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Arctic Military Infrastructure: The Olavsvern case

By and | Article
May 17, 2022
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Men in military uniform in the Norwegian underground naval base Olavsvern

On 19 February 2022, elements of the Royal Netherlands Marines prepare their landing crafts for a new mission in harsh Arctic waters. Photo: Vidar Hole

Infrastructure is a critical way for humans to engage with the natural environment in the Arctic region, as it facilitates access, connection, inhabitation, and productivity. The Arctic Institute’s 2022 series on Infrastructure in the Arctic investigates infrastructure as a critical point of analysis for considering human impacts and needs in the Arctic, especially in its role as a mediator, or as an interface, between politics, government, people and the natural environment.​

The Arctic Institute Infrastructure Series 2022

This article describes the Cold War development of the naval base Olavsvern as a strategic asset for NATO forces in the High North. The base was carved into a tall mountain side close to Tromsø. Olavsvern was widely used by naval vessels on patrol in the Barents Sea, tracking Russian submarines. After the collapse of the Soviet Union Olavsvern was decommissioned and sold to private investors in 2013. By this time Russia had already started rebuilding its military capacity in the Arctic. After the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, Arctic infrastructure was again needed. As a result, Olavsvern was put into military use again in 2021 but this time under commercial ownership. The authors conclude that military infrastructure is costly to establish, maintain and operate in the Arctic. A decision to decommission and to sell off specialized military infrastructure should be considered carefully: the future security situation can never be predicted with certainty.

Introduction

This article describes the past, present, and future role of the Arctic naval base complex Olavsvern (formerly known as Ramfjordnes base). During the Cold War, Norway constructed the base in Ramfjorden, a deep-water inlet 20 kilometers south of Tromsø. The base was carved into a steep and tall mountain side. Protected by a 270 meter thick roof of gabbro rock, the mountain complex comprised a 340 meter long mountain basin for submarines and fast patrol boats, a dry dock, workshops, ammunition stores, and command and logistics areas. Deepsea quays capable of handling larger vessels, including reactor-driven submarines, barracks, officers’ mess, offices, and further workshops were constructed on the outside of the mountain complex.Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the base was taken out of commission, demilitarized, and sold to private investors in 2013. In 2020, WilNor Governmental Services (WGS), a company in the Wilhelmsen group, specializing in military logistic services, acquired a majority of shares and returned the base to military use. The future role of Olavsvern is still uncertain, but the military situation in the High North and the rapid return of military activity at Olavsvern make it possible to outline some likely development paths. The current situation in Ukraine after the Russian large-scale invasion has further heightened the tension in the North: Russia uses exercises in the Barents Sea with its submarines, with intercontinental nuclear missiles, to demonstrate to NATO its capabilities to defend itself. Norway and its allies respond by signaling their intent to defend land areas and Norway’s enormous maritime zone.1) This situation will further underline NATO’s need for military infrastructure in the High North.

The development of Olavsvern from a military fuel depot to an important naval base for NATO spanned four decades, starting in the early 1950s. The estimated complete construction costs of approx. four billion NOK (450 million USD) were mostly financed by NATO.

We will first look at the development and operational use of Olavsvern during the Cold War, before touching on the Norwegian Parliament’s decommissioning decision, and then finally considering recent military use under private ownership and likely future developments. We will conclude the article with some reflections on lessons from the Olavsvern case.

The Cold War and the Importance of the High North

Norway became one of the 12 founding members of NATO in 1949. The country has a strategic position due to its common border with Russia in the North, a vast area of Arctic ocean territory, and a long coastline combined with a small population. An effective defense of Norway requires Allied reinforcements in times of crisis and war. Thus, the collective defense guarantee from NATO has always been important for Norway. In parallel with the NATO arrangement, Norway has developed a strong bilateral relationship with the U.S. American military assistance has been considered even more important than NATO due to the strength of U.S. military forces that can be deployed to Norway in a crisis scenario. Norway and the U.S. entered into a formal agreement on mutual military assistance in January of 1950. Since the start of their relationship, the U.S. exercised significant pressure on Norway to rearm. This pressure was accompanied by financial incentives: the US was prepared to cover parts of the defense investments as long as Norway also contributed.2)

