Arctic Technopolitics and China's Reception of the Polar Code

Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II marks the 70th anniversary of the International Maritime Organization at IMO Headquarters, London, on March 6, 2018. Photo: International Maritime Organization

China’s Arctic engagement has increased considerably during the past decade, which has not only offered plentiful economic opportunities but also created new risks and concerns among the eight Arctic states, non-state actors, and peoples. To increase understanding of dimensions of Beijing’s Arctic activities, The Arctic Institute’s China Series 2020 probes into China’s evolving Arctic interests, policies, and strategies, and analyses their ramifications for the region (and beyond).

The Arctic Institute China Series 2020

• China and its Arctic Trajectories: The Arctic Institute’s China Series 2020
• The tortuous path of China’s win-win strategy in Greenland
• Defining the Chinese Threat in the Arctic
• Reducing China’s Black Carbon Emissions: An Arctic Dimension
• Identity and Relationship-Building in China’s Arctic Diplomacy
• A Framework for Sino-Russian Relations in the Arctic
• The Emergence of a Sino-Russian Economic Partnership in the Arctic?
• Arctic Technopolitics and China’s Reception of the Polar Code
• ‘Prepared to Go Fully Kinetic’: How U.S. Leaders Conceptualize China’s Threat to Arctic Security
• China and its Arctic Trajectories: Final Remarks

The International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code),¹⁾International Maritime Organization, International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code), Res. MSC.385(94), November 21, 2014; and International Maritime Organization, International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code), Res. MEPC.264(68), May 15, 2015 which entered into force on January 1, 2017, constitutes a regulatory milestone for shipping in the Arctic.²⁾Langlois K (2017) IMO in the Polar Environment: The Polar Code Explained, The Arctic Institute, 17 May. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/imo-polar-environment-polar-code-explained/ Accessed 2 February, 2020. This article considers China’s actions within the International Maritime Organization (IMO) leading up to the Code’s entry into force in 2017, while also surveying how the Polar Code has been received in Chinese academic and industry circles. This inquiry takes place against the backdrop of, on the one hand, China’s emerging interests in the Arctic wherein shipping plays a central role; and on the other hand, the introduction of the Polar Code as an mandatory international law instrument in a region characterized by intersecting sets of regional, national, and international regulations.³⁾For a discussion of the ‘legalization’ of the polar regions, see Dodds, K., and Nuttall, M (2016) The Scramble for the Poles: the Geopolitics of the Arctic and Antarctic. Cambridge: Polity Press, 41.

As the world’s second-largest economy, with over 60 percent of its trade (in value) traveling by sea, China is obviously a major stakeholder in international shipping.⁴⁾China Power Team (2019) How much trade transits the South China Sea? China Power. 2 August, 2017. Updated 10 October, 2019. https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/ Accessed 16 January 2020. It is the world’s third-largest shipowner in terms of vessel tonnage and also the world’s largest shipbuilder.⁵⁾See UNCTAD (2019) Maritime trasnport https://unctadstat.unctad.org/datacentre Accessed 16 January, 2020. Shipping also figures prominently in Beijing’s engagement with the Arctic. Most notably through the Polar Silk Road—the Arctic outgrowth of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—which envisions the development of commercial shipping lanes across the Arctic Ocean. As an example, in 2013, the director of the Polar Research Institute of China (PRIC) made the optimistic prediction that between 5 and 15 percent of China’s international trade would use the Northern Sea Route (NSR) by 2020.⁶⁾Lasserre F (2019) Arctic Shipping: A Contrasted Expansion of a Largely Destinational Market. In: Finger M & Heininen L (eds.) The GlobalArctic Handbook: 84. However, commercial traffic in the Arctic is likely to only see modest growth this decade, with destinational shipping of hydrocarbons originating in the Arctic being the largest growth driver.⁷⁾Lasserre F (2019) Arctic Shipping: A Contrasted Expansion of a Largely Destinational Market. In: Finger M & Heininen L (eds.) The GlobalArctic Handbook: 84. Chinese shipbuilders also stand to benefit from Arctic shipping, notably the development of the NSR, as this would increase the demand for new, ice-capable vessels.⁸⁾Eiterjord T (2020) China’s Shipbuilders Seek New Inroads in Arctic Shipping, The Diplomat, 14 January. https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/chinas-shipbuilders-seek-new-inroads-in-arctic-shipping/ Accessed 14 January 2020. Finally, the prospects of re-routing portions of its maritime trade through the Arctic bears security implications for China, as large shares of its westbound trade today transits the South China Sea.⁹⁾Lanteigne M (2008) China’s Maritime Security and the “Malacca Dilemma,” Asian Security 4(2): 143-161. In the sections that follow, the notion of technopolitics, broadly defined as the “strategic practice of designing or using technology to enact political goals,”¹⁰⁾Hecht G & Allen M (2001) Introduction: Authority, Political Machines and Technology’s History. In: Hecht G et al Technologies of power: essays in honor of Thomas Parke Hughes and Agatha Chipley Hughes, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press: 14. offers a heuristic frame for examining the political underpinnings, as well as ramifications, of international standard-setting, especially as they pertain to global geopolitics. The development of international standards provides participating states with what some have argued to be an ‘anti-political’ venue for leveraging technical know-how in order to inscribe national interests into ostensibly technical issues.¹¹⁾Barry, A (2002) The anti-political economy. Economy and Society, 31(2), 268–284.

