The Arctic This Week Take Five: Week of 5 December, 2022

Arctic Data Cable Linking Europe to Japan Secures First Investment

As reported by Arctic Today on December 2, a plan to build the first fiber-optic cable across the Arctic has secured an initial investment. The subsea cable will be laid across the Arctic seabed linking Europe and Japan to the global internet infrastructure via Greenland, Canada and Alaska. NORDUnet, a pan-Nordic research and education network operator, has signed a letter of intent with Far North Fiber to invest in one of twelve planned pairs of fibers that will be contained inside the cable. Specialists estimate that the cable will reduce data transmission delays between Frankfurt and Tokyo by approximately 30 percent. (Arctic Today)

Take 1: The growing demand for secure, fast and expansive international data transmission capacity is exacerbated by antiquated trans-ocean fiber optic systems. New seasonally ice-free passages through the Arctic seas are not only opening strategic trade routes and raw material reserves but also providing shorter and lower-latency fiber optic routes. The new cable is hoped to be operational by 2025. It will terminate in Japan and on the European side, in Ireland and Norway with a link to Finland. Tentative additional landings are mapped in Alaska, the Canadian Arctic, Greenland and Iceland. Other major fiber-optic projects of varying sizes are either underway or in planning across the Arctic. Subsea Arctic cables are an interesting consideration against the backdrop of geopolitical tensions between the powerful nation states encircling the Arctic Ocean. While subsea fiber-optic cables have a potential military dimension, they are also critical connective infrastructure likely to be an early target in an escalation of conflict. However, whatever the role of subsea cables in the Arctic the continued interest and investment appear to confirm their future as a fixture of the Arctic seabed. (Arctic Today, Euractiv, Far North Digital, Technology.org)

Intensive High North Diplomacy at Work to Ensure the Future of the Arctic Council

As reported by High North News on December 6, the State Secretary to the Norwegian Minister of Foreign affairs Eivind Vad Petersson announced last week at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute that the Norwegian Chairmanship of the Arctic Council will begin from May 11, 2023. While political cooperation with Russia is considered unlikely, intensive work is being undertaken to ensure practical cooperation occurs at lower levels of the Arctic Council’s structure. (High North News)

Take 2: Despite the Arctic Council’s historically deft evasion of international political tensions, the recent Russian invasion of the Ukraine led to the temporary closure of the Arctic Council and its subsidiary bodies in March 2022. Although cooperation between the Western Arctic Council member states has resumed to a limited extent (notably with the exclusion of Russia) in the final months of the Russian Chairmanship, the future of the Arctic Council as the principal forum for intergovernmental cooperation in the Arctic remains uncertain. Given the increasing global importance of the Arctic ecosystem because of climate change, it is noteworthy that Russia controls the largest area of Arctic coastline and is therefore integral to the practical cooperation and information exchange which underpins climate and environmental monitoring. Arguably, failure to rekindle a greater collaborative relationship between Russia and the Western Arctic member states may diminish the relevance of the Arctic Council forum and threaten its dissolution. However, current diplomatic efforts to transfer Chairmanship smoothly from Russia to Norway in 2023, attest to the consensus across all Arctic actors that the preservation of the Arctic Council is a priority. Nevertheless, the upcoming Norwegian Chairmanship shoulders the significant task of re-establishing faith in the longevity of the Arctic Council, both among its members and observers as well as the wider international audience. (Arctic Council, High North News)

Trudeau Announces $800M for Indigenous-led Conservation Initiatives

As reported by CBC News on December 7, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau pledged 800 million dollars of funding for four large Indigenous-led conservation projects, two of which are based in Northern Canada. The announcement was made at the 15th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity held in Montréal this week. The initiative is expected to help Canada reach its target of conserving 25 percent of Canadian land and waters by 2025, and 30 percent by 2030. (CBC News)

