2022 Russian Maritime Doctrine: Implications for NATO & the Future of Great Power Competition in the Arctic
A Russian Kilo submarine passes the parade stand during the Russia Navy Day celebration in Vladivostok. Photo: U.S. Navy
The new Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation, published in July 2022, provides a clear picture of Moscow’s ambitions at sea. Despite the Russian Navy is currently going through difficult times, its military activity around the Arctic must nevertheless be carefully watched. The Arctic has grown in geostrategic importance during the last several decades and has considerable potential to become a theater for strategic competition1) between Russia, NATO nations and other external actors. The amount of energy resources and oil reserves lying under its seabed have drawn non-Arctic states to the game as well. China and India have long been interested in taking part in Arctic affairs, being both observers at the Arctic Council, and with the former now focused on developing its Polar Silk Road along the Arctic coast.2) With such a project, Beijing intends to develop emerging maritime shipping corridors, local economic partnerships and the necessary infrastructure to support all its activity in the region; looking to make it an Arctic wing of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Russia has an advantageous position in the region, holding more than 50% of the Arctic coastline, and has been modernizing its Soviet-era military infrastructure for more than a decade now. Considering the Arctic as its northern backyard, Moscow has resumed its activity in some 50 bases,3) which provides a significant edge over the rest of regional actors that are now aiming to establish their presence. The region’s geostrategic features and current situation make it imperative for NATO to pay close attention to what the 2022 Russian Maritime Doctrine develops regarding this region and Russian objectives for it; as it will lead to a higher political and military involvement in the region by other Arctic nations (Canada, the United States and Norway), as well as from their allies from afar. This article reviews the most predominant features of the new doctrine, particularly the ones related to the Arctic. Then, it is followed with its most relevant implications for the rest of NATO allies involved in the region and the future of Arctic security. As will be seen, Russian growing ambitions and capabilities in the High North will require NATO to reformulate its political strategy towards Moscow, as well as strengthening their deterrence capabilities and military assets to enjoy higher strategic awareness.
Russia 2022 Maritime Doctrine
The new Maritime Doctrine is straightforward when addressing Russian interests and objectives at sea, all of which add up to the main aspiration to become “a great maritime power”. At least, that is the goal. It also provides a clear definition of what Moscow understands as threats, challenges and risks to its maritime activity.In this sense, it comes as no surprise that after NATO’s definition of Russia as its main existential threat in its latest Strategic Concept earlier in the summer of 2022,4) the Alliance and the United States are now presented as the main threats to Russia’s security.5) Thus, it could be argued we are now at the initial stages of a time of increased military activity throughout the High North, as well as an extension of great power competition at sea. The new doctrine is a clear reflection of this last element and its recognition by Russia: “the development of maritime activities and maritime potential is one of the decisive conditions for the sustainable social-economic development of the Russian Federation in the XXI century”.6)
The document establishes five “functional areas” where the government aims to develop its activity: development of maritime transport, development and conservation of resources in the world’s oceans, development of offshore pipeline systems, scientific marine research, and naval activity.7) After them, it defines the “regional directions” of its maritime policy, providing the most fundamental objectives for each region, which includes the Atlantic (which encompasses the Mediterranean, Baltic, Black and Azov Seas as well), the Pacific, the Caspian Sea, the Indian, the Arctic and the Antarctic.
From all the aforementioned important regions established in the document, the Arctic appears as the most important for Moscow, with aspirations to establish “a given operational regime in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation by reinforcing combat capabilities of the forces of the Northern and Pacific Fleets”.8) Driven by “significant mineral and hydrocarbon resources, which abound in the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the Russian Federation”, it also recognizes the ongoing transition the region is experiencing as it turns “into a region of global competition in economic and military domains.”9) Such abundance of natural resources lying under the seabed (which remains, however, yet to be fully studied and explored) has been acknowledged by many nations, including China, the US and many NATO allies. Thus, Russia has also underlined as a priority the development of its Arctic zone “as a strategic resource base, and its sustainable use” in the coming decades.
To this end, there are 21 objectives established for this region, more than any of the other regions defined in the document. Among the most interesting ones, “enforcing control over activities of foreign navies in the waters of the Northern Sea Route,” which has been a concern for them for a long time, clearly reflects the Russian mindset towards its position in the region.10) The importance of such route is considerable for Russia, as it traverses through the entirety of its Arctic coast and will be critical for future oil and gas extractions there; and the proof for this can be found in the eighth threat listed in the strategy: “efforts by a number of states to weaken Russian control over the Northern Sea Route [and] an expansion of foreign naval presence in the Arctic.”11)
Yet, the main shadow over the newest doctrine remains whether or not Russia has the capacity to carry out its objectives. Essentially, as Flanagan pointed out back in 2018 when discussing the importance of North Atlantic security for Europe, “Russia’s capacity to realize these goals remains a subject of considerable debate and uncertainty among Western military experts.”12) Taking into account the economic difficulties and strains Moscow is already facing with the war in Ukraine, the aspirations depicted in the new document, which include “developing and ensuring the construction of warships, naval auxiliary ships, transport, fishing, research and other civilian vessels”13) and becoming a global maritime power, appear to be unrealistic and hard to be achieved in the medium term.
