Arctic Unknowns? The role of non-knowledge in the Kingdom of Denmark’s Arctic policy

The sun rises over northeastern Greenland. Photo: NASA on the Commons

If we want to improve Arctic governance, we have to accept non-knowledge as inherent to the Arctic region.

The Arctic is an area gaining increasing attention across mainstream media, international organizations, and academic circles. Despite the scientific exploration and state interaction dating back over two centuries in the Arctic—and the intimate knowledge of the region cultivated by those who have lived there for much longer—gaps in the information required to formulate an Arctic specific policy in 2017 remain. How does this lack of knowledge play a role in (national) policies on the Arctic? Concentrating on the Kingdom of Denmark’s¹⁾Consisting of the governments of Greenland, The Faroe Islands and Denmark. ‘The Kingdom’ from hereon. Arctic policy, I ask how non-knowledge (or simply the “unknown”) plays a role in the its Arctic policy. In order to examine this I use three key policy documents, which are all central in delineating the current policy. These three are the Kingdom’s Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020²⁾Denmark, Greenland and The Faroe Islands (2011), Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Denmark), Department of Foreign Affairs (Greenland) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Faroe Islands), available at https://um.dk/udenrigspolitik/lande-og-regioner/arktisk-portal. Accessed on 11-12-2016. and two other key documents, namely the 2016 Taksøe-Rapport,³⁾Taksøe-Jensen, Peter (2016), Dansk Diplomati og Forsvar i en Brydningstid: Vejen frem for Danmarks Interesser og Værdier mod 2030. København: Den Udenrigspolitiske Udredning, Udenrigsministeriet), available at https://um.dk/udenrigspolitik/aktuelle-emner/dansk-diplomati-og-forsvar-i-en-brydningstid. Accessed on 11-12-2016 an official report from the Foreign Ministry of Denmark, trying to identify Denmark’s future foreign policy interests, and the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration,⁴⁾The Ilulissat Declaration (28 May 2008). Ilulissat: Arctic Ocean Conference), available at https://um.dk/udenrigspolitik/lande-og-regioner/arktisk-portal. Accessed on 11-12-2016. a central document to Arctic interstate relations. Focusing on what we do not have might at first seem unacademic. However, as is shown, the way we deal with non-knowledge is not only important for future activities in the Arctic, but is also a highly political matter.

Moving forward rapidly in unknown territory—literally and figuratively speaking—is complicated. Key Arctic actors such as the A8 (the Arctic 8 is the eight Arctic states making up the Arctic Council: The Kingdom of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Canada, the US, and Russia) are advancing through policy-making and scientific exploration despite knowledge gaps in areas such as climate change, demarcation of national borders, and dynamics of Arctic interstate relations. Understanding how non-knowledge is implicitly and explicitly a part of different Arctic policies is therefore key to understanding how the Arctic is currently governed and how it might be governed better in the future.

Existing knowledge(s) of Arctic unknowns

Some scholars have touched upon the unknown in relation to the Arctic. The most common approach is to try to eliminate the knowledge gaps. This is what Wang, Commandant of the Royal Danish Defence College and former Head of the Danish navy, tries to do by examining the Arctic as an “equation with multiple unknowns”.⁵⁾Wang N (2013) Arctic Security: An Equation with Multiple Unknowns. Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 15(2): 16-30. He focuses on the unknowns of Arctic resource opportunities and shipping routes and tries to limit their number. Wang’s article therefore positions itself with the majority of the Arctic literature; it attempts to decrease the amount of non-knowledge. Wang’s article, and the approach taken in this article, are thus situated on different epistemological levels. Rather than focusing on gaining the knowledge itself, this piece examines how that, which is unknown about the Arctic, is made known.

