The Arctic Council in Transition: Challenges and Perspectives for the new Norwegian Chairship
Flags of the eight Arctic states and six Permanent Participants at a Senior Arctic Officials’ US 2015-2017 Chairmanship meeting held in Anchorage, Alaska 20-22 October 2015. Photo: Linnea Nordström / Arctic Council Secretariat
On the 11th of May 2023, the 13th Arctic Council Meeting took place in Salekhard, Russia and online. It marked the long-awaited transition of the Chairship1) of the Arctic Council from the Russian Federation to Norway. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine that started on the 24th of February, the Council entered a pause as of March 3rd, 2022, as a collective response from the seven other Arctic member states. Whilst some programmes that did not imply any Russian participation resumed in Summer 2022, all high-level meetings remained on hold. Russia continued its chairship alone in parallel and carried out a domestic agenda, organizing events- such as the ASM4 in St Petersburg – not attended by the other A7.2) The future and even the mere existence of the Arctic Council has been questioned by scholars and (non-Arctic) diplomats during the past year, creating sometimes tensions in Arctic conferences. It was thus a relief that the transition of Chairships from Russia to Norway went smoothly in a quiet and orderly manner without diplomatic incidents.3) It demonstrates the perceived relevance of the forum, at least for the 8 Arctic states that strived to maintain it. However, challenges ahead remain, especially concerning the level of possible/wished cooperation with the Russians. Other challenges that were put aside to concentrate on the immediate crisis, such as the role of Observers in the Council, will also have to be tackled. The Norwegian chairship programme acknowledges the “difficult and challenging time for international cooperation” that faces the Council. Indeed, with the pause of the Arctic Council (AC) – among other cooperation forums – the regional level has undergone the most significant disturbance to cooperation since its creation in 1996, making it challenging to reinstate a high level of communication. This article proposes a brief overview of the challenges that the Norwegian chairship must overcome. After coming back to the meeting of the 11th May 2023, we ask why maintaining a circumpolar dialogue still matters and how to resume and maintain it in the longer-term. We finish with some reflections about the possible evolutions of the institution, to face the new international context.
What happened at the “Ministerial”: A smooth transition?
Negotiations took place for many months between Russia and Norway, notably through the AC Secretariat, to find a solution for the meeting to take place within the rules of procedures of the Council and principles of the Ottawa declaration, while keeping it at the lowest level possible. As expected, the meeting was rather minimal. The “13th Arctic Council meeting” took place on 11th May in Salekhard (Russia) and online.4) The Norwegian Senior Arctic Official (SAO) was in Tromsø, where the AC secretariat is located, and took part online, along with the other SAOs and heads of delegations of Indigenous peoples’ organisations.5) Observers were also invited to attend but it is unclear if they actually attended.
According to the AC’s rules of procedure, the ministers can appoint a representative to participate and to sign the declaration, which they did. Hence, for the first time, the meeting was not a “Ministerial” meeting. No ministerial declaration was signed either, only a statement.6) It is worth noting, however, that this is not the first time. In 2019 when the US refused to agree on a Ministerial declaration that contained the word “climate change”, the solution of having only a statement approved by all was also chosen. The aim is to show that a certain level of unity, albeit minimal, remains.7)
To initiate the resumption of work, numerous diplomatic strategies had to be deployed due to the Council’s consensus-based nature. The released statement refers to the Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials’ Report to Ministers adopted in Reykjavik in May 2021, the Reykjavik Ministerial Declaration and the Arctic Council Strategic Plan (2021 – 2030). The resumption of the AC activities and working groups’ programmes is based on these documents as they were approved by the A8 before the start of the war in Ukraine. The only reference to the Russian chairmanship is found in the rather cold last point of the declaration, stating that the Council “[acknowledges] the conclusion of the Russian Federation’s second chairmanship”.8) The Council being consensus-based, it seems unlikely to host any new programmes in a near-future. A meeting is however scheduled in June with all chairs of the Working groups and executive secretaries, to plan the work that will be undertaken during the chairship. It will be a first steppingstone to see the extent of cooperation that may be foreseeable during this chairship and beyond.
Why maintaining a circumpolar dialogue matters
In addition to the urgent matter of sustaining a circumpolar dialogue, a fundamental question arises as to why Arctic states have consistently expressed their strong commitment to preserving the institution. Arctic diplomats have consistently emphasized, across various forums, that the Arctic Council remains alive and that the temporary suspension of activities did not imply any intention of withdrawal from the A7. Russia never explicitly indicated any desire to leave the Council either, even if the country did express some reservations about the future modalities of its participation.9) During its twenty-seven years of existence, the Council gradually became the central and key Arctic forum.10) Its structure, which grants a central role to Arctic States and Permanent Participants, combined with its consensus-based decision process, ensures that they have a significant influence on Arctic matters. There is no other circumpolar forum where Arctic actors have such a central role. Thus, the pause of the AC had detrimental consequences on political and scientific levels. As the AC was the most inclusive governance platform in which Indigenous peoples’ representatives could participate, its pause meant that the permanent participants had lost an important place to make their voice heard.