Overall, the doctrine reflects Russia’s perception of NATO as a major threat to its national security, which may in turn affect regional stability, pushing NATO (and especially its Arctic members) to increase their regional awareness and military presence in order to deter any potential aggression by Moscow. Following the course of action of the Russian government, which recently modernized the Northern Fleet Command to transform it into Joint Strategic Command North, to be later developed as one of their five military districts, there is a high potential for increased military presence over the following years.14)
Evidence of this is the expansion of the Northern Fleet, based in Severomorsk, which has seen a growth of its assets over the last three years. The first units of the fourth generation Borei-class submarines (SSBN) were incorporated into service in June 2020, with a stealthier capacity than previous designs.15) Its icebreaker fleet, largest by far in the world and still growing, provides Russia further capacity and strategic autonomy in the region, especially against the smaller and fewer vessels operated by Canada, Norway or the US. With two already deployed, the remaining three vessels of the new Arktika-class (biggest icebreakers in the world) are expected to be finished by 2024.16)
Implications for NATO
The nature of Russian activity and the growing presence of its military make it imperative, as said, for NATO and its allies to take action. Increasing current levels of military presence throughout the region to act as a deterrent against Russian expansion would be more than welcome by nations such as Norway, which has experienced firsthand the expansion of Russian activity throughout the region.17)
However, there are two main obstacles to achieving an increased maritime presence throughout the High North. The first is Russian military superiority in the region. On the one hand, the Northern Fleet, one of the biggest and strongest within the Navy, is composed of: nuclear-powered missile and torpedo submarines, missile-carrying and anti submarine aviation, missile, aircraft-carrying and anti-submarine ships.18) It is the home of Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrence forces, and ensures the security of Russia’s Northern flank in the region; and it also hosts, as said, the massive icebreaker fleet of the Navy. In essence, it is the main instrument upon which Moscow relies to pursue its strategic objectives and economic interests in the region. On the other side, to contend against such forces, allied nations do not come close to the number of icebreakers Moscow has. Furthermore, the US and some of its partners are not used to deploy sufficient vessels to the Arctic so as to dissuade Russia.19)
Secondly, adding to this, the limited presence of the US, Canadian and Norwegian Navies, together with the low level of sensors required to detect and follow Russian units, is also a significant impediment. Furthermore, as pointed out by Breitenbauch, Soby and Groemeyer, “the new strength and breadth of Russia’s access-denial strategy increasingly enables Moscow to threaten distant targets without deploying traditional power projection.”20) As discussed, developing and securing the Northern Sea Route is a priority for Moscow, and, as Mathieu Boulege argues, “operations have led to a complete reconstruction of forward bases and outposts in the AZRF [Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation], partly to increase search and rescue (SAR) capabilities and partly to meet Russia’s ambition there.”21) Thus, allied navies find themselves in a situation of considerable disadvantage, without even getting close to Moscow’s capacity to deploy and support vessels into the Arctic waters.
Norway, having long been the advocate for further involvement of the alliance in the region, is expected to keep “a combination of deterrence and deténte” as its security policy towards the region.22) Andreas Østhagen argues Norway should strive to keep cooperation with Russia in certain aspects of Arctic affairs, such as nuclear security or fisheries. This way, it is more likely Russia will change its approach to regional security.23) Yet, as Rolf Folland points out, the main weakness Russia could attempt to take advantage of is the great military inequality between both nations’ military forces.24) And with the increase in exercises and joint training with both the US and the UK, Russia did warn about possible negative consequences back in 2020.25) Thus, increased presence by allied powers in the Barents Sea and the GIUK Gap (critical for NATO’s North Atlantic defense but highly consuming in terms of operational resources)26) will be an essential element of the Alliance´s defense and deterrence in the High North.
