How Scotland is Carving out its Arctic Identity
Eilean Donan Castle in the western Highlands of Scotland. Photo: Sorin Tudorut
In the last decade, the number of Arctic-interested states has increased dramatically. Rapidly melting ice has meant that opportunities for commercial operations, scientific research and expatriate inhabitation have appeared where they once did not. Scotland is among the recently interested parties, turning to the (mostly self-proclaimed) geopolitical significance of being ‘the world’s most northerly non-arctic nation.’1) As Scotland works towards greater association with the Arctic, the feasibility of this comes under question: although it may seem far-fetched for this section of the UK to be declaring its Arcticness, it is possible for Scotland to successfully label itself as an Arctic nation, using methods of state branding, if it prioritises this national narrative now.
In this discussion, the term ‘association’ will be used to encompass a variety of Arctic links identified by Scotland where their relationship with the region can be deepened. Central to this paper’s argument is the underestimated power of informal diplomacy and discourse and their ability to legitimise both Scotland’s domestic and international interests. This Arctic rebranding could be extremely beneficial for Scotland, especially in the context of a post-Brexit UK. The nation possesses a significant appetite for independence with the percentage on either side fluctuating around the halfway mark. Both situations highlight the need for a strengthened national identity for Scotland, something that could be fortified by greater Arctic association.
In this context, it is helpful to look at the idea of ontological security explored by several international relations scholars.2) Summarising Brent J. Steele’s definition of ontological security, Mortensgaard writes that, ‘the pursuit of ontological security is the management and preferably the minimization of state anxiety about ‘who’ it is to itself and others.’3) A response to the realist idea of physical security, simply that states prioritise survival, ontological security poses the importance of stable state identities. Through informal diplomacy Scotland is able to deepen its Arctic association and in turn strengthen its ontological security.
While Arctic statehood is usually defined by geographical locations above the latitude of 66°33’39, the reality is much more contested. There are environmental, cultural, and political factors that also play a role in a state’s association with the region, to name a few: the presence of northern Indigenous peoples, Arctic flora and fauna, and different political administrative boundaries. This contested quality of Arcticness is best exemplified in the fact that almost the entirety of Iceland exists south of the Arctic Circle (apart from a small uninhabited island), yet it has successfully branded itself as one of the most Arctic nations.4)
In order to answer this question of feasibility, we will look at the process of state identity construction using identity markers. Scotland has done and can continue to do this through associations with the Arctic environment and its history. Then we will proceed to explore the concepts of informal diplomacy and sovereignty games which are means for Scotland to go beyond its devolved powers and achieve greater ontological security. Solidifying its Arcticness is a unique vantage point for Scotland’s national identity that could be used to distinguish the nation from the rest of the UK and as a more significant player on the world stage.
At the centre of this analysis will be the Scottish Government’s Arctic policy framework entitled ‘Arctic Connections’,5) published in 2019. As a complete outline of Scotland’s Arctic agenda, it provides the perfect empirical basis to assess the techniques at Scotland’s disposal in building its future Arctic association and those already being used today. This analysis has been conducted through identifying the areas of association outlined and prioritised by the Scottish government as well as individual initiatives and the framework’s semantics.
Historical context
Both Scotland and the Arctic have aligning factors that make it an appropriate time for greater association between the country and the region. Significant environmental and geopolitical shifts have meant that the present-day Arctic is largely considered as a ‘space in rapid flux.’6) The same could be said for Scotland and certain aspects of its national politics. As we speak, the Arctic is being transformed by the effects of climate change, both on a physical and political level. Melting ice means a greater portion of the region can sustain life and new sea passages are opening, which international actors view as opportune shipping routes. The region is becoming more attractive economically to once relatively uninterested parties; China has repositioned itself from a peripheral member of the Arctic Council to an active and vocal one. Historically, international activity in the region has primarily been shaped around Russia-US relations due to the significance of the Arctic in the Cold War, but as Russia continues its attack on Ukraine, its Arctic powers are perceived by international actors such as NATO’s members to be somewhat weakened as ‘short term military readiness’7) is focused elsewhere.
Now is also an important moment in time for Scotland. In the light of two momentous referendums (Scottish independence and Brexit), Scotland’s international identity is also in flux; Scotland had the largest majority of remain voters (62 percent) in the EU referendum out of all the devolved nations8) and yet still had to leave along with the rest of the UK. In response to this, the Scottish government has been dedicated to forging international alliances, especially with the EU, post-Brexit, in most key policy areas.9) Securing its Arctic identity is an opportunity to do this on a larger scale: something that will prove immeasurably important if and when they become independent from the rest of the United Kingdom.