In a side event organized at this year’s edition of the Arctic Frontiers, NUPI researcher E. Wilson Rowe highlighted that the AC over the years has had “cumulative” and “global ordering effects”. The body has participated to the stability of the Arctic region11) through work based on shared issues. However, the AC has also been a meeting place that has generated more binding international agreements. Around the Arctic Council emerged longstanding policy networks between Indigenous peoples’ organizations and their political and expert representatives, scientists and other related experts. These have been an important source of stability and progress throughout the Arctic Council’s history.12)
Given the increased international interest in the region, one would see why Arctic actors, both states and Indigenous peoples, want to keep the upper hand on Arctic matter, and the Arctic Council is key in that perspective. The danger would then be to try maintaining it as is at all costs, without reviewing the objectives of cooperation. The Council has evolved and adapted to changing international contexts since its inception: this is a critical moment to think again about its possible evolution.
How to maintain circumpolar dialogue?
As soon as Norway took over the presidency, the banner on the Arctic Council website stating that the Council was on pause was removed.13) Business is not, however, back as usual. Morten Høglund, the new Chair of the Senior Arctic Officials (SAOC), underlined that it was impossible as of now to resume meetings at a political level.14) On his end, the Russian SAO Korchunov emphasized that the matter of inviting the Russian side to the upcoming events during the Norwegian presidency was not addressed. He further stated that the exclusion of Russian representatives from Arctic Council events would constitute a violation of their rights as a member state. In such a scenario, he states that it would be unlikely for Russia to continue participating in the Council’s activities.15) At this critical juncture, two main issues arise regarding Arctic dialogue: given the situation, can the Council maintain an authentic circumpolar dialogue? How will the Council – if it can – sustain its central position in this dialogue in the short and medium term?
The first question at hand is far from straightforward. In February 2023, just days before the anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia made revisions to its Arctic strategy. The original version, published in March 2020, highlighted various multilateral cooperation formats, including the Arctic Council. However, the amended 2023 version removed these references and shifted the emphasis towards bilateral cooperation. Korchunov’s interview with TASS further reinforces this stance, particularly when he asserts that Russia now regards bilateral formats as more effective.16) On the other hand, the so-called A7 have continued cooperation amongst themselves. Within the Arctic Council, work that did not imply Russia resumed as soon as June 2022. Bilateral ties have also been strengthened: in March 2023 for example, Canada and Norway issued a joint statement on bilateral cooperation, stating among other things that both countries are “jointly committed to a peaceful and stable Arctic”.17) Maintaining a robust level of circumpolar dialogue has always demanded extensive effort, and the effectiveness of the Arctic Council relied on its ability to achieve a favorable cost-benefit ratio in this regard. The pressing question now is to what extent this still holds true.
As for the second issue, the Council’s establishment revolves around fostering circumpolar dialogue and cooperation. The Ottawa declaration explicitly states that the Council is established as a “a means for promoting cooperative activities to address Arctic issues requiring circumpolar cooperation”.18) The question is what kind of issues will now be deemed important enough to require an actual circumpolar cooperation. In other words, on what kind of issues Arctic actors will agree to work together? Climate science immediately comes to mind. After the Cold War, scientific cooperation proved to be a useful tool to establish a relationship of trust between Arctic actors.19) As of now however, the issue remains unresolved. Arctic science was severely hit by the diplomatic consequences of the war in Ukraine.20) With restricted access to the field, national guidelines sometimes preventing cooperation with Russia-based arctic scientists, it remains unclear at this point if and how science cooperation will resume. As FNI senior researcher Andreas Østhagen bluntly puts it: save the climate or support Ukraine?21) And if science is no longer the common language in the Arctic, on what kind of issues can Arctic actors cooperate? The stakes are high for the upcoming working group meeting to be held in June.
