $800 million in its Nunavik nickel mine in northern Quebec, acquired in 2010. Nickel ore has been transported at least once via the Northwest Passage to China. PetroChina, an energy state-owned, holds a 15 per cent ownership stake in the LNG Canada project in Northern British Columbia.
Finland: Several Chinese construction and transportation companies and Chinese financiers have expressed interest in constructing an undersea rail tunnel between Helsinki and Tallinn.
Norway: Sichuan Rail Investment Group has leveraged its experience with mountainous engineering in southwestern China and is currently involved in bridge-building projects in central and northern Norway. Growing volumes of Norwegian seafood destined for the Chinese market is being transported by rail from Kouvala, Finland.

The Arctic therefore represents not just a chance for China to obtain new sources of oil, gas, and minerals, but also a new opportunity for it to invest its capital and sell its infrastructure and growing expertise. First, in terms of infrastructure, China sees the Northern Sea Route as both a shipping shortcut and investment opportunity. China also aims to make the NSR part of its One Belt, One Road plan to establish a network of efficient trading routes between Europe and Asia both overland and on sea. The need to build up port infrastructure along the NSR and others could one day attract investment plans from firms such as China Insurance Investment Limited, formed in January 2016. The possibility for China to serve as a provider of infrastructure and other public goods in the Arctic is a real one. Second, in terms of expertise, while China is gaining knowledge about the Arctic through research and investment, it still lags behind Japan and South Korea in certain areas. It has, however, been gaining experience in building major ice-class vessels, including a fleet of seven ice-class 1A container vessels for Danish shipping company Maersk, and the Arc7 condensate gas carrier Boris Sokolov for the Yamal LNG project. Today, Chinese shipbuilders are marketing homegrown design for ice-breaking LNG carriers and heavy polar icebreakers.

China does not make any territorial claims to the Arctic, nor does it dispute the sovereignty of any of the Arctic states. It does, however, describe itself as a “near-Arctic state.” It is doubtful at this stage that the Arctic figures heavily into the country’s plans for military or naval expansion, but China, like other countries, is probably keeping an eye on how the world’s military powers react to the retreat of Arctic sea ice. Although there is a present lack of territorial claims or military posturing, Chinese officials do emphasize the status of the Arctic Ocean’s high seas as a global commons since freedom of navigation is important to the continued growth of Chinese trade. At the same time, Chinese government representatives have made claims to the country being a “near-Arctic state” thanks to the purported proximity to Siberia of its northernmost province of Heilongjiang, which has long and severe winters. Less often, parallels are drawn between the world’s so-called “Third Pole,” in the Himalayan ice sheet, and the Arctic. Chinese officials are generally keen to stress their country’s vulnerability to Arctic climate change, specifically sea ice melt, due to the potential for coastal flooding. Many of China’s most prosperous cities and regions sit near the coastline

China published its long-awaited Arctic policy on January 26th, 2018. In a so-called white paper China outlines the country’s Arctic agenda. Key aspects of the policy pertain to the exploration and understanding of the Arctic, the region’s environment and the impact of climate change, the use of Arctic resources, the region’s governance and international cooperation, and the importance of stability and peace in the Arctic.

In the policy China explains that it sees itself as an “active participant, builder and contributor in Arctic affairs who has spared no efforts to contribute its wisdom to the development of the Arctic region.” The Arctic Policy document follows on the heels of China’s maritime part of the Belt and Road Initiative published during the summer of 2017. China emphasizes the importance of maritime transport in the Arctic and ties the NSR into its Silk Road Economic Belt and speaks of creating a “Polar Silk Road.”

China also makes note of the dramatic impact of climate change on the Arctic region and its economy. The country takes a forward approach to discussing its bilateral and commercial interests in the Arctic and rejects the notion that it’s investments in the region could be seen as “invading the region’s markets.” And while China acknowledges that it has no territorial claims in the Arctic and will work within existing international laws and norms, the document clearly reiterates its “rights in respect of scientific research, navigation, overflight, fishing, laying of submarine cables and pipelines in the high seas and other relevant sea areas in the Arctic Ocean, and rights to resource exploration and exploitation in the Area.”

The policy makes a particular point of highlighting the “opportunities for the commercial use of sea routes and development of resources in the region,” and emphasizes the sustained impact these commercial activities will have on global shipping, international trade and energy supply – all areas of key interest to China. “The utilization of sea routes and exploration and development of the resources in the Arctic may have a huge impact on the energy strategy and economic development of China, which is a major trading nation and energy consumer in the world.”

As part of its Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road, China aims to build a “Polar Silk Road” by jointly developing the infrastructure needed to pave the way for regular commercial operations. China stresses its respect for existing international law and especially highlights that “the freedom of navigation enjoyed by all countries in accordance with the law and their rights to use the Arctic shipping routes should be ensured.”

The policy document continues to use the term “near Arctic state,” but to a lesser degree as in the past. China has become a well-established participant in Arctic governance through many global and regional intergovernmental forums, including the Arctic Council and its working groups. China participates in Arctic Council ministerials and meetings and in discussions at the International Maritime Organization regarding the Polar Code. As an observer in the Arctic Council, China does not have any significant powers within the organization. Observer funding of projects cannot surpass 50%. China has therefore instead focused on building bilateral relationships through which it can serve as a more equal partner. China engages in formal bilateral cooperation through institutions such as the China-Nordic Arctic Research Center, based in Shanghai. Iceland forms another close partner, becoming the first European country to sign a free-trade agreement with China in 2013. China National Offshore Oil Corporation is also working with Icelandic company Eykon Energy to explore for oil off the Arctic island’s northeast coast.

While the Chinese government and businesses likely see the Arctic as a new source of natural resources like oil, gas, and minerals and a shipping shortcut, they also see investment opportunities. China may therefore serve in the near future as an important provider of capital and infrastructure for Arctic economic development, especially through bilateral, rather than multilateral, cooperative arrangements.