Is Belgium the Next Near-Arctic State?
The Palace of Nations, house to the Belgian Federal Parliament in Brussels. Photo: Theedi
With a population of slightly over 11 million, a grand total of 70 kilometres of coastline, and a size so small it is often used as a unit of measurements for other geographical spaces,1) Belgium might not look like your typical near-Arctic state – to use the famous term coined in China’s 2018 Arctic Policy –2) Belgian Arctic policy or strategy has so far been inexistent. Policymakers in Brussels (which in this case is Brussels, Belgium not Brussels, EU) might even wonder why there should be any. Isn’t this the prerogative of the European Union and its new (sorry, updated) Arctic policy?3) To the surprise of many, Belgium had its Arctic lightbulb moment a few months ago as a few key events started to take place to cement its place as an Arctic stakeholder.
Belgium as a Polar Nation
To understand how the Arctic was not a feature of Belgium’s foreign affairs focus, we have to rewind the clock a little. Belgian and Antarctic historians are keen to point out that Belgium organised the first winter Antarctic expedition. Led by Baron Adrien de Gerlache,4) a navy officer from Hasselt, aboard the RV Belgica, the Belgian Antarctic Expedition of 1897–1899 is often considered the first expedition of the Heroic Age of Antarctic Exploration. Among its crew members, an unpaid 25-year-old Norwegian first mate, Roald Amundsen, would later become one of the most famous polar explorers. Belgium’s Antarctic interests did not stop there and continued in the 20th century. For Antarctic legal experts, the idea that Belgium is not a polar nation might sound ludicrous. Without a territorial claim to the seventh continent, Belgium was nonetheless one of the twelve original signatories of the Antarctic Treaty.5)
Under the Antarctic Treaty System,6) one of the core pillars of Antarctic governance and cooperation is the interest of states in science. During the International Geophysical Year in 1958-9, Belgium established the Roi Baudouin Base, its first Antarctic scientific research station, on a floating ice shelf off the coast of Dronning Maud Land. The station was later decommissioned in 1967. At the end of the 1970s, the Belgian government decided to build a research vessel dedicated to Belgian marine research.7) Named after its 19th century counterpart, the new RV A692 Belgica became operative in 1984.8) Fast forward to the 2000s, through the Belgian Science Policy Office (BELSPO) and the International Polar Foundation (IPF), directed by polar explorer Alain Hubert, Belgium has put together several scientific expeditions (BELARE). The IPF signed the full return of Belgium as an Antarctic science actor in 2009 with the construction of Princess Elisabeth research station. Named after King Philippe of Belgium’s eldest daughter, the station is the only zero-emission research station in Antarctica, running on solar and wind energy and hosts scientists from across the world each research season. After nearly 36 years of oceanographic research, the Council of Ministers decided to retire the RV A692 Belgica and to acquire a new research vessel. Keeping with tradition, this new research vessel,9) which will be operational at the end of 2021, will be named RV Belgica II and will be owned by the Belgian government through BELSPO. On 13 September 2021, Belgium signed an agreement10) with Ukraine to transfer RV Belgica to the Ukrainian authorities as part of the European Union for Improving Environmental Monitoring in the Black Sea project (EU4EMBLAS). Belgium’s former polar vessel will now be docked in Odessa and will be used to conduct scientific research in the Black Sea.
Belgium’s Slow Journey toward the Arctic
With such in-depth Antarctic expertise, it is easy to wonder why Belgium has not shown more willingness to be more active in Arctic governance. Belgium seems like an obvious European Arctic stakeholder. At the international level, Brussels has long seen itself as a promoter of the rule of law. With Arctic relevance, Belgium acceded11) to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1998, it has been invested in the UN negotiations on an international legally binding instrument under UNCLOS about Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction,12) which will, among others, codify how states conduct themselves in the Central Arctic Ocean in the future, and without being involved in Indigenous Peoples’ rights issues, Belgium voted in favour of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007. Beyond international law, as other non-Arctic states have demonstrated, scientific southern polar expertise might be transferable to the North with the right sensibilities for the social, environmental, cultural, and legal fabric of the Arctic. So far, Belgium has not followed many of its European counterparts in seeking observer status at the Arctic Council. In a world where strategic positioning is key to be regarded as an honest Arctic actor – that is, a non-Arctic actor with deep understanding of Arctic affairs – Belgium has not yet developed a comprehensive Arctic policy document outlining potential Belgian Arctic interests. However, in recent years, a few internal political developments have caught the eyes of Arctic experts in Belgium.