Fleet armament and access to the deep sea were important elements in the conflict between the superpowers. The Soviet Union had an ambition of developing a deep-sea fleet with global reach. The Cuban Missile Crisis and the successful US naval blockade underlined this fact. Additionally, nuclear-powered missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs) became a key element in deterrence between the adversaries.3)

From 1960 onward, the building of a Soviet deep-sea fleet accelerated. By the end of the 1960s, the Northern Fleet emerged as the largest and the most modern of the four Soviet fleets with respect to deep-sea vessels. Russia prioritized the Northern fleet because the Kola Peninsula offered better access to the Atlantic than deployments out of the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. In a conflict situation, the Baltic and Black Sea fleets could be denied access through the narrow passages through Öresund and the Bosphorus thus be shut out of operating in the Atlantic.4)

In 1962, one-fifth of the Soviet Union’s overall naval tonnage was made up of submarines. This proportion grew to nearly half of all the overall tonnage by 1981. The Soviet Union built large numbers of nuclear-powered ballistic submarines (SSBNs) from 1958 onward that would patrol in the Atlantic and the Pacific. As the range of ballistic missiles grew, Soviet SSBNs were able to patrol closer and closer to home waters, making them less vulnerable to detection and attack by Allied submarines. This ultimately led to the Soviet bastion doctrine around the Kola Peninsula, where Soviet SSBNs could remain in the Barents Sea, protected by Soviet attack submarines and surface ASW forces. It made the Soviet nuclear deterrent more defendable against potential US surprise attacks.5)

Detecting and tracking Soviet submarines were high priority tasks for Norway and NATO. Tromsø naval district (TRSD), with its command center and base complex at Olavsvern, was Norway’s Northernmost naval district facing the Norwegian Sea, the Barents Sea and with a geographical border towards the Soviet Union. It was at Olavsvern that the Allied submarines rested and replenished after shadowing Soviet submarines in the Arctic. Archived photographs from the era show Seawolf and Los Angeles-class submarines docking at the external facility.6)

The development of Olavsvern during the Cold War

The construction of Olavsvern started before WWII with the establishment of a naval fuel depot and fueling station. By 1 April, 1940, a wooden quay, three large oil tanks, and a shed for storing aviation fuel had been completed. The facility was taken over by the German forces and used throughout WWII. Repairs of the war-worn facility, upgrades, and new construction of additional tanks and buildings started in the early 1950s, followed by an expansion of the fuel station with four storage halls for sea mines and ammunition with a transport tunnel to the wooden quay. This first mountain base complex, “Anlegg 20” (Facility 20), was brought into use in 1963. The second expansion project started in 1961, comprising an operational maintenance- and supply base for fast-patrol boats and submarines. “Anlegg 23” (Facility 23) included a large mountain basin and drydock with access tunnels, workshops, command- and communication facilities, offices, storage halls and sanitary functions. Financing had been granted by NATO with a minor share covered by the Norwegian government.7)

Construction and installation continued until the hand-over to the Royal Norwegian Navy on 23 July, 1967. A massive, hydraulic opening steel gate was installed at the entrance to the mountain basin, in addition to a fresh water supply, power plant, and a complex ventilation system. Outside of the mountain complex, an administration building, barracks, and mess facility had been completed and handed over in October 1966. On 1 August, 1967 a fast-patrol boat flotilla and a submarine squadron were established at Olavsvern. On 7 June, 1976 Ramfjordnes base was renamed Olavsvern by His Royal Highness Crown Prince Harald.8)