China’s Activities in the IMO

China participated in the initial correspondence group set up in 2009 by the IMO to develop the Polar Code.¹²⁾Stokke, O (2013) Asian Stakes and Arctic Governance, Strategic Analysis 38(6), 770-783. The public database of the IMO reflects China first addressing the Polar Code in 2012 at the 56th session of the Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment (DE). Here, China suggested that governmental ships and “public service ships” should be excluded from the competency of the Polar Code.¹³⁾International Maritime Organization, Report to the Maritime Safety Committee, Docs. DE 56/25, April 10, 2012, para. 10.10. Prior to this session, however, China had expressed support for a proposal made by the United States to oppose a Russian proposal to include a savings clause in the Code’s preamble that would retain the primacy of national shipping regulations until the IMO could adopt a fully harmonized framework.¹⁴⁾International Maritime Organization. Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Report of the Working Group (Part 1). Doc. DE 55/WP.4. March 24, 2011; Moe, A. and Stokke, O. (2019) Asian Countries and Arctic Shipping: Policies, Interests and Footprints on Governance. Arctic Review on Law and Politics 10: 42. The Chinese delegation also called for a clarification of what the Code termed “category C” ships.¹⁵⁾International Maritime Organization, Report to the Maritime Safety Committee, Docs. DE 57/25 April 25, 2013, para. 11.39.1. The comment by the Chinese delegation problematized that the definition included both ice-class and non-ice-class ships. It subsequently asked for these two types to be differentiated, either in the definition of the category itself, or in subsequent technical provisions.¹⁶⁾The Polar Code classifies ships as either category A, B, or C, depending on their operational profile, with category A being ships operating in severe ice conditions, and C representing operations in mild or ice-free conditions. As for the adopted Code, it does not differentiate further between category C ships. Yet the technical regulations on ship structure do state that, at the discretion of the classifying authority, ice-strengthening is not required if the ship’s structure is deemed adequate for its intended operation. See Res. MEPC 68/21/Add.1 Annex 10, page 6, para. 2.2. 