Constructing state identity
A state can associate with the Arctic outside traditional channels of latitude and Arctic Council (AC) membership through the idea of state identity construction. As Medby puts it, ‘Building an [Arctic] identity, you build a brand.’10) In this section, we will explore the work of Ingrid Medby and Lin A. Mortensgaard. Ontological security helps us see the importance of national identity, both by how the state sees itself and also how it is seen by others. Because of this, with a commitment to active association, Scotland’s national narrative has the potential to become one of significant Arcticness. Mortensgaard uses the term ‘identity markers’ to characterise key junctures in this constructive process.11) things like imagery in official speeches, state branding and policy declarations. Medby describes it as the process of ‘actively perform[ing] the state into existence.’12) Medby and Mortensgaard agree that identity construction, especially concerning the Arctic, is done through a twofold approach; geographical and historical. These concepts can be applied to Scotland’s strategy in the Arctic and how they are going about deepening their association with the region.
However, it is important to note that there are potential limitations on the extent to which informal diplomacy can strengthen ontological security and construct national identity in this way; to recognise this it is helpful to look at the case of China and its Arctic strategy. While China has employed methods of informal diplomacy in the region such as scientific research bases and energy projects, there is a general consensus in the literature that their efforts have not been very successful in deepening their Arctic association. Some may suggest that is due to the shortcomings of informal diplomacy itself, but rather this paper recognises some key differences between China and Scotland that could be responsible for a disparity in their Arctic potential. Perhaps the greatest reason of all is found in the recognition that ontological security not only comes from a state’s own assertion of its identity but also its perception by other states. With already ‘strained bilateral relations with several Arctic states.’13) China has experienced a level of blockage from both AC and NATO nations that Scotland would not experience to the same extent due to their relative neutrality on the world stage. Additionally, while China has been called out by other Arctic states for its suspected singular self-interest, Scotland can be perceived to have a more balanced approach, with their Arctic Connections framework focusing on both what the nation can benefit from but also what they can provide for the region. While it is important to recognise that informal diplomacy can only go so far, to give in to the narrative that these limitations raise, would lead to an underestimation of its value when it comes to Scotland’s Arctic agenda.
Geographical identity markers
In Scotland’s Arctic policy framework, the first section opens with the reminder that ‘Scotland’s northernmost islands are closer to the Arctic Circle than they are to London.’14) Not only is this telling of Scotland’s allegiance to the Arctic, but it could also be seen as a potential slight to the British government. A northerly latitude is the most often cited identity marker when it comes to Arctic association, presumably because it is the closest thing that exists to an official definition. Members of the Scottish government have used the term ‘the new North’ to include themselves in Arctic activity.
Arctic states share a feeling of being disproportionately affected by climate change. In a speech by the First Minister at the time, Nicola Sturgeon shared the Arctic Circle Assembly’s rhetoric that the Arctic is ‘ground zero’ for climate change and that this was a priority acknowledged by Scotland as well.15) This narrative culminates in Scotland’s international efforts against climate change. Off of their northern coast, the nation has opened the world’s first floating wind farm in collaboration with the Norwegian state energy company.16) Although the wind farm is of course beneficial to Scotland’s broader climate agenda it can also serve them in international diplomacy. As Norway’s Arcticness is indisputable, this collaboration between the nations is a channel for greater association for Scotland through their response to the climate crisis. This show of solidarity in the face of climate change with the Arctic signifies a need for greater cooperation between the regions in the future. These are all key geographical identity markers that Scotland is using to achieve greater association with the Arctic. Although on a small scale, together these things demonstrate the Scottish government’s pursuit of ontological security.
Historical identity markers
Both Medby and Mortensgaard outline the importance of historical identity markers and how a temporal element is essential to state identity. Historical associations can be argued to be of greater significance than geographical markers because, once outlined, are less susceptible to change. Historical markers, though harder to manufacture, create a greater sense of legitimacy when it comes to a state’s pursuit of ontological security. As proposed by Edward Said, history is ‘to some considerable extent a nationalistic effort.’17) The Scottish government has identified the historical links between the nation and its Arctic counterparts. In the ‘Arctic connections’ document it states: ‘Our northernmost archipelagos were part of the Norwegian-Danish Kingdom until the end of the fifteenth century.’18) Norway and Denmark are two states whose Arcticness cannot be disputed and by historically linking with them in an official policy framework, Scotland is therefore asserting itself in this direction also.
Another historical identity marker that has been trialled is the idea of the Scottish explorer. As stated in the policy framework ‘Scotland has a proud tradition of explorers.’19) They refer to the previously forgotten Scottish Arctic explorer John Rae who ‘changed the history of the North American Arctic.’20) The inclusion of this section implies a certain underappreciated quality to Scotland’s Arctic history. History shapes present culture and is therefore an essential component in a state’s pursuit of sustained ontological security. If Scotland can identify a somewhat shared history with the region, there is an implication that they will have to work together in the preservation of this history. The idea of the explorer is significant because it connotes a certain claim to Arctic land and culture.