Take 3: As delegates gather in Montréal this week to negotiate a once-in-a-decade agreement on global biodiversity goals, attention is focused on Canada’s own conservation commitments. While Canada failed to achieve its 2020 national Aichi targets, experts project that the new targets to conserve 25 percent of lands and oceans by 2025 and 30 percent by 2030 are ambitious but achievable. The expansive spatial and diverse ecological coverage of the elected projects is a shrewd means of meeting international commitments. Both Northern projects cover distinct flora and fauna. In the Northwest Territories funding will be used to preserve boreal forests and tundra, while the Qikiqtani region is focused on the conservation of marine ecosystems located on the coast and sea ice edges. Despite the environmental protection potential of such projects, details remain forthcoming on how funding will be distributed through the Project Finance for Permanence. Given Canada has only eight years to double the amount of land protected in all national parks, provincial parks, conservation areas and other protected spaces, efficient implementation is critical. Nevertheless, the successful coordination of 30 Indigenous groups within the Northwest Territory as well as the larger scale management of federal, provincial, territorial, and Indigenous designations suggests momentum moving forward into the next decade of biodiversity conservation is promising. (CBC News, CBC News, CBD.int)

Amid Plummeting Export, Gazprom Opens New Arctic Field

As reported by Eye on the Arctic on December 7, Gazprom CEO Aleksei Miller announced the successful start of commercial gas production at the Semakovskoye field in the Kara Sea. The Semakovskoye field is a joint venture between Gazprom and RusGazDobych. The field’s reserves are largely located offshore in the shallow waters of Taz Bay in Western Siberia. To reach gas stocks, project developers have applied novel horizontal production technology from land. During the first phase of development, production is expected to exploit 19 wells, with recoverable reserves of 320 billion cubic meters. (Eye on the Arctic)

Take 4: Interestingly it is unclear where Gazprom intends on selling gas from the Semakovskoye field. The launch of commercial production occurs at a time when the Russian natural gas industry is experiencing a crisis following international sanctions. The declining demand for natural gas in the European market, as Europe seeks to reduce dependency on Russian hydrocarbons, has been a key factor in decreased export statistics. Nevertheless, a gas processing facility has been built at the Semakovskoye to prepare output for shipping via a dedicated 100 kilometre connector to the Russian gas trunkline network. Semakovskoye is one of several examples illustrating Gazprom’s continued investment in Russia’s upstream sector. However, the natural gas accumulated at this and other fields runs the increasing risk of being “stuck” in the Arctic as all regional infrastructure remains targeted at the EU market. Currently, Russia has only the Power of Siberia pipeline that brought less than five billion cubic meters to the Chinese market in 2020. Capacity will increase over the next few years, and Russia also has plans for a Power of Siberia 2 and 3. Yet, the outlook still appears bleak for export statistics as none of this can replace the EU volumes that exceeded 200 billion cubic meters, despite ambitions for new east-bound pipelines to link the Yamal region with China all new connections are several years from completion. (Oil and Gas Journal, The Barents Observer, upstreamonline, vedomosti) 

Russian Parliament Passes Law Limiting Freedom of Navigation along Northern Sea Route

As reported by The Barents Observer on December 1, the Russian Federation Council has approved a new law with an immediate effect on the passage of foreign military vessels sailing north of the Siberian coast between Europe and Asia. Under the amendment to its federal legislation on maritime jurisdiction, foreign military vessels following the Northern Sea Route will require diplomatic clearance from the Russian Federation 90 days prior to transit. No more than one foreign warship or other state-owned vessel may be located in Russian internal sea waters along the Northern Sea Route unless it is calling at port. Foreign submarines must also navigate on the surface under their own flag. (The Barents Observer)

Take 5: As melting sea ice reshapes the Arctic, Russian officials hope that the Northern Sea Route will become a new artery of commercial shipping, particularly following the global shipment delays caused by the infamous Suez Canal obstruction in 2021. Russia considers the amendment a neat legal solution to its desire to control the naval activity of foreign states, which Russia’s current NSR regulation used to control commercial navigation does not cover. The premise for the amendment relies on Russia’s claim that the four main straits belong to its internal sovereign waters, a maritime zone where states can revoke the right to innocent passage under the internationally-agreed and legally binding United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, a historically recognised exception means that innocent passage rights have been preserved in all Russian Arctic straits, ironically defeating the intentions of Russia’s proposal. Significantly, the clear contravention of the exemption may serve as a more persuasive rallying point for those states who have been seeking to challenge Russia’s legislative approach – that is, less contentious and more easily evidenced than the United States’ argument that the straits are international straits rather than internal waters. Furthermore, it is also worth recognising the limits of the new legislation, as foreign vessels would still be permitted to sail in Russia’s exclusive economic zone north of the straits. Nevertheless, the legislation is likely to be controversial and provoke protests within coming weeks. (Arctic Today, Lawfare blog, Reuters, TASS)