China also commented on a draft chapter on environmental protection. It urged that a thorough differentiation be made between Antarctic and Arctic waters, emphasising that while the former is a designated special area under several of the International Convention for Prevention of Marine Pollution (MARPOL) annexes, the latter was not. The Chinese delegation went on to suggest that the “general control level for environmental issues” and the attendant technical requirements concerning Arctic waters should first be decided in a committee or sub-committee instead of “rushing into the development of specific requirements.”¹⁷⁾IMO Docs. DE 57/25, para. 11.42. Furthermore, China sided with Greece and various other flag states and shipping NGOs in arguing that there was, at the time, insufficient scientific evidence to justify the draft requirements.¹⁸⁾IMO Docs. DE 57/25, para. 11.43. In addition to these interventions, China produced four proposals of its own, all of which were submitted after the Polar Code had been adopted by the Maritime Security Committee (MSC) during its 94th session in 2014. The timing of these proposals is significant, as by 2014, much of the Code’s content had already been developed by the DE sub-committee, leaving little room for any meaningful change. Of China’s four proposals, two were co-sponsored together with South Korea. Of note was the proposal to ease the administrative burden on ships conducting single or occasional voyages in the Arctic during the summer navigational season by lessening the requirement for these vessels to hold Polar Certificates.¹⁹⁾The two countries proposed that a short-term certificate could be issued to vessels whose operational envelopes did not usually include Arctic waters. This was argued on the grounds that such a provision would significantly reduce the economic and administrative burdens faced by the shipowner and the classification society. See China and the Republic of Korea, Consideration and Adoption of Amendments to Mandatory Instruments: Comments on the Draft International Code or Ships Operating in Polar Waters, Docs. MSC 94/3/15 October 3 2014. The second co-sponsored proposal was submitted to the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), proposing an amendment to a draft of the Polar Code containing a loophole in the description of outer shell and cargo tank protection requirements of oil tankers and other vessels carrying oil.²⁰⁾China and the Republic of Korea, Consideration and Adoption of Amendment to Mandatory Instruments: Proposed modifications to regulation 1.2.2 of chapter 1 of draft Polar Code, Part II-A, Docs. MEPC 68/6/4 March 23, 2015. This amendment was later incorporated into the Code. See IMO, Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-Eight Session, Docs. MEPC 68/21 June 26 2015, para. 6.6. The two remaining, independently-produced proposals were both submitted to the Human Element, Training and Watchkeeping Sub-Committee (HTW).²¹⁾See China, Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Proposed amendments to section B-V/g of STCW Code, Docs. HTW 1/11/2 January 6, 2014; and China, Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Proposed transitional arrangements for training and qualification requirements for seafarers on board ships operating in polar waters, Docs. HTW 2/9/1 December 12, 2014.

The two co-sponsored proposals with South Korea reflect an alignment of interests between the two countries as major shipbuilding states and user states. Moreover, China’s comments and proposals, taken together, indicate the wish for a leaner, less restrictive Code. Yet the country’s activity during the development of the Polar Code is, perhaps, best characterized by its inactivity. This relative inactivity reflects, in part, the country’s general behavior in the IMO. The Chinese delegation to the IMO has been described as “quiet and not that active,” and China’s attitude towards international maritime governance has similarly been characterised as conservative and passive.²²⁾Liu N & Hossain H (2017) China and the Development of International Law on Arctic Shipping: Challenges and Opportunities, Research Paper No. 2017-38. Surveys of China’s submissions to the IMO show that the country has historically lagged behind most other major shipping states in terms of proposals.²³⁾Sun D (2012) 2011 年国际海事组织 A 类理事 2011 年国际海事组织A类理事 提交提案分析 [Analysis of the status regarding proposals submitted by the IMO Category A Council members in 2011], Zhongguo Haishi 2012, no. 2. Moreover, China’s absence during the drafting process appears emblematic of the East Asian shipping states who all have expressed interest in Arctic shipping—but none of which made any substantial contributions to the Code’s development.²⁴⁾Moe, A. and Stokke, O. (2019) Asian Countries and Arctic Shipping: Policies, Interests and Footprints on Governance. Arctic Review on Law and Politics 10: 43. 