Several scholars have examined knowledge production in relation to the Arctic.⁶⁾Dodds K (2013) Anticipating the Arctic and the Arctic Council: pre-emption, precaution and preparedness. Polar Record 49(2):193-203; Shadian J (2009) Revisiting Politics and Sciences in the Poles: IPY and the Governance of Science in Post-Westphalia in Shadian, J & Tennberg M (eds.) (2009) Legacies and Change in Polar Sciences: Historical, Legal and Political Reflections on the International Polar Year. England: Ashgate: 35-62; Krupnik I, Aporta C, Gearheard S, Laidler G & Kielsen Holm L (eds.) (2010) SIKU: Knowing Our Ice Documenting Inuit Sea Ice Knowledge and Use. Dordrecht: Springer Verlag. A particularly informative example of alternative ways of knowing, often excluded in Western scientific circles, has been presented by Bates.⁷⁾Bates P (2007) Inuit and Scientific Philosophies about Planning, Prediction and Uncertainty. Arctic Anthropology 44(2): 87-100. He shows the value of Indigenous knowledge by studying how the Inuit community in Cambridge Bay in Canada relate to the future and the lack of knowledge inherent to the very idea of a future. The Inuit intentionally refrain from making predictions about the future as the Arctic environment simply entails too many uncertain factors to do so—what Wang would call too many unknowns. Plausible prediction of future weather conditions, wildlife movements, and ice thickness are not possible. Instead, the Inuit “respond to each situation as and when it presents itself.”⁸⁾Bates. Op.cit.: 421: 90. Solutions are improvised as, and when, problems arise. In this way, the Cambridge Bay Inuit try to acknowledge and embrace the fact that the unknown is inherent to Arctic life.

But how do Arctic states handle the unknown? How are national policies formulated in an area where even the most proficient experts lack knowledge of key issues? The A8 are the biggest players in Arctic governance, yet the role of non-knowledge in Arctic national policies remains unexplored. This article looks only at one of the A8, leaving ample space for other and deeper examinations of Arctic unknowns. Theoretically, the article employs Daase and Kessler’s conceptualization of the unknown to understand how non-knowledge plays a role in the Kingdom of Denmark’s policy.⁹⁾Daase C & Kessler O (2007) Knowns and Unknowns in the ‘War on Terror’: Uncertainty and the Political Construction of Danger. Security Dialogue 38(4): 411-434.

Theorizing the Unknown

In the broader IR literature, a number of scholars have examined the role of non-knowledge, particularly in relation to the War on Terror. Aradau and Munster¹⁰⁾Aradau C & van Munster R (2007) Governing Terrorism through Risk: Taking Precautions, (un)knowing the Future. European Journal of International Relations 13(1): 89-115. show that the idea of precautionary risk permeates the rationalities of modern-day security communities, forcing decisions to be made “not on the basis of what we know, but on the basis of what we do not know”.¹¹⁾Gulberg H (2003) Challenging the Precautionary Principle. Spiked-Online, Available at https://www.spiked-online.com/2003/07/01/challenging-the-precautionary-principle/#.WEyaKbLhDIU. Accessed 11-12-2016, cited in Aradau & Munster, Op.cit.: 102. However, as Daase & Kessler have shown, ways of attempting to know the unknown extend beyond precautionary risk.¹²⁾Daase C & Kessler O (2007) Knowns and Unknowns in the ‘War on Terror’: Uncertainty and the Political Construction of Danger. Security Dialogue 38(4): 411-434. Using former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s now (in)famous speech on the knowns and the unknowns of the world as a starting point, the article develops a theoretical framework. Applying this framework to one Arctic state’s policy is illuminating, as will be shown.

It is worth quoting part of Rumsfeld’s speech, which has since been turned into a poem, in order to understand where Daase & Kessler depart from:¹³⁾Rumsfeld D (2002) Speech at US Department of Defense Conference, 12 February 2002. Turned into a poem by Seely H (2003) Pieces of Intelligence: The Existential Poetry of Donald H. Rumsfeld. New York: Free Press. And cited in Daase & Kessler, Op.cit.: 411.

The Unknown
As we know,
There are known knowns
There are things we know we know
We also know
There are known unknowns
That is to say
We know there are some things
We do not know.
But there are also unknown unknowns,
The ones we don’t know
We don’t know.