A major further extension of Olavsvern took place in the 1980s. A new fuel quay was built in the period between 1980 and 1981. A new drydock was added to the mountain basin to accommodate the new Ula-class of diesel-electric submarines, and a very large ammunition storage area and other facilities were constructed. Furthermore, the unprotected fuel tanks, housed outside the complex, were removed and replaced with new fuel cisterns inside the mountain complex. Finally, an officer’s mess was built outside the main gate and opened in 1994.9)

The operational use of Olavsvern

The command and control of all subordinate units in the Tromsø naval district (TRSD) was conducted from the operations and communications rooms inside the mountain complex. These assets included three subordinate coastal fortresses, minefields, coastal radar stations, naval activity reporting stations, and fast-patrol boat squadrons deployed in the area acting in cooperation with the coastal fortresses. Additionally, the operations center communicated with other military assets in the north, including the Coast Guard, the Ramsund naval base further south, and other coastal fortresses and air bases. Larger naval vessels made port calls at the base to replenish and rest. Submarines and fast patrol boats were brought into the mountain basin for maintenance and repair. Inspections, hull maintenance, and replacement of parts were made in the drydock facility. The base complex soon became an important center for national and Allied exercises and winter training.10)

Olavsvern was also utilized for a significant number of port calls by Allied submarines enroute to and from the High North. A Norwegian submarine was always kept on 24 hour readiness in the mountain basin, with one submarine always at sea.11)

The decommissioning of Olavsvern and the period 2013-2020

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Norwegian armed forces were significantly downsized and restructured. Their priority shifted from anti-invasion defense to contributions to NATO missions abroad. With Russia’s Northern Fleet crumbling and a tentative partnership emerging between Russia and NATO, allied large-scaled exercises in the Atlantic were terminated.12)

It was a widespread belief in Norway after the collapse of the Soviet Union that Russia would not pose a serious threat in the foreseeable future. A significant part of the base and fortified infrastructure in Norway was closed and sold off at prices so low that they in no way reflected the construction costs. After a heated debate, the Norwegian Parliament decided with a narrow margin (53 to 50 votes) to close down Olavsvern and sell it on the private market.

Following a demilitarization process, Olavsvern was decommissioned and offered on the market with an asking price of only 100 million NOK (11.15 million USD) despite an estimated technical value of 965 million NOK (108 million USD). The final accepted bid was 38.1 million NOK (4.25 million USD), corresponding to roughly 1% of the construction cost of Olavsvern.13) The group of investors behind the winning bid had confidence that Olavsvern could be converted into an offshore supply base. Unfortunately, the foreseen oil exploration in the northern part of the Norwegian Sea never took place and income had to be found elsewhere. The fuel cisterns were sold to Bunker Oil, an established national provider of maritime fuels. The quays were rented out to vessels that needed a berthing space during inactive periods, including Russian seismic vessels and trawlers, and the impressive system of tunnels were filled with caravans, motorcycles, and vintage cars in winter-storage.

However, in 2014, the geopolitical situation changed abruptly as Russia surprisingly annexed Crimea and sent troops into Eastern Ukraine. In the preceding years, Russia had rearmed and rebuilt the Northern Fleet, again with strong emphasis on submarines.14) Russia has also invested in Arctic military infrastructure by re-activating and refurbishing former bases and by building new ones.15)

There has been a significant increase in the number of visits to Norway by American, British, and French submarines after 2014. According to the Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (DSA), the number of visits has increased from 10-15 to 30-40 visits per year (except for 2020, when the number of port calls was fewer). After the decommissioning of Olavsvern, the Haakonsvern naval base in Bergen remained the only port with license to receive nuclear-propelled vessels.16)

The Allied need for logistical support in Norway

The Norwegian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has found it difficult to maintain a comprehensive military infrastructure developed for Norway’s much larger Cold War force structure. The decommissioning of military infrastructure in Norway is still ongoing, although Norway is heavily dependent on NATO reinforcements in times of crisis and war. These forces need ports, airfields, bases, other military oriented infrastructure, as well as fuel, ammunition, spares, food, and water. As per NATO doctrine, Norway as a host nation is obliged to provide logistical support to Allied forces when deployed to Norway for training or operations.To close the gap between the limited Norwegian logistics capabilities and Allied needs during deployments to Norway, the solution has been to re-introduce the “Total Defense Concept” which dictates that military needs, to a large extent, are met by civilian capabilities. This concept was developed by the Norwegian government-in-exile in London during WWII. It was intended to meet the threat of an invasion by using civilian capacities to augment armed forces in times of crisis and war.17)