Low-Key Geopolitics

China’s low level of engagement with the Polar Code becomes more conspicuous, however, when one considers Beijing’s somewhat hubristic desire to go from a “rule-follower” to a “rule-maker” in the Arctic.²⁵⁾Eiterjord T (2019) China’s Busy Year in the Arctic, The Diplomat, January 30. https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/chinas-busy-year-in-the-arctic/ Accessed 30 January 2019. In its 2018 Arctic White Paper (WP), China states that it, in general, “has played a constructive role in the formulation of Arctic-related international rules and the development of its governance system.”²⁶⁾State Council Information Office (2018) Full text: China’s Arctic Policy. http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm Accessed 21 December 2019. The WP goes on to note that China “will participate in regulating and managing the affairs and activities relating to the Arctic on the basis of rules and mechanisms,” including “relevant rules of the [IMO].”²⁷⁾State Council Information Office (2018) Full text: China’s Arctic Policy. http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm Accessed 21 December 2019. The Polar Code is mentioned only once in a paragraph introducing Beijing’s Polar Silk Road. Here, it mentions the Code as it re-emphasizes China’s support for the IMO by stating that the country “abides by the [Polar Code], and supports the [IMO] in playing an active role in formulating navigational rules for the Arctic.”²⁸⁾State Council Information Office (2018) Full text: China’s Arctic Policy. http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm Accessed 21 December 2019. 

On this backdrop, China has arguably done very little to shape the future of Arctic shipping—despite it being a central component of its Arctic policy. The Code and the role of the IMO in governing regional shipping have, nevertheless, been well received as ordering forces that help smooth out the geographical hierarchy of Arctic and non-Arctic stakeholders. Moreover, observers have deemed the Code to be an important opportunity for China “to better understand and better grasp the rules of the game in Arctic affairs.”²⁹⁾Xue Y & Tong K (2019)《极地水域船舶作业国际规则》的法律属性析论 [Analysis of Legal Attributes of the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters]. Jidi Yanjiu 31(3): 335. Most significantly, Chinese law scholars have summarized the entry into force of the Polar Code as a positive development in Arctic governance, exactly because it makes certain aspects of Arctic governance less regional—describing it as a “hardening of international law” in the region.³⁰⁾Liu H & Sun K (2018) 演进中的北极治理以及中国参与北极事务的立场选择 [Emerging Arctic Governance and China’s Choice of Positioning when Participating in Arctic Affairs]. In Sun, H. (eds.) 北极蓝皮书：北极地区发展报告 [Arctic Blue Book: Report on Arctic Regional Development]. Others have noted the “fragmented nature of Arctic governance” and the “geographical advantage of the Arctic states” as factors limiting China’s foray into the Arctic.³¹⁾Yang Z et al (2015) 我国增强在北极地区实质性存在的障碍与挑战 [Obstacles and Challenges for China’s Growing Material Presence in the Arctic Region], Shandong Shehui Kexue 240: 134. On the former point, the criticism has been that the majority of competent governance bodies and instruments in the Arctic are regional and non-binding. Although more adaptable, these are perceived to be less effective when compared with hard law instruments and are “prone to be biased against China and other law-abiding states.”³²⁾Yang Z et al (2015) 我国增强在北极地区实质性存在的障碍与挑战 [Obstacles and Challenges for China’s Growing Material Presence in the Arctic Region], Shandong Shehui Kexue 240: 134. 

To this end, the country’s shipbuilding experts have prescribed that China should work within the framework of international law to “strengthen [the Polar Code’s] uniformity and coherence, and prevent the regionalization of the behavior of individual Arctic states,” referring to Russia and Canada. They further argue that “already-certified ships [navigating the Arctic] should not be subject to the regulations of coastal states,” and that any obstruction of regular ship traffic would constitute “an interference with international law.”³³⁾Wu C et al (2014) IMO极地规则和未来极地船舶发展趋势分析 [Analysis of Developing Trend of the IMO Polar Code and Future Polar Ship], Zaochuan Jishu 2: 9. On this point, maritime law scholars have recommended that China “must use international law to ward against coastal states who might abuse their regulatory powers to disrupt Chinese maritime traffic.”³⁴⁾Han J & Zhang S (2015) 极地规则制定进程对我国参与国际海事事务的启示 [Lessons from the Development Process of Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters for China Participating in International Maritime Affairs]. Zhongguo Hanghai 38(2): 99 Reflecting on this, the director of PRIC has called the Polar Code a “double-edged sword,” referring to the compromise between Arctic coastal states’ ability to regulate shipping in their exclusive economic zones and the sustainable regulation of polar shipping.³⁵⁾Zhang J, Yang H & Wang L (2016) 我国北极航道开拓的战略选择初探 [A Preliminary Study of China’s Strategic Choices in Developing Arctic Sea Routes] Jidi Yanjiu 28(2): 275 Others have expressed hope that, following the entry into force of the Polar Code, “Russia’s administration of its NSR will gradually become more in line with international conventions.”³⁶⁾Guo N & Hu M (2018) 北极航道利益研究综述 [A Review: Interests Brought on by the Arctic Sea Routes] Haiyang Kaifa Yu Guanli 10: 53 These statements are marked by a concern over the potential interdiction by Arctic coastal states to the detriment of international maritime traffic in the region. From this perspective, then, the advent of the Polar Code supports Beijing’s vision of the Arctic as an international space by uniformly regulating shipping in the region and anchoring this authority in a specialized body under the UN.³⁷⁾Bennett M (2015) How China Sees the Arctic: Reading Between Extraregional and Intraregional Narratives. Geopolitics 20(3): 645-668. This would, at least in theory, give Beijing a bigger seat at the table to influence Arctic governance as amendments to the Code are negotiated by the IMO in the future. 