Daase and Kessler add a fourth category to this; ‘unknown knowns’, which signifies knowledge that we actually possess, but which is neglected or forgotten out of discomfort or political reasons.¹⁴⁾Daase C & Kessler O (2007) Knowns and Unknowns in the ‘War on Terror’: Uncertainty and the Political Construction of Danger. Security Dialogue 38(4): 411-434. In this way, there are four distinct categorie which each represent a way of managing (non-)knowledge.

The first category, known knowns represents “secured knowledge”¹⁵⁾Daase & Kessler. Op.cit.: 421 which is knowledge that is obtainable and can be relied upon. In the known knowns category the stakes of a given situation are known; a specific threat can be identified. Deterrence is an example of this.¹⁶⁾Daase & Kessler. Op.cit.: 421 Deterrence necessitates that the enemy can be identified easily and that his capabilities are known. The consequences of an attack from either side can be assessed accurately and it is this knowledge (of a threat) that deters the other from acting.

In comparison, known unknowns are things we know that we do not know, but which we try to make known through probabilistic knowledge. We are trying to calculate the unknown to make it known. This way of thinking is not only morally problematic, but also methodologically so. By trying to make the unknown known, this method misses a key point, namely that there are things we simply cannot imagine and therefore cannot calculate with risk analysis tools.¹⁷⁾As has been argued by Gross M (2016) Risk as Zombie Category: Ulrich Beck’s Unfinished Project of the ‘Non-knowledge’ Society. Security Dialogue 47(5): 386-402, and Nielsen K & Sørensen M (2015) How to Take Non-knowledge Seriously, or “the Unexpected Virtue of Ignorance”. Public Understanding of Science: Online First View. The most advanced equation could not have predicted 9/11 because it was unimaginable that such an attack could happen. In a way, this category is dangerous because it lets us think that we have made the unknown calculable, thus predictable, when actually a large part of the unknown remains unknown.

The next category, unknown unknowns is the “disaster” category. As Rumsfeld put it, these are the things we are not aware that we do not know and as such, surprise is inherent to these unknown unknowns. They are exemplified by natural disasters, financial crises, or terrorist attacks. Security professionals across the globe are frantically trying to make some of these unknowns into knowns. The problem with this approach is, again, that we cannot calculate what we cannot imagine. We simply do not know what it is that we do not know.

Finally, the category of unknown knowns, which Rumsfeld perhaps knowingly did not mention, represents knowledge which is ignored for political reasons or consciously forgotten out of discomfort. This (sub)consciously chosen state of ignorance can, not surprisingly, lead to gross miscalculations.¹⁸⁾On this point, see also Gross, Op.cit.: 393-395. An example of chosen ignorance might be climate change denial. In a Foucauldian sense, then, not only is knowledge power, but non-knowledge can also be power.

Understanding the Role of the Unknown in the Kingdom’s Arctic Policy

To understand the role of the unknown in the Kingdom’s Arctic policy three key documents are used, as mentioned earlier; the Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020¹⁹⁾Denmark, Greenland and The Faroe Islands (2011), Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Denmark), Department of Foreign Affairs (Greenland) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Faroe Islands), available at https://um.dk/udenrigspolitik/lande-og-regioner/arktisk-portal. Accessed on 11-12-2016. and two other key documents, namely the 2016 Taksøe-Rapport²⁰⁾Taksøe-Jensen, Peter (2016), Dansk Diplomati og Forsvar i en Brydningstid: Vejen frem for Danmarks Interesser og Værdier mod 2030. København: Den Udenrigspolitiske Udredning, Udenrigsministeriet), available at https://um.dk/udenrigspolitik/aktuelle-emner/dansk-diplomati-og-forsvar-i-en-brydningstid. Accessed on 11-12-2016 and the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration.²¹⁾The Ilulissat Declaration (28 May 2008). Ilulissat: Arctic Ocean Conference), available at https://um.dk/udenrigspolitik/lande-og-regioner/arktisk-portal. Accessed on 11-12-2016