The narrative above portrays Scotland as inextricably linked with the Arctic and perpetuates the idea of collective struggle and identity. Although seemingly insignificant, the compounded power of identity markers is underestimated. We should not ignore the importance of Scotland’s striving to construct this identity, which is a gradual but effective process. After all, as Medby concludes her paper: ‘It is through active relating that power relations may be changed.’21) and from the section above it is clear that Scotland’s Arctic policy framework is full of active relating through the repetition of language and ideas to continually reiterate the nation’s ‘Arctic Connections’.
Informal diplomacy and sovereignty game
In the Scotland Act of 1998, a list of devolved and reserved powers was outlined. Devolved powers are the issues that the Scottish government has the sovereignty to legislate on and reserved powers are those held back under the British government. ‘Foreign affairs’ appears under the list of reserved powers, which means Scottish international relations officially come under the singular jurisdiction of the British government. Therefore, Scotland can only influence its relations with other countries (and the Arctic) through unofficial means. The government does this through sovereignty games and informal diplomacy, both of which are key in furthering their Arctic association. The idea of ontological security not only helps us to explain these strategies, but also to conclude their effectiveness in furthering Scotland’s association with the Arctic.
Grydehøj explores the concept of informal diplomacy in his paper on Norway’s Svalbard policy,22) but the idea can easily be translated to the case of Scotland and the Arctic. He describes informal diplomacy as the use of non-traditional means of diplomacy and international affairs for political gain; things that seem on the surface to be apolitical acting as a means of furthering an international agenda. Informal diplomacy is often used by states with ontological insecurity, like the case of Scotland who technically do not have the power to conduct their international affairs. Using this concept, we can identify the political meaning that sits beneath the surface of seemingly unrelated government activities. This falls under a wider field of literature to do with sovereignty games which Jacobsen describes as an awareness of certain political moves that push the boundaries of a state’s sovereignty.23)
Academic research as a method of informal diplomacy
Scotland’s sovereignty games can be recognised in its international academic efforts. That is not to say that these research operations are not inherently valuable, but rather that the element of informal diplomacy within them should not be ignored. Scientific research is an unofficial channel for Scotland to actively relate itself to the Arctic. In the policy framework it is clear that the Scottish government takes pride in their country’s contributions to Arctic research and literature, boasting that ‘since 2000, institutions in Scotland have contributed to more than one thousand academic publications about the Arctic region.’24) Academic partnerships are a way for Scotland to link itself to the Arctic and stretch its international autonomy without violating its agreement with the British government. The University of the Arctic (UArctic) brings together institutions ‘concerned with education and research in and about the North.’25) Ten Scottish universities are part of UArctic, each collaborating with universities and researchers in the Arctic and building connections. This is arguably a method of informal diplomacy because it’s a way of linking themselves with the Arctic without transcending their official devolved powers, something that will prove useful if and when they gain independence.
However, at the moment Scotland is not independent and the main Arctic research operations are conducted through the United Kingdom as a joint entity. The UK Arctic Research Station is located on Spitzbergen in the Svalbard Archipelago.26) Like many other Arctic-interested states, this is the UK’s way of taking advantage of the Svalbard Treaty, which while recognising Norway’s sovereignty over the archipelago, gives signatory nations the right to engage in scientific research. Scotland’s scientific collaboration is a form of informal diplomacy; on the surface, it is in the name of research but the connection that it forms between institutions and researchers is of great international political importance to the nation. This is not a new idea; the EU runs a Higher Education Informal Diplomacy Initiative (HEIDI) which centres around the idea of the ‘importance of higher education to foster international cooperation and solve global challenges.’27)
Although this is a channel to the Arctic for Scottish researchers, Scotland’s next move should be to focus on its own independent Arctic research operations. Exploring this channel of informal diplomacy further would be a way of materialising greater ontological security. By focusing on Arctic research in universities, their contribution to the UK Arctic Research Station would be an effective channel for them to have more control over their connections with the Arctic, simultaneously stretching their sovereignty. Scotland should be testing the waters in this area; academic research is valuable in itself, but it is also an opportunity to push the boundaries of their sovereignty with minimal resistance.
Conclusion
It has been demonstrated how Scotland is constructing its Arctic identity through geographical and historical identity markers. As a devolved nation, Scotland’s pursuit of ontological security drives this. It has also been identified that scientific research is a means of informal diplomacy that they should continue to use to stretch their international autonomy in the future. There is not a more opportune time for Scotland to act on its Arctic interest, because of melting ice and geopolitical shifts. With independence looming in the semi-distant future, Scotland should reclaim autonomy over their international relations in any way it has the means to, especially in a post-Brexit world. As a research topic, the legitimising power of informal diplomacy requires further contribution as it is chronically overlooked in the literature, much like Scotland’s potential for significant Arctic association.
Olivia Hamilton is an undergraduate student at the University of Bristol, having recently completed an exchange year at the University of Copenhagen.
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