Canada is also turning to the Arctic with clear intentions of strengthening its role in preserving regional security. Despite Trudeau’s government has shown interest in having more NATO presence across the region27) it must be remembered the Harper government blocked a NATO move to include the Arctic in an alliance-level strategic text back in 2007.28) Although that desire to restrain NATO’s involvement in Arctic affairs was aligned with Canada’s official position at the time, in the longer run it has translated into a lack of sufficient NATO presence to deter Russian ambitions. In the words of Charles Burton, from the MacDonald-Laurier Institute, “Canada has long paid lip service to the importance of Canadian Arctic sovereignty, but the defense of the Arctic has long been a low priority for Canadian military expenditures.”29) To this end, the development of the Harry DeWolf-class of Arctic/Offshore Patrol Vessels (AOPVs) intended to strengthen their regional awareness and maritime control, as well as NATO’s. With three already built, the last one was delivered to the Royal Canadian Navy in early September 2022,30) and three more are on their way. Yet, the program has faced strong criticism, with detractors arguing they are not well suited to fulfill their mission, and that Canada would be better off with icebreakers for the Arctic, and AOPVs for other regions.31) Certainly, they can’t be compared to Russia’s Arktika class of nuclear-powered heavy icebreakers; which currently stand as the world’s most capable cutters.32)
Aware of the current situation, other members of the Alliance are increasingly investing more and turning their sights to the High North, including the United Kingdom and Germany. The former expressed in its latest UK’s Defence Contribution to the High North its intent to “maintain a coherent defense posture, presence, and profile in the region, including training, partnering, and operating from and in the Arctic.”33) The latter, who also published its Germany’s Arctic Policy Guidelines back in 2018, expressed its concerns on the importance of safeguarding peace and ensuring a secure exploitation of natural resources. In sum, most national Arctic strategies of NATO allies acknowledge the importance of maritime routes and natural resources in the region, and support military presence in order to protect allied interests.
It is unlikely, however, any of them will lead an expansion of military presence in the region; that role will most certainly be for the US. The recent US National Strategy for the Arctic Region identifies four main pillars of work in its Arctic activity: Security, Climate Change and Environmental Protection, Sustainable Economic Development, and International Cooperation and Governance. Regarding the security dimension, the strategy clearly states their intentions to “enhance and exercise both our military and civilian capabilities in the Arctic as required to deter threats…”34) The emphasis placed on geopolitical tensions was barely mentioned in the previous strategy from 2013; evidencing the evolution of the region.
The Way Forward. The End of Exceptionalism?
In the words of Tyler Cross, “security in the Arctic Ocean will grow in importance as the polar ice caps shrink. Therefore, the United States, in conjunction with NATO allies, must develop appropriate security doctrine and measures that confront the dangers of the High North and Russian militarization in order to provide freedom of navigation in this often-neglected theater.”35) With the most recent publication of the 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic it appears there will be an increased US military presence. Moreover, the expressed intentions to “enhance and exercise both our military and civilian capabilities in the Arctic as required to deter threats and to anticipate, prevent, and respond to both natural and human-made incidents”,36) suggests Arctic exceptionalism is coming to an end.
Russia’s new Maritime Doctrine constitutes another statement of Russia’s unmistakable intentions towards the Arctic region and its natural resources. The Arctic holds a central position among the maritime interests of Russia, and will undoubtedly see an increased presence by both Russia and NATO. Although the doctrine seems to have set some of its ambitions and objectives somewhat high given how they are performing in Ukraine, Russia’s military posture and activity along its Arctic coasts and beyond must not be underestimated. The allies have increased their activity in the region as well, with Norway as the leading ambassador of the Alliance in the region, and growing presence with bases and military exercises should be expected.
But with Beijing strengthening its position in the region alongside Moscow and the increase of military activity from both sides, achieving an adequate level of strategic awareness will become a crucial goal. Such awareness could be enhanced by Finland and Sweden, given their proximity to the Kola Peninsula and the Northern Fleet base in Severomorsk. Even if it is unlikely that Russia will have the capacity to achieve the goals established in the new doctrine, its ambitions and current Russian activity must warn the allies and drive them to increase their presence and strengthen their infrastructures around the High North in order to secure their interests.
Thus, more involvement in the Arctic region by the NATO allies will be necessary to counter Russian ambitions and have an enhanced strategic awareness in the region, but such involvement must increase in a way that doesn’t lead to a rise in geostrategic tensions. The new Russian Maritime Doctrine depicts in a clear way Moscow’s objectives and aspirations of control, and together with the likely involvement of China to search for commercial revenues through a “Polar Silk Route”, not only will presence rise in general terms, but especially in terms of military assets to secure each own’s territorial waters. For now, it remains to be seen how realistic Russia’s new doctrine is, and how much energy is NATO willing to devote to the stability of the High North.
Gonzalo Vázquez is a Spanish senior-year student of International Relations and senior research analyst at the Center for Global Affairs & Strategic Studies of the University of Navarre.
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