Turbulent Technopolitics

Experts have emphasised the technological challenge posed by the Polar Code. The new regulatory regime has precipitated a new barrier of entry to polar shipping in the form of mandatory technical requirements for the construction and operation of polar-going vessels.³⁸⁾Yan N & Sun Y (2019) ‘冰上丝绸之路’面临的问题和挑战 [Problems and Challenges Facing the ‘Polar Silk Road’]. Shangye Jingji 509(1): 82-84. In this context, the Polar Code provides compulsory technical standards “that present great challenges to the Chinese polar shipping industry”³⁹⁾Li W (2016) International code for ships operating in polar waters: challenges to polar shipping safety rules in China. Advances in Polar Science 27(3): 150. by constituting a “technological threshold”—at once underscoring the still-nascent state of China’s polar seafaring, and its position as a major user and shipbuilding state.⁴⁰⁾Zhang J et al Strategic Choices: 275. Representatives from China’s shipbuilding sector have repeatedly called for greater engagement by domestic stakeholders and “actively take part in drawing up the Polar Code and boost its research on polar ship design and relevant regulations.”⁴¹⁾Wang T (2017) 智能装备助力智取海洋 [Smart Equipment To Outsmart the Ocean], Zhongguo Haiyang Bao. 28 February, 2017. China’s Maritime Safety Administration have similarly urged the shipbuilding sector to pay closer attention to new developments and to “more actively promote national interests,”⁴²⁾Yan H & Huang L (2018) 关于《极地规则》防污染要求的提案解读和利益相关方分析 [An Interpretation of Proposals on Pollution Prevention to the Polar Code and Analysis of Stakeholders]. Hanghai Jishu no. 5: 65-68. while others have called for the industry to “take a thorough inventory of its capabilities” in order to better argue its case in the drawing up of the Code.”⁴³⁾Han J & Zhang S (2015) 极地规则制定进程对我国参与国际海事事务的启示 [Lessons from the Development Process of Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters for China Participating in International Maritime Affairs]. Zhongguo Hanghai 38(2): 99.

