NATO in the Arctic: The Arctic Institute's NATO Series 2024-2025 (Part I)

NATO marines in the Norwegian Arctic for exercise Nordic Response 24. Photo: NATO

The Arctic is undergoing a seismic shift. The region is facing unprecedented warming and rapidly changing geopolitical relations. With Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine, regional forums that were previously spaces of cooperation and consensus are in crisis. Beleaguered by sanctions, Russian isolation from the West has also pushed it closer to China, giving the self-professed “near Arctic state” an opening to become more active in the region. Responding to the changing situation in the north, the United States has pledged to increase its involvement in the Arctic and sworn in its first Ambassador-at-Large for Arctic Affairs this year. Meanwhile, the Nordic states are discussing the formation of a joint Nordic air force with the signing of a joint declaration of intent in March 2023, and increased information sharing.

Yet the biggest geopolitical change, arguably, has been the accession of two new members to NATO – Finland and Sweden. With their addition, the Arctic is once again effectively bifurcated into two camps, echoing a bipolar balance of power reminiscent of the Cold War.

Since its creation in 1949, NATO has had a presence in the Arctic – five of the twelve original NATO members are Arctic states. During the Cold War, the Alliance was concerned about Arctic security, advocating for vigilance against potential Soviet sabotage attempts in the North Atlantic and patrols of uninhabited and remote northern islands and waters. Cold War securitization of the Arctic changed the region forever. From its earliest days, the defensive alliance saw Norway as the keeper of NATO’s northern flank, and believed control of Arctic islands such as Greenland and Iceland to be paramount to Western security and geopolitics. The creation of NORAD by Canada and the United States in 1958 cemented the Arctic as a strategic space in the Cold War. Over subsequent decades, the region was increasingly militarized, local communities were displaced, and the Arctic was turned into a military front. Cold War ideological rivalry brought the region into the fold of global geopolitics. An abundance of security infrastructure in the north, as well as the lived experiences of those who call the Arctic home, demonstrate that the conflict was not only a theoretical confrontation but a sprawling geopolitical contest, with various material dimensions and tangible consequences stretching across the entire circumpolar north.

Yet in the thirty years that followed the Cold War, NATO was not particularly active in the Arctic, partially due to disagreements among members (namely Canada and Norway) about what the Alliance’s role should be in the north, and an aversion to regionalization articulated at the highest levels of NATO leadership. The relative stability and cooperation that characterized Arctic diplomacy after 1991 survived growing tensions between Russia and the West throughout the aughts, NATO enlargement into the Baltics and Balkans in 2004 and 2009, the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, its military intervention in Syria, and even Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, but it did not endure Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Among the extensive fallout from Russia’s unprovoked violence in Ukraine, Finland and Sweden renegotiated their longstanding neutrality policies to petition for NATO membership. Thus, as of March 2024, seven out of eight Arctic states are now NATO members, indicating a marked shift in regional politics. Yet Russia is still a formidable Arctic actor, controlling just over half of the world’s Arctic coastline and building on a tradition of Soviet Arctic supremacy. What does this mean for a region that is rife with challenges, characterized by accelerated warming that is unfolding four times faster than the rest of the world, environmental disasters such as coastal erosion and wildfires, rising geopolitical tensions, and increasingly interested external actors?

The Arctic Institute’s NATO Series 2024-2025

The Arctic Institute’s new two-part NATO Series considers the past, present and future of NATO in the north. In an era of increased Western collaboration in the Arctic, but also rising tensions with Russia and China, we ask: What is the future of NATO in the north? Does the alliance, which now has member states stretching from the Bering Sea to the Barents Sea, need a new Joint Force Command to focus solely on the Arctic? What is NATO’s role in managing the climate emergency in the Arctic, which NATO itself has called a “crisis and threat multiplier”? Additionally, how has the Alliance’s presence in the region affected Arctic communities? In which ways does the addition of Finland and Sweden shift dynamics in the broader military alliance? What are the implications of NATO activities for Arctic governance, economic development, and militarization in an era of catastrophic climate emergency?

Part One of the Series, covering NATO in Arctic geopolitics and hard security, will be published between October and December 2024. Part Two will cover NATO in the context of Arctic environmental and human security, and will be released in spring 2025.

In Part One, Mathieu Boulègue examines the Russian perception of increased vulnerability in reaction to the accessions of Finland and Sweden and contends that NATO’s northern expansion has and will impact Russian engagements in the region, possibly leading to “the risk of miscalculation and escalation in a changing Arctic.” David Palmer and Rachael Gosnell explore Arctic defense agreements of the past and propose new paths forward to enhance future Arctic defense. Kari Roberts surveys the history of NATO-Russia relations and argues that it is imperative for the West to understand Russian security concerns and attempt to normalize relations with Russia if we are to see renewed stability and cooperation in the north. Sydney Murkins argues for a more defined US Arctic strategy that incorporates NATO cooperation in order to keep the region stable and to counter Russian and Chinese strategic Arctic ambitions. Alix Renaudin summarizes France’s strategic role in NATO’s Arctic activities and recounts the country’s strong involvement in shaping Arctic governance within the NATO framework. Finally, Smaranda Olariu examines Russian and Chinese media narratives about NATO involvement in the Arctic to analyze what this means for Arctic relations.

Through this two-part Series, we aim to answer the most pressing questions about NATO’s evolving presence in the Arctic and the state of affairs in the region. There is no doubt that the Arctic is changing along key environmental, diplomatic and geopolitical vectors. With NATO’s increased presence in the north, renewed examination is needed to understand the impact of evolving local and regional relations and on broader global affairs, and what the future of the Arctic may hold.