An Arctic Security Forum? Please, no!
On June 15, 2016 The Arctic Institute, in partnership with the American Security Project, will host a lunch discussion in Washington, DC on security challenges in the circumpolar region under the American Arctic Council Chairmanship. Over the next four weeks, Institute researchers will explore questions of circumpolar security cooperation today in preparation for our June 15 discussion.
- Why military security should be kept out of the Arctic Council
- Coast Guard Cooperation with Russia in the Arctic
The Executive Summary of the Review of Denmark’s Foreign and Security Policy from May 2016 highlights that “[i]n light of the increased military presence and activity level in the Arctic, it should be explored whether there is support for a discussion forum on security policy related to the Arctic.”1) Peter Taksøe-Jensen, Danish Ambassador to the United States and author of the piece, is not the only one calling for Arctic governance structures—especially the Arctic Council—to finally consider traditional, military security issues. As those already familiar with the Arctic know, the founding document of the Arctic Council2) explicitly excludes military security matters from the Council’s mandate and, to date, there are no other Arctic forums that deal explicitly with military security.
But is this really an issue in dire need of change? Is there a security framework vacuum in the Arctic that requires an Arctic Security Forum (ASF) or an Arctic Council endowed with military security competence? In contrast to a bevy of opinion pieces3) who answer this question with a resounding “yes”, this commentary argues that such developments are likely to create rifts between Arctic actors rather than alleviate any contention.
The most striking fact about all the arguments for a military security component to Arctic governance is that these calls are all grounded on preemptive arguments—i.e. they try to fix problems that do not exist. Because thus far, the Arctic has fared pretty well without an explicit security arrangement. Calls for an ASF thus always refer to an unpredictable future where such a forum would be necessary to maintain Arctic peace. While being skeptical about an ASF being able to perform such a role, I would even go a step further and argue that an explicit security forum for the Arctic—for example within the Arctic Council—would, instead of solving problems, create them.
Let’s imagine an Arctic Council able to address military security matters back in 2013 when the Ukraine crisis began to boil over. It can realistically be expected that, due to the ensuing tensions between “western” countries and Russia, the Arctic Council would have quickly been paralyzed. This could have taken shape as, for example, countries boycotting high-level meetings of the Council such as Senior Arctic Officials and Ministerial meetings. The Arctic governance regime would, in its entirety, have been severely challenged given the Council’s key role as the central political forum for the region. Since the Council coordinates various interests across a spectrum of different political, economic, and environmental issues—as exemplified in its Working Groups, Task Forces and Expert Groups—also all these non-security areas would have been affected.
A different scenario is what would have happened if in 2013 we would have had an Arctic Security Council, mirroring the existing Arctic Economic Council. It appears safe to assume that this body would have been declared dead similarly to the NATO-Russia cooperation when the Russia-NATO Council was suspended in 2014. As paradoxical as it seems, forums dealing with military security issues are usually counterproductive in the event of a traditional security crisis, since these cooperation arrangements are cancelled first because of the sensitive political issues they address. In contrast, low-level, non-security cooperation mechanisms are more likely to survive and to provide an open communication channel even in times of strained relationships in the security sphere.
In reality, in a world with no explicit Arctic security forum, the Arctic governance regime is repeatedly said to function very well, largely unaffected by major security crises like the still ongoing Ukraine crisis or the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict. One could even argue that the Arctic provides regular contact and communication between Russia and western states (something that is in short order at the moment in other forums). Thus, by excluding security matters, the Arctic Council constitutes a beacon of hope in otherwise severely strained relations. For example, representatives from all Arctic countries meet regularly on the working level to discuss and promote shared interests and concerns in relation to the Arctic environment and its people. There are even regular meetings on high political levels, such as Arctic countries’ ministers meeting every two years for the hand-over of the chairmanship.
In case this is not convincing enough, let’s consider the concrete security problems commentators often refer to when proclaiming the need for an ASF. They usually refer to “the spread of military activity in the Arctic over the past few years“4), whereas studies5) have shown that these are not of an aggressive nature but rather to be seen in terms of increasing civilian-military tasks such as search and rescue and surveillance. This, in some (Arctic) countries, falls within the realm of military infrastructure.
