Arctic Aspects in Denmark’s New Foreign and Security Policy Strategy

The Arctic aspects of Denmark’s new foreign and security policy strategy are aligned with the U.S. security perspectives. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen met with U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken in Copenhagen on May 17, 2021. Photo: U.S. Department of State

The Arctic is one of Denmark’s most important foreign and security policy priorities. This has been crystal clear during the past five years and has now been confirmed and strengthened with the government’s foreign and security policy strategy which contains some notable Arctic aspects.¹⁾Danish MFA, Udenrigs- og Sikkerhedspolitisk Strategi 2022, https://um.dk/udenrigspolitik/aktuelle-emner/udenrigs-og-sikkerhedspolitisk-strategi-2022. Accessed 4 February 2022

Low tension, more militarization

‘Low tension in the Arctic’ has for many years been a Danish mantra, which included a good deal of skepticism about involving NATO in the region. That skepticism has now been replaced by support. Because while the mantra remains unchanged, the interests and power relations have been altered so that the Arctic today “increasingly represents a geopolitical battlefield”, as unambiguously stated in the strategy. The support is especially a reaction to Russia’s military (re)armament in the region – and the federation’s unpredictable actions outside – which pose a so-called geopolitical challenge. At the same time, Danish intelligence services are warning against Russian cyber espionage and attempts to create discord between the United States, Denmark and Greenland.²⁾Danish Security and Intelligence Services (2022) Assessment of the espionage threat to Denmark. https://pet.dk/-/media/mediefiler/pet/dokumenter/analyser-og-vurderinger/vurdering-af-terrortruslen-mod-danmark/vurdering-af-terrortruslen-mod-danmark-2021.pdf. Accessed on 4 February 2022

Whereas the threat from Russia is primarily of military nature, China’s involvement in the Arctic is rather seen as a political challenge. The strategy is very concise in this regard, but previous events indicate that Chinese interests in Greenland’s comprehensive airport project and mining potential as well as research initiatives with possible military strategic components are the main problems. Not least for the United States that wishes to keep its global rival at a proper distance from the North American continent which Greenland is geographically located on. Thus, as previously revealed by Wall Street Journal,³⁾Hinshaw, Drew and Page, Jeremy (2019) How the Pentagon Countered China’s Designs on Greenland. Wall Street Journal, 10 February, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-the-pentagon-countered-chinas-designs-on-greenland-11549812296. Accessed on 4 February 2022 this was the reason why then-U.S. Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, in 2018 urged the Danish government to interfere with the Chinese overtures – which it did by giving the self-government in Nuuk an economic offer it couldn’t refuse.⁴⁾Breum, Martin (2018) How a dispute over China and Greenland’s airports worked its way toward a solution. Arctic Today, 30 June, https://www.arctictoday.com/dispute-china-greenlands-airports-worked-way-toward-solution/. Accessed on 4 February 2022

The United States is Denmark’s closest security policy ally. In the Arctic and in general. At the same time, the strategy’s characterization of Russia and China sounds like an American echo, which illustrates who in fact sets the course. In line with that course, Denmark has increased its military budget with a so-called ‘Arctic capacity package’ of approximately US$ 235 million in the aim to enforce its sovereignty and enhance surveillance in the Arctic. However, in an attempt to balance U.S. demands for increased presence with the mantra of ‘low tension’, the largest sums are earmarked for satellites, drones and radars. As such, Denmark is trying to limit its contribution to an Arctic security dilemma where armament on the one side causes armament on the other in a continuous negative militarization spiral.

Internal cohesion sustains external ambitions

The Kingdom of Denmark’s status as an ‘Arctic state’ is legitimized by Greenland’s geographic location and continuous membership of the Realm.⁵⁾Jacobsen, Marc (2016) Denmark’s strategic interests in the Arctic: It’s the Greenlandic connection, stupid!. The Arctic Institute, 4 May, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/denmark-interests-arctic-greenland-connection/. Accessed 4 February 2022 This fact has previously⁶⁾Jacobsen, Marc (2021) Danmarks arktiske udenrigspolitik: regionale ambitioner og rigsfællesskabets komplikationer. Økonomi & Politik, 94(2):35-53 often been ignored while Greenland’s and the Faroe Islands’ influence on foreign- and security policy matters in relation to the Arctic has been very limited. In contrast, the strategy both emphasizes their respective interests, announces concrete initiatives and continuously underlines the ambition of a stronger and more equal community in the Realm.