One new element in the re-introduced Total Defense Concept is the introduction of “strategic partnerships” with selected commercial companies with special competence and capabilities in a military setting. The strategic partnership agreement concept is, to a large extent, following known principles from more mature commercial relationships between industry and logistics providers, securing access to rapid scalable logistics capacity when needed.

n its proposition to the Norwegian Parliament in 2016 concerning the long-term plan for the armed forces, the government stated that the use of strategic agreements with civilian suppliers provides the advantages of cost effective time and resource allocation, increased readiness, greater operational freedom of action, improved endurance, and increased operational availability.18)

Based on this reasoning, the first strategic frame agreement was entered into by the Norwegian Defense Logistics Organization (NDLO) and the Wilhelmsen group under its affiliate WilNor Governmental Services (WGS) in March 2015.19) This system of close civil-military cooperation was tested successfully during a large-scale NATO operation in Norway in 2018, Exercise Trident Juncture, when 55000 troops from 31 nations were deployed to Norway.20)

The return of military activity at Olavsvern

WGS, with a clear understanding of Allied needs and interest in using Olavsvern, initiated contact with its owners in 2017 to acquire the base complex. Lengthy discussions between WGS and NDLO followed concerning future military use of Olavsvern. In the end, the Norwegian Defense Staff decided that the base was not needed for storage of supplies. However, a letter to WGS from the MoD, dated 3 December 2020, (Archive reference: 2019/1552-6/FDIII 2/MOBE) opened Olavsvern for Allied use.

On 24 December 2020, WGS took ownership of 66% of the shares in Olavsvern. WGS soon started a refurbishment process that will continue in the years to come and in parallel with Allied use. This refurbishment is funded by loans from the Wilhelmsen group and income from Allied use of Olavsvern. In early January 2021, the Royal Netherlands Marines moved in at Olavsvern for eleven weeks of winter training.21) During this training period, the US Marine Corps also arrived for a joint amphibious training event.22)

Prior to the second change of ownership of Olavsvern, a process had been ongoing to find a port for NATO submarines in Tromsø. There were mixed views in the Tromsø municipality council concerning the prospect of port calls by nuclear submarines. Following a public debate exposing friction between the municipality and the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defense, a solution was found for the submarines slightly north of Tromsø at Grøtsund. This is an industrial port, part of the decommissioned Grøtsund fortress, and now under ownership by Tromsø Port. There is little infrastructure at Grøtsund, apart from the deep-sea quay. During the debate that drew much media attention, concerns were voiced concerning the danger of a nuclear disaster close to the city center. Others expressed their concern that calls by nuclear submarines would seriously hamper initiatives aiming at developing the Grøtsund port into a major seafood exporting hub.

On 10 May 2021, the USS New Mexico, a Virginia-class nuclear attack submarine (SSN), arrived at Grøtsund for replenishment, rest, and recreation for the crew and was met by protesters. The crew was bused to Olavsvern for rest and recreation.23) One week earlier, a town hall meeting had been conducted and questions were asked about how well prepared the authorities were for a nuclear incident at Grøtsund. Others voiced their concerns about Norwegian authorities’ inability to verify that Allied vessels did not carry nuclear arms.24)

The allied activity at Olavsvern has continued with various visits by ambassadors, military officers, and survey teams through 2021. These technical and operational assessments have comprised the entire base, including diving surveys of the quay structures. The French Navy command and replenishment ship, FNS Marne, made a port call at Olavsvern in the end of June 2021. Now in January 2022, Dutch Marines have arrived at Olavsvern for a new period of winter training.