Since 2013, a cross-party group of Belgian Senators led by senator and former Flemish government minister Bert Anciaux (SLP) has kept submitting a draft resolution on the Protection and Conservation of the Arctic Region.13) Using a broad brush to paint the landscape of Arctic affairs, the original draft resolution describes the environmental challenges, potential economic activities, issues of governance, and the potential for conflicts in the region. Although it mentions Indigenous peoples and Arctic inhabitants, the draft resolution is more focused on the geopolitical consequences of Arctic changes. Among others, it calls for Belgium to play a more important role in the creation of a common European (EU) Arctic policy, to encourage the EU to keep applying for AC observer status, and to keep engaging in the Arctic through different multilateral frameworks such as at the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and through NATO. Interestingly enough, the most recent iteration of the proposed draft resolution in 2019 called for Belgium to be an advocate, in a EU context, for an international moratorium on mineral resource exploitation in the Arctic. For the keen EU-Arctic audience, this controversial moratorium might sound very familiar indeed.14) The EU’s Arctic involvement has been key in shaping how the Belgian government has positioned itself in recent years. For instance, answering MP questions at the Chamber of Representatives’ Commission for External Relations in September 2020, then Minister of Foreign Affairs Philippe Goffin (MR)reemphasized 15) Belgium’s support for the 2016 integrated EU Arctic policy16) and for the 2019 conclusion from the Council of the European Union.17) With renewed and ongoing Arctic interests from the EU, is it Belgium’s time to broaden its Arctic involvement?
In that regard, 2021 has been a seminal year for Belgium’s journey towards the Arctic. At the legislative level, a group of crossparty MPs (Jasper Pillen (Open VLD), Marianne Verhaert (Open VLD), Kattrin Jadin (PFF) and Goedele Liekens (Open VLD) tabled a new draft resolution asking the Belgian government to pay increased attention to the security challenges linked to developments in the Arctic.18) While the first half of the draft resolution focuses on geopolitical and security issues, the second half is more instructive about how Belgian politicians think about the Arctic. Acknowledging that the Arctic has had little influence on how Belgium acts internationally, the draft resolution highlights the strategic and geoeconomic impacts of a warming Arctic. For instance, as Zeebrugge, one of Belgium’s biggest ports, has heavily invested to become the main EU transhipment area for Russian LNG, the potential of new Arctic trade routes, as Arctic summer ice rapidly diminishes, would have commercial implications for Zeebrugge. The 2021 draft resolution concludes with a reminder of Belgium’s geography in relation to the Arctic stating that although Belgium is located 4,300 km from the North Pole, it has a strategic interest to keep an eye on regional development.
Although still very much a niche topic among foreign affairs civil servants and politicians in Brussels, the Arctic is slowly being talked about a bit more often in parliamentary meetings and debates. As recently as last month, EU Special Envoy for Arctic Matters, Michael Mann tweeted about having participated in a meeting of the Parliament’s foreign affair committee to discuss recent Arctic developments.
Belgium as an Honest Actor in the Arctic?
With its well-documented colonial past and legacy,19) Belgium needs to be mindful of how it engages in the Arctic. Avoiding colonial tropes of the Arctic as a “blank space”20) in need of protection and conservation is vital to act as an honest actor in the Arctic. At the same time, as climate change and the Anthropocene crisis affect the way humans and societies interact with the natural world (not only the Arctic), more thoughtful and stringent environmental measures are needed at home. If the old Arctic saying “what happens in the Arctic …” is true, so is the reverse. What happens in Belgium does not stay in Belgium. Amidst the mayhem of Belgium’s federal-federated competency distribution, this might require fostering more cohesion between regions and the federal government; a tall order even for the most skilful politicians.
With its rich Antarctic science diplomatic expertise, there is definitely room and willingness from relevant public and private institutions for more Arctic engagement in Belgium. Should Belgium launch itself in a bid to become an Arctic Council’s Observer? Are there other ways to engage in Arctic governance? In that regard, there are lessons to be learnt from non-Arctic states and non-state actors, which have sought more engagement in the Arctic in recent years. The EU’s continuous de facto observer status and the rejection of Estonia’s bid earlier this year serve as reminders that engaging in Arctic governance through the Arctic Council is no mince feat. To become honest Arctic actors, EU member states should develop long-term strategies to seek closer ties to the Arctic as a region, to Arctic states, and local and Indigenous communities.21) This might also mean bringing more Arctic in Belgium. As I have already co-argued elsewhere using Japan as a case study,22) the construction of an Arctic identity needs practice. It is performed through time and requires to be constantly reaffirmed. Non-regional states that want to be involved in all or some parts of Arctic governance will have to make a choice about what kind of Arctic relationships they want to create. The Arctic web of interlinked relationships can range from bilateral cooperation with specific Arctic states and non-state partners, investing resources in multilateral fora to promoting the rule of law and fighting climate change from home. The question left for Belgium now is which relationships it wants to invest in?
Even a brief look at the MOSAIC project list of contributors can tell us that many individual Belgian (or based in Belgium) scientists and researchers conduct or participate in Arctic-relevant projects.23) However, the “Arctic-ation” of Belgium’s foreign policy and science diplomacy cannot only rely on motivated individuals. It requires coordinated action. Promoting international scientific cooperation through science diplomacy, investing in Arctic research, in both natural and social sciences, and more dialogue with Arctic inhabitants would help streamline the engagement of domestic researchers and policymakers. The next task on Belgium’s Arctic agenda? The maybe not-so-easy and straightforward matter of drafting a cohesive Belgian Arctic strategy document linking science, policy, and a deep understanding of Arctic affairs and governance. But is there enough political will?
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