In the category of known knowns the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, adopted by the A5 (the five Arctic littoral states: Norway, Canada, the US, Russia and the Kingdom of Denmark), is an illustrative example. It is an insurance for the A5 as it promises cooperation and responsible conduct regarding maritime territorial disputes. The declaration ensures that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the legal framework for solving these disputes and the A5 have thus agreed to consult and follow the recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). The declaration asserts that the A5 “remain committed to this legal framework and to the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims”.²²⁾The Ilulissat Declaration (28 May 2008). Ilulissat: Arctic Ocean Conference), available at https://um.dk/udenrigspolitik/lande-og-regioner/arktisk-portal. Accessed on 11-12-2016

The logic underlying the declaration is one of full-disclosure. The rules are known and have been agreed on. On the basis of trust, but with threat as an undercurrent, the declaration deters each actor from doing something unexpected. Should one of the states decide to break this agreement, they can be sure to provoke a severe reaction from the others. It is much like the bipolar situation during the Cold War; the other actors are known, the rules are known, and the costs of acting on a whim are known—thus deterring surprise actions.

Not surprisingly, when it comes to the Arctic environment, large parts of the Kingdom’s strategy are known unknowns. The 2011 strategy has a whole chapter on “the Arctic’s vulnerable climate, environment and nature”.²³⁾The Kingdom: Op.cit.: 43. The summary of the chapter look as follows:

• The Kingdom will pursue a vigorous and ambitious knowledge building on climate change in the Arctic and its consequences in order to foster global and local adaptation to far-reaching change.
• The Arctic nature and environment must be managed based on the best possible scientific knowledge and standards for protection, and international cooperation in this endeavor must be promoted.²⁴⁾The Kingdom: Op.cit.: 43.

Evidently, the Kingdom has a pronounced ambition of gaining more knowledge on the effects of Arctic climate change so the necessary adaptation can be initiated. There is a wish to avoid surprises caused by climate change by trying to transform the unknown future consequences of (Arctic) climate change into known and thus predictable outcomes.

The strategy also lists three interconnected research programs with the aim of minimizing the lack of knowledge of the Arctic environment. The Regional Climate Modelling in the Arctic program is a tool to focus on “increasing basic knowledge about the climate in the Arctic (…) and to assist in a better understanding of the effects of climate change”.²⁵⁾The Kingdom: Op.cit.: 44. Simultaneously, the ‘Programme for Monitoring of the Greenland Ice Sheet – PROMICE’ aims to “establish a better knowledge base (…) to determine the ice sheet’s mass loss, explain why and provide data and observations.”²⁶⁾The Kingdom: Op.cit.: 45. The third program is the AC’s 2005 ‘Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA)’ and its 2011 follow-up ‘ACIA-report: Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic (SWIPA)’, which employs “200 of the world’s leading Arctic researches.”²⁷⁾The Kingdom: Op.cit.: 44. Despite the experts, the Kingdom recognizes that “in some areas the pace of change is happening much faster than expected.”²⁸⁾The Kingdom: Op.cit.: 44. This begs the question: is it possible to transform unknown unknowns into known unknowns when it comes to Arctic climate change? If 200 of the world’s leading Arctic researchers cannot do this adequately, perhaps this is not entirely possible?

The category of unknown unknowns is, by its nature, difficult to comment on. Neither this article nor the Kingdom can know what it is that is presently unknown. Only the future will reveal what are currently unknown unknowns. A state is unlikely to proclaim this and it is therefore a lost cause to attempt to find evidence of this category in the Kingdom’s policy.