The future military use of Olavsvern

The security situation in the High North has reverted to similar conditions as during Cold War with high military activity and naval surveillance. The Russian Northern Fleet, with a strong submarine component, has been re-built and is again perceived as a serious threat. The Allies have again focused on tracking and monitoring Russian submarines operating out of their bases on the Kola Peninsula. There is no sign that this situation will change in the foreseeable future.

The Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) has pointed out that Russia regards Western military activity in the High North as a threat to the military bases on the Kola Peninsula and to Russian security. Russia is strengthening the Northern Fleet’s capability to carry out military operations generally and to engage in combat under Arctic conditions. Russia is speeding up the development of military bases around the Barents Sea, on the Arctic islands, and the coastline along the Northeast Passage. The Northern Fleet is the flotilla with the highest priority and, in 2021, it will take receipt of some of the most capable vessels.25)

Allied submarines and other warships enroute to and from the patrolling areas in High North waters need infrastructure in Northern Norway for logistical purposes. Tromsø, with its decommissioned naval base at Olavsvern and proximity to the submarines’ primary patrolling areas, seems to be a suitable location.

Allied exercise activity in Northern Norway has been stepped up since 2014. The Allied use of Olavsvern in 2021 and 2022 indicates that Olavsvern offers a preferred infrastructure for High North operations. Olavsvern is unique in its geographical proximity to the High North. Nevertheless, the Royal Norwegian Navy has started to expand its only base in the North, Ramsund Naval Base, on the south side of the Lofoten Islands, 267 kilometers south of Olavsvern. However, the Islands’ geography prevents vessels larger than frigates and conventional submarines from accessing Ramsund.

Norwegian authorities have decided that nuclear submarines visiting Norway will go to port at Haakonsvern in Bergen and Grøtsund in Tromsø. Yet, distinct from Grøtsund, Olavsvern offers elaborate purpose-built military infrastructure and a geographically shielded location from the populated city center. One respected observer of Norwegian defense policy, Sjalg Fjellheim, has reflected on this topic. In his view, the controversy around the submarine port calls to the industrial port of Grøtsund is a consequence of one of the weakest substantiated decisions in Norwegian defense policy in modern times, namely the decommissioning and sale of Olavsvern. He argues that there are two possible options: first, that the government re-acquire Grøtsund or, second, re-acquire Olavsvern. The latter option will secure the arrangement that submarines can again call at an Arctic military port and lower tension with the population of Tromsø.26)

Conclusion

With the current security situation in the High North, there is a need for military infrastructure in Northern Norway to support NATO operations. Naval operations related to surveillance of the Northern Fleet require port infrastructure that can accommodate nuclear submarines and surface vessels. Considerable NATO infrastructure funds were invested in Olavsvern to form a large and well protected naval base to support High North operations during the Cold War. The history of Olavsvern underlines that military infrastructure is costly to establish, maintain, and operate in the Arctic. A decision to decommission and to sell off specialized military infrastructure like Olavsvern should be considered carefully. The future security situation can never be predicted with certainty.

In hindsight, it was clearly a premature decision to decommission and sell Olavsvern. To “mothball” the base complex for a later activation, if dictated by changes to the security situation, would have been better and more cost-effective. Important Norwegian military infrastructure is still currently decommissioned and sold at a steady rate despite the need of Allied access to infrastructure in the Arctic.

Olavsvern has now been brought back to military use and is under refurbishment. This change took place without any Norwegian government funding and was made possible by the revitalized Norwegian total defense concept where commercial capacities are taken into military use.

Russia has followed a similar track with re-activation of some of their former arctic military bases and new construction. The financial models, however, are different. While the Russian drive is funded by the state, Norway has so far not been willing to fund the re-activation of Olavsvern. Again, it is Allied financing that secures the military use of Olavsvern. This time the financing is not funneled through NATO infrastructure funds but comes as payment to WGS by the visiting units.

References[+]

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