Given the strategy’s external aim, this attention to more internal conditions is remarkable. Nevertheless, it is both refreshing and understandable in the light of the nuanced, interdependent relationship and the ongoing work of formulating a new common Arctic strategy for the kingdom as a whole. The strategy should have been published last year, but reportedly the process has been delayed by the general election in Greenland and by COVID-19.⁷⁾Quinn, Ellís (2020) COVID-19 could delay Kingdom of Denmark’s Arctic strategy. Eye on the Arctic, 19 May, https://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2020/05/19/covid-19-could-delay-kingdom-of-denmarks-arctic-strategy. Accessed 4 February 2022 However, the rumor says that questions of representation and divergent interests are also part of the reason for the delay, so the formulations in the foreign and security policy strategy could very well be part of a Danish attempt to bring the three parts closer together regarding their common Arctic strategy.

Climate change: a neglected catalyzer of security issues

Another striking formulation which makes good sense in the same light is the special focus on economic and social sustainable development “to the benefit of the people who live in the region”. Rather than using the imprecise and often misused concept of ‘sustainable development’,⁸⁾Gad, Ulrik Pram, Jacobsen, Marc and Strandsbjerg, Jeppe (2020) Introduction: Sustainability as a political concept in the Arctic. In: Ulrik Pram Gad and Jeppe Strandsbjerg (eds.), The Politics of Sustainability in the Arctic. Reconfiguring identity, time and space. London: Routledge: 1-18 the strategy is very precise on who should first and foremost benefit from the development: the people. This is honest talk and completely in line with what Nuuk and Tórshavn have been advocating for for many years.

At the same time, it is interesting that environmental sustainability gets very little attention in the strategy’s focus on the Arctic as the region is now warming 4 times faster than the rest of the world.⁹⁾Voosen, Paul (2021) The Arctic is warming four times faster than the rest of the world. Science, 14 December, https://www.science.org/content/article/arctic-warming-four-times-faster-rest-world. Accessed 4 February 2022 Interesting, because the warming causes vanishing of ice which has cascading effects on other security issues,¹⁰⁾Jacobsen, Marc and Herrmann, Victoria (2017) Introduction: Arctic International Relations in a Widened Security Perspective, Politik, 20(3): 6-14 but also because ‘Climate diplomacy’ – which is a distinct chapter in the strategy along with ‘Value’, ‘Safety’, ‘Migration’ and ‘Economic’ diplomacy – has previously been used very actively to bring powerful world leaders to the inland ice sheet where they could experience the effects of climate change first hand. Visits, which have helped strengthen the Kingdom of Denmark’s voice in the global climate debate.

Upgrading of Denmark’s Arctic diplomacy

The strategy’s double focus on Denmark’s Arctic ambitions and the cohesion of the Realm is reflected in a number of diplomatic priorities, which on the one hand serve to improve relations between Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, while on the other hand aim at enhancing cooperation with Canada and the U.S. in particular.

As such Denmark’s Arctic diplomacy will be upgraded with:

• One man-year stationed in Washington D.C. and one local man-year in Ottawa.
• One man-year in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Arctic Office to the strengthening of cooperation and representation of interests in the Arctic Council.
• One man-year in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Security Policy Office.
• One man-year in Nuuk as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ representative.
• Continuation of a number of temporary arrangements, e.g. posting of Greenlandic and Faroese employees in Denmark’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to promote a common foreign service for the entire Realm.

Together with more involvement of Greenlandic and Faroese ministers in foreign and security policy questions relating to the Arctic, these initiatives shall altogether ensure that “the toasts and speeches of the past are put into action”, while improving Denmark’s, Greenland’s and the Faroe Islands’ influence on the international Arctic agenda. 

Partly due to the status as an Arctic state, the Kingdom of Denmark ‘punches above its weight’ in international politics where it has more impact than what a small state usually has. Considering this, the new diplomatic initiatives make very good sense. Some may perhaps even think that it is about time as other Arctic states have taken similar or larger steps to enhance their respective diplomatic influence in the region. Nonetheless, the enhanced focus and the new initiatives are well-timed as the 2025 chairmanship of the Arctic Council is now appearing on the horizon.

A shorter version written in Danish was first published in Altinget on February 3, 2022. Marc Jacobsen was a Senior Fellow and Leadership Group member with The Arctic Institute and is currently a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Scott Polar Research Institute (Cambridge University).