Furthermore, the Ukraine crisis (and earlier the Russia-Georgia crisis) is said to trigger the need for an ASF6). However, no study has been able to show solid evidence for the often proclaimed “spill-over” from Ukraine to the Arctic. While the example of Canada and the US boycotting a (low level) Task Force meeting of the Arctic Council in April 2014 is regularly forwarded as proof of this spillover, it is not very convincing. This is because Task Forces are not attended by high level staff; they are temporary in nature, usually put in place for the duration of one chairmanship to deal with a very specific issue (the Task Force in this case dealt with measures to reduce black carbon and methane emissions); and Canada and the US did not attend the April meeting because it was held in Moscow, not because they wanted to spoil the cooperation effort. The subsequent meeting of the Task Force was held in Helsinki six weeks later when delegations from all Arctic states attended again.
Analyses highlighting this boycott event generally fail to mention the multitude of cooperation examples, for example how many meetings on Working Group, Task Force and Expert Group level take place where all Arctic states are present; or new forums agreed upon by the eight Arctic states such as an Arctic Economic Council established in 2014. It is also never mentioned that the aforementioned Task Force was a huge success because the highly elaborate document they drafted was adopted as the Framework for Action for Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emissions Reductions in 2015.
Another often-cited reason for needed military security cooperation is the opening of the Arctic due to climate change and the increasing accessibility of the Arctic Ocean because of the receding sea ice. How this demands more hard security efforts remains elusive to this day (I am still wondering why said smugglers and terrorists7) would bother taking the long, dangerous and pointless route through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago or from north of Svalbard to reach Arctic countries for their racketeering). Not least, as General Walter Natynczyk, Canada’s then chief of defence staff, said in 2009: “[i]f someone were to invade the Canadian Arctic, my first task would be to rescue them.“8)
And more concretely, which conflicts are supposed to be prevented with an ASF? The Arctic is unanimously described as a region of peace and cooperation—something that everyone wants to maintain (see e.g. all Arctic countries’ strategies). An ASF would have no concrete task or mandate, and what it would actually do remains unclear. In the worst case, such a forum would create its raison d’être by forging a (formerly non-existent) problem through attempts to look for its solution.
Above all, we shall not forget that military security issues were excluded from the Arctic Council for a reason. The US would not have consented to the Arctic Council otherwise, and it appears safe to assume that the US is not the only one favoring a non-security focus of the Council. It is thus unlikely that an ASF would find consensus among all Arctic states, many of which are eager to protect this realm of strong national sovereignty. Alternatively, if countries in favor of such a forum (like Denmark, apparently) went ahead with such an initiative, it would create yet another rift between Arctic states on security matters in addition to the divide that NATO currently represents.
Importantly, an ASF would most likely exclude non-state actors, especially the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic, who are traditionally not at the table when security issues are discussed. Similarly, a military security focus at the Arctic Council would take time and resources away from the concerns and needs of Arctic inhabitants and Indigenous peoples. For many citizens of the circumpolar north, non-traditional security issues like environmental protection, economic opportunities, cultural heritage, and health issues are much more salient. Setting up an ASF would thus not help dissipate any alleged tension but rather create disagreement and divide Arctic actors.
To conclude, cooperation on specific security matters surely makes sense and is necessary given the challenging and complex issues the Arctic is faced with in times of rapid global and regional change. But these are basically all in non-traditional security realms such as energy; health; traditional, secure and sustainable livelihoods; and safety issues like preventing civil emergencies, increase domain awareness, and providing humanitarian assistance and disaster response. Traditional security challenges abounding elsewhere should also be addressed elsewhere, and Arctic cooperation should not be jeopardized by attempting to solve these tensions from the North.
And things are moving in this direction with an Arctic Economic Council dealing with Arctic economic development, an Arctic Coast Guard Forum, and an Arctic Security Forces Roundtable deliberating stronger cooperation efforts for search and rescue and human and environmental safety issues. So why create an “Arctic Security Forum” with no clear and necessary function that would endanger the long- and well-established cooperation in the Arctic? The answer is simple: Please no!9) Instead, we should cherish and protect the great cooperation achieved within the unique forum the Arctic Council represents and avoid reforming the Council to death with imprudent calls for a military security mandate. But let’s also stay alert to new challenges and sensible governance responses, though let’s do our homework by carefully studying and understanding the concrete problems and according appropriate governance forms and forums.
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