The Arctic Institute is pleased to announce that we are accepting abstracts for the 2025 series on China’s role in the Arctic. This series builds on our previous China series from 2020 and 2023.
China’s role in the Arctic continues to be an important research focus in 2025. Since China has declared itself a “near Arctic state” and published its Arctic Policy in 2018, China’s Arctic engagement has grown considerably in socioeconomic, political, scientific, cultural and security terms.
China continues to invest in the extraction of Arctic resources like oil, gas and minerals, particularly through partnerships with Russia. China sees potential in developing the “Polar Silk Road” as part of its Belt and Road Initiative. How has the conflict in Ukraine affected such ambitions?
Global climate change and economic prospects affect China’s interest in understanding the Arctic through polar expeditions, data collection, and monitoring. China maintains Arctic research facilities like the Yellow River Station on Svalbard. What are the implications of Sino-Russian scientific collaboration in the context of a severing of Russia-West cooperation?
China’s growing engagement in Arctic research has drawn criticisms from the West about the potential military application of “dual use” activities. The Pentagon’s most recent Arctic Strategy called China its number one concern regarding Arctic security. How are such criticisms substantiated against the background of great power competition?
While China does not have a permanent military presence in the Arctic, China has stepped up its security-related cooperation in the region through joint naval patrols and bomber drills with Russia. Donald Trump has called for acquiring Greenland and pointed to Chinese ships “all over the place.” How are such developments affecting the security and geopolitical situation in the region?
China became an observer to the Arctic Council in 2013 and has promoted a narrative of the Arctic as a “common heritage of mankind.” After the 2022 pause of the Arctic Council by the Arctic states, Chinese diplomats said they would not support Norway’s Arctic Council chairship if Russia was excluded. China participates in discussions to protect the Arctic environment and ecosystems, positioning itself as a stakeholder in global climate governance. How has China’s role in Arctic diplomacy and governance changed over the past few years?
We welcome diverse perspectives and contributions that explore such questions and beyond. We welcome authors from any discipline or education level. Contributors can submit a commentary (a 700–800-word short opinion or analysis piece), an article (a 1,000-3,000-word analysis), or a multimedia contribution (we have published videos, audio, infographics, and poetry) focusing on China’s role in the Arctic.
If you are interested in contributing, please submit an abstract of no more than 300 words, as well as a short paragraph about yourself to the series editor, Pavel Devyatkin (pavel.devyatkin@thearcticinstitute.org) and TAI’s editor-in-chief Alina Bykova (alina.bykova@thearcticinstitute.org) by May 1, 2025.
You can read more about the Arctic Institute here at www.thearcticinstitute.org and specifically about submissions here. In addition to our web-based publications, we have a weekly newsletter of over 5,000 subscribers from 90+ countries and average hundreds of thousands of web-publication hits each month.