For Norway, the risk of conflict in the Arctic has increased

Norwegian Navy Frigate KNM Thor Heyerdahl on its annual visit to Svalbard in 2022. Photo: Forsvaret

One of the central questions in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine has been how it will affect security policy in the High North, i.e. the European parts of the Arctic. The sabotage of the gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea has placed this issue at the forefront of Norwegian security concerns.

The problem is often that such factors as ice melting, resource extraction, great power games, symbolic politics, and submarines are mixed into a spicy stew of simple causation. When you move from the general to the substantial, however, details emerge. One solution is to distinguish between the immediate, short-, and long-term threats in the Arctic.

Immediate: Norway becomes part of the war

The immediate threat to Norway—particularly in the North—is simple: Norway’s “High North” will play a central role in the conflict between NATO and Russia, because Russia has positioned its strategic forces there, aimed at the US and NATO. Therefore, Russia continues to hold military exercises outside Norway’s living room door to warn Norway, NATO, and the US to stay away. The message is clear: “If you get close to our strategic forces (read submarines and missiles), we will take control of the areas north of Lofoten in Norway.”

This type of threat is not new, as Norway found itself in a similar situation during the Cold War. However, Russia is a different and—increasingly—more unpredictable actor now. The danger of NATO and Russia warring over possible Russian interventions in the Baltic countries, Poland, or Finland is real—Norway will thus not only become involved through NATO’s Article 5, but it will also become a target in the wider Russian defense strategy. As recently highlighted by the Norwegian Chief of Defense: “The relative importance of nuclear deterrence [in the North] for Russia with the ongoing war in Ukraine has increased.”

Short-term: Conflict escalation

That Russia wants to assert military supremacy in the North is not new. However, in recent decades, security policy considerations have been balanced by the Russian desire for economic development in its Arctic regions.

After the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent sanctions regime imposed by the “West”, it is clear that several Russian Arctic economic projects cannot be implemented or expanded. Cooperation in various forums, such as the Arctic Council and the Barents Council, has also been put on hold.

It may seem that the Russian calculation in the North has changed in favor of security interests and in opposition to the desire to keep the Arctic a low-tension area. Thus, more worrying than the Arctic possibly being drawn into a larger conflict is that Russia may also wish to challenge Norwegian sovereignty to test Norway’s military capabilities, NATO’s cohesion in the North, or both.

This is the short-term threat to Norway in the Arctic. Particularly vulnerable is Svalbard, the Norwegian archipelago with a Russian settlement. There, Russia has laid the foundation to challenge Norwegian sovereignty—if it wishes—through protests and statements across several decades. In the maritime zones around the archipelago, both Russian fishing boats and research vessels operate, at times with unclear intentions.

The sabotage of the gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea also provides a clue as to what covert Russian actions could look like in the North. The cutting of one of the two fiber cables connecting Svalbard to the world in January 2022 was another frightening example of the vulnerability of Arctic infrastructure. The infrastructure in the High North is both more vulnerable and more extensive than that in the South of Norway.

Long-term: Geoeconomics and China

To be clear: Ice melting or resources located in the Arctic does not lead to the immediate or short-term threats described here, nor do the sea routes in the North or petroleum/mineral extraction drive security policy dynamics.

However, this does not mean that the potential for resource extraction or sea routes is unrealistic or could not have security policy consequences. Here, it is important to distinguish between Russia as a military actor in the North and, especially, China as a global superpower with both political and economic interests.

Geoeconomic policy, i.e., the use of economic instruments to achieve geopolitical objectives, is China’s global approach. The question is whether, in the long term, we will have to deal with an increasingly assertive China that challenges Norwegian interests related to resource management, research, or local development also in the North.

How can we avoid a conflict in the High North?

While we want to isolate and punish the Russian regime in Kreml, international politics is complex, consisting of several levels and varying interests. Norway has chosen to maintain cooperation with Russia in some areas, including nuclear safety, fisheries management, and search and rescue.

The need for upholding collaboration in those areas concerns several factors. In the past, Norwegian decision-makers believed it was possible to change Russian perceptions and encourage both the local population in the Murmansk region and the leaders in Moscow to be friendlier to Norway through cooperation at the local level. Unfortunately, it has become clear that such low-level cooperation is not enough to change the Putin regime’s aggressive behavior and prevent further escalation in the Arctic.

An alternative approach has been to appeal to Russian economic interests and convince Russia to desire to maintain low tension in the region, as outlined above. Cooperation can bind Russia to the mast so that decision-makers in Moscow refrain from drawing the security policy focus northwards. Unfortunately, it seems our notions of rationality no longer apply to the Putin regime, where the “fight against the West” overshadows everything, also in the Arctic.

If it is neither possible to change Russian perceptions nor its interest calculations, at least we can secure our own interests. Norway does not benefit from an accident with Russian nuclear waste along the Norwegian coast, nor from Russian fishermen overfishing the cod stock in their economic zone or from a conflict arising on Svalbard, where Russia can claim Norway is violating the Svalbard Treaty and then “protect” its citizens and interests.

Despite the desire to punish Russia and cut contact in as many areas as possible, we must maintain direct dialogue to avert accidents, disagreements, and escalations. The easiest way to avoid conflict in the North is to ensure that incidents, both intentional and unintentional, do not occur.

The importance of the Arctic in terms of security issues was clear long before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but the invasion brought number of challenges to the fore in the North. At the same time, we must distinguish between different types of dangers, as well as determine what we can do to avoid conflict escalation. The devil is in the details.

This commentary was originally published in Norwegian, by Altinget, on 28 September 2022.