Unknown knowns, those facts that are chosen to be ignored, represent the most political of the four categories. Similarly to unknown unknowns, it is difficult to know at this point in time what it is that the Kingdom is choosing to ignore. However, a close reading reveals some unknown knowns in the Kingdom’s policy. The third chapter of the Kingdom’s strategy focuses on extraction of resources in the Kingdom’s realm. It is explicitly stated that the potential oil and gas resources in Greenland and the Faroe Islands will be exploited and that “Greenland will continue the successful licensing policy and strategy of competitive tenders in the oil and gas sector.”²⁹⁾The Kingdom: Op.cit.: 24-25. Similarly, the Taksøe-Report, which aims to outline Denmark’s interests towards 2030 notes that the melting of Greenland’s ice sheet means “new opportunities for increased economic activities such as fishing, scientific research, resource exploitation, new transport routes and tourism.”³⁰⁾Taksøe-Jensen. Op.cit.: 10. My translation. Both documents thus show a pronounced interest in oil and gas exploitation.

The aim of hydrocarbon exploitation does not concur with what climate change research prescribes. This “Arctic dilemma,” is a vicious circle through which fossil fuel burning expedites the melting of Arctic ice which; in turn, enables the extraction of Arctic oil and natural gas. The strategy contains indications that the Kingdom is aware of this problem. For example, the Kingdom wishes to work towards “the establishment of an international liability and compensation convention and a possible international compensation fund for pollution damage caused by offshore oil exploration and exploitation.”³¹⁾The Kingdom. Op.cit.: 25. Moreover, the Kingdom promises to undertake an environmental impact assessment to “ensure that any oil/gas activities can be implemented on an environmentally sustainable basis.”³²⁾The Kingdom: Op.cit.: 26. These statements show that the Kingdom is, of course, aware of the climatic consequences of fossil fuel extraction and use. Further, the plan to extract oil in the Arctic is justified by the Danish authorities standing ready to fulfill its international obligations “in case of major unscheduled incidents”.³³⁾The Kingdom: Op.cit.: 24 It is well-known that oil acts differently on ice and with potential disastrous consequences should an Arctic oil spill occur. Yet the Kingdom chooses to ignore this knowledge by continuing its resource extraction plans and by downplaying its consequences by presenting contingency planning as a way to control major unscheduled incidents. Here, the a attempt to transform unknowns into known unknowns is also visible in the contingency planning itself. Thus, the Arctic dilemma and the potentially uncontrollable effects of an oil spill are ignored because political and economic considerations are prioritized. Unknown knowns are also part of the Kingdom’s policy on the Arctic.

Conclusion

As shown all four of Daase and Kessler’s categories are present in the Kingdom’s Arctic policy – although one, the unknown unknowns, is difficult to prove. Non-knowledge plays (at least) four different roles in the Kingdom’s Arctic policy and understanding these ways of conceptualizing and handling the unknown, enables us to comprehend from what basis the Kingdom is governing. Importantly, we also understand how policy-making in some areas is taking place on an incomplete knowledge basis.

Dealing with non-knowledge is not simply about gathering more data and conducting more research. In fact, the more that we know, the more we become aware of all the things we do not know.³⁴⁾Gross M. Op.cit.: 87. This is perhaps an unpleasant realization, yet one that is needed. As Nielsen and Sørensen state, it is certain “that non-knowledge will not go away, even if we continue to communicate only known knowns, or known unknowns [and therefore] it is more than ever important that experts and authorities address the consequences of non-knowledge upfront instead of pretending that non-knowledge does not exist”.³⁵⁾Nielsen & Sørensen. Op.cit.: 4.

Keeping this in mind, this article will end with two recommendations. First, that we try to discard the unknown knowns; this type of knowledge is not only politically problematic, but also a mockery of the very goal of science; to use what we actually do know to conduct our societies better and smarter. The second recommendation is that we, like the Inuit of Cambridge Bay, accept that there are just some things that we do not know and cannot know. Even though this thought might be uncomfortable, Arctic nations and the people who inhabit them have to accept the unknown unknowns as inherent to the region.

Lin A. Mortensgaard is studying a Master in Political Science at The University of Copenhagen. This article is based on an assignment written for the course “Greenland at the Crossroads: Climate Change, Global Arctic Interests and Developments in Greenland” taught by TAI’s Marc Jacobsen in the autumn of 2016. You can reach Lin here.