Relations with Russia in the North were already tense. Now it’s getting worse.

Border mark number 299 at the Norwegian-Russian Arctic border. Photo: Blyngre

It is far from the High North to Donbass. But the conflict in Ukraine has consequences for Arctic security, especially in the Norwegian North.

From a Norwegian perspective, there are many reasons to be concerned about what is happening in Ukraine. The most obvious is the need to protect international law and the territorial sovereignty of states. In addition, there’s a desire to show solidarity with other NATO members who feel particularly threatened by Russia, and not least, to support the Ukrainian people who have experienced war since 2014.

In this way, Norway does not differ from other Western countries. However, Norway has an extra reason for both attention and concern when it comes to Russia: a 196-km-long border and a maritime boundary that extends almost to the North Pole. Norway’s proximity to Russia makes the country vulnerable and forces some difficult choices. Three areas stand out in particular:

Increased military tension in the north

First and foremost, it is Norway’s role as NATO’s “listening post” on the alliance’s northern flank that makes Norway vulnerable when relations with Russia deteriorate. The Russian Northern Fleet—one of Russia’s four strategic fleets—is a stone’s throw from the Norwegian border and central to Russia’s military strategy. For over a decade, Vladimir Putin has rebuilt and modernized it. This has led to fears that Russia is militarizing the Arctic.

We can expect the trend of increased military activity and partly provocative statements from Russia to continue. It is no coincidence that Russia is conducting military exercise in the Barents Sea with submarines designed for intercontinental nuclear weapons while stepping up military activity on the border with Ukraine. The message is clear: Russia has the capacities and capabilities to defend itself vis-à-vis the United States and NATO in the north.

In return, the Norwegian Armed Forces and Norway’s allies—especially the United States—both want to deter Russia in the European parts of the Arctic (i.e., the High North) and to have control over Russian military activity and development. Norway, together with its allies, has no choice but to show both the ability and willingness to defend land areas and to have control over the enormous maritime areas in the north.

Nevertheless, in isolation, a low level of tension in the Arctic is still in Russia’s interest. Increased military exercise activity and the building up of forces in the same area, on the other hand, do not contribute to this. The more tense the situation in Ukraine becomes, the more this tension will spread to the northern areas of Europe. For Norway, Svalbard in particular appears to be a vulnerable point where Russia may wish to test Norwegian responsiveness and boundaries.

Halt of political contact with Russia

This negative spiral in which Norway and Russia are trapped became clear after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. Not only was military contact between Norway and Russia halted, but political contact with Russia was also scaled down or canceled. It took five years before a Norwegian prime minister traveled to Russia again.

Afterward, we saw several signs that both Norway and other European countries have wanted a more normalized relationship with their neighbor to the east. The Norwegian government, which took office in the autumn of 2021, wrote on its official platform that it would “further develop bilateral cooperation with Russia in the north,” in addition to “strengthening the foreign and security policy dialogue in the north.” This is not to say that Norway accepts Russian actions in Ukraine; however, one realizes the practical necessity of having a dialogue with Russia on a political level.

However, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, it will again be difficult for Norwegian politicians to engage in high-level dialogue with Russia, such as in the Arctic Council, where Russia holds the presidency. At the same time, Foreign Minister Anniken Huitfeldt will probably go to great lengths to preserve the dialogue in the High North, as was done after the Crimean annexation.

Difficulties with cross-border cooperation

In addition, cross-border contact between Norway and Russia at the local level concerning everything from culture and education to business will become even more difficult than it is today. The “people-to-people” cooperation between North Norway and Northwestern Russia is the speaking point all Norwegian politicians bring forth when they refer to how Norway is working for a constructive relationship with Russia. However, this stands in contrast to the bilateral relationship at large between the two countries.

We can also ask what the effect of cooperation and contact at the local level is on the security policy relationship between Norway and Russia. Putin hardly thinks about educational cooperation or ice hockey across the border when his regime is considering a new military exercise in the north.

At the same time, this collaboration has value for those who actually live on the border in the north. Dialogue and contact can also help break down barriers in the long run: the more contact with the Russian people (if not Putin himself), the more understanding and sympathy we can hope for.

And not least, local contact across the border in the north has a direct value for the practical cooperation that both Norway and Russia benefit from. This includes, for example, search and rescue agreements and fisheries cooperation to manage the world’s largest cod stock.

Neighbors remain neighbors

Norway cannot choose its neighbors. It has to manage Russia—to a greater extent than other NATO members and most Western countries. Norway’s membership in NATO guarantees its territorial security. The country’s endorsement of sanctions against Russia is a natural result of its desire to uphold international law and punish aggressive actions by the Putin regime.

The Norwegian government, led by Prime Minister Støre and Foreign Minister Huitfeldt, must still make some choices. What punitive measures will Norway implement that also do not hinder the necessary practical cooperation with Russia? What dialogue at the political level, if any, is possible with Russia? And what is the long-term strategy for how Norway will handle an increasingly challenging neighborhood in the Arctic?

Norway’s historical relationship with Russia is not marked by war and conflict, unlike some of Russia’s neighbors further south. But this is not a state of nature. The Russian invasion in Ukraine makes Norway’s relations with Russia both more tense and more difficult to deal with. Especially in the north.

This is an op-ed originally published in Norway’s largest print newspaper Aftenposten, on the day of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.