Finding new ways to cooperate
The Arctic Council has constantly evolved since its creation and this crisis will likely result in further evolutions. On a side-event organized to tackle this very question at Arctic Frontiers 2023, Whitney Lackenbauer suggested as a first step to look at what Arctic states wanted to keep: in other words, what kind of issues need a circumpolar level of cooperation and thus require a regional dialogue. From this starting point, it would be possible to shape the new reality of circumpolar cooperation. On the same panel, Gosia Smieszek offered compelling thoughts for an enhanced Arctic Council that aligns with present-day realities. One notable idea suggested the establishment of an Arctic coordination mechanism within other international organizations, akin to the coordination among EU member states. This approach holds promise in bolstering an Arctic influence within global bodies. For example, exploring potential connections with the work conducted by the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), particularly regarding the ban on Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) and underwater noise, presents promising possibilities. Additionally, the implementation of the Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) agreement opens avenues for regional governance measures. Specifically, the adoption of area-based conservation measures in the Central Arctic Ocean could serve as an opportunity to reinforce Arctic regional governance by establishing additional legal mechanisms, such as the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement (CAOFA), wherein Arctic states would “maintain control.”22)
Interesting propositions were also made by the civil society and environmental NGOs. The open-letter written by Clean Arctic Alliance23) to the Norwegian Chair and the WWF Arctic programme policy-paper24) are two interesting examples. They offer concrete propositions with a timeline, that are based on existing legal and cooperation structures and documents (such as the AC Strategic Plan, the Norwegian Chairship programme, the 2013 Oil spill agreement or the work of PAME and CAFF) and provide the AC with solid arguments to resume and develop a stronger Arctic Council. By adopting a long-term outlook that aligns with the strategic plan and spans the three upcoming Scandinavian chairmanships, and by emphasizing the ocean-scale of the issues at stake, these proposals present perspectives that extend beyond the mere immediate resumption of work and the survival of the Arctic Council. Most importantly, they reintroduce a much-needed circumpolar perspective to regional cooperation, which has been lacking in the present circumstances.
The Arctic Council is a “policy-shaping” body that requires the member-states to implement the recommendations it publishes. A means to enhance this function would be to have a better implementation by the Arctic states – an idea also stressed in the above-mentioned Arctic Frontiers discussion. This could be done by creating a soft reporting mechanism of implementation by the Arctic states at the national and local levels, similar to the one Observers States already have to submit every two years. Technical cooperation could also hold promises, supplementing the body with currently lacking tools such as circumpolar weather monitoring services and shared oil spill response equipment, working with local and Indigenous communities. All Arctic states agree on the importance of keeping a primary role in managing the Arctic: there are avenues to keep circumpolar cooperation not only alive but most importantly relevant.
Conclusion: Remaining challenges and long-term perspectives
On 11th May, at the 13th Arctic Council meeting, the procedural rules were respected, ensuring a smooth transition, a “first milestone” in the words of the SAOC. Whilst this milestone was certainly key, important challenges, questions and uncertainties remain. For example, the chairship programme fails to make any reference to observers. The focus of communications released after the presidency switch was really on orchestrating a transition as smooth as possible, and on resuming dialogue. Yet observers are a recurring point of discussion in ministerials, since the 2013 Kiruna ministerial meeting where six states were granted the status. Some states have recently demonstrated a strong interest in applying for an observership – such as Latvia.25) Given the current circumstances, it is difficult to envision reaching a consensus on this matter or even initiating a discussion.
This question of observers encompasses an additional aspect beyond the longstanding debate over their number, namely, the limited role they play within the Council. Its suspension prompted external observers to question its relevance and utility,26) raising concerns about the emergence of alternative ad hoc forums or exclusive circles of discussion. This includes groups like the A7, European and Asian states sharing common perspectives, as well as Russia and BRICS countries, notably China. There is a prevailing apprehension that these parallel initiatives could undermine the fundamental circumpolar vision that was integral to establishing the Arctic as an internationally recognized region.27)
As both sides deplore a loss of trust,28) the format of the SAO meetings is still under discussion. For now the Norwegian chairship says that political meetings cannot resume. This is a means to avoid the questions of the format: will China attend if Russia is not invited? Many say that an Arctic Council without Russian participation does not make sense. But will the US or European countries and the EU attend if Russia is invited? Finally, whilst cooperation among the A7 remained high, the pause of the AC meant the loss of a political platform to articulate a common circumpolar vision. Some divisions also exist among Indigenous groups. In March 2022, RAIPON officially expressed support to Putin and the war in Ukraine29) and the Sami Council had to stop cooperating with the Russian side for their safety. The next 10 years that cover the span of the Strategic Plan for 2021-2030 adopted at the last ministerial with the Russians will be crucial to reinvent a model of Arctic cooperation. To do so the AC will have to show creativity and innovation.
Emilie Canova is a PhD candidate at the Scott Polar Research Institute at Cambridge University. Pauline Pic is is a Postdoc fellow at the Graduate School of International Studies, Université Laval.
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