Academic and industry experts have shown to be particularly cognisant of the technopolitics that played out within the IMO as the Polar Code was being drafted. Law scholars have argued that “due to the IMO being a specialized agency, countries with the most advanced technology speak with the strongest voice (huayuquan),” and will “use the IMO as a platform to spread their own standards.”⁴⁴⁾Han J & Zhang S (2015) 极地规则制定进程对我国参与国际海事事务的启示 [Lessons from the Development Process of Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters for China Participating in International Maritime Affairs]. Zhongguo Hanghai 38(2): 98. Others have argued that since “all international cooperation is based on national strength”—and seeing as shipping stands particularly prominent in the Arctic—China should make concerted efforts to improve its polar shipbuilding capabilities.⁴⁵⁾Han L & Song S (2016) 北极海域的国际法规制及对中国利用北极航线的影响 [The Regulation of Arctic Waters by International Law and Its Effects on China’s Utilization of Arctic Shipping Lanes]. Zhongguo Haishangfa Yanjiu 27(3): 62. The country’s shipbuilders have stressed China’s geographical context as a non-polar state as well: “By being a non-polar state, Chinese ships have to traverse large distances of open water before reaching the ice-infested waters of the polar regions.” Therefore, these ships “should not need to be able to operate in polar areas independently to the same extent as those of polar states,” and as its polar shipbuilding capabilities mature, “China should emphasize these conditions in the drawing up of the Polar Code.”⁴⁶⁾Wu C, Wu G & Wang X (2014) IMO极地规则和未来极地船舶发展趋势分析 [Analysis of the Development Trend of the IMO Polar Code and Future Polar Ships]. Zaochuan Jishu no. 2: 9. Shipbuilders have also expressed worries over an eventual ban on the use and carriage of Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO), echoing China’s position during deliberations in the IMO, arguing that the Code “must strike a balance between commercial shipping and environmental protection and not simply adopt an outright ban.”⁴⁷⁾Wu C, Wu G & Wang X (2014) IMO极地规则和未来极地船舶发展趋势分析 [Analysis of the Development Trend of the IMO Polar Code and Future Polar Ships]. Zaochuan Jishu no. 2: 9. Perhaps the clearest articulation of these technopolitical dynamics is the prescription that China should adhere to a “principle of moderation” when participating in the future work of the Polar Code: its delegation to the IMO ought to remain within the “category of technology (jishu de fanchou)”⁴⁸⁾Han J & Zhang S (2015) 极地规则制定进程对我国参与国际海事事务的启示 [Lessons from the Development Process of Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters for China Participating in International Maritime Affairs]. Zhongguo Hanghai 38(2): 99.—seeing as the technical nature of the IMO negotiations provide China with room to further its interests without becoming embroiled in regional politics and issues of sovereignty. To this end, argue that China should use “technology” to circumvent “political principles (zhengzhi yuanze).” On matters not in China’s interest, it should adopt a “principle of procrastination (tuoyan de yuanze)” in order to buy more time.⁴⁹⁾Han J & Zhang S (2015) 极地规则制定进程对我国参与国际海事事务的启示 [Lessons from the Development Process of Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters for China Participating in International Maritime Affairs]. Zhongguo Hanghai 38(2): 99. 

Conclusion

Albeit only a cursory review, this look at China’s reception of the Polar Code reveals that, while having taken a back seat during its development, the Code is nevertheless recognized as a development favourable to Beijing’s interests in the region by anchoring the regulation of Arctic shipping in the IMO. Its development has partially been framed as a technopolitical competition, wherein technological competency can be leveraged for political gains. This accords in many ways with the observation that China, as a geographical outsider, must resort to being a “norm entrepreneur” as it attempts to grow its position in the Arctic.⁵⁰⁾Lanteigne M (2017) ‘Have you entered the storehouses of the snow?’ China as a norm entrepreneur in the Arctic. Polar Record 53(2): 117-130. Paralleling this observation, Chinese International Relations scholars have explored the concept of “creative involvement” and identified the Polar Code as a “technological route” through which Beijing can gain a greater voice in Arctic affairs.⁵¹⁾He G & Song X (2013) 创造性: 中国参与北极地区事物的条件与路径探索 [Creative Involvement: Analysis of the Circumstances and Channels of China’s Participation in Arctic Affairs], Taipingyang Xuebao 21(3): 51-58. Future studies should explore China’s activities in the IMO more in-depth than what this article has been able to do. They should also examine how industrial policy is being configured to meet the concerns outlined here. More generally, then, this article hopes to highlight how negotiations over technical issues can serve as fruitful venues for exploring broader, geopolitical contentions – articularly as they, in the case of Arctic shipping, gather both Arctic and non-Arctic states. The anti-political qualities of such processes can be productive for states and non-state actors who lack the geographical or political legitimacy to argue their cases in other forums. This sentiment was, perhaps, best captured by the title of an article in the trade publication China Ship News: when it comes to emerging maritime regulations, “asking questions beats answering them.”⁵²⁾Li Q (2014) 应对海事新规：”答题”不如”出题” [Responding to new maritime regulations: “asking questions” beats “answering” them]. Zhongguo Chuanbo Bao. August 29, 2014.